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Abstract 
This thesis will focus on four issues regarding terrorism and counterterrorism 
in Kuwait. It will first provide a comprehensive understanding of the threats and the 
phenomenon of terrorism in Kuwait since its independence in 1961. Second, this 
thesis will discuss the counterterrorism policies and agenda that Kuwait has 
adopted to react to terrorism. Third, the criminal offences related to terrorism in 
Kuwait will be examined. Finally, this thesis will evaluate measures intended to 
thwart financing terrorism in Kuwait before and after the ratification of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). 
Within these themes, this thesis will assess and evaluate the effectiveness of 
the abovementioned reactions by the Kuwaiti government. The thesis will also 
assess whether these reactions have impacted Kuwaiti constitutional values. 
Therefore, this research project will evaluate the fairness and appropriateness of 
these reactions with regard to Kuwaiti constitutional law and also with regard to 
international laws, including human rights. 
Finally, this thesis will consider the reality that many of the causes of terrorism 
and many of the possible solutions to these causes do not originate in Kuwait. 
Nevertheless, Kuwait is not immune to the consequences of terrorism and the 
efforts of international laws and international partners to stop it. Therefore, this 
thesis will assess how far Kuwait, as a country in an area of the world that is greatly 
affected by terrorism, is able to look after its own interests in this regard or is 
subjected to the wishes of other countries, such as the United States, or the 
international community. This analysis is especially important, since Kuwait is a 
small country surrounded by much larger, more powerful, and largely unstable 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.  
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Chapter One 
Research Plan 
1.1   Introduction and Background 
Terrorism is a worldwide problem that concerns every nation. Its importance is 
evidenced by the counterterrorism efforts of the United Nations, the United States 
of America, and other countries, including Kuwait. Although concerns about 
terrorism became very prominent after 9/11, this thesis will show that terrorism first 
affected Kuwait well before the incidents of 9/11. Therefore, it is not sufficient to 
look at 9/11 as the point when the State of Kuwait first became concerned about 
terrorism. Nevertheless, the events of 9/11 galvanised the reactions and concerns of 
the international community about terrorism and counterterrorism and ensured that 
every country has at least minimum measures to combat terrorism. In fact, since 
9/11, concerns about terrorism and investigations into how it developed nationally 
and internationally have been constant. 
In response to these concerns about terrorism and its effects upon all nations, 
including Kuwait, many policies, laws and other actions have been implemented to 
combat it. In Kuwait, for instance, policies and measures are in place that have the 
effect of combating terrorism, even though they are not specifically related to 
terrorism and there are no comprehensive and specific counterterrorism laws. 
Terrorism has been, and remains, a major concern in Kuwait. 
For the purposes of this research project, this thesis will focus on four issues 
regarding terrorism and counterterrorism in Kuwait. It will first provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the threats and the phenomenon of terrorism in 
Kuwait since its independence in 1961. Second, this thesis will discuss the 
counterterrorism policies and agenda that Kuwait has adopted to react to terrorism. 
Third, the criminal offences related to terrorism in Kuwait will be examined. 
Finally, this thesis will evaluate measures intended to thwart financing terrorism in 
Kuwait. It should be noted that this thesis covers all available measures to 
counterterrorism until 1 August 2014. 
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Within these themes, this thesis will assess and evaluate the effectiveness of 
the abovementioned reactions by the Kuwaiti government. The thesis will also 
assess whether and how these reactions have impacted upon Kuwaiti constitutional 
values. Therefore, this research project will evaluate the fairness and 
appropriateness of these reactions with regard to Kuwaiti constitutional law and 
also with regard to international laws, including human rights. 
Finally, this thesis will consider the reality that many of the causes of terrorism 
and many of the possible solutions to these causes do not originate in Kuwait. 
Nevertheless, Kuwait is not immune to the consequences of terrorism experienced 
elsewhere and the efforts of international laws and international partners, such the 
United States, to stop it. Therefore, this thesis will assess how far Kuwait, as a 
country in an area of the world that is greatly affected by terrorism, is able to look 
after its own interests in this regard or is subjected to external pressures which 
might inspire less suitable counter-terrorism responses. This analysis is especially 
important, since Kuwait is a small country surrounded by much larger, more 
powerful, and largely unstable countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq.  
1.2   Statement of Thesis 
This research will investigate how the State of Kuwait, as a Gulf nation with 
limited geo-political influence and very much dependent upon the protection of 
others, is subjected to external influences but still seeks to interpret, modulate and 
apply external expectations about combating terrorism within its own jurisdiction 
and according to its own values. This research will focus on the potential conflict 
between external and local influences toward the overall responses to terrorism in 
Kuwait and the results it has produced. 
There is exploration as to how Kuwait has been subjected to many pressures 
from foreign, regional or international bodies that have impacted on, and potentially 
prompted or hampered the government’s overall response to terrorism since its 
independence in 1961. These influences are explored within the specific contexts of 
criminal laws against terrorism and counter-terrorism financing law, which are 
subjected to tests of effectiveness and fairness. 
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1.3   Research Questions, Objectives and Content in Outline 
This thesis will analyse, investigate and examine the following questions, 
which are arranged according to the sequence of the chapters. 
1.3.1 Chapter One: Research Plan 
This chapter is an introduction to the thesis, it explains the overall content of 
the thesis and it outlines briefly the content of each chapter that will follow in this 
thesis. It will also describe the importance and originality of the thesis. It will, in 
particular, cover the research design and methodology which will be adopted and 
implemented in the research project, and how they will help the researcher in 
achieving the aims and objectives of the research project. It is worth noting that this 
chapter will explain the fieldwork process, the sampling strategy and how the 
fieldwork findings will be important specifically for chapters four and five. 
Moreover, it will explore ethical issues that might occur while doing the research 
project and how they will be tackled. Finally, the chapter will illustrate the scope 
and the limits of the study, and the potential problems that might occur while 
undertaking the research investigation. 
1.3.2 Chapter Two: The Phenomenon of Terrorism in Kuwait 
This chapter will examine the development of terrorism in Kuwait. It will 
analyse the types of terrorism that have emerged during the history of Kuwait and 
why they have emerged. How has terrorism developed in Kuwait since its 
independence? What terrorist groups are in Kuwait, and to what extent are their 
ideologies connected to other regional and international terrorist movements? Is Al-
Qaida in fact a threat in Kuwait? This chapter will also evaluate how the conflicts 
in neighbouring countries influenced the Kuwaiti population and produced 
extremism related to terrorism and the evolution of terrorism. This chapter will also 
examine whether there are any transnational aspects of terrorist activities in Kuwait. 
It will go further to critically assess how the presence of, and alliance with, the 
United States in Kuwait has been responsible for bringing terrorism to Kuwait. 
Finally, this chapter will analyse the phenomenon of terrorism in Kuwait, its nature 
and how it has developed since the 1960s. The main aim is to evaluate how 
terrorism in Kuwait has persisted over time and what has influenced its persistence. 
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It is understood that the Middle East countries have undergone profound 
regional, political, social and ideological changes as the result of the loss of the 
Arab-Israeli War in 1967, the Iran-Iraq war and the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet-
Afghan war and the latest incident of the Arab Spring Movement. As this chapter 
concerns the nature of terrorism in Kuwait, it aims to examine the terrorist incidents 
that have happened in Kuwait and to analyse whether the aforementioned changes 
have influenced and contributed to the development of terrorism in Kuwait. 
Kuwait is a small country situated in a sensitive position in the region. Its 
borders are shared with unstable countries that are famous for their many national 
troubles: Saudi Arabia from the southwest and Iraq and Iran from the northeast. As 
a result, Kuwait has been affected by the conflicts of its neighbouring countries. 
Moreover, Kuwait is a close ally of the United States and hosts American troops in 
its territory since the American liberation of Kuwait from Iraq’s invasion. Thus, it 
is to be determined whether such conditions have any impact on the development of 
terrorism in Kuwait. This chapter will examine the potential threats to Kuwait’s 
national security. 
During recent years and especially since the 9/11 incidents, Al-Qaida has 
aimed to spread its ideology of global Jihad in the world, which has become one of 
the major threats to Kuwaiti national security. Therefore, Kuwait has witnessed 
many terrorist attacks conducted by groups that are either related to Al-Qaida or 
have adopted and praised its ideology. This chapter will conclude by outlining the 
possible future threats from neighbouring countries and Al-Qaida’s adaptive 
strategy after the death of Bin Laden.1 
1.3.3 Chapter Three: Kuwait’s Counterterrorism Strategies 
This chapter will critically analyse the government’s overall policies and 
strategies against terrorism by addressing the following questions. How has the 
government developed its overall policies and strategies against terrorism? And to 
what extent has Kuwait set its own agenda to combat terrorism in its own territory? 
                                                
1 Jenkins, B. M., Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade: Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory?, (RAND, 
2012), Available at: 
<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP362.pdf> accessed 
1st Dec. 2014. See also Celso, A. N., ‘Al Qaeda’s Post–9/11 Organizational Structure and Strategy: 
The Role of Islamist Regional Affiliates’, (2012) 23(2) Mediterranean Quarterly, 30-41. 
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What regional and international pressures were on Kuwait to respond to terrorism? 
How has the hostile environment caused by neighbouring countries impacted 
Kuwait’s response to terrorism? This chapter will critically assess whether external 
pressure, such as from the United States or the international community, has any 
impact on the Kuwaiti government’s response to terrorism. What is Kuwait’s 
counterterrorism strategy, and how effective is it in addressing the threats of 
terrorism in Kuwait? Which approach of the counterterrorism legal strategies has 
Kuwait adopted in responding to terrorism, and how does the Kuwaiti government 
consider the normative considerations of the Kuwaiti constitutional values? To 
what extent are the adopted legal strategies in accord with the rule of law and 
effective in protecting the human rights which have been stated in the Kuwaiti 
constitutional law? What is the definition of terrorism in the Kuwaiti perspective? 
Therefore, this stage of the research will explore and examine how Kuwait has 
reacted to terrorism threats during its history. The chapter will start with a general 
illustration of Kuwaiti fundamental values and principles that have been set out in 
the constitutional law and in the international conventions on human rights that 
Kuwait has ratified (e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 
which in general regulate the government’s response to any crimes, specifically 
crimes related to terrorism. It is not certain what the counterterrorism strategies in 
Kuwait are due to the lack of publication of the government’s policies in any 
comprehensive statement. However, this research will analyse Kuwait’s general 
policies, whether in the form of policy statements issued by the Kuwaiti 
government or by the National Assembly of Kuwait. In other words, this chapter 
will focus on how Kuwait has addressed the various threats discussed in the 
previous chapter and according to each period. Furthermore, the research will 
analyse the construction of Kuwait’s strategies against terrorism by analysing its 
domestic and international policies. In addition, this chapter will investigate 
whether there were international or regional pressures in adopting policies that are 
not implemented with any enthusiasm or effectiveness. This chapter will conclude 
with an assessment of the government’s policies against terrorism and whether the 
government has addressed the threats of terrorism in accordance with its national 
constitutional values. 
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1.3.4 Chapter Four: The Kuwaiti Criminal Law: Criminal Offences Related 
to Terrorism 
This chapter will critically examine the criminal laws related to terrorism in 
Kuwait by addressing the following questions. To what extent has Kuwait 
developed the necessary legal framework to address the threats of terrorism? What 
are these laws, and what offences do they outlaw? This chapter will assess how far 
are these laws related to the adopted strategy, and to what extent do they achieve 
the strategic aims and objectives? What is the legal framework supporting the 
general strategy which has been adopted by the Kuwaiti government to deal with 
counterterrorism, and has it been counterproductive? This chapter will examine 
whether implementing international laws or Western style laws exacerbate 
domestic political tensions? It will go further to assess to what extent has Kuwait 
been enthusiastic in implementing laws which are not locally derived? This chapter 
will also critically evaluate how the laws related to terrorism comply with the 
Kuwaiti constitutional law and with the human rights treaties and conventions that 
Kuwait has signed and ratified. 
Therefore, this chapter will focus on outlining and analysing the criminal 
offences that are related to terrorism in the Kuwaiti criminal law. Although there is 
not a comprehensive counterterrorism law in Kuwait, yet there are some articles 
within the Kuwaiti criminal law that criminalise terrorist activities. In addition, 
there are also some adopted international laws regarding specific forms of 
terrorism. Therefore, identifying those articles and the functions that they serve is 
the main focus of this chapter. In this regard, an analytical study will be made of the 
Kuwaiti criminal law, which is the Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 1960, and of the 
other special laws that have since been passed and added to the law or that have 
amended some of its parts which related to crimes related to terrorism. It will also 
critically evaluate how these laws adhere to Kuwait’s commitments to the 
international conventions on terrorism and international conventions on human 
rights. Moreover, this chapter will investigate whether Kuwait has been pushed into 
passing laws to criminalise terrorism in a way that have exacerbated, rather than 
resolved, political tensions. In addition, this chapter will examine other internal 
issues among political blocs within the national parliament, which have hampered 
the government’s initiatives against terrorism. 
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1.3.5 Chapter Five: Terrorist Financing: Kuwait’s Response 
This chapter will focus on Kuwait’s regulated banking system and the money 
service businesses related to financing terrorism by addressing the following 
questions. How has Kuwait regulated the banking system and the money service 
businesses in order to combat financing terrorism? Has Kuwait passed any new 
laws to meet the normative requirements set by the United Nations International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing 1999 and complied with the 
40 + 9 recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)? This chapter 
will also evaluate the government’s regulations and measures in two areas that have 
concerned the international community. Firstly, it will discuss how Kuwait has 
responded to the risks created by the informal money transfer system, the Hawala 
system of money remittances. Secondly, it will discuss the measures that have been 
set by the government to regulate Islamic charitable (Zakat) and humanitarian 
organisations. This chapter will explore how effective was the Kuwaiti government 
in implementing laws related to combating financing terrorism, especially those 
that were adopted from the international conventions. It will consider to what extent 
did these laws exacerbate the political debate in the parliament, especially with 
regard to the Islamic blocs and how did they react? Considering the international 
concern about financing terrorism, were there regional and international pressures 
on Kuwait to respond to financing terrorism? The chapter will next explore whether 
there are any special units to track terrorist financing activities, which units, and 
how do they work? Finally this chapter will critically examine Kuwait’s financial 
system against terrorist financing and to evaluate the financial position and 
framework to determine how terrorism is financed. 
International attention and concern about terrorist funding has become a 
universal issue, especially after UNSCR 1373 of 28 September 2001 which was 
adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, all member 
states in the UN are now obligated to regulate their financial systems in accordance 
with the normative requirements set by the United Nation’s International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing 1999 and the 40 + 9 
recommendations made by the FATF. Thus, this chapter will be narrowed to 
explore Kuwait’s response and initiative in addressing the issue of financing 
terrorism in line with these precepts. Additionally, it will outline the offences 
 8 
related to financing terrorism within the national laws and will discuss and analyse 
how they comply with domestic and international standards. 
Since some Kuwaiti citizens and organisations have been listed on the UN 
Consolidated List, the List established and maintained by the Committee pursuant 
to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) with respect to individuals, groups, 
undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida, some initiatives have 
been made by the Kuwaiti government against the financiers. The research, 
therefore, will evaluate the Kuwaiti legal framework against terrorist financing. It 
will also examine whether the Kuwaiti government has been pushed to react to 
individuals or organisations that are mentioned on the list and whether that response 
has caused any internal tensions. This chapter will conclude with an overall 
assessment of the national laws and procedures intended to ensure that the money 
will not be diverted to terrorist organisations. 
1.3.6 Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This chapter will give an overall assessment of the outcomes and findings. In 
addition, the chapter will reflect on the adopted methodology and how successful it 
was in obtaining original and relevant information. Furthermore, this chapter will 
outline what have been covered in this study, and suggest avenues for future 
research which will complete the full picture of the Kuwait counter-terrorism 
efforts. Finally, it will critically evaluate how has the regional and international 
influences affected the overall response to terrorism in Kuwait. 
1.4   Importance and Originality of the Research 
This research is intended to contribute to the development of analysis and 
critique of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kuwait, the Gulf region and at the 
international level. Most regional researchers, and some international ones, have 
written about terrorism in the Middle East by focusing on Saudi Arabia, Bahrain 
and Yemen, and how these governments have reacted to terrorism. Other studies 
have focused on Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and other related terrorist 
groups in the region, notably in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Yet, there has been no 
major study during the last decade about terrorism in Kuwait and how terrorism and 
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counterterrorism has developed in this country. In fact, there is only one study, in 
2003, which has illustrated ‘the regional measures Kuwait and other States in the 
region resorted to, to counter terrorism’.2 In addition, most of what has been written 
was mainly about political or historical studies of the situation in Kuwait, and was 
not comprehensively related to the phenomenon of terrorism in Kuwait. 3 
Furthermore, the available literature that related to criminal/penal law and anti-
money laundering crimes does not deal with how Kuwait applies these laws to 
terrorism.4 Moreover, there is not any literature which deals with how Kuwait 
combats the financing of terrorism, apart from the IMF 2011 report on Kuwait.5 
Also, there is no literature about the most recent reforms in this area, which were 
made in 2013. 
Thus, this research has originality with regard to its analysis of both terrorism 
and counter-terrorism in Kuwait. This research is intended to provide a better 
understanding of the phenomenon in Kuwait and to identify the terrorist groups, 
their ideologies and the type of terrorist crimes that they have committed. 
Furthermore, the study will critically analyse the Kuwaiti counterterrorism policies 
from the perspectives of effectiveness and fairness and explore how national, 
regional or international pressures have affected Kuwait’s response to terrorism. 
The thesis will also significantly contribute by providing information regarding the 
national security agenda and how Kuwait has developed, or adapted available, 
instruments to combat terrorism. 
This thesis also intends to contribute to a better understanding of the Kuwaiti 
legal instruments in responding to terrorism and the Kuwaiti criminal laws against 
terrorism and terrorism financing. In addition, as already mentioned, this thesis, for 
the first time, covers the New Kuwaiti Law on terrorism financing, Law No. 106 of 
2013 Regarding Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
                                                
2 Al-Ajmi, T. S., ‘Legal Responses to Terrorism with Special Reference to the Position of Kuwait’, 
(PhD Thesis, University of Wales, 2003). 
3 See Chapter Two. 
4 See Salem, A. B., Mediator to Explain the Kuwaiti Penal Code, (3rd edn, Kuwait University, 
1993). See also Ghnam M. G. and Al-Kandari F. A., Explain the Kuwaiti Penal Code, (2nd edn, 
Kuwait University, 2010-2011). See also Mohammadain, J. W., Anti-Money Laundering: According 
to the Kuwaiti law No. 35 of 2002, (The Industrial Bank of Kuwait K.S.C.: September 2003). See 
also Chapters Four and Five. 
5 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International Monetary 
Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011). 
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Terrorism (AML/CFT). This contribution is very important, because it will provide 
a critical evaluation of the new policies and laws about terrorism in Kuwait and will 
evaluate how the government can develop its agenda in the future.  
Another aspect of originality arises from the findings arising from the 
empirical research on terrorism conducted in Kuwait. Though empirical data has 
been regularly gathered since 2001 by international bodies such as UN CTC and the 
FATF, no in-depth academic fieldwork has recently been undertaken. 
1.5   Research Design and Methodology 
This section will present the methods that have been used in this research 
project. It will examine and explain why such methods have been chosen and how 
they helped to achieve the research aims and objectives. Further, it will describe the 
sampling and the data analysis strategy. Finally, it will discuss the ethical issues 
that impacted on this study. 
This approach involved a socio-legal approach, which combines documentary 
and doctrinal legal research, an historical research method, and fieldwork 
interviews undertaken through a qualitative research approach. It should be noted 
that this thesis is not a full comparative study since it is mainly about Kuwait; 
however, since this thesis was being written in the UK, it was feasible and useful to 
draw lessons from the UK. 
1.5.1 Historical and Socio-Legal Research Method 
Since this research analysed and explored the history of terrorism in Kuwait 
and how laws related to terrorism have been developed, a historical research 
method has been used as one of the research approaches in the study. This has 
entailed the exploration and investigation of the terrorist groups and individuals in 
Kuwait since its independence and the development of Kuwaiti counterterrorism 
measures. As a result, searching for accurate and trusted records and documents 
have been given a high concern,6 so the research relied on government reports and 
publications, newspapers, and published secondary commentaries whether on law 
                                                
6 Melton, B. F., Jr., ‘Clio at Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists’, (1998) 83, 
Minnesota Law Review, 377. 
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or on terrorist incidents. The documents relevant to the development of the laws 
related to terrorism were available in the Library of the National Assembly of 
Kuwait. Some of these sources were primary, which enabled the researcher to 
analyse the actual texts of prime actors. The researcher also relied upon secondary 
sources with regard to the development of the terrorist activities in Kuwait and the 
region. In this study, the researcher also outlined the historical events that happened 
in Kuwait and analysed the experienced pressures that have been generated from 
the internal political changes in the parliament which determined how such changes 
had an impact on the government’s response to terrorism. Consequently, this thesis 
can be seen as a socio-legal study. 
Socio-legal research provided important insight in this research study, because, 
sometimes, a legal edict or ruling may become ambiguous or unclear and is 
therefore more easily interpreted when viewed in its proper historical or social 
context.7 Thus, doctrinal legal research and the historical research method have 
been complemented by a socio-legal research method implemented by fieldwork 
interviews. The researcher used expert interviews to obtain a proper behind-the-
scenes account of what was influential in designing Kuwaiti policy and whether 
there were international or regional pressures. The vision of socio-legal research 
always extends beyond legal texts, academic writings, libraries and the like to 
investigate ‘law-in-society’.8 In other words, the main objectives of the socio-legal 
research are to put the law in context through gathering insights and information 
from respondents. It also serves to broaden the research discourse by filling the gap 
between ‘laws in books’ and the social world, by taking the researcher from merely 
investigating ‘the law’ to collecting the related data from wherever possible.9 In 
other words, the empirical data that were generated from socio-legal research gave 
important insights on ‘how the law works in the real world’.10 
                                                
7 Chynoweth, P., ‘Legal Research’, in Knight and Ruddock (eds.), Advanced Research Methods in 
the Built Environment, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 30. 
8 Bradshaw, A., ‘Sense and Sensibility: Debates and Developments in Socio-Legal Research 
Methods’, in Thomas, P. A., edt, Socio-Legal Issue, Socio-Legal Studies Series, (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Ltd., 1997), 99. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Abd Razak, A., ‘Understanding Legal Research’, (March, 2009) 4, Research Bulletin of the 
Faculty of Economics and Management, 19-24. 
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1.5.2 Documentary Research 
The relevant research instruments were texts and materials gathered from 
primary sources, such as legislation on terrorism in Kuwait and official documents, 
and from secondary sources, such as the internet, scholarly articles, magazines, 
newspapers and textbooks. The extent to which the hypotheses mentioned earlier 
are true have been verified using the descriptive material gathered. 
1.5.2.1 Doctrinal Legal Research 
Doctrinal legal research is sometimes described as study of ‘black-letter law’ 
due to its main concern for the law itself, which can be obtained and accessed 
through court cases and statutes.11 It also explores the law regarding specific issues 
and describes how it has been developed and applied.12 
To determine the laws and the policy related to terrorism in Kuwait, especially 
in the absence of a comprehensive and clear counterterrorism law,13 the researcher 
examined the proximate legal texts and especially the Kuwaiti criminal law, 
constitutional law and conventions that relate to terrorism in Kuwait. These were 
complemented by the analysis of other primary sources, such as official documents, 
unpublished documents, human rights reports, parliamentary documents regarding 
national, regional and international security and defence. These sources were 
chosen to the extent that they provide sources on the doctrine of the law and the 
policy. Therefore, the aims and objectives of the research have been achieved by 
examining the different legal perspectives on law and policy. 
The following libraries were visited in order to collect the relevant materials 
about terrorism in Kuwait. Firstly, Kuwait University Libraries: the Faculty of Law 
Library, Sheik Jaber Al-Ahmad Central Library, the library of the Faculty of Sharia 
and Islamic Studies, the Centre of Strategic and Future Studies and the Centre of 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies. Secondly, Government libraries: the Library of 
                                                
11 McConville, M. and Chui, W., ‘Introduction and Overview’, in McConville, M. and Chui, W., 
Research Methods for Law, (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 2007), 1-3. 
12 Dobinson, I. and Johns, F., ‘Qualitative Legal Research’, in McConville, M. and Chui, W., 
Research Methods for Law, (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 2007), 19. 
13 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, Chapter 2. Country Reports: 
Middle East and North Africa Overview, (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011) 
Available at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2010/170257.htm> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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the National Assembly of Kuwait, the Library of the Central Bank of Kuwait, the 
Library of the Kuwait Institute for Judicial and Legal Studies, the Library of the 
Ministry of Justice and the Central Library of the Saad Al-Abdullah Academy for 
Security Sciences. 
In addition, UK's libraries were helpful in housing materials related to 
terrorism and counterterrorism in general, and in providing materials related to the 
political history of Kuwait with some references to terrorism. For example, 
University of Leeds libraries: Brotherton and Edward Boyle libraries were visited 
in order to collect the relevant materials. Furthermore, the inter-library loan service 
was used to gain access to some documents which were not found in the University 
library. Moreover, libraries like the British library and the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies (University of London) library were visited while doing the research. 
1.5.3 Qualitative Research 
The proposed study is critical, analytical and descriptive in nature. Therefore, 
to deepen the enquiry into the identified problem, qualitative research was the 
chosen tool through which to analyse the terrorism and its local responses to 
universal threats and international demands in Kuwait. For such qualitative research 
to be effective, it was necessary to understand basic social and other human related 
difficulties that must be overcome and resolved by knowing their root causes. To 
initiate qualitative research, the prominent factor was to look at the facts of interest, 
which have many aspects and which emphasised the functional relations between 
the society and the problems arising in society due to terrorism. 
Therefore, a qualitative research method was adopted for this research project 
to secure the following benefits. Firstly, the qualitative approach is based on 
obtaining a more practical feel of the field of study that cannot be achieved by 
numerical data and statistical analysis used in quantitative research. In addition, 
because quantitative method only deals with numbers, statistics and surveys, it is 
therefore more likely to result in a closed understanding without any interaction 
with the social world, unlike the qualitative approach which is more interactive 
with the social world. Furthermore, there are no accurate documentation or 
statistics related to terrorism and terrorism cases because, in Kuwait at least, this 
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information is very sensitive and accessing to it could not be achieved. Therefore, 
the qualitative research approach offered more flexible ways to collect and analyse 
data and was, therefore, an appropriate approach for the collection and 
interpretation of field data. Moreover, as stated by Bogdan and Taylor, qualitative 
research data can ‘Provide a holistic view of the phenomena under investigation’.14 
What is more, the data give the ‘Ability to interact with the research subjects in 
their own language and on their own terms’.15 Lastly, qualitative research provided 
added facts and understanding of them. 
Within the qualitative approach adopted, this study utilised the expert 
interview, because the researcher aims were to gain an in-depth and clear 
understanding about Kuwaiti policy in response to terrorism and other sensitive 
issues related to regional and international influence. Knowledgeable personnel 
provided rich information on the research topic.16 By contrast, Kuwaiti legal books 
and law provided important but limited detail about how Kuwait has responded to 
terrorism. They were especially limited in explaining perceptions and 
implementation of laws and policies. Therefore, socio-legal research helped to 
correlate the social and cultural construction of the people’s reactions to the stated 
law and policy.17 In addition, interviewing experts was helpful in gaining access to 
documentary information that had not been published. 
Next, and by way of further justification, it should be noted that observational 
study approaches were rejected in this study for several reasons. First, terrorism 
cases do not often occur in Kuwait, especially during the last three years. Second, 
terrorism cases are considered as sensitive cases in Kuwait, and therefore most of 
terrorism cases are ended with a ‘confidential court hearing’, which did not allow 
the researcher to observe. In addition, focus groups approaches were not utilised in 
this study for many reasons. First, this study intended to interview experts from 
different ministries and departments who are busy, and it might not be possible to 
                                                
14 Bogdan, R. and Taylor, S. J., Introduction to qualitative research methods, (John Wiley: New 
York, 1975), 6-11. See further Patton, M. Q., Qualitative evaluation methods, (Sage: Newbury Park, 
CA: 1980). 
15 Kirk, J., and Miller, M. L., Reliability and validity in qualitative research, (Qualitative Research 
Series 1, Sage: Beverly Hills, CA: 1986). 
16 Denscombe, M., The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Research Project, (Open University 
Press, McGraw Hill Education, 2003), 165. 
17 Silverman, D., Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, (Sage Publication: London, 
2000), 5. 
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get them all together at one time and place. Second, such an approach might pose 
some hesitancy on the part of experts about voicing opinion before other experts, 
and therefore might not provide useful information at the individual level. 
Having selected interviews, as the chosen method, the interview  consisted of a 
conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee rather than a strict 
‘question and answer’ session.18 It was advisable to allow the experts to express 
their ideas freely and to try to draw as much information as possible for the 
research purposes. In this thesis, the researcher used expert interviews to obtain 
valuable sources of information and evidence related to terrorism, counter-
terrorism, and the law of Kuwait. Expert interviews are crucial, especially when the 
researcher needs to gather new information in a research project. Meuser and Nagel 
define ‘expert’ as ‘a person who has privileged access to information about groups 
of persons or decision processes or who is responsible for the development, 
implementation or control of solutions, strategies and/or policies’.19 Thus, such 
interviews helped to give a good understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism and 
the processes of how the government responds to it during the recent history of 
Kuwait. 
The researcher conducted face-to-face interviews with key government and 
law enforcement officials. He also interviewed non-State experts, comprised of 
defence lawyers, NGO representatives that deal with human rights and professors 
from the Kuwait University, who provide critical understandings and views of 
terrorism and the laws of Kuwait. 
Thus, expert interviews were meant to accomplish two key objectives. First, 
they helped to obtain valuable insights and information regarding the history, 
development and the future of terrorism in Kuwait and the official way of 
responding to terrorism. Secondly, interviews brought immediate gains in terms of 
originality, which in turn helped to strengthen the overall result of the research. 
                                                
18 Mason, J., Qualitative Researching, (Sage Publications: London, 2002), 67. 
19 Meuser, M., and Nagel, U., 'ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht. Ein Beitrag 
zur qualitativen', (2002), Cited in Picone, I., ‘Conceptualising Online News Use’, (2007) 3, 
Observatorio (OBS*) Journal, 093-114. 
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The research adopted the semi-structured interview for several reasons. First, 
this form of interview allowed the interviewees to explain and express their ideas 
and thoughts openly.20 In addition, it helped the interviewees by giving them room 
for flexibility to develop their ideas on the topic that has been raised by the 
interviewer.21 Thirdly, as there is no major study about terrorism in Kuwait, room 
to develop ideas was necessary when the interviewees provided unexpected and 
vital information during the interviews. However, the researcher worked from a list 
of questions regarding chapter related topics, which helped the interviewer to define 
and control the interviews.22 These questions are set out in Appendix. 
1.5.4 Sampling of Participants and Sample Strategy 
This research study adopted the following sampling strategies: ‘purposive 
sampling’ and ‘snowball sampling’.  
Firstly, purposive sampling was useful for this research study since that 
technique reflects the expectation that the researcher can correctly identify those 
participants who are the best-selected people to help the researcher to understand 
the problem and answer the research questions.23 In this regard, the researcher 
selected participants for study that are ‘information-rich’ and illuminative. As 
Patton stated, ‘they offer useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest’.24 
Therefore, sampling was sought to give an insight into the topic area that was being 
investigated by the researcher, ‘not empirical generalisation from a sample to a 
population’.25 According to Holloway: ‘In purposive sampling, generalizability is 
less important than the collection of rich data and an understanding of the ideas of 
the people chosen for the sample’.26 Thus, it is rare to choose a large-scale 
population in qualitative research, which instead usually ranges between 4 and 40 
                                                
20 Arksey, H. and Knight, P., 'Interviewing for Social Scientists', (Sage Publicatiois Ltd.: London, 
1999). 
21 Bryman, A., Social Research Method, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008), 438-440. Further 
look at Flick, U., An Introduction to Qualitative Research, (Sage Publication: London, 2006), 155. 
22 Bryman, A., ‘Qualitative Research on Leadership: A Critical but Appreciative Review’, (2004) 
15, The Leadership Quarlerly, 729-769. 
23 Creswell, J. W., Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches, ( 2nd 
edn, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003), 185. 
24 Patton, M., Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, (3rd edn, Sage Publication: London, 
2002), 40. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Holloway, I., Basic concepts for qualitative research, (Blackwell Science: Oxford, Malden, 
Mass., 1997), 142. 
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participants.27 For the benefit of this study and due to the time limit for the 
fieldwork, which was 4 months, the participants of this study were 28 respondents 
selected according to their direct involvement in the research topic. 
It is worth noting that the researcher’s purposive sampling strategy was based 
on two different methods. First, the researcher identified the related institutions 
which deal with terrorism, and then asked the institutions help in identifying the 
appropriate participants. Second, the researcher asked his professors in Kuwait who 
work within his department, the criminal law and criminal justice department, and 
contacts who work within the Kuwaiti criminal justice system to help him in 
identifying the right experts for his research project. 
Next, the ‘snowball or chain referral sampling’ utilised in this study whereby 
the researcher asked the interviewees for their recommendation of other expert 
people who possess some characteristics that are of research interest.28 This method 
helped in locating the most related participants to the research study using the 
knowledge of the insider people who are interested in the same study.29 As a result, 
making more connections, and sharing and collecting more information, similarly 
to a snowball that rolls and become bigger in size as it collects more snow. In 
addition, and as mentioned above due to the time limit of the fieldwork, a snowball 
sampling strategy helped in identifying the most relevant participants to the 
research study without wasting much time. 
The participants were divided into four categories as follows. The first 
category consists of Government officials from representative ministries and law 
enforcement officials that deal with terrorism. Specifically from Ministry of 
Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs and the National Assembly – Legal Department. 
These respondents were an important source of information in understanding and 
determining how Kuwait has responded to terrorism, what its counterterrorism 
measures are, and what the government’s policy and agenda are toward the 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Biernacki, P. and Waldorf, D. ‘Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral 
Sampling’, (1981), 10(2) Sociological Methods and Research, 141-163. 
29 Ibid. 
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phenomenon of terrorism. Moreover, such participants were amongst the key 
players in the development and implementation of counterterrorism laws and 
conventions. Therefore, the opportunity to interact with such participants provided 
crucial knowledge about the processes of implementing international and regional 
counterterrorism conventions and cooperation and whether the Kuwaiti government 
faced any obstacles in implementing such initiatives. Additionally, such 
participants provided information regarding the extent to which international or 
regional pressures were imposed on Kuwait to pass laws that exacerbated political 
tension. Thus, the mentioned ministries are the most relevant ministries that deal 
with terrorism and counterterrorism in Kuwait. Therefore, the researcher 
interviewed participants from such ministries, and especially participants from the 
related department that deal with terrorism within each ministry. 
The second category consisted of financial institutions. As financing terrorism 
is among the issues investigated in this study, financial institutions provided 
important information regarding how Kuwait has regulated and secured its financial 
system from being abused by terrorist financers. Since there is no detailed literature 
with regard to how Kuwait combats terrorism financing, apart from the IMF 2011 
report 30  on Kuwait that looked at the situation on Kuwait through 2011, 
interviewing such institutions were very helpful. Additionally, such institutions 
provided the research with vital cases in which Kuwait has been used and abused 
by terrorist financiers to finance terrorist organisations whether inside or outside 
Kuwait and how the Kuwaiti government has reacted to such crime. Furthermore, 
one of the most crucial reasons to interview such groups was basically to 
understand the measures and the level of regional and international cooperation in 
ensuring that money transferred, especially in the ‘Hawala’ and ‘Zakat’ operations, 
will not be diverted to terrorist organisations. For these reasons, the Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK) was a vital institution to interview, as it control the banking system 
in Kuwait as well as setting the rules and regulations that governing the financial 
sectors in Kuwait. In addition, the exchange companies and the charitable 
organisations in Kuwait was another crucial side to interview in order to have the 
practical atmosphere of controlling the money from not being diverted to terrorist 
                                                
30 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011). 
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groups and terrorism. Therefore, from each department the researcher interviewed 
two participants. 
The third category consisted of judges, prosecutors and police officers. They 
are the responsible bodies in the investigation and the prosecution of terrorist 
related crimes, they provided important information about how the law has been 
interpreted and applied in such cases and what are those laws. However, access to 
real case files was denied, and limited information was gathered about the main 
offences charged by the courts to prosecute terrorist offenders. Within the 
prosecution service, the State Security Prosecution Department, is a department that 
specialises in investigating terrorism and other national security crimes; however, 
no special court is devoted to terrorist crimes. Instead, such cases are handled by 
the normal criminal courts. As a result, judges were a vital source of information, 
not only because they preside over such cases, but also because they used to be 
prosecutors before they became judges. Therefore, due to their knowledge of, and 
experience with, the subject matter, they provided well trusted information not only 
related to the cases and the law, but also related to the appellate law principles in 
terrorist crimes. Additionally, the researcher interviewed police officers from the 
Ministry of Interior. Specifically, the researcher interviewed participants from two 
departments within the Ministry of Interior that deal with terrorism, namely the 
State Security Bureau (SSB) and the Anti-terrorism Unit. Therefore, the researcher 
interviewed six participants within this category, two from the prosecution service, 
two from the judicial system and two from the Ministry of Interior. 
The fourth category consisted of non-official stakeholders, such as academics 
from Kuwait University, lawyers and independent think tanks like Kuwait Human 
Rights Association. Participants in this category were those who played and are still 
playing a part in the Kuwaiti agenda in countering terrorism. As distinct players, 
and because of their knowledge and involvement in the subject matter, they 
provided an independent, objective and critical assessment and evaluation of the 
government’s reaction to terrorism. They also offered full insight of the current, and 
future, Kuwaiti policy in combating terrorism. For the abovementioned benefits, the 
researcher interviewed two participants from each sub-category. 
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The following table summarises and describes how the participants were 
distributed: 
Table 1.1: The Selected Sample 
Category Number of Participants 
1- Government officials from representative 
ministries. 
10 
2- Financial institutions. 6 
3- Judges, prosecutors and police officers. 6 
4- Non-official stakeholders. 6 
In Total 28 
 
1.5.5 Access Strategy 
Negotiating access is a problem faced by many researchers when conducting 
qualitative research.31 Since, in this study, the researcher interviewed some senior 
officials from the Kuwaiti government, an advance arrangement was made to 
secure the appointment with the relevant respondents. Therefore, the researcher 
started contacting the abovementioned respondents before and during the first 
month of his fieldwork in order to secure the access to the relevant participants, and 
interview them during the period of the fieldwork. Additionally, since this research 
project was fully sponsored by (the Kuwait University – Faculty of Law – the 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice Department), the department provided the 
researcher with an official letter to facilitate the access process to complete the 
research project. This letter  helped the researcher to be identified as a research 
student to the government officials who are going to take part in the research 
                                                
31 Epstein, L. and King, G., ‘Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of 
Inference’, (2002) 69, University of Chicago Law Review, 1. 
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project. Furthermore, if, during the research process, the researcher faced any 
difficulties in accessing any relevant authorities, the Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice Department was able to help to resolve such difficulties; for example, by 
helping the researcher to rearrange another appointment with the government 
officials. In addition, the researcher, in some cases where the official letter did not 
succeed in getting access to the aimed participant, he used his networks and 
contacts to secure access to the relevant participant. 
1.5.5.1 Issues Related to Professional Standards and Researcher’s Relations 
Conducting fieldwork and collecting data from interviewing participants in 
Kuwait sometimes presents ethical issues, which will be highlighted in this section. 
These issues occur as a result of the Kuwaiti social culture, in which people are tied 
together in kinship or tribalism, and the number of Kuwaiti citizens, which total 
approximately a million and a half. In addition, some of the researcher’s family 
members work in the criminal justice services. Therefore, some of the interviewees 
may know the researcher personally. To overcome this problem, the researcher 
avoided selecting relatives or people who have any relations with the researcher, 
and interviews were conducted to satisfy the applicable professional standards. 
Nevertheless, where the problem could not be avoided, and where the participant is 
very important to the research project, then the researcher carried on with the 
interview with his awareness to accomplish the professional standards. 
1.5.6 Data Analysis 
After completing the interviews, rich and worthwhile information was obtained 
regarding how Kuwait has responded to terrorism. Therefore, another important 
stage of data analysis has occurred.32 In fact, it should be noted that analysing the 
data was an on-going process, started from the time of collecting the data to the 
stage of coding and categorising. Therefore, the logic and choice of methods for 
data analysis certainly result from the research questions set up for the purpose of 
the study. 
                                                
32 Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M., Qualitative data analysis, (2nd edn, Sage Publication: London, 
1994). 
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1.5.6.1 Produce a Record and Coding the Data 
This study used the tape-recording method to record the interviews. Before 
that, however, the researcher asked for the interviewee’s consent to record the 
interview. 
Using tape-recording as a main method during the interviews had many 
advantages. Firstly, it provided a semi-permanent source of information about the 
entire interview, which offers accurate information obtained from the interviewees 
when they quoted in the thesis. However, there are also some disadvantages in 
using tape-recording. According to Noaks and Wincup, tape-recording is usually 
performed using a machine recorder, which can have issues like battery failure and 
other ‘technical failures’.33 To avoid that, the researcher had a spare recorder and 
additional batteries in case any of the abovementioned problems occur. After the 
interview, the researcher transcribed the recorded interview. 
The interviews were conducted in the researcher’s mother tongue, which is 
Arabic. Therefore, all of the information obtained from the interviews was 
transcribed and analysed in Arabic first and then the researcher translated selected 
passages into English. However to save time, not all of the transcribed information 
was translated into English; only selected passages were translated, which the 
researcher needed to use and quote in the study. 
The coding process was the next stage. Coding can be done using either 
computer software or manually. Nevertheless, the researcher chose to code 
manually. This is due to the fact that the NVivo programme is provided only in 
English, yet the interviews in this research project were carried out in Arabic.34 In 
other words, using computer-aided methods in this study would be ineffective and 
would be very time-consuming. Therefore, the coding process was in Arabic rather 
in English. As a consequence, this study used the methods broadly known as the 
traditional methods.35 Hence, the researcher, firstly, transcribed the information and 
read through them carefully. Then, the researcher looked at the common words that 
are used from time to time and used a highlighter to emphasise them in different 
                                                
33 Noaks, L. and Wincup, E., Criminological Research: Understanding Qualitative Method, (Sage 
Publication: London, 2004). 
34 NVivo9 Fundamentals, a workshop that was attended on October 27, 2011. 
35 Mason, J., Qualitative Researching, (Sage Publications: London, 2002). 
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colours according to the most common used and most related to the research 
chapters. A process of reflection lead to an identification and understanding of the 
key themes and important insights. 
1.5.7 Ethical Issues 
This section considers the ethical issues that might arise while conducting the 
interviews with the participants. First, the guidelines of the British Society of 
Criminology Code of Ethics (BSC)36 and its ethical standard were the researcher’s 
cornerstone in resolving ethical issues while undertaking the fieldwork. In this 
regard, the researcher considered the participant’s rights and took responsibility in 
protecting their interest and privacy. Therefore, this section illustrates the way that 
voluntary and informed consents were given by the participants, the terms of 
confidentiality, and how the data were protected. 
1.5.7.1 Informed Consent and Confidentiality 
Informed consent is an important part of the research process.37 This means not 
only that the researcher must obtain the participant’s signature on the form, but also 
that the researcher must clearly outline the research’s aims and objectives and 
explain what the participation involves. Moreover, it means that the participants 
must consent to participating in the research project free from any coercion or 
undue influence in making their decision. Therefore, the participants were told 
about their rights to withdraw without having to give a reason for their 
withdrawal.38 However, there was a time limit for their right to withdraw; to be 
precise the researcher indicated that all the participants have the right to withdraw 
no later than one month from the interview date. In addition, the researcher ensured 
                                                
36 British Society of Criminology, ‘Code of Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology’, 
Available at: <http://www.britsoccrim.org/codeofethics.htm> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
37 For further information read the University of Leeds, ‘University Guidance on Identifying Ethical 
Issues’, Available at: 
<http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/index.php/academic_staff/good_practice/university_ethics_polici
es> 
38 British Society of Criminology, ‘Code of Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology’, 
Available at: <http://www.britsoccrim.org/codeofethics.htm> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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the confidentiality and the anonymity of the participants. This was guaranteed by 
illustrating how the information is going to be used and stored.39 
Sometimes, difficult issues might occur regarding confidentiality where the 
researcher is put in a situation of either protecting the respondent's confidentiality 
or divulging wrongdoing. Therefore, the British Society of Criminology advises the 
interviewer to set limits to confidentiality and to make the interviewees aware about 
the limits of confidentiality.40 As a result, the researcher wrote a notice into the 
consent form and also notified the participants about their right not to reveal any 
personal wrongdoing. Otherwise the researcher retained the right to reveal serious 
information to the relevant authorities. 
1.5.7.2 Data Protection and Retention Strategy 
One of the researcher’s important obligations is to ensure the security and the 
confidentiality of the research’s data outcome. This is also one of the most 
important policies in the University Information Security Management System 
(ISMS).41 Thus, the researcher did everything possible to ensure proper data 
management of the research outcome. In this regard, the researcher ensured against 
disclosure of the data to unauthorised recipients, used good data storage, backup 
and encryption and, most importantly, and set a time limit as to when to destroy the 
data. 
Therefore, after recording the interviews, the researcher stored the recorded 
tapes and transcripts in the University software system, and, if he needed the 
information, he used the University’s secure remote access, known as ‘Desktop 
Anywhere’. As a result, the information were secured from any unacceptable 
disclosure, which would otherwise harm the participant’s confidentiality. Finally, 
and after the completion of the research project it is expected that the researcher 
will not be able to access the University’s secure remote access. Therefore, the 
researcher saved the data in an encrypted external hard disc and will retain it for 
                                                
39 Noaks, L. and Wincup, E., Criminological Research: Understanding Qualitative Method, (Sage 
Publication: London, 2004), 50. 
40 British Society of Criminology, ‘Code of Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology’, 
Available at: <http://www.britsoccrim.org/codeofethics.htm> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
41 Information Security Management: Policy on Safeguarding Data Storage, Backup and Encryption, 
Available at: <http://campus.leeds.ac.uk/isms/>  
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three years. The mentioned period is important in case the researcher wants to 
return to the data for further information and to publish findings. After three years, 
the researcher will destroy the recorded tapes and data, because they will be stale. 
Participants involved in this research project were, in advance, familiarised with the 
processes of the data protection and retention strategy. 
1.6   Conclusion 
This chapter has given an overview of the scope and purpose of this research 
project. It has also outlined the proposed chapters that will follow. The focus of this 
research will be terrorism and counterterrorism in Kuwait and how terrorism and 
counterterrorism have developed during its history specifically since its 
independence in 1961. The exposition will be tested against the normative criteria 
of effectiveness and fairness, and the impacts of external influences will also be 
assessed. 
This research utilised a qualitative research approach within a socio-legal study 
as its core fieldwork research method. However, the research also implemented 
other research methods, such as historical, documentary and doctrinal legal research 
methods. 
This research encountered some methodological difficulties, in large part 
because the Kuwaiti government is conservative and publishes little information. 
However, the researcher employed every reasonable effort to obtain the information 
relevant to the research project. Further, the researcher conducted interviews with 
twenty-eight participants who are well versed in the subject matter while doing his 
fieldwork. 
This thesis will provide important data that will permit an original exposition 
as well as critical analysis and evaluative study of terrorism and counterterrorism in 
Kuwait. 
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Chapter Two 
The Phenomenon of Terrorism in Kuwait 
2.1   Introduction and Background 
This chapter intends to explore and analyse the threats of terrorism to the State 
of Kuwait, and how terrorism has developed since the state’s independence in 1961. 
This analysis will be conducted in the light of regional and international pressures 
and the conflicts in surrounding countries. It will further explore why Kuwait has 
been affected by such phenomena, and how far these terrorism threats constituted 
internal or external threats to Kuwait. Additionally, this chapter will examine 
whether these activities and threats were driven by foreign or national Kuwaiti 
movements, and it will assess how serious the threat was to Kuwait in each period. 
It will evaluate the extent to which these movements remain problematic today and 
the potential future threats that they pose to Kuwait. 
This chapter will assess the different sources of threats to the State of Kuwait 
in order to better evaluate the counterterrorism measures by the Kuwaiti 
government, which will be investigated in the chapters that follow. 
Kuwait is situated in an unstable region of the world. Kuwait adjoins Iran, Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia, all of which, including Kuwait, face the threat of terrorism. Since 
its independence, Kuwait has witnessed many incidents in which terrorist groups 
have used such tactics as assassinations, suicide bombings and aircraft hijackings. 
Some of these terrorist activities were retaliatory, because Kuwait had prosecuted 
terrorists or put pressure on the Kuwaiti position on some regional matters. 
The content of this chapter will be presented in chronological order. Kuwait 
has faced terrorist activities during three periods since 1968. It started when the 
People’s Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait sought to impose its ideology of 
Marxism–Leninism. Kuwaiti society witnessed serious extremism from that 
ideology, which was accompanied by attempts to impose that doctrine on the 
Kuwaiti society through varied means. 
 27 
In the 1980s, the Iranian revolution started to affect Kuwaiti society. Many 
young Kuwaiti Shiites were attracted to the revolutionaries. Consequently, during 
the First Gulf War, some young leaders of these movements caused explosions to 
occur in the country, including some in the oil fields.1 
Kuwait has endured terrorist attacks since 2001, a period that began with the 
incidents of September 11 and continued during the campaign in Iraq led by the 
United States. They included assaults on different locations and targets within the 
Kuwaiti territory. The terrorist attacks targeted American forces and Kuwaiti 
security personnel. More dangerously, during this period, Jihadist thought spread in 
the region, including in Kuwait. As a result, the State Security Bureau (SSB) found 
large stores of explosives, arms and some paper plans.2 
For each of these periods, this chapter will discuss firstly the background of 
the terrorist movements and their context. Then it will describe the terrorist groups 
or individuals, their actions and activities, and the terrorist incidents attributed to 
each movement. Lastly, in each period, this chapter will discuss what happened to 
the groups and the extent to which they still present a danger to Kuwait. 
This chapter will be divided into corresponding sections. The first section will 
be about the People’s Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait, 1968–1969. The second 
section will talk about the Iranian-inspired domestic situation, especially after the 
Iranian Revolution and during the Iran–Iraq war, also referred to as the First Gulf 
War. The third section of this chapter will investigate the development and the root 
of the new phenomenon of terrorism in Kuwait, starting with the veteran Jihadists 
of Kuwaiti nationality, who served and returned from the Soviet war in 
Afghanistan, through to today. This section will also examine the organised 
Islamist presence in Kuwait, its connection with Al-Qaida and other issues related 
to the phenomenon of terrorism, such as financers and supporters, fundamentalist 
religious scholars, Kuwait as a source of fighters, and Kuwait’s role within the 
global Jihadi agenda. The fourth section of this chapter will analyse the possible 
future threats from terrorism in Kuwait. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an 
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overall understanding of the development of the phenomenon of terrorism in 
Kuwait. 
This chapter will assess only the threats of terrorism without considering here 
the definition of terrorism, but that issue will be explored in the next chapter in the 
context of Kuwait. However, for the purposes of this chapter, it is recognised that 
there are different types of terrorism, such as state terrorism, non-state terrorism, 
revolutionary terrorism and non-revolutionary terrorism. This thesis will focus only 
on non-state terrorism and more specifically on revolutionary terrorism. Therefore, 
the terrorist activities related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are excluded from this 
thesis, as they represent a type of state terrorism that is not related to the aim of this 
thesis. 
2.2   The People’s Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait, 1968-69 
The People’s Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait is one of the political 
organisations that was affiliated with the Arab Nationalist Movement as a result of 
the multiple conflicts in that large and diverse movement in the Arab world. 
2.2.1 Background of the emergence and the conflicts that happened within 
the Arab Nationalist Movement 
The Arab Nationalist Movement was a direct result of the occupation of 
Palestine by the State of Israel. The Arab Nationalist Movement was established in 
the late 1940s at the American University of Beirut by some students who were 
studying there. They were from many Arab nationalities and included Dr. George 
Habash and Wadea Haddad from Palestine, Dr. Ahmed Al-Khateeb from Kuwait, 
and Hany Al-Hindi from Syria. 3  They worked to establish branches of the 
movement all over the Arab World through the slogans that the movement raised 
during that period, which were composed of three words, ‘unity, liberation, and 
retaliation.’4 It was a pan-Arab nationalist organisation influential in much of the 
Arab world, most famously within the Palestinian movement. It formed many 
branches in different Arab countries. In the beginning of the fifties, Dr. Ahmed Al-
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Khateeb succeeded in forming the first seeds of the movement in Kuwait, as he 
took advantage of the relatively democratic openness in Kuwait when Sheikh 
Abdullah Al Salem Al Sabah became the new Amir of Kuwait.5  Later, the 
movement faced some political divergence, especially from Syria and Iraq, which 
became more attracted to the Nasserist ideology of pan-Arabism or Arab 
nationalism and indeed adopted the Nasserism path.6 
In 1961, a group of army officers seized power in Syria and then terminated 
the unity between Egypt and Syria.7 As a result, a conflict erupted in the Arab 
Nationalist Movement around the feasibility of Scientific Socialism and the 
importance of committing to it. Accordingly, the executive committee of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement arranged an exceptional conference for the leaders of the 
Arab Nationalist Movement in Beirut in 1963. 8  During the conference, two 
different tracks appeared. One advocated Scientific Socialism, while the other 
rejected socialism and preferred Nationalism as an objective in its struggle.9 
However, the convened delegates suggested stopping the conference to avert the 
development of more conflicts between the different nationalist tracks. Later, 
Marxist literature started to attract different figures to the network of the Arab 
Nationalists Movement. Some important figures of the movement, especially those 
from the Gulf, studied Marxism, Leninism, and the Vietnamese Revolution. In 
addition, those important people, who were open to Scientific Socialism, were 
influenced by the Yemeni Revolution that was led by the Nationalist Front for 
Liberating the Occupied South of Yemen and the Democratic Revolutionary Party 
in Northern Yemen.10 
After the defeat of the Arab armies by Israel in June, 1967, the leftist figures 
called for the holding of the first conference of the branches of the Arab Nationalist 
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Movement in Beirut.11 They issued a scathing criticism of the leftist movement of 
Kuwait, which was responsible for regulating the branches of the leftist movement 
in the whole Arab Peninsula, for its failure to follow the activities of the movement 
in the region.12 Consequently, the conference made several decisions. First, it 
decided to consider Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman Sultanate and 
Kuwait as constituting one single regulatory region because of the similarity of the 
political systems in these countries. Second, it proposed to establish two central 
committees, one for the Peninsula and the other for the Gulf region. Third, it 
proposed to establish two political offices, one for the Peninsula and another for the 
Gulf region. Fourth, it committed to Scientific Socialism as a regulatory ideology 
for the movement. The conference avoided talking about Marxism–Leninism 
because of the sensitivity it might create in the Arab Nationalist Movement.13 
Finally, the conference committed the region to armed resistance to the remaining 
British occupation and to bringing down the tribal systems.14 
In 1968, a severe conflict took place during the Fourth Conference of the 
Nationalist Front for Liberating the Occupied South of Yemen between the right 
and the left wings of the Yemeni branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement. The 
left controlled the conference, which led to an alliance between the right wing, 
which was defeated in the conference, and the army. As a result, the military 
arrested the leaders of the left wing of the movement in Southern Yemen, which led 
to a declaration of armed resistance against the military coup.15 These events led the 
leftist figures in the branches of the Arab Nationalist Movement in the Omani coast 
and desert to call all of the branches of the movement in the Arab Peninsula to 
convene in an exceptional conference in Dubai during the second half of July, 
1968.16 Accordingly, the left managed to control the conference and overran the 
right wing of the movement in the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf. The conference 
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then made the following decisions: firstly, it committed to Marxism–Leninism as a 
regulatory ideology of the Arab Nationalist Movement in the Gulf region; secondly, 
it adopted a centralised political office; thirdly, it froze the Kuwaiti leadership of 
the movement because of the leadership’s alliance with the right wing and because 
it rejected the Marxist–Leninist ideology; fourthly, it granted the Political Office of 
the Arab Nationalist Movement in the Peninsula and the Arab Gulf the authority to 
select another name for the organisation and to dismantle its commitments to the 
Arab Nationalist Movement. During the first meeting of the Political Office, a new 
name was approved for the movement, the People’s Revolutionary Movement in 
Oman and the Arab Gulf, instead of the Arab Nationalist Movement in the 
Peninsula and the Arab Gulf. Furthermore, it terminated its relationship with the 
Arab Nationalist Movement in Beirut.17 
The final result of these events that passed over the organisation of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement was the arrangement of many local meetings to discuss the 
decisions of the exceptional conference of Dubai. 
In summary, this section has elaborated how the conflicts within the Arab 
Nationalist Movement had produced a rivalry between groups in the Arab world 
that were revolutionary, that did not believe in the existing regimes, and that 
wanted to bring them down. It has also explained that the formed groups were anti-
Western and their ideologies were broadly Socialist. Consequently, this section sets 
the background to understanding how the aforementioned conflicts contributed to 
the rise of the People’s Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait, which will be 
discussed in the next section. 
2.2.2 The emergence of the People’s Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait and 
its terrorist activities 
Some individuals within the Arab Nationalist Movement in Kuwait took 
advantage of the absence of the leadership of the movement in the summer of 1968 
and called for a regional preparatory conference to discuss the decisions of the 
exceptional conference of Dubai. The leaders of this conference were Dr. Ahmed 
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Al-Robie and Nasser Al-Ghanim.18 They were important figures in the Students’ 
Leadership and the Workers Union, and they had significant relations with the left 
wing of the Arab Nationalist Movement in the branches of the Arab Peninsula and 
the Gulf region. As a result, the left wing of the movement managed to hold the 
preparatory conference in mid-October 1968 and made the following decisions: 
first, it committed to Marxism–Leninism; second, it expelled the leaders of the 
Arab Nationalist Movement in Kuwait, who were Dr. Ahmed Al-Khateeb, Sami Al-
Menais, Dr. Khaled Al-Wesmi, Abdullah Al-Nibari and Ali Radwan; and, third, it 
chose Hussein Al-Youha, Nasser Al-Ghanim, Nashi Saad, Rashed Moharib, Dr. 
Ahmed Al-Robie and AbdulAziaz Al-Duaij to serve as the temporary leadership for 
the movement in Kuwait to manage the affairs of the movement until an 
organisational conference could be established. The affiliated group also decided to 
take another name, the People’s Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait, and 
committed to the decisions made in the exceptional conference of Dubai in July of 
1968.19 
The Political Office of the People's Revolutionary Movement in Oman and the 
Arab Gulf proposed some conditions that, if accepted, would have the branch of the 
People’s Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait be approved as a branch of the 
People's Revolutionary Movement in Oman and the Arab Gulf. One of the most 
serious conditions was to practice violent assaults and to lead armed revolutionary 
violence against the ruling regime in Kuwait. 20  Accordingly, the People's 
Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait led terrorist attacks against the ruling political 
regime in Kuwait. On November 1968, one of these attacks involved the use of 
explosives against the caravan of the Shah of Iran during his visit to Kuwait in front 
of the Iranian Embassy and the airport road. Another, on January 1969, included 
setting explosives in front of the Parliament (the National Assembly), the buildings 
of the Interior Ministry, and the home of the Interior Minister, all in response to the 
rigging of the elections of 25 January 1967.21 These violent acts were accompanied 
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by a campaign of publications that incited the Kuwaiti people to lead a 
revolutionary movement against the regime in Kuwait.22 
As a result, in mid-February of 1969, the Political Office of the People's 
Revolutionary Movement in Oman and the Arab Gulf accepted the People's 
Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait as one of its branches in the region and 
changed its name to the People’s Revolutionary Movement in Oman and the Arab 
Gulf – Kuwaiti Branch. However, shortly after the emergence of this organisation, 
the Kuwaiti authorities arrested most of its members, although other members 
managed to escape the country. On November 29, 1969, twenty-one of the 
members were tried, all of whom were convicted and sentenced to prison, and some 
of them were sentenced in absentia. However, shortly after they were imprisoned, 
the Amir of Kuwait Sheikh Abdullah Al Salem Al Sabah issued an Amiri pardon, 
as the result of which all were freed.23 
Dr. Ahmed Al-Robie, who was one of its leaders, escaped to Oman, where he 
joined the Dhofar Rebellion. However, the Omani authorities seized and 
imprisoned him. Shortly after Al-Robie’s arrest, the Amir of Kuwait intervened and 
requested that the Sultanate of Oman repatriate him to Kuwait. The Sultanate 
complied with the request and released Al-Robie. Upon his return to Kuwait, Al-
Robie was freed due to the Amiri pardon, which was issued to all of the members 
of the People’s Revolutionary Movement in Oman and the Arab Gulf – Kuwaiti 
Branch.24 
Although the People's Revolutionary Movement in Kuwait terminated after 
what happened to it, the Arab Nationalist Movement still exists in Kuwait under the 
name of the Movement of the Progressive Democrats – Harakat Al-Taqaddumiin 
al-Dimuqratiin (a Kuwaiti Political Party). The movement was reconstituted by its 
old and original members, who were expelled by the People's Revolutionary 
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Movement in Kuwait as mentioned above.25 This is a political party that rejects the 
revolutionary ideologies and does not engage in political violence. 
2.3 The Impact of the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq-Iran War on 
Terrorism in Kuwait between 1979-89 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Kuwait faced massive terroristic attacks, some of which took an international 
form, through the turmoil in the Arabian Gulf region after the eruption of the Iraqi–
Iranian war in 1980. When the consequences of the First Gulf War reached Kuwait, 
terrorist events occurred. 
Kuwait has long been a target for many regional and international parties, and 
it was not omitted as a regional entity from the wider international political and 
security stage. 26  Indeed, since its independence, Kuwait has battled for self-
establishment, identity and power in the region. 
Without probing the historical facts deeper, we can summarise that the largest 
strategic challenges that faced Kuwait in the last quarter of the twentieth century 
centred on keeping the independence of the Kuwaiti identity in the face of 
overwhelming creeds and policies that attempted to exert their power. One of the 
most serious challenges was the contagious Iranian Revolution that erupted in 
Tehran after the rise of the Iranian religious political regime in February of 1979, 
which was a serious turning point in the strategic equilibrium in the Middle East.27 
Another serious threat came from the southern part of Iraq, where the Islamic 
Da’awa Party is centred. 
The general and clear viewpoint of the issue of importing the Iranian 
Revolution was not only confined to the spread of the religious revolutionary 
values. It changed the political regimes and imposed special ideological alternatives 
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clearly expressed in the speech and directions of the policies of the Iranian 
Revolution that attracted massive congregations and followers. 
Many countries use national or ethnic loyalties to create a political imbalance 
in another country and to extend political influence over other countries. In this 
way, one country seeks to take advantage of the minorities affiliated to it, who live 
in another country. The aggressor country seeks to use such minorities to 
destabilise the organisation of the political systems in the other country.28 For 
example, the Islamic radical regime in Tehran sought to exploit the racial minorities 
in Gulf countries to destabilise more countries which backed Iraq in its war against 
Tehran between 1980 and 1988.29 Thus, the region witnessed waves of sectarian 
polarisation after the insistence of Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah Musavi 
Khomeini to export the Iranian Revolution to neighbouring states in the region. 
This led to a massive reorganisation of the Shiite groups scattered all over the 
region, applying the same model as the radical system in Iran to oppose the ruling 
families.30 The Iraqi-Iranian War had already added to the separation of the 
political viewpoints in the region, and the sectarian sentiments grew massively, 
especially in Kuwait, due to the fact that Kuwait have more political freedom than 
other countries in the region. 
2.3.2 The Impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran on the Shiites of Kuwait 
Kuwait has ethnic divisions in its society and practically between Sunni and 
Shiite. Most Kuwaiti citizens are Muslim, comprising 85% of the overall 
population. 70% of them are Sunni, and 30% are Shiite.31 Although Shiites are a 
minority, they play an important role in Kuwaiti society. In addition, Kuwaiti 
Shiites are divided into two different groups. Arab Shiites originally came from 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and southern Iraq, and Farsi Shiites came from Iran and are 
the majority of the Shiites in Kuwait. Farsi Shiites are more influenced by the 
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Iranian ideology, as they consider Iran as the protector of their religious beliefs. 
Therefore, these divisions have been exploited for political purposes and have given 
a rise to political conflicts including terrorism. 
The first declared presence of a political Shiite organisation emerged in 
Kuwait in 1963, as the Shiites took advantage of the democratic openness that was 
applied by the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah. The 
Association of the Social Culture – Jami'ah Al-Thaqafa al-Ejtimaiah – was formed 
after Kuwaiti independence and represented the different cults of Shiite in the 
country. It is also considered a quasi-political foundation for the Shiites, which was 
a good social and religious cover despite recording it as a charity and cultural body. 
The Shiites in Kuwait used the organisation for their political activities. It was first 
controlled by political conservatives. However, after the Iranian Revolution, the 
Shiite revolutionary political extension, which was backed by the Iranian Khomeini 
political regime, achieved its first victories by overthrowing the conservatives when 
they won the election. 
A revolutionary spirit started to spread all over the Shiites in the region after 
the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran under the leadership of Ruhollah 
Musavi Khomeini. This was reflected in the regrouping of the Shiites in the region, 
such as the emergence of the Islamic revolution organisation for the liberation of 
the Arabian Peninsula led by Hassan Al-Safar in Saudi Arabia, which was backed 
by Iran. The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain was established in 
Bahrain.32 The Kuwaiti political arena was not far from these changes, as Shiites 
were divided into two parties. 
One party was comprised of conservatives, who were represented by the 
aristocratic party of merchants, who were connected to the ruling local authorities 
and who shared common interests. The objective of this party was to reform the 
religious and social conditions in Kuwaiti society. The other party was made up of 
believers in revolution in Kuwait; they consisted of young Shiite people, especially 
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those of the middle class.33 The objectives of this party were to overthrow the 
conservative regimes and to replace them with an Islamic Republican regime that 
would follow the Iranian model. The Islamic Revolution in Iran became the source 
of awareness and inspiration that represented the overwhelming majority of 
Kuwaiti Shiites. In addition, the Iranian regime considered its embassies to be its 
messengers for building terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah. It was determined to 
export the revolution by supporting the lobbies and followers, forming financial, 
racial and media lobbies, and connecting them together as it did in Lebanon. 
The Islamic Revolution in Iran worked to spread the revolutionary spirit 
among Shiites in Kuwait, especially among young people. The aim was to convince 
them to participate in the demonstration that started at the house of Ayatollah 
Sayyed Abbas Almohri, the representative of Khomeini in Kuwait, in 1979 and 
headed to the Iranian Embassy. The flag of the Shahihshah was removed and 
another was raised with ‘Allah is the greatest’ (Allah – u – Akbar) written all over 
it.34 This was the first Shiite demonstration since 1938. This political movement 
was a massive development for Shiites, especially as it led to a clash between the 
demonstrators and the Kuwaiti Special Forces that tried to stop them. Some of the 
demonstrators were arrested. Abbas Almohri presided over a group derived from 
the leadership of the association. The group went to Iran to congratulate the 
leadership of the revolution, Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, for its success.35 
2.3.3 Turning to violence: the Impact of the First Gulf War 
The Revolutionary Shiite movement took, at first, a conservative stance over 
the policies held by the Kuwaiti government in its support of the Iraqi regime’s war 
against Iran. Then, the Kuwaiti government started to expand its support of Iraq. 
This support was clear in financial, media and military aid, as the total value of the 
financial aid that Iraq managed to take from 1980–1988 reached 15 billion dollars. 
In addition, the Kuwaiti government made available for the Iraqi military the Al-
Ahmadi and Al-Shuaibi ports to transport nutritional materials as well as 
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weapons.36 Most of Kuwait’s capabilities were used in the service of Iraq during the 
war with Iran. 
This support for Iraq angered Kuwaiti Shiites, as they considered Iran the 
protector of Shiites all over the world. The Iranian political regime took advantage 
of the sympathy of these groups of Shiites in the region and in Kuwait to form a 
base for the Kuwaiti Shiites to unite in one group. The radical revolutionary Islamic 
regime in Iran targeted a group of Shiite militants to destabilise the political 
stability of Kuwait in retaliation for Kuwaiti aid to the Iraqi regime.37 As a result, 
the Kuwaiti political arena witnessed terrorist violence between 1980–1988, 
characterised by the spread of terrorist operations and the incitement of the Kuwaiti 
people to revolt against the political ruling system. In addition, groups were 
established that followed the model of the revolutionary state in Iran, which 
conducted many terrorist activities.38 These included the assassination attempt on 
the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, in 1985 and the 
association of some Shiites with explosions in 1986 and in January, May and July 
of 1987 that targeted the oil cities in Kuwait during the political turmoil in 1987. In 
addition, some disturbances occurred in Kuwait between 1980 and 1989. For 
instance, there was a disturbance in the city of Meshref on January 30, 1987 during 
the attempt by Special Forces to capture a group of Shiite militants, when relatives 
of the wanted members fought the Special Forces. 39  Moreover, there were 
confrontations between the Iranian-backed militant groups in the streets between 
1987 and 1990. Evidence of the names of the Arabs and Kuwaitis who supported 
the Iranian regime and collaborated to integrate in it can be found at the web site of 
the Iranian cleric ‘Dar Al Welayah.’40 
Different groups were behind the terrorist incidents that supported the Islamic 
regime in Iran, such as the Battalions of Changing the Regime in the Kuwaiti 
                                                
36 Assiri, A., Kuwait's Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics, Westview Special Studies on the 
Middle East (Boulder, Cob.: Westview Press, 1990), 70-71. 
37 Ibid, 71. 
38 Al-Medaires, F. A., Shiite movement in Kuwait, (1st edn, Kuwait: Dar Qertas, 1999), 30. For 
further reading, see Ramazani, R. K., The Gulf Cooperation Council: record and analysis, (1st edn, 
USA: the University Press of Virginia, 1988), 36-38. 
39 Assiri, A., Kuwait's Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics, Westview Special Studies on the 
Middle East (Boulder, Cob.: Westview Press, 1990), 69 and 72-73. And Al-Medaires, F. A., Shiite 
movement in Kuwait, (1st edn, Kuwait: Dar Qertas, 1999), 30. 
40 ‘Dar Al Welayah’, Available at: <http://www.alwelayah.net/welayah/index.php> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. 
 39 
Republic, the Voice of the Free People of Kuwait, the Organisation of Islamic 
Jihad, and the Forces of the Revolutionary Organisation in Kuwait. Some say that 
the Forces of the Revolutionary Organisation in Kuwait was responsible for most of 
the terrorist operations that took place in the eighties.41 However, others believe 
that all of these names are contrived and that most of these terrorist incidents were 
organised by the Kuwaiti Hezbollah in cooperation with the Islamic Da’awa 
Party.42 
2.3.4 Hezbollah in Kuwaiti 
Hezbollah in Kuwait was established in Kuwait in 1980 after the Iranian 
Revolution and the formation of some Shiite organisations in the regions by young 
Shiites, who were educated in the religious shrine in Qom.43 Some examples of 
these organisations were Hezbollah in Hijaz in Saudi Arabia and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon.44 The Kuwaiti Hezbollah was activated through aid granted to it by the 
Iranian political regime that supervised the establishment of the ‘Al-Nasser’ 
(Victory) magazine as the mouthpiece of the organisation, which called itself the 
pure voice of Muhamedi in Kuwait.45 
Hezbollah in Kuwait is one of the integral movements led by Ayatollah Sayyid 
Mohammad Baqir Mousavi al-Mohri, who is a Kuwaiti Twelver Shi'a Marja. It 
advocates a public referendum to enable the Kuwaiti people to say for themselves 
what they might choose as an independent ruling system. Hezbollah in Kuwait 
suggests that the governmental authorities in Kuwait are determined to isolate the 
Shiites from participating in the political decision making by denying them 
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positions as ministers.46 Hezbollah in Kuwait has always criticised the methods of 
the organisation of the parliamentary constituencies and asserted that Shiites are 
deprived of the advantages of the main newspapers and magazines. Hezbollah in 
Kuwait has also criticised the government’s attitude of denying the entrance of the 
Shiite Qur’an readers and religious figures and denounced the ban over naming 
schools and streets after Shiite figures. They believe that these discriminatory 
stances by the Kuwaiti government will lead the country to be transformed into 
another Lebanon.47 
Hezbollah in Kuwait opposes other political powers and rejects commitment to 
the constitution of 1962. They suggest that the opposition in the Parliament, who 
were the Nationalist at that time, lacked political ambition when they confined their 
ambitions in the establishment of the constitution of 1962, which was ‘a foolish 
mistake.’48 Hezbollah in Kuwait has declared its opposition to the whole political 
regime and invited other political forces to overthrow the whole political system in 
Kuwait. It has blamed the opposition party for its caution in dealing with the Shiite 
opposition in a step that strengthens the discrimination in the Kuwaiti political 
atmosphere, which does not serve anyone but the interests of the ruling regime in 
Kuwait and which widens the gap between the Sunni and Shiite communities in the 
country.49 
Hezbollah has been keen to stir up divisions in the country and to follow the 
policies of the central command in Iran.50 The actions of this party include blessing 
the assassination attempt against Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah by the Islamic 
Da’awa Party on May 25, 1985 while he was traveling from his residence in the Al-
Dasman Palace to the Royal Palace (Al-Sief Palace) on The Arabian Gulf Street. 
The Amir’s car was blocked by a white Nissan driven by a suicide assassin. His 
Excellency was sitting in front beside the driver. The assassin targeted the Amir’s 
car, but he was not successful, as he crashed into a police car causing a massive 
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explosion. Four people died in the incidents, including two of the Amir’s 
bodyguards, but the Amir of Kuwait was not seriously hurt.51 
On July 12, 1985, pro-Iranian terrorists carried out an explosion in two cafés in 
the city of Kuwait that left 11 civilians dead and 89 others injured. 
On April 29, 1986, the Kuwaiti security force declared that it had thwarted a 
terrorist attack planned by 12 people to hijack a plane of Kuwaiti Airlines, which 
was going to East Asia.52 
On April 5, 1988, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi ordered the leadership of Hezbollah 
to hijack a Kuwaiti Airlines known as ‘Al-Jabriyah’ coming from Bangkok to 
Kuwait and to redirect it to Mashad Airport in Iran. This operation, which lasted for 
fifteen days, was under the leadership of Imad Fayez Mughniyah, who was 
considered the head of security in the Lebanese Hezbollah organisation. They tried 
to land at the Beirut Airport, but their requests for permission to land were rejected. 
They then turned to Larnaca International Airport in Cyprus, where they murdered 
two Kuwaiti passengers, Abdullah Al-Khaldi and Khaled Ayoub, and threw their 
bodies off of the plane. Then, they moved to Algeria, where the hostages were 
finally released, and the hijackers escaped, as the Algerian authorities had promised 
to free them if they released the hostages.53 During this incident, the hijackers 
demanded that the Kuwaiti government release some prisoners in Kuwaiti jails. The 
prisoners were accused of conspiracy in the explosions in 1983 with the help of a 
branch from the party called Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad Al-Islami organisation), that 
had targeted a main electric station, the Kuwait International Airport, the American 
and French embassies, a large petrol plant and a residential condominium.  
These incidents caused 7 deaths and 62 others to be injured, all of whom were 
civilian technicians working in the residential and petrol sites. 54  The same 
organisation was also involved in the hijacking of a Kuwaiti airplane called 
‘Kazma’ in 1984 with more than 150 passengers. They took the plane to Mashhad 
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Airport in Iran, where the Iranian special forces raided it after unsuccessful 
negotiations with the hijackers, yet no one knows what happened to the hijackers. 
The casualties were two American passengers.55 However, Hezbollah’s request to 
release the prisoners was rejected by the Kuwaiti government. 
In 1989, the Iranian regime took part in a ruthless terrorist event that took 
place in Mecca when a group of armed Kuwaiti youth, linked to the Kuwaiti 
Hezbollah, moved to Saudi Arabia with the help of some Iranian diplomatic 
members. The group was provided with explosives from the Iranian embassy in 
Kuwait to attack pilgrims in the season of Hajj. This group named itself ‘The 
seekers of the track of the Imam’, and they executed a terroristic operation on June 
23, 1989 with the help of two Iranian diplomats, Sadek Ali Reda and Mohamed 
Reda Gholam.56 The Saudi authorities captured the group, who included 29 Kuwait 
citizens, and accused them of involvement with the Iranian intelligence to conduct 
terrorist activities in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi court executed 16 of them, sent 4 to 
prison, and acquitted the rest.57 The arrested persons confessed that they came to 
Hajj with the intention of carrying out the explosive operations, that they were part 
of the Kuwaiti Hezbollah, and that the group was headed by Ayatollah Sayyid 
Mohammad Baqir Mousavi al-Mohri, who blessed the operation.58 
Hezbollah in Kuwait has been subjected to counteraction from the State 
Security Bureau in Kuwait, as many of its members were arrested for placing 
explosives in various places in the country in an attempt to overthrow the legally 
ruling regime in Kuwait.59 Additionally, on November 11, 1989, the Kuwaiti 
government dissolved the elected Board of Directors of the Association of Social 
Culture, as a result of their alliance with the Iranian regime, and appointed a 
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supervised board instead to manage the affairs of the association.60 According to 
the statistics regarding Hezbollah in Kuwait, 21 of its members died and 527 were 
jailed from the time when the party was established and Iraqi invaded Kuwait in 
1990.61 However, during the Iraqi occupation, the prisoners were able to escape, 
and some of them took part in resisting the occupation, while the others fled to Iran.  
After the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, the government allowed some of the 
members and supporters of the Kuwaiti Hezbollah party, who managed to escape 
during the Iraqi occupation, to return to Kuwait. This was in gratitude for the role 
the Shiites played in the resistance of the Iraqi invasion and for the demanding that 
was made by the Kuwaiti Shiites at home for those who had fled the country could 
return home. 
Additionally, political changes took place in Iran after the death of Ruhollah 
Musavi Khomeini. The new leadership by Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
tended to oppose the external revolutionary movements and wished to establish 
good relations with the Gulf countries. As a result, he closed the Kuwaiti 
Information Centre in Tehran and banned the publication of Al-Nasser magazine 
from Iran.62 This magazine, the mouthpiece of Hezbollah Kuwait, changed its 
headquarters to London and began criticising the leadership of Iran. 
The revolutionary Islamic changes in Iran led to direct changes in the political 
atmosphere in Kuwait. These events affirm that changes that happen in the 
neighbouring countries directly affect the situation inside Kuwait. In reaction, the 
Kuwaiti leadership worked to revise its former policies with more political 
openness in the post-liberation era. 
Although Hezbollah, as an ideology, still exists in Kuwait, the organisation has 
changed its attitude and has become a structured political group that reject political 
violence with the new name of Al-Tahaluf al-Islami al-Watani (the Islamic 
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National Alliance). This political group was created after the Gulf War in 1991, and 
it took full shape in 1998.63 
Having said that, it is worth noting that Hezbollah, as an organisation, is not 
prohibited by the Kuwaiti laws and this also apply for any other organisations, as 
there is no specific law in Kuwait listing/naming the prohibited organisations. 
However, if such organisation commits crimes or activities that are proscribed by 
the law, then individuals will be held liable for committing such crimes. In addition, 
Article 43 of the Kuwaiti Constitutional Law states ‘Freedom to form associations 
and unions on a national basis and by peaceful means is guaranteed in accordance 
with the conditions and manner specified by law.  No one may be compelled to join 
any association or union.’64 However, the explanatory memorandum of the same 
Article prohibited the form of political parties.65 Additionally, Article 30 of the 
State Security Law prohibits any associations, groups or entities ‘which have the 
purpose to disseminate the principles that aimed at the demolition of the basic 
systems illegally or by force to the catabolism of the social system or economic 
system in the country.’66 
This study has shown that terrorism or revolutionary violence has occurred in 
Kuwait that it was inspired and to some extent aided by external influences, 
primarily in this case from Iran. The Iranian regime manipulated the Shiite citizens 
in Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq War to cause terrorist incidents. 
2.4 The Development and the Root of the New Phenomenon of Terrorism in 
Kuwait since the 1990s 
2.4.1 Background 
The international and regional changes in the late eighties and early nineties 
and the Soviet war with Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 led many Arabian people 
from the Gulf States to join the military and Jihadi operations in Afghanistan. After 
the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Taliban ruled in Afghanistan, and the 
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terrorist groups were reinforced through an organisation of international terrorism 
called Al-Qaida.67 
Al-Qaida was formed years ago when a group of young Muslim militants 
travelled to Afghanistan to fight the troops of the Soviet occupation forces in the 
early eighties under the flag of Islam.68 The Services Office of the young militants 
in Afghanistan, known as Maktab Al-Khidamat (MAK), started to recruit a group 
of Arabs in the militant’s movement in collaboration with Osama bin Laden and 
Abdullah Yosef Azzam between 1982 and 1984. This collaboration was meant to 
fight the Soviet and the Afghan Marxist regime.69 Furthermore, the MAK’s role 
was to transfer money collected from different countries and charity resources in 
the Middle East and North America to be used to fund military operations in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, the Philippines and Indonesia.70 
Osama bin Laden started in Pakistan by helping the foreign Jihadists and 
inaugurating the Services Office there. He then moved to Afghanistan to fight the 
Soviets allied with expelled Islamists from Egypt and from other Arab countries.71 
Additionally, and in the same path, the Pakistani leader Zia ul-Haq used his secret 
service to help the Pashtun Afghanis, who played an important role in aiding the 
foreign Islamists and providing shelter for the other radical Afghani militants, 
including Ozbak, Tagic and Heraz.72 
After the Soviet withdrawal in February of 1989, some militants started to 
expand their operations and their targets. Osama Bin Laden started to organise one 
of these movements in 1988 to expand Jihadism.73 In contrast, Azzam attempted to 
keep the original track in the military trend until his assassination in a car bombing 
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in 1989. As a result, the Services Office (MAK) was withdrawn from the 
movement of Azzam and joined the movement of Bin Laden.74 
After the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation, Bin Laden went back to Saudi 
Arabia in 1989, where he was arrested on accusations of weapons trafficking.75 
After that, he moved to Sudan where he commenced the activities of his movement 
in training camps for Jihadists. There, the movement of Al-Qaida took its complete 
and full shape with lists of the roles and positions of its formation committees.76 
Al-Qaida with its new ideology was formed in early the 1990s, at which time it 
had a degree of formal organisation.77 There were some Kuwaiti citizens within the 
formation of Al-Qaida. For example, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, a Kuwaiti citizen who 
had lost his citizenship, was a member of the Consulting Committee and the Media 
Committee.78 Therefore, it is obvious that Al-Qaida had to some extent attracted 
Kuwaiti people from the start of its formation. 
The formation of the movement of Al-Qaida contains five Committees, 
through which Al-Qaida operates its movement. First, at the top level, is the 
Consulting Committee - Lajnat Al Shura (the Consulting Board – Al Majles Al 
Esteshary) - which was comprised of the closest members to Bin Laden in the 
Sharia and the politics committee that start making Fatwas. Second is the Military 
Committee, which is responsible for suggesting targets and operations 
reinforcement. The third is the Funding Committee, which is responsible for 
providing the required funds and for purchasing the necessary weapons and 
explosives, in addition to providing the different provisions for the training camps. 
The fourth is the Security Committee, which is responsible for protecting the 
important figures and managing enemy intelligence. The last is the Media 
Committee, which is responsible for the preparation of media campaigns.79 
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Al-Qaida underwent radical changes as the result of the war led by the United 
States since 2001. It transformed from a unified organisational institution to a half 
disfigured organisation that used some terrorist activities to show that it was still 
capable of waging war.80 These activities included terrorist attacks, assassinations, 
hijacking and taking hostages. There was also some important evidence of Bin 
Laden’s interest in making biological and chemical weapons.81 Today, Al-Qaida is 
a movement or an ideology rather than a structured organisation.82 
After the war on the Taliban and Al-Qaida, the operations of Al-Qaida were 
expanded to all Gulf countries. Previously, it was confined only to some Arab 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This was accomplished especially 
through issuing a Fatwa, in 2001, by Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri and inviting those 
Jihadists to regroup for terrorist attacks against foreigners, especially the American 
forces in the region, and to expel them out of the Arabian Peninsula.83 This inspired 
the rise of young Arabian militants that resulted in sporadic attacks throughout the 
Peninsula. This occurred after the incidents of 9/11, after which all Muslims were 
accused of terrorism and of being a threat to peace and world security.84 This in 
turn led to some oppression against Muslims in some countries. Additionally, the 
unresolved conflict between Israel and the Arabs, especially Palestine, and the 
American occupation of Afghanistan and of Iraq in March, 2003, the collapse of the 
Iraqi regime, and the American military presence in the region worsened the 
relations between Muslims and the West. These events and the extreme racial 
conflict in Iraq led to more conflicts in the whole region and particularly in the 
surrounding countries.85 
The fostering of a global Jihad became more predominant in Kuwait between 
2001 and 2005.86 Perhaps most attributable to the increase in Jihadism in Kuwait 
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was the constant pressure from the Al-Qaida ringleaders, Osama bin Laden and his 
deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, from 2001 until recently for Jihad to be intensified in 
countries in the region that supported the American-led operation in Iraq and for the 
utilisation of oil as a defensive mechanism. 
In addition, this was in part because of Kuwait’s geography – it is situated 
between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, where there is a solid base of Jihadis – and partly 
because of the pro-American policies that it adopted. Kuwait has borne the brunt of 
escalating susceptibility caused by the twofold pressure of the invasion of Iraq 
steered by the United States and the proliferation of extremism all over the 
Peninsula. At the same time, as some parts of the society in Pakistan became 
extremist due to the 1980s anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan, edging radicalisation 
was noted in part of the society in Kuwait due to the Jihad in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.87 As such, terrorist groups, among them Al-Qaida, prefer Kuwait for their 
logistical operations, like the enrolment of combatants for Jihad purposes 
(Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) and as a hub for the transfer of its funds, equipment and 
workforce to other countries, above all to Iraq.88 
2.4.2 Kuwait’s position within the Global Jihadi agenda 
Even though Kuwait is not a key target of Al-Qaida and its supporters, it plays 
a part in the global Jihadi plan largely for two reasons. The first is its affiliation 
with the United States especially after the First Gulf War, which illustrates 
significantly the ‘imperialist presence’ that Washington is claimed by Al-Qaida to 
maintain in the Arabian Peninsula.89 Presently, a large foreign military presence 
exists in Kuwait, which includes 16 functioning and 6 inoperative bases and 
thousands of soldiers.90 This acts as a target for different extremists following the 
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Jihadist philosophy and Al-Qaida. To extremists, the Kuwaiti administration is also 
a good target because of its support for the United States and to some degree its 
only partial compliance with the Islamic/Sharia laws.91 Article 2 of the Kuwaiti 
Constitution states that ‘the Islamic Sharia shall be a main source of legislation’ 
rather than the only source of legislation. 92  Another, and perhaps the most 
important, reason why Kuwait is a target of Al-Qaida is that Kuwait is a transfer 
country for cash, equipment and operatives in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Pakistani, where the ‘Holy War’ is being fought. 
Physically, the operation of Al-Qaida in Kuwait is theoretically subservient to 
the authorised Al-Qaida franchise in the area, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), and to Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI).93 Headquartered mostly in Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen, AQAP’s control over the operations of the Jihadists in Kuwait is not 
clear. Even so, its itinerary implies that its reach encompasses the whole Gulf 
region.94 Because of the increasing attention that AQAP received in 2009, mainly in 
Yemen, its expansion is expected to be hesitant. 
The targeting of Yemen and Saudi Arabia by AQAP has inspired other 
extremists to plan attacks on Western targets in Kuwait. These extremists may have 
historic relations to leaders of Al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is important 
that some of the most high-ranking Al-Qaida operational individuals, such as 
Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Hakim Murad and Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the architect of 
the September 11 attacks, were of Kuwaiti origins and that their families and 
friends still reside there.95 Moreover, the extremists have also aided the enrolment 
of Kuwaitis into Al-Qaida and the International Islamic Front (IIF).96 
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When the United States began air assaults on Al-Qaida bases in Afghanistan 
on October 7, 2001, approximately 150 Kuwaitis were in the Al-Qaida and IIF 
training bases.97 Approximately 50 were alleged to have perished during the air 
assaults, but the rest either escaped to Iran or Pakistan or were seized by the 
Pakistani Army. A few made their way to Iraq after March of 2003. The rest 
succeeded in returning to Kuwait.98 
Terror events have been on the rise in Kuwait in the wake of the September 
11th attacks, most of which have been linked to Al-Qaida. 
In October of 2002, two Kuwaiti extremists, Anas Al Kandari and Jasem Al 
Hajri, opened fire at a base on Failaka Island, approximately 10 miles off the 
Kuwaiti City coast, killing one U.S. Marine and injuring another.99 The attackers 
were killed in the confrontation; one of them was said to have sworn loyalty to 
Osama bin Laden. In the following month, an audiotape was released in which 
Osama glorified the attack and proclaimed that it was the work of ‘zealous sons of 
Islam in defense of their religion.’100 The former Al-Qaida chief of external 
operations, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, professed total responsibility for the attack.101 
In his book The Martyr’s Oath, Stewart Bell gave details of how Suleiman Abu 
Ghaith enrolled and brainwashed the gunmen. 102  Published Guantanamo trial 
manuscripts establish that Anas al Kandari was related to one of the detainees, Faiz 
al Kandari. Both were trained together with Abu Ghaith at a pre-9/11 airport 
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training camp close to Qandahar in Afghanistan, one of bin Laden’s many training 
camps.103 
Next, two American soldiers on their way to their base in November of 2002 
were attacked by a law enforcement agency officer, who worked in the Ministry of 
Interior. He stopped the soldiers in the 7th ring road, shot one of them in the face 
and the other in the shoulder. He was an Al-Qaida sympathiser and, according to 
BBC News, had a history of mental illness.104 The officer was arrested and 
sentenced to jail.105 
Subsequently, in March of 2003, the State Security Bureau arrested a five 
member terrorist ring. Three members of this ring were Al Awqaf’s mosque 
management employees. Security officers found them with ammunition and plans. 
According to the confiscated plans, the ring was planning an assault on Kuwaiti and 
American targets. Nearly all of the ring members had been to Afghanistan and 
received coaching on how to carry out a terroristic attack.106 Three of them were 
sentenced to prison, and the other two were acquitted.107 
Two months prior to this, a few miles from the American military base called 
‘Camp Doha,’ two civilian workers employed by the American military in Kuwait 
were ambushed and attacked. One was killed and the other injured. 108  The 
perpetrator was captured by the Saudi authorities and extradited to Kuwait. 
According to the BBC, he confessed to being an Al-Qaida and Bin Laden 
sympathiser.109 
Kuwaiti authorities apprehended approximately 37 operatives of a global jihadi 
ring that, in the beginning of 2005, had carried out a number of incursions. Among 
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those apprehended were citizens of Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and 
Australia.110 Even though it was most probable that the extremists were linked to 
Al-Qaida, reports indicate that a number of them were not affiliated to any 
organisation. While they were being interrogated, several rings were mentioned; it 
became apparent that these rings were independently operating as had been the case 
in Iraq. These rings included The Mujahideen of Kuwait, The Brigades of the Two 
Shrines, The Sharia Falcons Squadron, The Peninsula Lion Brigade and The Martyr 
Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin Brigade, the name of which indicates that it was named after 
an Al-Qaida’s peninsula group leader, who was killed in June of 2005 by security 
officials in Saudi Arabia.111 
Three terrorist rings were said by the authorities in Kuwait to have operated in 
the country.112 The first of these was under the stewardship of Amer Khalif al 
Enezi, who died while in police custody, and his brother, Nasser, who was killed 
during the confrontation with the State Security Bureau at the end of January. This 
ring was called The Peninsula Lions. The second ring, under the leadership of 
Mohsen al-Fahdli, was called The Kuwait Mujahideen. The last ring, headed by 
Ahmad al-Mutairi and Khaled al-Dousari, was nameless.113 
Mohsen Al-Fahdli worked with Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and was affiliated 
with Suleiman Abu Ghaith, a former Kuwaiti who lost his citizenship in 2001 and 
was an Al-Qaida spokesman.114 While in Afghanistan, Al-Fahdli became friends 
with Ahmad al-Mutairi, who became a partner in 2003 in the establishment of The 
Peninsula Lions, an Al-Qaida network, also referred to in Kuwaiti as Al-Jazeera 
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Lions and Asood al Jazeera.115 Al-Fahdli worked with an Islamic international 
group in Chechnya in a revolt against the Russians and he fought the Russian forces 
there.116 He partnered with, and was under, Abu Al-Walid Al-Ghamdi while he was 
there and later met the leader of the Arab fighters, Thamer Al-Swailem, also known 
as Khattab.117 In 2002, Al-Fahdli returned to Kuwait to supervise The Kuwaiti 
Mujahidin, a group that infiltrated the security authorities there.118 
Through the help of three Kuwaiti military officers and by keeping a close 
relationship with the Wahhabism School of clerics in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Al-
Fahdli orchestrated attacks on Western hotels based in Yemen.119 This plot was 
thwarted, however, by Yemeni authorities with help from Kuwaiti authorities.120 
Consequently, in mid-November of 2002, Al-Fahdli was apprehended and 
questioned by Kuwaiti authorities but later released. 121  Thereafter, he fully 
incorporated his group, the Kuwaiti Mujahidin, with the Peninsula Lions. 
Following the Riyadh compound bombings that occurred in mid-May of 2003, Al-
Fahdli’s name appeared on the list of the 36 most wanted issued by the Saudi 
authority in 2005.122 
It has been established that Asood al Jazeera, Al-Jazeera Lions, or The 
Peninsula Lions was the name used by the Kuwaiti wing of Al-Qaida. Its operation 
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in the Emirate ran from late 2002 to 2005, by the end of which almost all of its 
operatives were killed, apprehended or escaped to Iraq.123 
Al Jazeera is Arabic for island but is commonly used to refer to the Arab 
Peninsula that is bordered by the sea in three directions and by the desert in the 
fourth, the North in this case. Journalists allege that, while being cross-examined, 
Amer Al-Enezi acknowledged that the Al-Jazeera Lions were affiliated with the al-
Haramain Brigades operated by the late Abdul Aziz Muqrin, an Al-Qaida leader of 
Saudi origin.124 Al-Enezi confirmed that he and his younger brother, Nasser al-
Enezi, were given explosives and remote control detonators and training in the 
Kuwaiti desert so that they could execute assaults on the American military 
convoys that were en route to Iraq via Kuwait. He also said that he went to Iraq, 
where he gained weapon and explosive use and transportation techniques.125 He 
also explained the travelling to Iraq of Mohsen al-Fahdli and Khaled al-Dosari, 
high-ranking operatives.126 
The principal objective of the Asood al Jazeera was to ‘expel Americans from 
the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Jazeera).’127 In the long run, as established by Al-Enezi, 
the group aimed at establishing an Islamic emirate in the region through extensive 
bombings and murders.128 From the name, it can be gathered that the group’s focus 
is not only on Kuwait but also on administrations all across the Arab Peninsula that 
are friendly to the United States.129 
Following a probe on the activities and location of the murdered Fawaz al-
Otaibi, security forces in Kuwait, on 30 January 2005, surrounded a six floor 
building in the Kuwait City neighbourhood of Salmiya, where activists of Asood al 
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Jazeera assembled.130 After a brief shootout, Nasser Al-Enezi was among the three 
activists killed. He was formerly a Kuwaiti policeman and the brother of the gang 
leader, Amer Khlaif Al-Enezi. A fourth activist was apprehended. A security officer 
afterwards succumbed to his injuries suffered during the shootout.131 
Using leads from the arrested activist, Amer Al-Enezi, along with two other 
activists, was arrested the following night about 30 kilometers south of Kuwait City 
in the Mubarak Al-Kabeer area. Four militants were killed in the raid.132 These 
events and those that ensued led to the arrest of seventeen Kuwaiti suspects, two 
Jordanians, two Saudis and four Bidoon without nationality.133 Other ringleaders, 
such as Khaled al-Dosari and Mohsen al-Fahdli, were able to escape, never to be 
caught.134 This operation, which caused the death of 8 Islamic activists and the 
apprehension of the others, effectively disabled the Kuwaiti Al-Qaida network. 
The prosecution of 37 Al-Jazeera Lions activists began on the 24 of May in 
2005 in Kuwait City. 11 of these activists were prosecuted in absentia.135 Only 
eight days after being apprehended, on February 8, 2005, Amer Khlaif Al-Enezi 
died in jail, allegedly as a result of ‘heart failure.’136 A cleric at the al Jahra mosque, 
Al-Enezi, was seized on January 31. Before his death, he was sacked in the summer 
of 2004 by the Awqaf (endowment) and Islamic Affairs Ministry because of his 
extremist opinions. In fact, he chose to ignore the many warnings from the Kuwaiti 
authority for his demanding Jihad against the Iraqi based U.S. Army.137 The wife of 
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Amer al-Enezi, Asood al Jazeera spiritual leader, Noha al-Enezi, was not put on 
trial because of her cancer, to which she later succumbed in April of 2005. 
On December 27, 2005, all of the charges against seven suspects were 
dropped, among them the Islamist lawyer, Osama Al-Monawer, and Hamid Al-Ali. 
Three Kuwaitis and three Bidoon (without citizenship) were found guilty of 
planning to execute suicide attacks in Iraq and were sentenced to death. One was 
given a life sentence and the remaining sentences ranged from four months to 
fifteen years.138 Looking at the total casualty numbers, eight terrorists, four security 
officers and one Bahrainian civilian were killed in the confrontations.139 
As recent as August of 2009, six members of an Al-Qaida affiliated ‘terrorist 
network’ who were organising attacks on an American military base ‘Camp 
Arifjan’ were apprehended by Kuwaiti security officers.140 The camp, which is 
under heavy surveillance, accommodates 15,000 American soldiers and is the 
logistics camp for troops operating in Iraq.141 The six apprehended suspects, who 
were Kuwaiti citizens, had in their plans an attack on the command centre of the 
Kuwaiti internal security agency.142 
The attacks and terrorist incidents that happened in Kuwait between 2001 and 
2009 can be divided into two categories: attacks that were generally directed 
against foreigners, specifically American forces, and attacks that were aimed at the 
Kuwaiti security forces. 
This section has provided an overview of the Jihadi terrorist threats and their 
phenomenon in Kuwait. Terrorism is an enduring threat to Kuwait, and some of its 
activities have been internal, while others have been external. However, most of the 
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terrorist incidents share an internal element, although the ideological concept has 
been adopted and implemented from the external influences, i.e. from Al-Qaida. 
Moreover, the presence of American troops in Kuwait has, to some extent, played a 
role in increasing the number of terrorist incidents in Kuwait, especially after the 
Bin Laden’s Fatwas to target the foreign bases in the Peninsula. 
2.5   Further Threats to Kuwait 
In addition to the attacks on the Western and regime targets mentioned above, 
Kuwait offers other benefits to the Jihadists. To begin with, Kuwait is a critical 
transit station for money transfers, and equipment and workforces transfer from the 
countries in the Gulf to other countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq,143 but 
also to Syria since 2012. Because this route is inadequately watched by Kuwaiti 
security agencies, it is an important channel that sustains guerrilla and terror 
organisations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Using their smuggling and document 
forgery systems, the terror organisations use Kuwait to sustain them fiscally and 
militarily. As a result, Kuwaiti extremists have become very important players at 
the heart of the Pakistani Al-Qaida operations, involved in both logistics and the 
operation of the organisation.144 
In the same light, Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), the Al-Qaida faction in Iraq, has 
recruited some of its operatives (troops and suicide bombers) from Kuwait.145 The 
youth of Kuwait were and still are being enrolled and dispatched, via Syria, to Iraq 
to carry out their ‘Jihadi duty’ in attacking coalition forces. In fact, dependable 
sources state that a number of Kuwaiti youths have joined Al-Qaida in Iraq to fight 
American forces and local security services.146 From these reports, eleven Kuwaitis 
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have been killed during suicide operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2005.147 A 
case, which came to be known as the case of ‘recruiting youngsters,’ was tried in 
the Kuwaiti Criminal Court in 2004 that involved devout extremists, who were 
recruiting young men and dispatching them to Iraq to fight American troops.148 In 
the account of an Iraqi AQI commander, tens of Kuwaitis were under his watch as 
of 2008.149 
The greatest danger to the national security of Kuwait comes from veteran 
Kuwaiti Jihadists, who, on completion of their ‘duty’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, are 
eager to put into practice in their native land what they learned abroad. Because of 
the extensive connections with other operatives and the required insurgent fighting 
and bomb-making techniques that these skilled extremists possess, the proclivity 
for attacks on Western and Kuwaiti administrations is heightened.150 A number of 
reports have established that efforts have previously been made to use experts from 
Kuwait in attacks, and high-ranking Al-Qaida officers in Pakistan are notorious for 
assigning trainees from Kuwait to covert missions that are to take place in 
Kuwait.151 Nevertheless, the trend of veteran Kuwaiti Jihadists initiating attacks in 
Kuwait will still be restrained, provided that more appealing Jihad areas, like 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and others, exist. 
Since the Guantanamo Bay camps opened on January, 2002, twelve Kuwaiti 
prisoners, who were seized on the Afghan–Pakistan border, were held in the camps. 
Ten of them were later relocated and deported to Kuwait, while Fayiz Mohammed 
Al Kandari and Fawzi Khaled Al Odah, the remaining two, remain there.152 All of 
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the deported former inmates were charged but eventually found not guilty by the 
Kuwaiti Criminal Courts because of insufficient proof that they committed such 
offences.153 While each of these deportees are presently living normal lives, with 
most getting married and starting their families, one of them, Abdallah Saleh Ali Al 
Ajmi, on March 28, 2008, carried out a suicide attack in the Iraqi town of Mosul.154 
The funding of terrorist activities is another of the problems that Kuwait faces. 
Since the cause of this problem is its neighbour Saudi Arabia, a number of 
supporters who offer financial aid to Middle East and Asian Jihadists to enable 
them to accomplish their terror attacks are believed to be in Kuwait.155 Due to the 
increasing official knowledge of this trend, much energy has been put into ensuring 
that the transfer of criminal money is forbidden and prevented. Measures that 
restrict the movement and trading of arms by these extremists and that freeze 
terrorist funds have also been adopted by the Sanctions Committee of the United 
Nations Security Council.156 
The role played by the fundamentalist intellectuals in Kuwait is the final 
dynamic of Islamic activity in the country. Perhaps the most renowned case 
involved a Salafi cleric Hamid Abdallah Ahmad Al-Ali, who has attracted many 
enthusiasts. A former secretary general of al-Harakat al-Salafiyya fil-Kuwait (The 
Salafi Movement of Kuwait), from 1991 to 1999 and a professor of Islamic Studies 
at Kuwait University, 157  Al-Ali has been publicly labelled by the American 
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authorities a sponsor of, and an advocate for, terrorism all over the world.158 His 
opinions were viewed as extremist and sympathetic to Al-Qaida, such as, for 
example, giving out fatwas supporting the crashing of planes into buildings.159 In 
contrast, some of his other opinions were seen as more associated to the rational 
attitude forced on him by the authorities, such as, for example, influencing Muslim 
youth by using his sermons and articles that he broadcasts on his website.160 As to 
his fatwas, ‘in modern time(s) this can be accomplished through the modern means 
of bombing, or by bringing down an airplane on an important site that causes the 
enemy great casualties.’ 161  These fatwas endorsed ‘the permissiveness, and 
sometimes necessity, of suicide operations on the conditions of crushing the enemy 
(or causing moral defeat to the enemy), to obtain victory.’162 
Al-Ali was among the many who demanded retaliation against America 
because of the humiliation of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib. In May 2004, he said 
that ‘…the new conservatives, and particularly the gang of [U.S. President George 
W. Bush], are enjoying the humiliation of the Muslims.’163 In addition to financing, 
recruiting, and providing ideological and logistical assistance to the extremists, Al-
Ali is alleged to have aided in the provision of explosives training to possible 
trainees in 2004.164 In his website, he published techniques for manufacturing 
explosives and biological and chemical weapons. After publishing fatwas 
proclaiming that Kuwait and other governments were kuffar (unbelievers) and 
hence were lawful targets for the Mujahideen (for tolerating the antagonism by non-
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Islamic countries to Muslims), Al-Ali was arrested and handed a suspended 
sentence.165 
According to the Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) 
regarding Al-Qaida and its associates and affiliates, Al-Ali is the sponsor and 
religious leader of the Kuwaiti-based The Peninsula Lions, a group that was 
responsible for orchestrating attacks on Kuwaiti and American targets at the 
beginning of 2005. The group looked up to him for ideological guidance.166 In fact, 
it is said by the committee that Al-Ali made numerous visits to the group’s 
Kuwaiti-based camps to provide funds in support of its terroristic activities.167 
Suleiman Abu Ghaith, a former religious teacher in a Kuwait City high school, 
was another key extreme religious individual, who later became a key Al-Qaida 
figure.168 On becoming an Al-Qaida member in 2000, Abu Ghaith, became a 
member of the group’s Majles al Shura, the legislation and consulting committee. 
He also headed the group’s media committee and was in charge of propaganda, 
making him the group’s official spokesman and one of bin Laden’s most trusted 
advisors.169 Abu Ghaith was part of a section of Al-Qaida high-ranking officials 
who left for Iran in 2005 and is alleged to be there presently, in what some refer to 
as protective detention. A publication entitled The Long War Journal labelled his 
custody ‘a loose form of house arrest.’170 Al Rai, the Kuwaiti newspaper, reported 
on September 9, 2010, that, in exchange for Heshmatollah Attarzadeh, a diplomat 
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from Iran, who was abducted in November of 2008, Abu Ghaith was released and 
returned to Afghanistan.171 
In the month that followed the attacks of September 11, he was seen on two 
extensively distributed videos that were first broadcast by Al Jazeera defending the 
attacks and warning of further retaliations if the United States went ahead with the 
planned Afghanistan invasion. He stated: ‘The Americans should know that the 
storm of plane attacks will not abate, with God's permission. There are thousands of 
the Islamic nation's youths who are eager to die just as the Americans are eager to 
live.’172 
Another of the radicals is a terrorist architect and agitator based in Kuwait, 
Mubarak Mushakhas Sanad al-Bathali. Like Al-Ali, al-Bathali is labelled by the 
United Nations and the US government a financial sponsor and supporter of 
terrorism.173 In Al-Qaida, he functions as a solicitor and recruiter. In a number of 
Kuwaiti mosques, he has spoken to fundraise for Al-Qaida.174 For many years, he 
solicited funds for terrorist groups, which led him, in 1999, to a number of high-
ranking Al-Qaida officials to whom he gave $100,000.175 Other incidents of 
financing in which he was involved included: giving approximately $20,000 to an 
Al-Qaida finance manager in Pakistan in 2001 through a courier service; 
contributing, through Syrian links, $20,000 to Ansar al-Islam in 2002-2003; 
funding, through AQI agents in 2003-2004; and collecting hundreds of Kuwaiti 
dinars weekly for terrorist groups like Al-Qaida, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and Ansar al-
Islam in 2004.176 In addition, in 2001, al-Bathali, alongside his son, produced about 
six thousand copies of a propaganda tape that was recorder by bin Laden’s advisor. 
Later in 2003, he echoed his desire to support the recruitment of Arabian Peninsula 
                                                
171 ‘Suleiman Abu Ghaith returned to Afghanistan’, Al Rai, (9 September 2010), Available at: 
<http://www.alraimedia.com/Alrai/Article.aspx?id=225609> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
172 ‘In full: Al-Qaeda statement’, BBC, (10 October 2001), Available at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1590350.stm> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
173 U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, Treasury Designations Target Terrorist Facilitators, (7 
December 2006), Available at: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp191.aspx> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-
Qaida and associated individuals and entities, Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: 
QI.A.238.08. MUBARAK MUSHAKHAS SANAD MUBARAK AL-BATHALI, Available at: 
<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI23808E.shtml> 
 63 
Muslim youth, mainly Kuwaiti and Saudi, into Al-Qaida-allied combatants in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.177 
The support that al-Bathali was talking about consisted of soliciting 
contributions for the operatives and utilising the Internet to raise funds and to 
spread propaganda. 178  To show this, in 2006, he assisted the movement of 
operatives who were organising attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an interview 
published in May of 2008, he conceded that he took part in the recruitment of youth 
and in transporting them to fight oversees, specifically in Afghanistan, and that he 
had on previous occasions transported some to Chechnya, Kosovo and Iraq.179 In 
July of 2003, his son, Abdulrahman, went to Iraq to enrol in the Mujahideen but 
was later arrested and jailed.180 Abdulrahman was later found not guilty by an Iraqi 
court and released after seven years in both American and Iraqi detention centres.181 
Abdulrahman died nine months after his release after he instigated a suicide 
attack on Iraqi-based American troops.182 When asked to comment on the death of 
his son by Al Watan newspaper, al-Bathali said: ‘Thank God for the honour of the 
martyrdom of my son, Abdulrahman, and I recommend that all parents should do 
dearly for this great religion, because Allah has made sacrifice a way to enter 
Heaven.’183 He added that, ‘if I had had another son, or sons, I would have sent 
them to Jihad as well.’184 In conclusion, he commented that ‘I would wish to die in 
the same way as my son Abdulrahman did.’185 
It is apparent that clerics like Hamid al-Ali, Mubarak al-Bathali and Suleiman 
Abu Ghaith play an important part in teaching and propagandising Kuwaiti Salafis 
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and radicals, in particular the ones that enrol in the armed battle of the Jihadist. 
Therefore, it should be noted that chapter four will investigate the extent to which 
speech or incitement that encourages violent actions is prohibited or prevented in 
Kuwait. 
2.6   Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there have been various sources of threats of 
terrorism to the State of Kuwait, as it has faced terrorism activities in three different 
periods. It started in 1968. Some of the earlier terrorist activities still exist to today 
(such as financers and supporters, fundamentalist religious scholars), some of the 
earlier threats have largely ended (the People’s Revolutionary Movement in 
Kuwait), while others pose possible future threats (the Iranian-inspired domestic or 
Hezbollah in Kuwait and the veteran Jihadists). It has been demonstrated that most 
of the terrorist actions and ideologies are generated from external influences. In 
fact, most of the ideologies have been imported from outside doctrines and do not 
relate to purely Kuwaiti causes. However, the research has illustrated that such 
radical doctrines have influenced Kuwaiti citizens and have thereby had an impact 
on Kuwait. In fact, most of the active terrorists in Kuwait were Kuwaiti citizens 
who adopted various radical ideologies. This chapter has also analysed the different 
level of threats to Kuwait. It has shown that most of the threats that Kuwait has 
experienced were revolutionary in nature but none remotely threatened the stability 
of the state or can be compared to the existential threats posed by states hostile to 
Kuwait, especially Iraq. 
In addition, this chapter has analysed the nature of the threats and the different 
types and groups of terrorism that the State of Kuwait has experienced. It has 
established that, while externally inspired for the most part, most of the terrorist 
activities have an internal element. Additionally, it was shown that, 
overwhelmingly, ideological concepts have been adopted and implemented from 
external influences. This chapter has also demonstrated that some of the terrorist 
perpetrators have been trained outside Kuwait, for example in Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Iran, and when they returned they tried to implement what they have learned 
abroad. It has been explored that the Kuwaiti geo-political situation has to some 
extent exacerbated its terrorism problems, though terrorism does ultimately involve 
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Kuwaiti people. This chapter discovered that some of the terrorist activities in 
Kuwait have been aided from outside the country, especially during the Iranian 
Revolution. However, today most of the supporters are seen to be Kuwaiti citizens. 
Additionally, those supporters are not only supporting terrorist activities in Kuwait, 
but also they supporting terrorist activities outside the country. 
Therefore, having presented and assessed the different threats and sources of 
terrorism to Kuwait, and after illustrating that the threats to Kuwait from terrorism 
were limited in nature and not extensive compared to other neighbouring countries 
(like Iraq), the next question to be answered is what is the appropriate reaction to 
those threats? Thus, the next chapters will evaluate and assess the different 
counterterrorism policies and laws that Kuwait has implemented and adopted to 
combat terrorism. These will be assessed by reference to effectiveness and fairness, 
and whether such initiatives were externally/internally driven. 
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Chapter Three 
Kuwait’s Counterterrorism Strategies 
3.1   Introduction 
Kuwait does not yet have an articulation of a comprehensive counterterrorism 
policy that in some manner resembles the United Kingdom’s policy CONTEST.1 
However, this chapter will show, whilst looking at the disparate strategies which 
Kuwait has adopted during its history in responding to terrorism, that there is a 
fairly comprehensive set of strategies about countering terrorism in Kuwait. 
Therefore, elements like criminalisation, international cooperation, protective 
security and education are common themes which will emerge whilst looking at the 
different responsive measures that the State of Kuwait adopted since its 
independence. For this reason, the present chapter will consist largely of an 
overview of Kuwait’s laws, policies, and regulations. Although Kuwaiti 
counterterrorism legislation has certain gaps, it tackles the terrorism threats in 
response to their emergence. Nevertheless, the information about counter-terrorism 
measures in Kuwait is fragmented, which emphasises the need to design a more 
comprehensive and integrated policy. The purpose of the present chapter is thus to 
look at the policies and strategies in Kuwait that are designed to react to terrorist 
threats, and the counterterrorism mechanisms and reactions that the state has 
developed so far. In addition, this chapter will explore whether the development of 
the counterterrorism strategies reflected the actual need to react to the national and 
international terrorism threatening Kuwait, or were they the effect of the 
international pressures? In the context of the present discussion, the legal, 
institutional, and public domains of counterterrorism activity in Kuwait will be 
covered. 
Kuwait is a relatively young state, which must exist and develop in a 
problematic political environment. Being one of the Gulf countries and a neighbour 
of Iran and Iraq, both nurturers of terrorism, separatism, and Islamist extremism, 
Kuwait faces additional challenges in its democratic and human development. Even 
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with the multi-faceted support of the West, mainly the United States and the United 
Nations, Kuwait still experiences challenges in defining its domestic and 
international policies, in tackling the dangers of terrorism, and in identifying the 
workable strategies to counter terrorist activities targeted at the Kuwaiti people and, 
through Kuwait, at the international community. 
To target terrorism effectively, Kuwait must develop a comprehensive legal, 
institutional, and public framework for responding to terrorist acts and threats. To 
accomplish that task, Kuwait must overcome a range of troubling issues, such as 
the initial formulation of a comprehensive domestic vision of what ‘terrorism’ is. 
As Ben Saul noted, even UN Resolution 1373 (2001), adopted immediately after 
and in response to the most notorious and large-scale act of terror occurred on 11 
September 2001, did not provide a comprehensive and recognisable definition of 
terrorism as a phenomenon, thus complicating the task of criminalising terrorism by 
states.2 The basis of defining terrorism in this resolution was provided by the earlier 
International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which 
states in Article 2(1)(b) that terrorism is an 
act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a 
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from 
doing any act.3 
This present definition is quite broad and does not present a clear framework for 
considering terrorism as distinct from any other form of criminal or political 
activity. 
In addition to this definition, regional efforts have been made to identify 
terrorism. The results of legal work are seen in the 1998 Arab Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorism that defined terrorism as 
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any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that 
occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal 
agenda and seeking to sew panic among people, causing fear by 
harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or 
seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private 
installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking 
to jeopardise a national resources.4 
However, even though this definition is much more detailed and concise than the 
UN version, the Arab Convention has been widely blamed for restricting the 
individual freedom of Arab people and increasing the power of authoritarian Arab 
governments in identifying the actions of political opponents as terrorism.5 Not 
only is the Arab Convention accused of engendering unfairness, but also the UN 
documentation, in particular the Security Council Resolution 1373, has also been 
criticised for restricting human rights.6 Therefore, Kuwait and other Arab countries 
still face a challenge in the way in which they criminalise terrorism and its 
financing, as well as making their legal, institutional, and public policy mechanisms 
and reactions to terrorism more effective and appropriate to meet local terrorist 
threats. 
Nevertheless, Kuwait has almost entirely followed the international definition 
on terrorism that has been provided under the ICSFT 1999, as discussed in chapter 
five, and has not produced its own definition on terrorism. Especially, since Kuwait 
has not passed any comprehensive counterterrorism law to date, it is therefore 
justifiable/reasonable that there was not any need to formulate a definition on 
terrorism. However, as discussed in chapter four, Kuwait needs to have a 
comprehensive counterterrorism law in order at least to protect its citizens and 
territories from the threats of terrorism that have been amplified in the region. As a 
result, a definition of what is terrorism means to Kuwait need to be set out, and 
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need to be in the line with the rule of law and the human rights obligations in order 
to make the law effective and fair. 
3.2   The Legal Framework of Kuwait’s Counterterrorism Response 
3.2.1 Kuwait’s Constitution and the Government’s Response to Terrorism 
The Constitution provides the framework for the legislation that should be 
established at all levels in Kuwait. The compliance with this framework ensures 
legitimacy for the laws issued in accordance with the Constitution. For this reason, 
an overview of the national Constitution of Kuwait is necessary within the 
framework of this section. 
An effective counterterrorism policy based on state legislation is one of 
Kuwait’s priorities to achieve its national stability and development. Located in the 
hostile environment (characterised by continuous wars, invasions, military 
conflicts, rivalry for economic dominance over natural resources) caused by 
neighbouring countries, Kuwait nevertheless seeks to follow its own 
counterterrorism policy.7 Given its strategic wealth, it is not surprising that, since 
the beginning of the 21st century, Kuwait has occupied a significant role in the 
global counterterrorism struggle.8 
The State of Kuwait is based on the Constitution adopted in 1962 after gaining 
its national independence.9 As any other Constitution, it reveals the societal rights 
and values which are to be protected by law. However, it is difficult to identify 
whether Kuwait’s Constitution provides a suitable setting for an effective national 
counterterrorism policy. On the one hand, the state Constitution has a relatively 
democratic nature, because it provides ‘the broad guarantees of freedoms and rights 
including freedom of conscience, religion and press (Articles 35 to 37), and 
equality before the law (Article 29)’.10 On the other hand, according to Article 4 of 
the Constitution, Kuwait is an hereditary emirate that supposes the rule of a single 
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dynasty (currently ruled by the descendants of the late Mubarak Al-Sabah); ‘this 
Article, in practice, has also been extended to the nominating and appointing the 
Prime Minister, who also need to be from the descendants of the late Mubarak Al-
Sabah’. 11 As a result, the practical implementation of this Article imposes 
restrictions and limitations related to citizens’ rights and freedoms, including, for 
example, a right to change their government.12 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
the ambiguous nature of this Article complicates the ambitions to create a 
successful and fair counterterrorism policy. 
It is worth noting that Kuwait’s legal documents do not provide comprehensive 
counterterrorism legislation or a definition of terrorism. Hence, the country’s laws 
with regard to counterterrorism and its official definition of terrorism are mostly 
based around the criminal law and other fragmented laws. However, the 
corresponding measures to the creation of legal foundations for counterterrorism 
are taken by the government. In this context, the essential role of the national 
counterterrorism establishments, including the Kuwaiti Security Services, in 
providing an in-depth understanding of counterterrorism cannot be 
underestimated.13 For example, these establishments were the primary institutions 
that revealed that religious extremists with militant intentions and explosive devices 
are the primary people who can be called terrorists.14 
Overall, the definition of terrorism from the Kuwaiti perspective is conditioned 
by the country’s physical environment. From the Kuwaiti perspective, terrorism is 
an unacceptable phenomenon from religious, moral, and humane points of view, 
which needs to be eliminated.15 Within the country’s environment, terrorism is 
perceived as a product that emerges due to different factors, such as the ‘spread of 
weapons and losing every fear of using them as a result of the Iraqi occupation of 
Kuwait’, the ‘loss of all trust in the security figures’, and the ‘loss of religious and 
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ethnic ideology in the young people’.16 Overall, Kuwait’s engagement in combating 
terrorism is to be expected, because the state Constitution implies that terrorism is a 
challenge to the Kuwaiti society that should be overcome for the sake of the 
country’s sustainable future and the rights of its citizens. 
Moreover, Kuwait’s Constitution of 1962 directly affects the government’s 
response to terrorism. According to the Constitution, the country performs the role 
of furthering Arab nationalism by promoting world peace and human civilisation 
based on allegiance to traditions and citizens’ freedom, social justice, and equality, 
enhancing the dignity of the individual (the Preamble), and safeguarding ‘the pillars 
of society’, ‘security, tranquillity’ (Article 8).17 In accord with these provisions, 
Kuwait’s government must not support terrorism and must treat it as a threat to the 
Constitution. Hence, terrorism is considered a major obstacle to the country’s 
national development and the performance of its national role stated above. 
Next, the Constitution protects particular rights and freedoms that directly 
influence the government’s response to terrorism. They should be considered so as 
to understand the role of Kuwait’s Constitution in implementing national 
counterterrorism. The following rights and freedoms influence the government’s 
counterterrorism policy: the right to complain, the right of litigation, freedom of 
religious belief, and freedom to hold meetings and form different societies.18 These 
rights and freedoms will now be explored in greater detail. 
The right to complain gives an opportunity to be involved with the 
corresponding legislative body in alerting it to injustices. For example, according to 
Article 115, all Kuwaiti citizens have the right to make complaints against any 
injustices suffered (for example, violation of the right of free opinion). These 
complaints are sent to the special council and corresponding committees that help 
to clarify the situation that made a particular citizen complain.19 In addition, Article 
45 says that, ‘every individual has the right to address the public authorities in 
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writing over his signature’.20 It means that the public authorities should address the 
complaints of citizens.21 In this context, if a Kuwaiti complains about his or her 
civilian insecurity owing to terrorism, a corresponding council, committee, or other 
legislative body needs to react in an appropriate way. 
The right to complain is often associated with the right of litigation. If a person 
complains of some injustice, a judicial procedure may help to resolve the situation. 
This right is one of the most important rights in Kuwaiti society, because 
sometimes, litigation is the only way to be protected against injustices.22 According 
to Article 166, ‘the right of recourse to the Courts is guaranteed to all people’.23 A 
corresponding legal procedure is prescribed for state courts to examine a case of a 
particular individual, who wants to challenge injustice in a judicial order. In 
addition, Article 173 provides that the state judicial apparatus is obliged to decide 
administrative conflicts and to put each case under close review.24 Overall, the 
rights of complain and litigation help to satisfy the public and individual interests in 
securing justice, and therefore there is no need to engage in violent activities in the 
Kuwaiti society. In this context, the Kuwaiti judicial system provides for the 
litigation of cases related to terrorism. 
The freedom of belief is based on the right of citizens to practice any type of 
religion, which, in Kuwait, refers mainly to Christianity, Judaism and Islam.25 This 
freedom is protected by Kuwait’s Constitution. Article 35 provides: ‘Freedom of 
belief is absolute. The State protects the freedom of practicing religion in 
accordance with established customs, provided that it does not conflict with public 
policy or morals’. For the reason that acts of terror are often conducted on sectarian 
religious grounds in Kuwait’s environment, this constitutional article suggests that, 
for example, the activity of Islamic extremists can be treated as terrorism, 
especially when their activities involve acts that violate the rights of other 
individuals. 
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Finally, the freedom to hold meetings and to form different associations is also 
important, since it relates to terrorist groups. Article 43 says that each citizen has 
the ‘Freedom to form associations and unions on a national basis and by peaceful 
means is guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and manner specified by 
law’.26 In addition, Article 44 states: 
(1) Individuals have the right of private assembly without 
permission or prior notification, and the police may not attend such 
private meetings. 
(2) Public meetings, demonstrations, and gatherings are permitted in 
accordance with the conditions and manner specified by law, 
provided that their purpose and means are peaceful and not contrary 
to morals.27 
Hence, although a terrorist group/organisation might be understood mistakenly as 
an association and their meeting might be treated as a private assembly, yet its 
measures are not peaceful and therefore are not protected by Articles 43 and 44. 
Despite the fact that Kuwait’s Constitution protects the rights and freedoms of 
the country’s citizens as mentioned above, it presents some challenges for the 
creation of an effective counterterrorism policy in Kuwait. 28  Each of these 
challenges must be revealed to understand why Kuwait’s Constitution does not 
directly provide favourable conditions for national counterterrorism. 
The first challenge associated with the legislative basis for counterterrorism is 
the state religion protected by the Constitution. Article 2 states: ‘The religion of the 
State is Islam, and the Islamic Sharia shall be a main source of legislation’.29 This 
article may encourage the terrorist activity of Islamic extremists, especially those 
targeting Western. For example, a terrorist might view his/her action as a religious 
duty, Jihad. 
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The second challenge is the absence of official definitions of counterterrorism 
and terrorism in the national legislation allows interpreting the Constitution in the 
most preferable way for terrorism supporters. To be more specific, Kuwait’s 
legislation lacks an exact definition of terrorism ‘that coincides with the rule of law 
and human rights’,30 which might help the terrorists to regard themselves as a 
freedom fighters. 
It is reasonable to conclude that, although Kuwait’s Constitution supposes that 
terrorism should be countered, because terrorism violates citizens’ rights and 
values, the national laws do not directly refer to terrorism. This way, constitutional 
rights and freedoms can be interpreted in different ways including even those that 
meet terrorist’s interests. It is obvious that the absence of the legal foundations for 
counterterrorism in Kuwait leads to the challenging process of creating an effective 
governmental counterterrorism policy. 
3.2.2 The Development of Counterterrorism Strategies in Different 
Historical Periods 
The counterterrorism activity adopted by Kuwait’s national government started 
at the beginning of the 1960s when Kuwait became a member state of the United 
Nations (UN). The present section covers the development of counterterrorism 
strategies provided by Kuwait’s government in different historical periods, in 
particular, during the periods of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Iran-Iraq war, and 
the Islamist extremism and Al-Qaida. Overall, this subsection will discuss laws and 
official documents that establish the strategies to combat terrorism within Kuwait’s 
jurisdiction. 
3.2.2.1 Counterterrorism in the time of Marxist-Leninist Ideology 
The first significant period that influenced the counterterrorism approaches of 
Kuwait was the 1960s, when the country’s revolutionaries adopted the Marxism-
Leninism ideology. The year 1967, which is associated with the Six-Day War, 
caused by the tensions between Arab countries and Israel, and the formation of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), was decisive for Kuwait’s 
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counterterrorism policy.31 However, before Kuwait’s counterterrorism legislation of 
this period is presented, the Marxist-Leninist ideology must be discussed in the 
context of Kuwait’s terrorism and the events of the Six-Day War that caused the 
formation of the PFLP. 
In 1967, the Arab participants in the Six-Day War and the PFLP were 
supporters of Marxism-Leninism. Within the environment of extremist Arabs, the 
absorption of this ideology led to the creation of national terrorism, through which 
terrorists pursued the elimination of injustice in their society through violence and 
terrorist acts. Taking the special perception of Marxism-Leninism by revolutionary 
Kuwaitis, the participation in the illegitimate armed struggle became evident in 
Kuwait in 1968-69. At the same time, the participants were people that did not 
regard themselves as terrorists but rather as soldiers, liberators, and ‘legitimate 
fighters for noble social causes’.32 
The events of 1967-69 made the Kuwaiti government take corresponding 
measures aimed at effectively criminalising terrorism and punishing crimes that 
could be perceived as terroristic. In other words, Kuwait’s government utilised 
criminalisation as the prime method for counterterrorism. The policy of 
criminalisation means that terrorists should be treated as common criminals, and 
there should not be any legal distinctions between the politically motivated crime 
and the other criminal behaviour, i.e. by dealing with it through the normal legal 
process.33 As a result, the Kuwaiti Penal Code (Law No. 16 of 1960) was the most 
important legal document related to counterterrorism. This code was the first 
significant legal document that became the basis for Kuwait’s counterterrorism 
legislation, although, in the years that followed, it was modified several times.34 In 
the 1970s, the Kuwaiti Penal Code was modified by adding other crimes, for 
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example, hostile actions against a foreign country that threatens Kuwait with war, 
acts that intentionally or unintentionally cause harm to people, etc.35 In fact, after 
1967 incidents mentioned in the last chapter, the State Security law (Law No. 31 of 
1970) related to terrorism was enacted. This law provides the legal basis for the 
punishment of people who do damage and harm with the help of weapons, and the 
organisations or groups which use illegal methods. According to Article 4, any 
assembly of soldiers that does not receive prior permission from the government is 
punished by law.36 According to an interviewed Judge, 
the word ‘soldiers’ in Arabic does not only mean military personnel. 
In fact, the word ‘soldier’ can also mean non-military personnel, 
who in this term means supporters to the same ideology.37 
Article 29 defines the overthrow of the existing regime using force or any other 
illegal means as a punishable crime. 38  In addition, according to Article 34, 
participating in a gathering that has as its purpose to commit crimes or disturb the 
public security is a punishable crime.39 Article 35 punishes foreign people who 
entered the country with the aim to commit or incite to commit such crimes 
included in Law No. 31 of 1970.40 It is notable that according to the code, all these 
mentioned crimes are punished not by fines but by long-term or life imprisonment 
and execution. At the same time, amnesty from punishment for repentant 
perpetrators (Article 22) is permitted.41 
Kuwait’s experience of 1968-69 increased the national awareness of the danger 
posed by terrorism. It also led to the creation of the first legal foundations for the 
country’s counterterrorism policy, i.e. by adapting the existing laws to counter the 
terrorism threats. Overall, the first stage of the development of Kuwait’s 
counterterrorism strategy included the following legal documents: the Penal Code, 
the Criminal Procedure Code, the Act of State Security Crimes, and the Law 
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regarding Public Meetings and Assemblages. These laws will be examined in detail 
in the next chapter. 
3.2.2.2 Counterterrorism during and after the Iraq-Iran War 
The second stage of the development of Kuwait’s national counterterrorism 
strategy is associated with the Iraq-Iran war, which was accompanied by Shiite 
religious terrorism. In the 1980s, Kuwait’s awareness of counterterrorism grew 
owing to the events of that war. A brief discussion of this war and the 
characteristics of Shiite religious terrorism will help to understand the 
government’s efforts to exclude terrorism from the country’s environment. 
The Iran-Iraq war, or the ‘Gulf War’, started due to Iran-Iraq tensions on the 
religious ground (between Shiites and Sunnis). Exactly at that time, the extremists’ 
movement in Kuwait was initiated. These religious tensions led to the emergence of 
Shiite terrorists, who subsequently caused much damage and many deaths.42 
After the events of the 1980s, the national government had to take 
corresponding measures to prevent terrorist activity by Kuwait’s Shiite Muslims. 
During the Iran-Iraq war, criminalisation as a method of countering terrorism was 
continued. A law which criminalises and imposes severe punishment on crimes 
involving explosives was passed, (Law No. 35 of 1985), in responding to the 
incidents happened at that time. In addition, Kuwait was supported by the United 
States, which partly determined the impact of Kuwait’s counterterrorism policy 
development. To be more specific, the ‘US-Kuwait defence and political relations 
warmed considerably at the height of the Iran-Iraq war, when the United States 
established a US naval escort and tanker reflagging programme to protect Kuwaiti 
and international shipping from Iranian naval attacks’.43 
After the Iran-Iraq war, and precisely after the liberation of Kuwait from the 
Iraqi invasion, the government of Kuwait expanded its legal basis for its national 
counterterrorism policy. The Law on Weapons and Ammunition (Decree of Law 
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No. 13 of 1991) was enacted, because a large amount of weapons remained in 
circulation in Kuwait.44 According to this law, the acquisition or possession of 
weapons and ammunition without authorisation from the Minister of the Interior is 
a punishable crime. In addition, it stipulated that no licenses could be given to 
people who acquire or possess machine guns and silencers.45 Another law that 
emerged in this period, Law on Concerning Crimes Relating to the Safety of 
Aircraft and Air Navigation (Law No. 6 of 1994), was also significant.46 Such law 
can be seen as following a protective strategy in countering terrorism. It provided 
protection to airplanes, passengers, and airports from being vulnerable, and it 
protects the citizens against the danger of using weapon for terroristic purposes. In 
addition, this law has initiated Kuwait’s judicial practice of confidential hearings of 
the cases associated with hijacking (Article 8).47 
Kuwait’s experience with the Iran-Iraq war made the national government to 
develop and expand the legal basis for its counterterrorism policy by implementing 
new strategy, protective security, to counter the new threats. The enactment of new 
laws that prohibited and criminalises the use of explosives, the possession of 
weapons and ammunition, and the hijacking enriched Kuwait’s history of fighting 
terrorists at the national level. Overall, the events of the 1980s helped the 
government to improve and protect the national security system by providing 
Kuwaitis with a new level of protection. 
3.2.2.3 Counterterrorism in the Period of Home-grown Islamist Extremism and Al-
Qaida 
The third stage of the development of Kuwait’s counterterrorism strategy is 
associated with home-grown Islamist extremism and Al-Qaida. The legal 
documents elaborated by Kuwait’s government during this period can be divided 
into two phases. The first phase was about the State’s involvement in the 
international community in the fight against terrorism. The second phase can be 
called as the time when the government started to engage in the battle of ideas with 
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terrorists through educational programmes, and also through controlling the Internet 
security. Advanced technologies emerged at the beginning of the 21st century that 
provided terrorists with new opportunities to act distantly through cyberspace. In 
response to such technologies, Kuwait’s national government needed to develop its 
counterterrorism policy in a corresponding way. 
Since the end of the 20th century, Kuwait’s terrorist extremism has been 
increasing. Immediately following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Kuwait’s terrorist 
activity notably grew. In addition, more of Kuwait’s revolutionary Muslims took 
part in violent attacks beyond its borders. Most of these attacks were caused by 
religious tensions and a distorted understanding of the Islamic doctrines. As one of 
the affected Kuwaitis said, ‘I present myself as a cheap commodity in the sake of 
Allah to defend my religion and take revenge of my brothers who were killed by 
Christians all over the world’.48 Hence, it is reasonable to admit that Islamic 
extremism and Kuwait’s terrorist activity are inseparably connected with the 
external radical Muslims’ desire to act in correspondence with their religion seen 
through the subjective lenses. 
Kuwaiti extremists represent Islamic fundamentalism. This term refers to 
people dedicated to pursuing the fundamentals of their religion even at the expense 
of their own lives and the lives of others.49 Since, at the end of the 20th century, 
they supported the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism, it is not surprising that the 
majority of revolutionary Kuwaitis joined Al-Qaida, a global militant Islamist 
organisation that has attacked both civilian and military targets in different 
countries, and its former leader, the late Osama bin Laden. Kuwaiti participants in 
Al-Qaida attacks can refer to those supporting the radical Sunni Muslim movement, 
global Jihad (‘struggle’, a religious duty of Muslims), and rigorous advocates of 
Sharia. 50  The terrorist nature of Islamist extremism meant that the further 
development of the national counterterrorism strategy in Kuwait was required. 
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The most significant official documents that further advanced Kuwait’s 
counterterrorism strategy will now be considered. Most of them were enacted 
pursuant to Kuwait’s involvement in international counterterrorism activity. After 
2001, when Kuwait became subject to the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 
and its Counter-Terrorism Committee inquiries, which was organised in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the country’s government modified its 
domestic law in correspondence with UN requirements. For example, the denial of 
a safe haven for terrorists is presented in Kuwait’s legislation, because UNSCR 
1373 calls upon states ‘to deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or 
commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens’, and ‘to prevent and suppress terrorist 
attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts’.51 In addition, since 
Kuwait was subject to the UN Counter Terrorism Committee reviews, the national 
government started to sign many conventions which related to countering terrorism. 
In particular, Kuwait’s government signed the UN International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 (ICSFT); however, Kuwait has not 
ratified this convention until June 2013.52 
In subsequent years, various modifications to Kuwait’s national legislation 
were made. For example, in 2002, the UN Security Council resolution related to 
support and assistance provided to terrorists and terrorism was signed.53 In 2003, 
the Kuwaiti legislature enacted the Law on Approving the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which 
provides for the protection of all kinds of watercraft and their passengers from 
terrorists (Law No. 15 of 2003).54 In 2004, Kuwait’s government signed the 
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Convention of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf for the 
Suppression of Terrorism and enacted the Law on Approving the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (Law No. 27 of 2004).55 In 
2006, the Law on Approving the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime and its Protocols was enacted (Law No. 5 of 2006).56 
Overall, all mentioned laws were adopted within the framework of the 
international treaties signed by Kuwait’s government. In addition, all of them 
became part of Kuwaiti domestic law, and provided national and international 
counterterrorism measures with the corresponding legal basis. 57  As a result, 
internationalisation emerges as a strategy to counterterrorism by adopting and 
implementing the international conventions against terrorism. Therefore, this 
development in the Kuwaiti counterterrorism strategy makes the State of Kuwait 
become a part in the international community in the fight against terrorism. Not 
only by signing up to the mentioned conventions, but by cooperating in an 
institutional way which will be discussed in the next section. 
In addition, the issues of terrorism and antiterrorism are also addressed through 
education in the forms of schooling, media, and propaganda. The ultimate 
importance of this aspect of counterterrorism strategies became apparent after the 
9/11 attacks, which made Kuwaitis aware of new and far-reaching dangers of 
terrorism. In October of 2004, the government established a ministerial committee 
that was chaired by the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs. The committee 
announced a programme aimed at encouraging moderation among the youth. 
Subsequently, the committee maintained cooperation with the Ministry of 
Information and the Ministry of Communications to close access to Kuwait-based 
Internet sites propounding extremist ideology.58 
Another priority the Kuwaiti chose was the development and modernisation of 
school curricula, as ‘rigid school textbooks on Islam have partly contributed to the 
                                                
55 Ibid, 36-37. 
56 Ibid, 36. 
57 Most of the Participants interviewed have confirmed the same. 
58 Terrill, W. A., Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship after 
Saddam, Strategic Studies Institute, (Carlisle, PA: 2007), 70-71. 
 82 
danger of extremism’.59 Such measures might have also been triggered by the fear 
of Kuwaiti authorities that the strategic relationship between Kuwait and the United 
States might be affected if the state were viewed as encouraging an extremist 
educational system. These considerations were also provoked by domestic events, 
such as the conflict that occurred at the beginning of 2005 between the police and 
the Peninsula Lions, which resulted in the death of eight extremists. A violent 
response would be a logical reaction of extremist organisations to the killing of 
their members.60 
The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs emphasised in its strategic 
initiative that it will make every effort to help people understand the benefits of 
moderation, which ‘has always been the overwhelming character of the Kuwaiti 
society in its rites, intellectual thinking, moral practices, social relations, and even 
in political approaches’. 61  Therefore, in 2006, the Ministry established the 
‘International Moderation Centre’. The Ministry claims that a moderate approach 
must prevail in its objectives, activities, and programmes. The Centre promotes 
‘moderate thinking, and belief, moderate worshipping performance, moderate 
cultural origin and moderate moral behaviour’.62 Therefore, the government of 
Kuwait has realised the important need to ‘win the battle of hearts and minds’63 of 
its citizens. 
With the emergence of ‘cyber terrorism’ in the 21st century, Kuwait’s 
government needed to modify its counterterrorism strategy to combat potential 
terrorist activities on the Web. Therefore, Kuwait’s national government asserts that 
‘the Internet is a medium that facilitates the maintenance of a decentralised, global, 
violent extremist movement’.64 In addition, the Internet is both an assistive source 
used for reconnaissance purposes for potential attacks, secret or private information 
gathering, fundraising, data mining, and the like to combat terrorists and a 
                                                
59 Ibid, 71. 
60 Ibid, 72. 
61 The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, Strategic Plan to The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic 
Affairs, 2006/2007 – 2010/2011, (Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, Kuwait: 2006), 9. 
62 Ibid, 13. 
63 Walker, C. And Rehman, J., ‘'Prevent' responses to jihadi extremism’, in Ramraj, V., Hor, M. And 
Roach, K. (eds), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 
242-267. 
64 Shetret, L., ‘Use of the Internet for Counter-Terrorist Purposes’, (2011), 1, Available at: 
<http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/LS_policybrief_119.pdf> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. 
 83 
preventive source used for the detection of terrorist locations, tracking terrorist 
activity, neutralisation, etc. for countries involved in the global fight against 
terrorism.65 Furthermore, in Kuwait’s context, the Internet can be viewed as ‘glue’ 
to a ‘leaderless jihad’.66 
For this reason, corresponding preventive counterterrorism measures have 
been taken by the national government. For example, the Ministry of Interior, The 
General Department of Criminal Investigations – Department of Combating 
Electronic Crimes, was the responsible department to ensure the security of the 
national network system was strengthened through taking measures related to 
Internet security, such as the installation of an advanced system for detecting cyber 
terrorism and issuing related instructions prohibiting damaging national Internet 
based systems. 67  Recently, Kuwait’s government monitored Internet 
communications, such as forums and blogs, for security reasons. Today, the 
Ministry of Communications continues to block Web sites considered to incite 
instability and terrorism. All Internet service providers are required to block the 
Web sites that violate the state’s traditions and customs. Moreover, Internet café 
owners are obliged to obtain the names and identification numbers of customers 
and to submit this information to the Ministry of Communications upon request.68 
The government have also initiated the prosecution and punishment of 
individuals who publicly expressed their political or religious views via the 
Internet, including e-mail, in accordance with the laws related to libel and national 
security. Kuwait’s government also attempted to collect individuals’ private 
information to check the extent to which the Internet users practice peaceful 
expression of ideological, political, and religious beliefs. Actually, this case can be 
associated with the intentional violation of human rights and freedoms, especially, 
those related to a right to privacy and a freedom of opinion expression.69 
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Overall, the control over strategically significant Web sites and most sensitive 
information presented in Kuwait’s networks has been strengthened. The system of 
users’ access to the Internet has become more sophisticated and security-oriented to 
respond to the needs of the new environment.70 In the context of Kuwait’s national 
government, the Internet is primarily understood as a means to combat growing 
radicalisation. Recent research on the Internet has indicated that the worldwide 
Web is an efficient way to reach terrorists’ target audience – young Kuwaiti men 
considered the most vulnerable to Islamic extremists’ recruitment. 71  In this 
environment, strengthening the Internet security policy as a part of the 
counterterrorism agenda is reasonable and necessary, because it provides Kuwaitis 
with a safe cyberspace. 
Internet security is a vital aspect of today’s public policy established by 
Kuwait’s national government to prevent the emergence of terrorism and to 
neutralise the efforts of existing terrorists. The most notable feature associated with 
the use of the Internet on the territory of Kuwait is presented by the tendency to use 
this media source as a way to spread religious extremists’ ideas and radical 
opinions related to politics and other spheres of the state’s functioning. Today’s 
content of Kuwait’s official Web sites and different forms of Internet 
communication are to some extent controlled. The Internet security measures 
represented by the establishment of new systems and technologies promise to 
reduce Kuwait’s terrorism and to maximise public safety in the cyberspace. 
Thus, it can be seen that after the incidents of September 11 international 
cooperation against terrorism has been strengthened. The United Nations has 
intensified its support to the fight against terrorism, which place obligations over all 
countries, including Kuwait, to take actions against terrorism and Al-Qaida. 
Considering these factors, Kuwait’s government has developed a national 
counterterrorism strategy that meets the needs of the current changing and 
challenging environment. This development is evident by the involvement of the 
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State of Kuwait in the international effort in combating terrorism, and by the advent 
of the new and long-term strategy which focus on fighting the battle of ideas of 
radical Muslims through introducing educational programmes and controlling the 
content of the Internet. Therefore, the modifications of domestic law in accordance 
with the framework of the international counterterrorism policy improved the 
Kuwaiti national security system. Overall, during recent years, Kuwaiti awareness 
of the need for counterterrorism measures has increased. 
3.2.3 Kuwait’s Counterterrorism Policy: Kuwait’s Struggles and External 
Demands 
3.2.3.1 Dynamics of Counterterrorism Strategies in Kuwait 
The strategic counterterrorism initiatives undertaken by Kuwait have been 
determined, to a great extent, by the course of the country’s development. The 
essence of the terrorist threat as seen by the Kuwaiti authorities determines the 
involvement of corresponding institutions. These threats are addressed through 
various means. Kuwait’s view of a terrorist threat is linked to the milestones in its 
development. 
Security considerations became critical for the country when Kuwait obtained 
its independence. Previously, the state had not been seriously disturbed by any 
external conflicts. In 1961, however, the political situation changed not only in 
Kuwait, but in the surrounding countries as well. The collapse of the Iraqi 
monarchy in 1958 resulted in a growing menace from the Arab nationalist 
movement and a radical Iraqi regime that lay claim to Kuwaiti territory.72 
After the withdrawal of British military forces, Iraqi forces immediately 
approached the border. At that time, the conflict was settled but showed all the 
weaknesses of the new state. After the crisis, Kuwait adopted the policy of 
negotiation and compensation to counteract threatening powers.73 However, despite 
the attempts to neutralise threats by means of mutually beneficial collaboration, the 
country was the object of fierce attacks undertaken by Iraq (a series of such 
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conflicts led eventually to the Gulf War) and Iran (caused by the support that 
Kuwait showed to Iraq in the conflict between the two countries).74 
The Iraqi invasion resulted in serious tension in relationships between Kuwait 
and the Arabic countries supporting it in the conflict and Iraq and its supporters 
among Arabic countries. Therefore, ‘it was not possible in the post-invasion era to 
coordinate positions in issues relating to terrorism between these States because of 
the hate and mistrust the Iraqi aggression had caused among them’.75 The concept 
of terrorism itself and the corresponding institutional functions were reshaped after 
this aggression to include the Iraqi use of violence against Kuwait, and in many 
speeches, this component dominated in the understanding of terrorism as a threat to 
the nation.76 
During these crises, Kuwait had to seek support from the Western countries, 
especially the United States which provided this support. American and other 
military forces assisted Kuwait greatly in withstanding the Iraqi threat. Moreover, 
the invasion entailed such a disagreement among the Arabic states that the situation 
fostered the ongoing enhancement of collaboration between Kuwait and other 
Western countries, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. 
Such a position resulted in the development of an appreciative attitude in Kuwait 
toward these Western states and Kuwait’s adoption of strategies that are likely to be 
supported by them.77 The regime of Saddam Hussein repeatedly showed signs of 
aggression toward Kuwait.78 In addition, there remains a degree of pressure and 
tension between Kuwait and Iran, as the two countries never fully reached an 
agreement on the issue of oil and gas, though they maintain dialogue aimed at the 
improvement of their relations. Therefore, it can be seen that after the 1991 there 
has been a significant shift in the Kuwaiti policy toward the external influences. 
Simultaneously, Kuwait strives to keep tension-free relations with Saudi 
Arabia. The nations began to collaborate more during the Iran-Iraq war. They 
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participated in joint operations with the United States aimed at protecting their 
borders against Iraq and Iran and the involvement of the GCC states in their 
practices. Moreover, Kuwait has close relationships with the majority of the other 
Arab states, although the degree of success varies in each individual case.79 
Moreover, Kuwait also had to face the external factors which resulted in a 
number of internal issues concerning terrorism, including Shiite terrorist attacks 
during the Iraq-Iran war and the involvement of citizens in terrorist organisations 
like Al-Qaida. These events show that Kuwait had to take the issue of security 
seriously with regard to the constant instability in the region. Moreover, the country 
maintains dialogue with both Western and Eastern neighbours in the effort to 
counteract terrorism. 
3.2.3.2 Kuwait’s Counterterrorism Strategy from the Perspective of External 
Demands 
Kuwait’s counterterrorism policy has become a point of discussion within the 
international environment. The views of the United States government and of the 
UN General Assembly on Kuwait’s counterterrorism policy must be discussed in 
this subsection, because Kuwait’s international relationships are primarily 
connected with these foreign authorities. 
After the Iraq-Iran war, and specifically after Kuwait’s liberation from Iraqi 
occupation, Kuwait became closer to the United States because ‘US forces 
spearheaded the liberation of Kuwait’ 80  in 1991. Kuwait’s government then 
concluded an agreement with the United States according to which Kuwaiti forces 
had to participate in joint military exercises, American training, arms sales, pre-
positioning of the American military equipment, and gave access to Kuwaiti 
facilities.81 Another influence is that Kuwait has been a member of the UN since 
1963. 
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Although Kuwait and the United States are close allies working together in 
their fight against international terrorism, it is obvious that the US government does 
not support some aspects of Kuwait’s counterterrorism strategy.82 For example, the 
administration in Washington did not support Kuwait’s policy concerning the 
detention of convicted killers and its refusal to exchange terrorists for hostages. 
During the Iraq-Iran war, Kuwait witnessed violent terrorist attacks, as Shiite 
Muslims drove trucks carrying bombs into six major targets, including the 
American and French embassies and a number of Kuwaiti installations. The attacks 
resulted in several deaths and numerous injuries. The government arrested those 
responsible for the attacks and sentenced some of them to death, others received 
imprisonment terms of varied lengths. Intending to free the prisoners, the radicals 
launched several attacks to force the government to make concessions and to 
negotiate the freedom of the imprisoned criminals. These attacks included hijacking 
a plane and killing two hostages on board, driving a car into the emir’s motorcade 
and killing four people, arranging explosions in Kuwaiti cafes with nine victims, 
assassinating the editor of a newspaper and sabotaging oil facilities. In each 
instance, the government maintained its firm position, stiffening measures against 
possible and actual terrorists. 
The next step taken by terrorists directly involved American interests. More 
specifically, they made the freedom of American hostages in Lebanon contingent 
upon the release of Kuwaiti prisoners. However, Kuwait’s government did not 
succumb to the pressures from the US authorities and refused to barter the 
prisoners.83 The newspaper, Ar-Ra’y al-‘Am, criticised the American President for 
making unjustified promises to the hostages’ families. The paper directly appealed 
to Reagan’s principles: ‘Have you forgotten that you are the chief advocate for 
combating terrorism in the world? … If we agree to exchange the sentenced 
prisoners in Kuwait for your hostages in Lebanon… you become an encourager of 
terrorism’.84  The newspaper directly expressed suspicion of American double 
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standards, which arises when the interests of the United States conflict with the 
interests of other countries, specifically Kuwait’s counterterrorism strategies. It 
viewed US policy as encouraging terrorism.85 
In addition, the emergency measures, adopted by the Kuwaiti government after 
the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, of deporting over 400,000 
foreigners (mainly Palestinians) in order to enhance the security regulations 
contradicted the strategy chosen by the United States and endorsed by the United 
Nations.86 However, it showed that for Kuwait counterterrorism is the higher 
priority than its international reputation, at least in that era. 
Another example is that although the Kuwaiti government has met the US 
requirements of building a rehabilitation centre for terrorists or ex-terrorists,87 the 
US government still has detained the remaining two Kuwaiti prisoners, Fawzi Al-
Odah and Fayiz Al-Kandari, in its detention centre in Cuba, Guantanamo Bay.88 
The Al-Salam Centre has been built inside the Kuwaiti prison in order to receive the 
released prisoners and put them under medical and psychological treatment. In 
addition, the prisoners will be assessed by a committee which includes officials 
from the Ministry of Health, Interior and Education before they are released.89 
Therefore, it can be said that the US administration does not share certain 
points related to Kuwait’s counterterrorism policy, and it does not approve of some 
aspects of Kuwait’s counterterrorism policy. 
Although Kuwait’s government currently adopts most of the UN convention 
requirements related to terrorism and terrorists, its modifications of the legal basis 
related to counterterrorism do not always correspond exactly with international 
requirements. Kuwait is a conservative country with a strict moral code based on 
religion and its own pace of national development. In comparison with the 
relatively humanistic criminal law presented in the Western UN member countries, 
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Kuwait imposes more severe penalties and stricter counterterrorism measures. For 
many years, ‘Kuwaitis proposed heavier punishments than the nationals of other 
countries for all categories of offenses’, including terrorism.90 
Kuwait has done much to implement international laws with the help of the 
UN, which seems to approve of the range of legislative modifications made by 
Kuwait’s government during the last decade. One of the main modifications made 
in Kuwait’s Penalty Code relates to torture.91 Since the UN General Assembly and 
the UN Security Council in particular have often accused Kuwaitis of torturing, the 
Kuwait government has taken corresponding measures.92 Recently, Kuwait sent a 
report to the UN Committee Against Torture, in which the government explained 
its policy with regard to the use of torture in Kuwait.93 According to this report, 
Kuwait’s government officially recognises that violent physiological and 
psychological tortures have been used against national terrorists. However, the 
corresponding initiatives were made to meet the UN penalty requirements. 
Moreover, the Committee welcomed the Kuwaiti government’s initiatives in the 
establishment of the Higher Committee for Human Rights in 2008.94 
Although the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment was signed and ratified in 1996,95 torture is 
still used as a method of gathering information from terrorist suspects. In addition, 
Kuwait has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). 96 
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However, after the observations of the UN Committee Against Torture in 2011,97 
Kuwait’s national government started to implement more effectively the 
convention. This implementation was a considerable step in the current 
development of Kuwait’s counterterrorism policy. The following subjects are 
included in the Convention and have been adopted by Kuwait’s domestic laws: 
definition and criminalisation of torture, fundamental legal safeguards, monitoring, 
inspection of places of detention, non-refoulement, imposition of the death penalty, 
and training of Kuwaiti law enforcement officials about human rights. The UN 
welcomed Kuwait’s decision to change its national legislations (the Penal Law and 
the Prison Law) in relation to the use of torture.98 Overall, the UN Convention is 
aimed to make Kuwait’s laws and practices compliant with human rights 
requirements on Kuwaiti territory, and Kuwait has gradually incorporated its 
requirements. However, although the law are now in the line with the international 
requirements to forbid the use of torture, yet there are still allegations of using 
torture in practice. A good example of this can found on the case of attempting to 
bomb camp Arifjan.99 
Another significant modification to the Kuwaiti legislation was, recently, the 
ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism 1999 (ICSFT),100 and the enactment of Law No. 106 of 2013 regarding 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism,101 which 
implemented the ICSFT. However, even before the ratification of the ICSFT, the 
government of Kuwait has done a great deal through its Ministries and organs in 
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preventing financing terrorism domestically and internationally.102 Overall, this will 
be discussed in more details in chapter five. 
Hence, from the perspective of Western countries, today’s Kuwaiti 
counterterrorism policy is not yet sufficiently developed and realised. It is notable 
that the views of the US and the UN authorities on the Kuwaiti counterterrorism 
strategy differ in some important aspects. Although the US government considers 
Kuwait a powerful ally in the current fight against terror, it does not approve of 
some conservative aspects of Kuwait’s legal policy with regard to terrorists. 
Although the UN Security Council recognises that Kuwait is not fully prepared to 
become democratic fighter against terrorism, it treats this country as relatively 
successful in terms of its modification of domestic law. Both the US and the UN 
authorities believe that Kuwait has advanced in the positive transformation of its 
counterterrorism policy and in its peaceful but powerful struggle with terrorists 
based on the promotion of human rights. The result is also an intensification of 
international influences on Kuwait's counter terrorism strategy and laws since 9/11. 
3.3   Institutional Mechanisms for Countering Terrorism in Kuwait 
3.3.1 The Hierarchy of Institutions Elaborating and Implementing 
Counterterrorism Strategies 
The acts of terror that occurred on September 11, 2001, showed that 
antiterrorist strategies and policies required new steps and new institutions to 
regulate them. The Kuwaiti institutions that perform functions in the sphere of 
counterterrorism initiatives work in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches 
of the State. The number and functions of these institutions have significantly 
evolved since the establishment of the State. The legislative body of Kuwait, the 
Parliament of the people (the National Assembly), could not maintain its stable 
work, which seriously affected the function of legal enforcement of laws that 
criminalise and prevent terrorism.103 The overall strategy was implemented by the 
Council of Ministers of Kuwait in governing the country. The introduction of 
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control measures was carried out through the tools of the Ministry of Interior and 
Foreign Affairs, including the Armed Forces, the police, Border Security, Coast 
Guards, and the Kuwait State Security. Preventative measures targeting financial 
operations that contribute to the development of terrorism were given special 
attention, as they were consistent with the international initiative of restricting 
terrorist access to financial assets. These measures presupposed the participation of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
the General Administration of Customs, and the Central Bank of Kuwait. Terrorism 
is also addressed on the level of the values sets of society and individuals through 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Information, and the Ministry of Awqaf 
and Islamic Affairs. The Kuwaiti officials used Osama bin Laden’s death to 
reiterate the country’s enduring commitment to counterterrorism. Politicians used 
the event to advance attempts to cross a line between the message of Islam and the 
appeals of radical and terrorist organisations. They emphasised that terrorism 
distorts religious teaching of Islam and continued calling for tolerance and 
moderation.104 
The efficiency of the counterterrorism steps undertaken by Kuwait depends 
considerably on the cohesiveness of strategies employed by various institutions 
performing counterterrorism functions. In this respect, the relationship between the 
legislative and executive branches in Kuwait needs special attention. The state has 
‘a relatively open political system by Gulf standards’. 105  However, political 
disputes frequently occur as documented by several successive Parliament 
dissolutions since 1976.106 
The Parliament performs a significant role in enacting legislations that 
criminalise terrorist acts and maintaining the executive’s accountability in its 
implementation of such laws, but it exerts no influence on the formation of the 
government in the country. Thus, the performance of state institutions causes some 
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dissatisfaction, as the tension between the legislative and executive branches may 
result in the paralysis of efficient action.107 The Parliament includes fifty elected 
members, by the people, in addition to the appointed ministers who comprise a 
third or less of the number of elected members. 
The Council of Ministers (the Government) is headed by the Prime Minister. 
Previously, the Crown Prince used to combine the premiership with his position. 
However, the link between the Crown Prince and the premiership was removed in 
2003. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence are always 
headed and allocated to the ruling family.108 Therefore, the accountability of these 
positions become, sometimes, culturally difficult. 
The government does not require the support of a majority in Parliament. 
Therefore, the results of elections do not directly affect the composition of the 
government. Legislative initiatives in fact rely on the coalition of parliamentarians, 
as there are no established political parties. Situations have occurred when members 
of the parliament successfully adopted laws against the will of the government, 
such as occurred in 2006, when changes to the electoral system were adopted. 
Nevertheless, normally Parliament does not get involved in governance directly, 
preferring instead to conduct inquiries into the executive’s conduct.109 
The conflict between the two branches during the last decade led to the 
suspension of the Parliament in different times, which affects the issue of 
implementing some of the international conventions and to develop an effective 
counterterrorism laws. There are two observations concerning the recent political 
situation in Kuwait. First, the role of the legislature is quite restricted in the 
development of strategies for national development. Since 2006, when the current 
President Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah becomes the head of the State, the 
Parliament has been dissolved and re-elected four times. The government enjoys a 
lot of power and seriously restricts the attempts to criticise its efforts. The 
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Constitution and its activation incite conflicts between political powers in Kuwait, 
as the government is reluctant to follow the Constitutional regulations.110 
Kuwait has not codified terrorism in its legal system. Instead, the state has 
chosen to use fragmental security laws, the interpretation of which can be used to 
impose restrictions on human rights should the exercise of such rights be regarded 
as a crime against national security.111 However, it appears that much effort by the 
government and the Parliament is aimed at the political authority and does not 
include actual steps to implement the chosen course of development. Instability 
remains the dominant feature of the relationship between the legislative and 
executive branches in Kuwait,112 which hinder the government’s ability to develop 
a more effective counterterrorism policy. 
3.3.2 Executive Agencies Involved in Counterterrorism 
The introduction of control measures to monitor the internal and external 
situation represent one category of protective security steps taken by Kuwait. The 
performance of functions in this area involve the police, Border Security, Coast 
Guards, Kuwait State Security, the Kuwait National Guard, the Civil Defence, the 
Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both the police and State 
Security are overseen by civilian Interior Ministry authorities. 
3.3.2.1 Security Forces 
The Kuwaiti Police is a national organisation with approximately 4,000 police 
officers, the majority of whom are concentrated in Kuwait City. The police are 
equipped with light weapons, small arms, and all-terrain vehicles; they are capable 
of handling violent disorder and performing usual police duties.113 The police are 
solely responsible for the implementation of laws not linked to national security. 
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In contrast, State Security exercises control over national security affairs and 
intelligence. Kuwait State Security focuses on Islamist extremists and the threat 
posed by them. The body also performs counter-intelligence functions and arrests 
individuals suspected of espionage.114 The military carries out the responsibility of 
maintaining external security. In general, the police have pursued their core 
responsibility properly. Internal security is the first consideration of the police.115 
Consequently, they address the issue of internal threats linked to terrorist attacks, 
especially those that involve injuries to Kuwaiti citizens and damage to Kuwaiti 
assets. 
The Kuwait National Guard (KNG) is composed of several major units and it 
is estimated to have an approximate of 8,500 personnel. It is an all-volunteer body. 
The Kuwaiti government has defined its mission as ‘providing assistance to the 
military and security forces, in addition to the execution of any assignment 
entrusted to it by the Higher Defence Council, such as safeguarding establishments 
and utilities of a sensitive nature and importance.’116 The Guard’s ultimate role is to 
protect the royal family. During the Persian Gulf War, it was also entrusted with the 
function of patrolling borders of the 25 km wide UN-controlled zone of 
demilitarisation between Kuwait and Iraq, which saved Kuwait from any terror 
spillover. Counterterrorism functions of the unit also included ensuring security of 
crucial installations, such as diplomatic missions. Unlike the police and the army, 
the KNG is composed exclusively of Kuwaitis.117 
The Civil Defence was established before the Iraqi invasion of 1990. Its 
function is to cope with the threat of bombing, which occurred in the late 
eighties.118 There are about 2,000 participants; the body is accountable to the 
Ministry of Interior. This unit also shares the responsibility of handling the effects 
of a possible military invasion.119 
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3.3.2.2 Other Government Forces 
Customs plays a particular role in counterterrorism, as the Kuwaiti customs 
service is instrumental in detecting terrorists who seek to enter the country and who 
attempt to import goods and equipment that they can use.120 In addition, the 
institutional efforts to counteract terrorism include steps to prevent terrorist-related 
customs offences. The Ministry of Interior and the General Administration of 
Customs cooperate to track down offenders inside Kuwait. Those offenders who 
manage to leave the country and avoid apprehension are tracked down through 
extensive cooperation between the executive units of the Ministry of Justice, the 
office of the Attorney-General, the General Administration of Customs and 
Interpol.121 
The General Directorate of Border Security is also controlled by the Ministry 
of the Interior. Its major function is to patrol the frontier with Iraq and to prevent 
any inward movement that might affect the security of Kuwait; for instance, the 
potential threats of any terror spillover. The Kuwait Coast Guards performs similar 
functions.122 
Border management believed to be ‘a major component of homeland 
protection’.123 For each country involved in the global counterterrorism, border 
management is a crucial component in preventing terrorism, and Kuwait is not an 
exception. Overall, border management is defined as ‘the procedures applied to 
persons and objects crossing the border to ensure they comply with laws’.124 
Naturally, within the framework of Kuwait’s counterterrorism strategy, 
strengthening and improving border management are obviously necessary, since 
today’s reality associated with a changing and challenging environment establishes 
new security needs that must be met. 
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Since Kuwait is a UN member state, its border management policy aimed to 
enforce national security is shaped by the general UN border control initiatives. 
Since 2006, when the UN global counterterrorism strategy was initiated, Kuwait 
and other GCC countries have been experiencing changes in relation to their border 
management.125 These changes are provided through corresponding reformation 
and modernisation of the existing border management system at the national, 
regional, and international levels to enhance national security in the air, on land, 
and on the seas.126 
Within the framework of this strategy, border security is the most crucial 
element of the overall national and international strategy for combating terrorism. 
As one may agree, 
while border security is a matter that almost all states have paid 
increased attention to in the new millennium, it must be 
acknowledged that transboundary activity and the relatively simple 
and inexpensive means of perpetrating terrorist acts means that the 
operational capacity of most terrorist entities should be viewed as 
being reasonably high.127 
Hence, the first step toward the prevention of terrorism in the area of Kuwait’s 
national security and border management was the strengthening of its current 
migration law by supplement it with some ministerial decrees, which on the one 
hand protect the human rights of migrants, and on the other hand deter the potential 
trafficking in person.128 
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In addition, the International Organisation for Migration supported by the UN 
offered to support the government of Kuwait with its migration initiatives. 
According to the UN calculations, the funding requirements needed to implement 
this regime in Kuwait’s environment constitute US $850,000.129 The IOM will keep 
up with: 
• supporting the Kuwaiti Government’s efforts to counter 
trafficking and provide comprehensive direct assistance to 
trafficked persons and vulnerable migrants through continued 
technical assistance and training; 
• supporting Kuwait and other countries in the region to manage 
labour migration effectively and to uphold migrants’ human 
rights through ongoing localised technical assistance and 
activities to highlight good practices and lessons learned; and 
• promoting intraregional and interregional dialogue and practical 
cooperation through inter-State meetings that bring together 
GCC countries and/or origin and destination countries.130 
Overall, the migration regime in Kuwait supported by the UN is associated 
with strengthening law enforcement on the state’s border, including increased 
attention to compliance with human rights fixed in the national Constitution and 
increasing rigorous control over migrating populations (emigrants and immigrants). 
The detention and capture of terrorist suspects on borders, along with the 
investigation of their crimes, are also supposed to be provided. In addition, the 
corresponding agencies engaged in border management, including Kuwait’s 
customs and national police, need to undergo special training related to the 
prevention of terrorism on national borders.131 
                                                                                                                                   
of the Committee -Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1455 (2003)’, S/AC.37/2003/1455/31, 
Available at: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/31> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
129 International Organization for Migration, ‘Migration initiatives 2012’, (International 
Organization for Migration [web documentation], 2011), 43. Available at: 
<http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/books/M
igration-Initiatives-Appeal.pdf> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
130 Ibid, 49. 
131 Ibid, 51. 
 100 
In addition, the provision of Kuwait’s customs with new technologies is a great 
contribution to the enhancement of the national transport security system. This 
modernisation changes Kuwaitis’ lives positively, since it provides them with more 
convenient means to cross the national border. For example, to enhance Kuwait’s 
border control security, the establishment of machine-readable passports along with 
e-passport validation service, the so-called Public Key Directory, has been 
provided. The new e-passport technology is an extremely effective security 
measure ‘as a means of detecting the alteration or counterfeiting of passports or the 
use of stolen passports’.132 Today’s refugees crossing Kuwait’s national border are 
automatically provided with machine-readable travel documents.133 The e-passports 
that are expected to be introduced in the recent future contain a digitally stored 
image and fingerprints of their holders.134 In addition, Kuwait’s border management 
was provided with another supportive technology, the electronic customs-clearance 
system with the installed risk profiles, which help to identify whether migrating 
people or their transported objects present a risk to national security.135 Kuwait’s 
border management is reformed and modernised through the digitalisation and 
computerisation process that meets people’s needs in the changing and challenging 
environment. Overall, the implementation of this process within Kuwaitis’ living 
environment makes their lives modern, convenient, and secured. 
The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) is also involved 
in the UN’s counterterrorism strategy. In the context of Kuwait’s border 
management, INTERPOL provides its support and assistance in terrorism 
prevention through the provision of access to the international database (covering 
lost and stolen travel documents, terrorists’ identities, etc.) that can be obviously 
helpful. 136  With the help of the database provided by INTERPOL, Kuwait’s 
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authorities may detect and prevent illegal movements, and they may capture 
terrorists who are currently sought (for example, those from Al-Qaida). 
Naturally, Kuwait’s border management has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Despite the UN’s support and assistance in Kuwait’s 
counterterrorism struggle, Kuwait’s modernisation and reformation of border 
management has been realised slowly. However, Kuwait’s current border 
management includes a modernised surveillance system.137 
In 2009, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior proposed a four-year action plan 
aimed to improve the national border management. Within the framework of this 
plan, the particular counterterrorism initiatives should be realised.138 To be more 
specific, the following quotation represents the four initiatives that were proposed 
by the minister: 
• Border Security (US$ 602,000,000): This initiative proposes that 
national border security will be realised by monitoring and 
surveying restricted areas, deterring foreigners’ illegal entry into 
the country, and preventing smuggling. 
• Terrorism (US$ 13,000,000): This initiative suggests that the 
counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation project is meant to 
help achieve stability, securing the ‘internal front’, and 
protecting the Kuwaiti society against extremists and their 
activity.139 
• CCTV (US$ 475,000): This initiative implies that this network 
secures land and marine borders, populous locations, islands, 
highways, and vital installations. 
                                                                                                                                   
<http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/A%2066%20762%20English.pdf> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. 
137 Cordesman, A. H., Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International 
Security Dimensions, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 248. 
138 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism – Kuwait, (5 August 2010), 
Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c63b63a27.html> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
139 Ibid. 
 102 
• Port Security (US$ 138,000,000): This initiative ensuring 
security of land, sea, and air ports.140 
This action plan to some extent corresponds with the requirements set forth in the 
UNSCR 1624 paragraph 2.141 To improve Kuwait’s counterterrorism potential and 
to prevent terrorism in the future, its law enforcement agencies undergo special 
training provided by international experts on counterterrorism. According to the 
UN and American national security experts, Kuwait’s border security disposition 
needs to be improved through their specially designed counterterrorism training.142 
The training is provided through the exchange of professional experience, 
acquisition of knowledge and skills, and enhanced awareness of the danger of 
terrorism for social wellbeing and national security. 
The recent U.S. State Department annual report on terrorism admitted that the 
Kuwaiti government had taken steps to counteract terrorism and its expansion, 
including the implementation of biometric fingerprinting for security considerations 
at the Kuwait International Airport, the plans to install retina-scanning equipment at 
every port of entry and to elaborate a system allowing one to match border crossing 
information with visa submissions taking place at embassies abroad.143 
Numerous improvements should be realised in the near future to ensure the 
successful realisation of Kuwait’s counterterrorism strategy. The current state’s 
border management system has numerous benefits due to the modernisation, 
reformation, and computerisation processes and helps Kuwait’s government to 
realise its counterterrorism strategy in public policy. The development of today’s 
border management within Kuwait’s overall framework of the fight against 
terrorism at the national, regional, and international levels promises the 
achievement of the national welfare and the provision of sustainable life for the 
Kuwaitis in the future. 
                                                
140 Ibid. 
141 See UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) [on threats to international 
peace and security], 14 September 2005, S/RES/1624 (2005), Available at: <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/510/52/PDF/N0551052.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. 
142 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Strategic plan’, (2007), in US Department of 
Homeland Security [online database], accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
143 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 - Kuwait, (31 July 
2012), Available at: <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195544.htm> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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3.3.2.3 Executive Agencies Involved in Combating Terrorism Financing 
In 2002, the Central Bank of Kuwait created a department for combating 
money-laundering and financing terrorism operations that establishes directions 
concerning overseeing the units subject to control (investment companies, banks, 
etc.). It also works in coordination with relevant government bodies, such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since international resolutions are applied to freezing 
assets of organisations and individuals suspected of terrorism, as well as the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, which is conditioned by monitoring and 
control over the transfers of individual public welfare organisations licensed to 
participate in charitable work.144 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry oversees various establishments, 
financial and non-financial organisations, to ensure that ministerial laws and 
resolutions are not contravened. The Ministry gives the following instructions to 
each organisation that it oversees: verify identities of all of its customers with 
reliance on official documents; enter all conducted transactions in commercial 
ledgers and records, indicating the customer’s personal data, contacts and type and 
date of the transaction (showing value and nature); keep the record of the 
transactions for a minimum of 10 years; refrain from hosting anonymous accounts; 
report in writing any suspicious operation to the Public Prosecutor Office; and 
elaborate and implement programmes of work procedures and monitoring systems 
aimed at fighting money-laundering. 145  The Ministry of Information also 
collaborates with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labour in collecting monetary donations and charitable activities. More 
specifically, all media (television, print and radio) are instructed not to announce 
any collection of donations without the prior approval of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Labour.146 
                                                
144 UN Security Council (CTC), ‘Kuwait’s Report to the CTC (2006)’, Security Council, Distr.: 
General, 17 November 2006, S/2006/903, Letter dated 8 November 2006 from the Permanent 
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Committee, online: UN Security Council, Counter Terrorism Committee, 17 November 2006. 
145 UN Security Council (CTC), ‘Kuwait’s Report to the CTC (2004)’, Security Council, Distr.: 
General, 31 December 2004, S/2004/945, Letter dated 17 December 2004 from the Chargé 
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman 
of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, online: UN Security Council, Counter Terrorism Committee, 
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146 Ibid, 5. 
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Therefore, it can be seen that the government of Kuwait has developed its 
counterterrorism measures with regard to financing terrorism. This development is 
evident by the involvement of the different government’s ministries which will be 
discussed in more details in chapter five. However, it should be noted that the 
recent U.S. Department of State report on terrorism stressed that, although Kuwait 
has an anti-money laundering law and a number of successful prosecutions in 
related cases, the Parliament has failed to adopt a comprehensive law on AML and 
CFT.147 In fact, it is not until June 2013 when Kuwait passed a comprehensive law 
on AML and CFT (Law No. 106 of 2013), which discussed in chapter five. This 
failure, one of many, suggests the need to introduce changes to the procedure of law 
enforcement, as the present procedure seriously hampers the country’s initiatives 
and advances in counterterrorism. This is one area in which Kuwaiti authorities do 
not manage to maintain efficient communication and cooperation, yet the 
achievements in other spheres show the critical importance of such consistency and 
collaboration. 
3.3.3 Overall Assessment of Kuwait’s Counterterrorism Strategy 
What becomes apparent when examining the Kuwaiti counterterrorism 
establishments and practices is a distribution of functions, accountability, and lines 
of cooperation that seek to ensure the prompt exchange of information. The mode 
of collaboration between the competent authorities presupposes accumulation and 
fast transmission of relevant information. This cooperation ‘is effected through 
communication between the security organs of the Ministry of Interior and the 
authorities concerned or by means of diplomatic contacts through the organs of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.148 
What is more, it is necessary to underline one remarkable feature of Kuwait’s 
counterterrorism policy. This feature is presented by the shift in priorities made by 
the national government. In the aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and Al-Qaida 
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terroristic activity, the counterterrorism methods provided by Kuwait’s government 
were supposed to pay great attention to such hard security tools as ‘surveillance, 
direct action, key point security, and censorship’.149 However, after 2005, the 
Kuwaiti government started dealing with the root causes of terrorism. 
The mentioned shift in the priorities determined the corresponding 
counterterrorism policy measures taken by Kuwait’s national government. First, 
some measures are taken to attack the ideological base of violent extremism. In this 
context, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs undertake stricter monitoring of 
preachers. In addition, in 2006, a special commission to deal with the problems and 
issues believed to be important for Kuwaiti youth was organised by the 
International Moderation Centre. A programme called ‘The Future Scholars’ was 
initiated in order to educate youths in Islamic learning and how Islam rejects 
extremism and violence. The programme brings together psychologists, 
sociologists, educational experts, and clerics to create initiatives that help to combat 
extremism and terrorism at the national level.150 
Overall, the shift made by Kuwait’s national government points to the fact that 
today’s public policy is shaped by offensive measures rather than defensive. Whilst 
offensive measures mean that the ‘measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to 
terrorism’ in order to eliminate or at least reduce it, defensive measures should be 
understood as the ‘measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and 
property to terrorist acts’ to prevent and mitigate terrorism.151 A public policy 
aimed to eliminate the root causes of terrorism is more effective than that focused 
only on reducing terrorism. 
Although numerous useful measures in the national public policy have been 
taken, several major challenges need to be overcome to achieve success in the 
implementation of the counterterrorism strategy. Political rivalry, absence of the 
central government’s control over Kuwait’s National Assembly, sectarian tensions 
                                                
149 See the International Moderation Center, ‘Future Scholars’, Available at: < 
http://wasatiaonline.net/index.php/2014-03-10-13-08-42/51-2010-04-12-17-06-31> accessed 1st 
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between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, the demographic problem presented by the 
‘youth explosion’, and increased radicalism among young Kuwaitis are the major 
challenges that complicate today’s counterterrorism-oriented public policy. 
Naturally, the elimination of these challenges will positively influence the 
implementation of the national counterterrorism strategy. 
With the lapse of time, Kuwait’s counterterrorism strategy has positively 
changed; however, there are still many internal problems that should be solved. 
Today, Kuwait’s antiterrorist measures included in the national public policy 
promise a sustainable future for the state. Nevertheless, the real-life implementation 
of the counterterrorism strategy that violates Western human rights and freedoms 
peculiar to Kuwait must be eliminated from Kuwaiti society to ensure public safety 
and national security in a democratic way. 
3.4   Conclusion 
The counterterrorism strategies adopted in Kuwait have been formulated over 
many decades and constitute responses to the terrorism threats that became evident 
in the state during three periods of its existence – during the 1960s’ existence of 
Marxist-Leninist terror groups in the Middle East, during Shiite religious terrorists’ 
activities associated with the Iraq-Iran war, and during the recent terror threat from 
the Al-Qaida terrorist grouping. Though the sources of terrorism are fragmented in 
terms of timing and origins, it is notable that criminalisation as a strategy has been 
building throughout the development of the country's counterterrorism policies and 
has been the most basic and constant response. Protective security is another 
important strategy adopted by the government of Kuwait since the Iraq-Iran war. 
Internationalisation and countering radicalisation has been the most recent 
significant improvement made by the government of Kuwait to counter the threats 
of terrorism in an educational way and with the involvement in the international 
efforts on combating terrorism. In addition, the recent period of Kuwait’s existence 
is characterised by the multilateral assistance of powerful Western states and 
entities, such as the United States and the United Nations, which helps Kuwait to 
establish effectiveness and to formulate fair regulations to fight terrorism. 
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Kuwait, as a matter of political policy wants to be seen as an ally of the West, 
particularly to the United States. Therefore, in terms of rhetoric it goes along with 
the concept of the ‘war on terror’ and endorses it. According to the Head of the 
Follow-Up and Coordination Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ambassador Khalid Al-Maghames, ‘Kuwait is keen on waging war against 
terrorism and its ramifications’.152 However, hard action does not follow, and the 
government of Kuwait does not mirror the American war on terror. For example, 
there is not any new security legislation which resembles the U.S. approach, and the 
Kuwaiti military stance cannot be compared with US activity. In addition, the 
government of Kuwait has not even mirrored the UK anti-terrorism legislations 
which is far more extensive compared with what Kuwait has adopted. Another 
approach to counterterrorism that Kuwait has not followed, apart from recently the 
implementation of international financial sanctions related to terrorist financiers in 
Kuwait, is the use of ‘executive orders’ (such as detention without trial). In fact, 
Kuwait has a modest or limited counter-terrorism strategy and catalogue of 
measures as outlined in this chapter. 
However, it should be noted that although Kuwait’s counter-terrorism strategy 
is restrained, yet it has been seen that for Kuwait at least it has been to some extent 
efficient and reasonable. For example, Kuwait has not witnessed a large number of 
terrorist attacks on its soil like the UK or the U.S., and therefore, it does not need to 
take the same actions as the UK or the U.S.. Overall, Kuwait’s counter-terrorism 
strategies and actions have been mainly focused on criminalisation and protective 
security as the prime responses to terrorism threats. These two strategies mirror the 
UK’s CONTEST strategies of ‘pursue’ and ‘protect’, albeit on a much reduced 
scale. Latterly, and especially because of external pressures action against terrorist 
financiers has been added as a strategy. 
Consistent with the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism 1999 (ICSFT) definition of terrorism and the acceptance of 
the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism’s definitions, Kuwait has the 
counter-terrorism focus of its activity firmly embodied in the state Constitution and 
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many other related legislative documents. However, it is notable that, 
notwithstanding the respect that Kuwaiti legal authorities show toward both 
definitions, Kuwait has not yet ratified Arab Conventions, and as for the UN ICSFT 
it is not until June 2013 that Kuwait ratified it.153 There are even doubts regarding 
the impact of some counter-measures within the Constitution in Kuwait, since the 
focus on preventing terrorism often affects the issues of privacy of personal issues, 
correspondence, private property, and the like. Hence, Kuwait can be considered an 
active combatant against terrorism in the international context, and through its legal 
framework for fighting terrorism, it has been prepared to strengthen counter-
terrorism measures at the expense of Kuwaitis. 
Overall, the counterterrorism strategies of Kuwait are designed well so far as 
they go, and Kuwait has implemented most of the international conventions against 
terrorism in so far as they relate to criminal law – specific criminal offences against 
terrorism, although they may be some faults/problems, as discussed in chapter four. 
However, there remain gaps in the provision. In fact, there were major gaps until 
very recently in regards to the financing of terrorism, as this thesis shall explain in 
chapter five. In addition, there is also a problem of bringing the laws into greater 
compliance with the domestic and international norms of democracy and liberty, 
which should be among the key priorities for the future. Therefore, this thesis shall 
assess in the next chapters the role of the internal and external influences in 
implementing these international conventions, which are also subjected to tests of 
effectiveness and fairness. 
 
 
 
                                                
153 See Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Four 
The Kuwaiti Criminal Law: Criminal Offences Related 
to Terrorism 
4.1   Introduction 
The current chapter is dedicated to the criminal offences within the 
counterterrorism legislative framework of the State of Kuwait. The present chapter 
is organised as follows. Section I looks at the history and content of the major 
counterterrorist international treaties to which Kuwait acceded. In particular, 
Section I provides an overview of the following treaties: Convention on Offences 
and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and the Montreal Protocol, 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, and International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings. It should be noted that this chapter will not cover the conventions on 
Nuclear terrorism, as it is not a major issue in Kuwait. Furthermore, the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. In addition, Section I offers a brief 
analysis of the limitations of the international treaties. The purpose of Section I is to 
show what kinds of obligations in the area of counterterrorism are imposed on 
Kuwait by international law. 
Section II provides an overview and analysis of the domestically generated 
Kuwaiti laws that address terrorism. In particular the section looks at: Kuwaiti 
Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 and its Amended Laws, Law No. 31 of 1970 In Regards 
to Crimes Related to State Security, Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regards to Crimes 
Related to Safety of Aircrafts and Air Navigation, Decree of Law No. 13 of 1991 In 
Regards to Weapons and Ammunition, Law No. 35 of 1985 In Regards to Crimes 
of Explosives, and Law No. 17 of 1960 promulgating the Criminal Procedure Code. 
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The section discusses the ability of the laws to cover certain form of terrorism. 
Also, the section examines whether the domestic laws comply with the 
aforementioned international treaties. Furthermore, the section discusses potential 
interferences of the laws with the internationally accepted human rights. The main 
purpose of Section II is to find out whether Kuwait has comprehensive 
counterterrorist laws or whether it addresses terrorist acts within the general 
legislative framework. Furthermore, this section investigates whether international 
laws/agenda influenced the Kuwaiti legislator, and to what extent Kuwait has 
implemented the mentioned conventions in Section I. 
Discussions contained in Section III flow from the finding that Kuwait lacks 
comprehensive counterterrorist laws. In this section the author argues that Kuwait 
should have comprehensive counterterrorist laws and cites reasons for that. The 
reasons are categorised into two groups: general and specific. General reasons 
explain why any State, not only Kuwait, should criminalise terrorism. Specific 
reasons clarify why it is important for Kuwait to have comprehensive 
counterterrorist laws. Section III also briefly discusses the relationship between 
counterterrorism laws and human rights. 
4.2   Section I: International Law and Terrorism 
4.2.1 Introductory Remarks 
The current section discusses how international law addresses terrorism. The 
author looks at the key treaties designed to tackle the problem of terrorism. The 
presented analysis is limited only to those treaties to which Kuwait is a party. 
According to Article 70 of the Kuwaiti Constitution, ‘A treaty has the force of law 
after it is signed, ratified, and published in the Official Gazette’.1 However, treaties 
that suggest additional budget expenditures or amendment of the Kuwait laws 
require the enactment of specific laws to enter into force.2 In any case, the Kuwait 
Constitution allows treaties concluded by Kuwait to constitute a part of its national 
law. Therefore, the overview and analysis of these treaties can be regarded as an 
overview and analysis of Kuwaiti counter-terrorist laws. 
                                                
1 The Constitution of the State of Kuwait, Article 70. 
2 Ibid. 
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Thus, the purpose of this section is to find out to what extent the existing 
international instruments are enough to effectively fight against terrorism. The 
author reaches the conclusion that existing international treaties alone are unable to 
combat terrorism effectively. There should be further support from additional 
domestic laws. Such support should come in the form of further domestic 
implementation of international treaties, since the latter impose on Contracting 
States to enact necessary counter-terrorist laws. To put it simply, international 
treaties would be useless without counter-terrorist laws adopted by States. 
4.2.2 International Conventions 
4.2.2.1 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board 
Aircraft (the Tokyo Convention) 
4.2.2.1.1 Brief History 
By the year 1963, when the Tokyo Convention was concluded, aircraft 
hijacking became a pressing issue. For instance, the hijacking of US aircraft 
constituted forty percent of all the hijackings around the world.3 In particular, there 
was the wave of aircraft hijackings from the United States to Cuba. The United 
States unsuccessfully attempted to address the hijackings.4 The main reason for the 
failure was the fact that there was no formal diplomatic relationship between the 
United States and Cuba, and thus, it was impossible to find a formal legal solution 
for the problem.5 
In 1962 at the Rome meeting of the Legal Committee of the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a specialised UN body in the area of international 
civil aviation, the United States together with Venezuela suggested that the newly 
proposed Convention on the Legal Status of Aircraft should make a reference to 
aircraft hijacking.6 The US-Venezuela proposal met substantial support of the 
international community. At the Tokyo Conference which was held in September 
                                                
3 Ghosh, S. K., Terrorism: World under Siege, (APH Publishing, New Delhi, 1995), 159. 
4 McWhinney, E., Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism: the illegal Diversion of Aircraft and 
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5 Ibid. 
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1963 it was generally agreed that it was important to address the issue of aircraft 
hijacking at the international level.7 The result of the conference was the conclusion 
of the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board 
Aircraft which is known as the Tokyo Convention. For Kuwait the Tokyo 
Convention entered into force on 25 February 1980.8 
4.2.2.1.2 How does the Convention address terrorism? 
The Tokyo Convention does not contain any reference to the term ‘terrorism’. 
However, it addresses one of the important forms of the twentieth-century terrorism 
which is aircraft hijacking. The notorious terrorist attack of 9/11 demonstrated the 
continued close link between aircraft hijacking and terrorism. Kuwait is one of the 
many countries that has faced the problem of aircraft hijacking. Thus, in December 
1984 a Kuwait aircraft was hijacked in an attempt to release from prison the 
members of Aljihad Al-Islami organisation that claimed responsibility for the bomb 
attacks in Kuwait City in 1983.9 The aircraft was hijacked on the route from Dubai 
to Pakistan. During the hijacking two American passengers were killed.10 The 
aircraft was forced to land in Tehran, Iran.11 Then the Iranian authorities raided the 
aircraft.12 Thus, one may observe that aircraft hijacking serves for terrorists as one 
of the means to achieve their goals. Therefore, since the Tokyo Convention 
addresses aircraft hijacking, it addresses one of the most prominent and feared 
forms and means of terrorism. 
Article 11 (1) of the Tokyo Convention reads as follows: 
When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat 
thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of 
control of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be 
committed, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to 
                                                
7 Gist Jr., F. J., ‘The Aircraft Hijacker and International Law’, (Master of Laws Thesis, McGill 
University), 72. 
8 Decree of Law No. 64 of 1979, Gazette Kuwait Al Youm, No. (1271) Year: Twenty Five. 
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(PhD Thesis, University of Wales, 2003). 314-315. 
10 Ibid. 
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restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve 
his control of the aircraft13 
One may observe that Article 11 (1) does not use the term ‘hijacking’ but rather 
refers to unlawful interference, seizure or other wrongful exercise of control of an 
aircraft. Interestingly, the Convention does not denote these acts as crimes or 
offences. In simple terms, the Tokyo Convention does not criminalise aircraft 
hijacking. At this point it becomes clear that it is up to States whether or not to 
criminalise aircraft hijacking. 
The Convention gives the Contracting States certain instruments to deal with 
aircraft hijacking. First, the Convention gives the State of aircraft registration the 
right to exercise jurisdiction over aircraft hijacking.14 Thus, if the aircraft registered 
in Kuwait was hijacked on the route from London to Dubai, Kuwait, under the 
Tokyo Convention, would have jurisdiction over the aircraft hijacking. To elaborate 
the hypothetical situation, suppose that under Kuwait law aircraft hijacking is not 
an offence. That would mean that at least in Kuwait, the hijackers would escape 
responsibility. This scenario shows how important it is for every country to address 
aircraft hijacking in their criminal law. For this reason, the Tokyo Convention 
foresees cases where a Contracting State which is not the State of Registration may 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction. Thus, Article 4 of the Convention allows a non-
registration Contracting State to exercise jurisdiction over an aircraft in flight in the 
following cases: (1) the offence has effect on the territory of such a State; (2) it was 
a national or permanent resident of such as State who committed the offence; (3) 
the offence has been committed against a national of such a State; (4) the offence 
violates the laws and regulations of manoeuvre of aircraft or flight, which are in 
force in such a State; (5) a State should exercise such a jurisdiction in order to 
comply with its obligations under multilateral international treaties; (6) the offence 
threatens security of such a State.15 
Exercising jurisdiction over aircraft hijacking can be a powerful tool for 
combating terrorism. In order to make the tool powerful, there should be 
                                                
13 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft (adopted 14 
September 1963, entered into force 4 December 1969) 704 UNTS 220. 
14 Ibid, Art. 3 (1) 
15 Ibid, Art. 4 
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sustainable counter-terrorist laws in the States which are parties to the Tokyo 
Convention. Without such national laws, the exercise of jurisdiction is not capable 
to deal with terrorism effectively. Thus, Abeyratne correctly points out that ‘the 
Tokyo Convention is relatively ineffective if States do not make provisions in their 
own laws to give legal effect to the concerted action that is required at international 
law to combat terrorism’.16 In other words, the Tokyo Convention gives the States 
certain rights and imposes certain obligations. However, it is the sovereign right of 
States to decide in what manner these rights and obligations are to be exercised. 
Another tool provided by the Tokyo Convention is powers assigned to aircraft 
commanders. Article 6 is assigned with powers to impose reasonable measures, 
including restraint, on person who commit, or is about to commit hijacking. This 
power, however, can be exercised only under the following circumstances: (1) 
aircraft is in flight (‘from the moment when all external doors are closed following 
embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation’); 
(2) there is a necessity to take measures to protect the safety of the aircraft, 
property, or persons; (3) there is a necessity to maintain discipline and order on 
board; (4) measures are necessary to enable the aircraft commander to deliver the 
hijacker to the competent authorities.17 
4.2.2.1.3 Limitations of the Convention 
The Tokyo Convention is the first attempt to address such form of terrorism as 
aircraft hijacking in a legally binding international document. As many first 
attempts, this one did not escape some flaws. The Convention contains many 
limitations some of which were probably the result of diplomatic compromise but 
others were unconsidered flaws. 
The first limitation is that it does not apply to aircraft used in police services, 
military and customs.18 This limitation stems from the principle that international 
law produced within the UN framework concerns mainly international civil 
aviation. Indeed, the Chicago Convention, the fundamental convention which 
regulates international civil aviation, stipulates that it applies only to civil aircraft as 
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17 Tokyo Convention, Art 6 
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opposed to state aircraft (which includes aircraft used in customs, police services 
and military).19 It means that if police, customs or military aircraft are hijacked, 
Kuwait or any other State cannot take measures provided by the Tokyo Convention. 
Secondly, the Tokyo Convention imposes on the State of aircraft registration a 
duty to take measures to establish its jurisdiction20 but it does not require the State 
of registration to prosecute, try, or extradite the hijackers. To recall, the treaty only 
requires taking a hijacker in custody. Moreover, Article 16 (2) expressly specifies: 
‘nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to create an obligation to grant 
extradition’. The issue of prosecution, trial and extradition are left to the discretion 
of the State of registration or the State which may exercise its jurisdiction over the 
aircraft hijacking as foreseen by the Tokyo Convention. Thus, if a State of aircraft 
registration does not have laws which entitle its authorities to prosecute or extradite 
hijackers the latter can completely escape responsibility. The absence of 
prosecution and extradition obligations in the Tokyo Convention makes the treaty a 
toothless beast. 
In addition, the requirement to take measures necessary to establish 
jurisdiction appears to be the requirement of minimum measures. Mendelsohn 
explains that despite the imperative language adopted in Article 3 (2) of the 
Convention, it leaves upon the discretion of a State of aircraft registration to decide 
whether establish jurisdiction over acts, even if they are criminal under the State’s 
law.21 Moreover, even a Contracting State declines to take measures to establish 
jurisdiction no other Contracting State can see such a decline as a violation of the 
Tokyo Convention.22 Indeed, one may observe that the treaty does not foresee any 
sanction for the disinclination to establish jurisdiction. 
                                                
19 Convention on International Civil Aviation (adopted 7 December 1944, entered into force 4 April 
1947) 15 UNTS 296, Art.3 
20 Tokyo Convention, Art 3 (2) 
21 Mendelsohn, A., ‘In-Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture Under the Tokyo 
Convention’, (1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 509, 516. 
22 Ibid. 
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4.2.2.2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague 
Hijacking Convention) 
4.2.2.2.1 Brief History 
It is soon become apparent that the Tokyo Convention was insufficient to deal 
with terrorism. The year 1969 witnessed the wave of aircraft hijackings. In 
particular, 82 hijackings were recorded.23 This figure is almost twice much than the 
number of hijackings recorded in the period between 1948 and 1968.24 The high 
number of hijackings and the weakness of the Tokyo Convention made the Legal 
Committee of the ICAO accept that Article 11 ‘does not provide a complete 
remedy’ for aircraft hijackings. 25  The Legal Committee worked on the draft 
Convention that was subsequently submitted to the ICAO Conference in The 
Hague. The Conference was attended by 77 States and resulted in the adoption of 
the draft without any alternation on 16 December 1970.26 Kuwait acceded to the 
Convention on 25 May 1979.27 
4.2.2.2.2 How does the Convention addresses terrorism? 
The Hague Hijacking Convention is referred to as ‘… a milestone both in 
general development of an international criminal law and in the fight against aerial 
hijacking specifically’.28 This Convention was designed to eliminate or mitigate 
flaws of the Tokyo Convention. As well as the Tokyo Convention, the Hague 
Hijacking Convention does not contain the term terrorism. However, unlike the 
Tokyo Convention, the treaty expressly indicates aircraft hijacking is an offence. 
Thus, Article 1 of the Convention stipulates: 
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: 
                                                
23 Williams, C. and Waltrip, S., Aircrew Security: A Practical Guide, (Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 
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24 Ibid. 
25 Abeyratne, R. I. R., Aviation Security Law, (Springer, 2010), 230. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Decree of Law No. 19 of 1979, Gazette Kuwait Al Youm, No. (1245) Year: Twenty Five. 
28 Mankiewicz, R. H., ‘The Hague Convention’, (1971) 37 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 195, 
195. 
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a. unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of 
intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or 
attempts to perform any such act, or 
b. is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to 
perform any such act commits an offence (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘the offence’)29 
Defining aircraft hijacking as an offence brings more legal certainty. Thus, even if 
under national law of a Contracting State aircraft hijacking was not an offence, a 
Contracting State which acceded to the Convention now should treat it as an 
offence. It is also important that Article 1 covers not only a hijacker but also a 
person, who assists a hijacker. 
Compared to the Tokyo Convention, the Hague Hijacking Convention imposes 
more strict duties upon the Contracting States. Thus, the Convention requires the 
Contracting States to make aircraft hijacking punishable by severe penalties.30 It 
means that Contracting States have to enact specific criminal laws which foresee 
severe criminal responsibility for aircraft hijacking. Therefore, under this treaty 
Kuwait is under the duty to enact laws that would provide for a severe punishment 
for a crime of hijacking. While the Tokyo Convention left it up to States to decide 
whether aircraft hijacking is an offence and whether it should be addressed by 
criminal justice, the Hague Hijacking Convention allows no such a choice. 
Another obligation imposed by the treaty on the Contracting States is the 
obligation to prosecute or extradite aircraft hijackers (aut dedere aut judicare). 
Thus, Article 7 provides that if the Contracting State on whose territory the 
offender is found, should, if not extradite him, then, at least, ‘to submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution’. One may observe that the 
Convention does not require the Contracting States to extradite hijackers. However, 
what the treaty mandates is to treat aircraft hijacking as an extraditable offence.31 
For Kuwait this obligation means that in case an alleged hijacker is found on its 
                                                
29 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (adopted 16 December 1970, 
entered into force 14 October 1971) 860 UNTS 1971. 
30 Ibid, Art 2 
31 Ibid, Art 8 
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territory, it should take measures, if not extradite, then at least take measures to 
prosecute such a hijacker. 
4.2.2.2.3 Limitations of the Convention 
As well as the Tokyo Convention, the Hague Hijacking Convention does not 
apply to aircraft used in military, police or customs service.32 Furthermore, some 
restrictions can be found in the definition of hijacking embodied in Article 1. To 
recall, Article 1 defines hijacking as an offence committed while aircraft in flight. 
Chung correctly points out that the Hague Convention, similar to the Tokyo 
Convention in that it covers only the so called ‘on board hijacking’.33 The author 
specifies that there is another type of hijacking which is a ‘non-on-board 
hijacking’.34 The example of a ‘non-on-board hijacking’ is when a person who is 
not on board of aircraft placed a bomb or other device on the aircraft and may 
extort the aircraft to divert from its route.35 There are also suggestions that it is 
possible to hijack an aircraft via remote control.36 Currently these cases are not 
addressed by the Hague Convention. It means that a person who placed a bomb or 
other device which enables the extortion or forced the diversion of an aircraft 
cannot be taken into custody or prosecuted only by virtue of the Hague Hijacking 
Convention. Nowadays, to bring such a person to justice, national counter-terrorist 
laws are needed. 
At the same time, the situation may change in the near future. The point is that 
at the Diplomatic Conference on Aviation Security, which was held in Beijing from 
30 August to 10 September 2010, States signed the Protocol Supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the Beijing 
Protocol), which covers different forms of hijacking. The Beijing Protocol 
significantly expands the scope of the Hague Hijacking Convention. In particular, it 
amends Article 1 of the Hague Hijacking Convention.37 As a result, the Protocol 
eliminates the ‘in flight’ restriction. The new Article 1 (1) covers all cases when a 
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34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 For further information see 'Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
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person unlawfully controls an aircraft, no matter whether such person on board or 
not. In other words, the Beijing Protocol covers also a ‘non-board’ hijacking. Also, 
the Protocol addresses not only the act per se but also a threat and/or of hijacking. 
Furthermore, the circle of persons who can be responsible for the hijacking is 
enlarged. Now it includes not only the person who directly committed the offence 
but also those once who organised it and assisted it. Moreover, the Convention 
requires Contracting Parties to treat as an offence an agreement to commit hijacking 
(whether on board or non-on-board) or assistance to commit. To sum up the Beijing 
Protocol imposes more strict and precise duties on the Contracting States to address 
terrorism in their national laws. It should be noted that the Protocol is not yet in 
force. 
4.2.2.3 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (sometimes referred to as the Sabotage Convention or the Montreal 
Convention) 
4.2.2.3.1 Brief History 
On February 21, 1970 an aircraft heading from Zurich to Tel Aviv exploded 
about nine minutes after take-off. The bomb that was placed in the aircraft was set 
to explode when the aircraft reached 30,000 feet.38 In result of the attack, forty-
seven passengers and crew members were killed. On the same day another 
explosion occurred. The aircraft assigned for the cargo flight bound for Tel Aviv 
exploded in mid-air.39 The aircraft managed to make an emergency landing in 
Frankfurt.40 As well as in the first instance, the bomb was placed in the plane. 
These two cases compelled the international community to take an immediate 
action. 
There were expectations that the cases of aviation sabotage could be addressed 
through amendments to the Hague Hijacking Convention. 41  However, the 
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39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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Convention was not in force yet and there were fears that amendments would delay 
the treaty’s entry into force.42 Therefore, it was decided to adopt a new treaty which 
would address aviation sabotage. The outcome is that the Montreal Treaty is almost 
identical to the Hague Hijacking Convention. The only difference is that the former 
addresses aviation sabotage. The Sabotage Convention was signed on 23 September 
1971 in Montreal. For Kuwait, the Convention entered into force on 23 November 
1979.43 
4.2.2.3.2 How does the Convention addresses terrorism? 
The Montreal Convention addresses terrorism in the same way as the Hague 
Hijacking Convention does. In other words, the Sabotage Convention addresses a 
particular form of terrorism which is aviation sabotage. Originally, the Sabotage 
Convention, as well as the Hague Hijacking Convention conferred the concept of 
offence only to the aircraft in flight or aircraft in service. The Article 1 of the 
Sabotage Convention defines the aviation sabotage as follows – an act of violence 
against a person on board of aircraft if such act is likely to put the aircraft safety in 
danger, or destruction of aircraft in service, or causing such damage to aircraft that 
makes it incapable of flight, or placing a device or substance which is likely to 
destroy aircraft or render it incapable of flight, or destruction and damaging air 
navigation facilities, or communication of false information and thus, putting an 
aircraft in danger. The attempt to commit aviation sabotage is also considered as an 
offence.44 
On 24 February 1988 the States signed the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports serving the International Civil Aviation (the 
Montreal Protocol). This Protocol is a supplement to the Sabotage Convention. For 
Kuwait, the Montreal Protocol entered into force on 6 August 1989.45 The Montreal 
Protocol extends the scope of the Sabotage Convention to airports serving 
international civil aviation. Thus, the aviation sabotage, except as discussed earlier, 
                                                                                                                                   
International Law: Essays in Honour of Georg Schwarzenberger on his Eightieth Birthday, (Stevens 
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43 Decree of Law No. 62 of 1979, Gazette Kuwait Al Youm, No. (1271) Year: Twenty Five. 
44 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (adopted 23 
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45 Decree of Law No. 71 of 1988, Gazette Kuwait Al Youm, No. (1803) Year: Thirty Five. 
 121 
also includes acts of violence against a person at an airport serving international 
civil aviation that leads to serious injury or death, or destruction or damaging the 
facilities of an airport serving international civil aviation or aircraft, which is not in 
service.46 In order to qualify as aviation sabotage, the aforementioned acts should 
be accompanied with the use of any weapon, device, or substance and to put or 
likely to put an airport serving international civil aviation in danger.47 One may 
observe that the purpose of the Montreal Protocol is to address aviation sabotage 
which takes place other than on board. One may draw an analogy with ‘on board’ 
and ‘not-on-board’ hijacking. Here, there can also be ‘on board’ sabotage (as 
originally foreseen by the Sabotage Convention) and ‘not-on-board’ sabotage (as 
addressed by the Montreal Protocol of 1988). 
The Sabotage Convention imposes the same duties on the Contracting States as 
the Hague Hijacking Convention: (1) to make aviation sabotage (whether ‘on-
board’ or ‘not-on-board’) severally punishable;48 (2) to take measures to establish 
its jurisdiction over the aviation sabotage when it is committed on the territory of 
the State, or is committed on board or against aircraft registered in the State, or the 
aircraft with an alleged offender lands in the territory of the State, or on board or 
against the aircraft leased by company, whose principal place of business in the 
State;49 (3) take an alleged offender into custody;50 (4) make preliminary enquiry 
into facts;51 (5) notify interested States of the person in custody and circumstances 
of detention;52 (6) to, if not extradite, be obliged to present the case before the 
competent authorities with the purpose of prosecution of the offender;53 (7) to make 
an effort to take all feasible measures to prevent aviation sabotage.54 
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4.2.2.3.3 Limitations of the Convention 
As with all the before mentioned treaties, the Sabotage Convention does not 
apply to aircraft used in police, military, or customs.55 The original weakness as 
regards the narrow scope (only ‘in flight’ offences were addressed) was later 
eliminated by the Montreal Protocol. Finally, one more weakness of the Convention 
is that it lacks an enforcement mechanism. In other words, even if the State fails to 
comply with its treaty obligations, there are no sanctions. It means if the State 
refuses to prosecute an alleged offender, the Convention does not offer any 
solution. At the same time, the lack of enforcement is the weakness of all 
international law in general. 
4.2.2.4 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents 
4.2.2.4.1 Brief History 
Another significant form of terrorism is violent attacks on diplomats. Among 
numerous cases of terrorist attacks on diplomat, two instances attracted special 
media attention. In March 1970 Karl Count von Spreti, an ambassador of the West 
Germany to Guatemala was kidnapped and assassinated by guerrillas who sought to 
exchange him for twenty-two incarcerated rebels.56 In March 1973, another case 
involving several diplomats, among which there were Belgians and Americans, 
were taken as hostages, and subsequently were killed, by Palestinians during a 
reception at the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, Sudan.57 Both these events attracted 
enormous public attention throughout the world. It became clear that diplomats 
were increasingly becoming an attractive target for terrorists. The adoption of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents was prompted by these unfortunate 
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cases.58 The Convention was adopted on 14 December 1973. In Kuwait, the 
Convention entered into force on 1 March 1989.59 
4.2.2.4.2 How does the Convention address terrorism? 
First, the Convention defines who can fall under the category of international 
protected persons. Article 1 specifies that the following persons are internationally 
protected persons: Head of State, Head of Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and their accompanying families; representatives and officials of a State, officials 
and agents of intergovernmental international organisations. Second, the 
Convention covers the following offences: murder, kidnapping, or other attack on 
internationally protected person or her liberty committed intentionally; a violent 
attack on the official premises, the means of transport, or the private 
accommodation of an internationally protected person; a threat to commit such an 
attack; an attempt to commit such an attack; participate in the accomplishment of 
such an attack.60 Third, the Convention imposes the following obligations on a 
Contracting State: (1) to make the crimes punishable by appropriate penalties;61 (2) 
to take measures necessary to establish jurisdiction when the crime occurs on the its 
territory, or on board of aircraft or ship registered in the State, or when an alleged 
offender is a national of the State, or when a crime is committed against 
internationally protected person, who exercises functions on behalf of the State;62 
(3) to take all feasible measures to prevent preparation of the crimes in its 
territory;63 (4) to exchange information and coordinate measures to prevent the 
commission of the crimes;64 (5) to communicate all relevant facts of the crime and 
information on identity of the alleged offender who fled from its territory;65 (6) to 
endeavour to transmit information about victims and the circumstances of the crime 
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to interested States;66 (7) to take an alleged offender into custody with the purpose 
of further prosecution or extradition; 67  (8) to submit the case to competent 
authorities with the purpose of prosecution of an alleged offender;68 (9) to treat the 
crimes concerned as extraditable;69 (10) and to communicate the final outcome of 
the criminal proceedings regarding an alleged offender to the Secretary-General of 
UN.70 One may observe that, as far as obligations of Contracting States are 
concerned, the Convention in many respects is similar to the Hague Hijacking 
Convention and the Sabotage Convention. Thus, the treaty imposes a duty to 
prosecute an alleged offender, but contains no imperative language as to 
extradition. In simple terms, there is no obligation to extradite an alleged offender 
under this treaty. 
4.2.2.4.3 Limitations of the Convention 
The major limitation of the Convention is that it protects only a very limited 
circle of persons. Every year many people become victims of terrorists. At the same 
time, the Convention protects only diplomatic personnel. Such a narrow approach is 
explained by the fact that the majority of States believed that it was more feasible to 
achieve an international accord on the Convention which covers traditional subjects 
of international law rather than on any other document that would give protection to 
all mankind in general.71 The fact that the treaty protects only a very limited circle 
of individuals, however, is negated to a certain extent because of the existence of 
other multilateral international treaties. For instance, the Tokyo Convention, the 
Hague Hijacking Convention and the Sabotage Convention render their protection 
to such broad categories as air passengers. Indeed, independently of status, 
nationality, origin, religious views and other factors, air passengers may enjoy the 
protection provided by the afore-mentioned international treaties. 
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4.2.2.5 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (the Hostages 
Convention) 
4.2.2.5.1 Brief History 
As it has been mentioned earlier, not only diplomats and other protected 
persons often become victims of terrorist attacks. Taking hostages is one of the 
forms of terrorism. One of the most notorious hostage crises took place in 1972 in 
Munich. The Israeli athletes were taken as hostages by the members of the one of 
the Palestinian terrorist groups. The Palestinians demanded the release of 230 
prisoners from Israeli prisons.72 Also, they demanded West Germany to release five 
members of the terrorist group known as the Baader-Meinhof gang.73 Israel was 
reluctant to negotiate or to make any concessions.74 There were negotiations and 
terrorists were even able to get to the airport together with hostages.75 However, the 
result of an attempt of German police to release the hostages was that the terrorists 
opened fire and all the hostages were killed.76 The Munich massacre shocked the 
world.77 Apart from this kidnapping became another pressing problem. Thus, there 
were several instances of kidnapping of German businessmen.78 Perhaps, for this 
reason it was Germany that became an initiator of the International Convention 
Against Taking Hostages.79 In a letter dated 28 September 1976 the Federal 
Republic of Germany stated that taking hostages became of the pressing global 
problems and proposed to adopt an international instrument that would deal with 
the problem of the hostage taking.80 After this proposal the usual procedure 
followed: Ad-Hoc Committee was established to produce a draft Convention.81 
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Finally, the Convention was adopted on 17 December 1979. Kuwait ratified the 
Convention on 6 February 1989.82 
4.2.2.5.2 How does the Convention address terrorism? 
First, the Convention defines an offence of the hostage taking which includes: 
seizure or detention or threat to kill or to injure or to continue to detain a hostage in 
order to compel a State, an international organisation or intergovernmental 
organisation, or natural or legal person, or group of persons to do or to abstain from 
doing any act; attempt to commit hostage taking; participation as an accomplice in 
the hostage taking.83 Second, the Hostage Convention requires the States to make 
the hostage-taking punishable by appropriate penalties. 84  It means that a 
Contracting State should enact laws, if there are no any, which would foresee 
appropriate punishment for the offence of hostage-taking. Furthermore, the 
Contracting States are under the duty to take all appropriate measures to ease the 
situation of the hostage, e.g. to secure his release and to facilitate his departure if 
necessary.85 As well as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, the 
Hostage Convention requires the Contracting States to take all feasible measures to 
prevent the hostage taking, and exchange information and coordinate such 
measures with other interested States.86 
In general, the Hostage Convention is similar to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
Including Diplomatic Agents. Thus, as well all the Conventions which have been 
discussed before, the Hostages Convention does not mandate the Contracting States 
to extradite the offender. Moreover, the Hostages Convention explicitly allows the 
Contracting States to deny extradition of the offender if the request for extradition 
is based on the aspiration to punish the offender on account of his ethnic origin, 
nationality, race, or political opinion.87 Also, a Contracting State may deny an 
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extradition if the alleged offender may be prejudiced or if he will not be able to 
exercise his rights of protection. 88  These provisions essentially represent a 
compromise between the concerns about human rights and the need for security. 
During the negotiations, many countries expressed the concerns that the future 
Convention would result in the condemnation of hostage taking by ‘liberation 
fighters’, while ‘massive hostage taking’ by oppressive, racist and colonial regimes 
would remain unaddressed.89 The provision that a Contracting State may refuse 
extradition of an alleged offender serves as a certain safeguard to persons viewed as 
‘liberation fighters’. Thus, if a Contracting State, which took an alleged offender in 
custody, has reasons to believe that in the State, which requested his extradition, 
such an offender will be prejudiced by the oppressive regime because of his race or 
religion, it has legitimate reasons, as per the Convention, to deny extradition. 
While the Convention does not explicitly mandate the extradition of an alleged 
offender, it does require taking measures to prosecute hostage takers. In particular, 
the Convention requires submitting the case before the competent authorities with 
the purpose of further prosecution.90 Then, the Convention specifies that the 
competent authorities should take the decision in accordance with the national law 
of the State concerned. This specification shows the importance of national law in 
dealing with an offence of hostage taking. 
4.2.2.5.3 Limitations of the Convention 
The major limitation of the Hostages Convention is that the obligation to 
prosecute an alleged offender or consider his extradition does not apply to acts of 
hostage-taking committed in the course of an armed conflict.91 Moreover, the 
Convention does not apply in the cases of armed conflicts where people are fighting 
against the foreign occupation, colonial domination, and against racist regimes in 
the exercise of their right to self-determination. 92  At the first glance, such 
conclusions seem to be supportive of ‘liberation fighters’. However, the important 
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reservation is that the Convention does not apply in the case of armed conflicts 
insofar the Geneva Conventions 1949 and Additional Protocols to these 
Conventions apply.93 The effect of these complicated provisions is that while, the 
Convention treats national liberation movements as legitimate,94 it does not accept 
that terrorist acts may be justified by such movements. In simple terms, the 
Convention applies to all cases of international hostage-taking.95 The key term here 
is ‘international’. It means that if a national liberation movement within a given 
country takes hostages, the Hostages Convention may not apply, because such act 
may not necessarily be seen as an international hostage taking, particularly if it does 
not involve nationals of other countries, but only the nationals of the given country. 
4.2.2.6 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (the Rome Convention) 
4.2.2.6.1 Brief History 
As with many other counter-terrorist conventions, the Rome Convention 
became a response to particular acts of terrorism. In October 1985 members of one 
of the Palestinian terrorist groups seized an Italian vessel Achille Lauro when it was 
heading from Alexandria to Port Said.96 Shortly after the incident, in November 
1985, the problem of maritime terrorism was raised before the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO).97 In particular, the United States suggested that there 
is a need to prevent maritime terrorism which takes a form of ship hijacking, crew 
kidnapping, explosion of ships, killing passengers or threat to kill them.98 A year 
later, in November 1986 the governments of Egypt, Italy, and Austria submitted a 
proposal to draft a convention on the unlawful acts against the safety of maritime 
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navigation.99  On March 1988, at the Rome Conference, the Convention was 
adopted.100 Kuwait ratified the Convention on 30 June 2003.101 
4.2.2.6.2 How does the Convention address terrorism? 
The Convention does not explicitly refer to the term ‘terrorism’ or ‘maritime 
terrorism’. At the same time, the Rome Convention defines offences that constitute 
maritime terrorism. These offences include: unlawful and intentional seizure of a 
ship or exercising control over a ship by means of force, a threat of force and other 
forms of intimidation, or act of violence against a person of board if such an act is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship, or destruction of a ship or damage 
to it or its cargo that endangers the safe navigation of ship, placing devices that are 
likely to the safe navigation, destruction or damage to maritime navigational 
facilities, communication of a false information that endangers the safe navigation 
of a ship, or killing or injuring a person in connection with an attempt to commit 
the aforementioned offences.102 The attempt or threat to commit these acts is also 
treated as an offence.103 Furthermore, abetting to commit those acts constitutes an 
offence as well.104 
The scope of the Convention is extended by the Protocol for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental 
Shelf. By virtue of this Protocol the Convention also covers the following offences: 
unlawful and intentional seizure or exercise of control over the fixed platforms by 
force or by threat of force, or act of violence against a person on board of the fixed 
platform which is likely to endanger the platform’s safety, or destruction or damage 
to the fixed platform, or placing a device that is likely to destroy the platform.105 
The relationship between the Rome Convention and the Fixed Platforms Protocol is 
the same as the relationship between the Sabotage Convention and the Protocol for 
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the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports serving the International 
Civil Aviation. To recall, initially the Sabotage Convention applied only to acts of 
sabotage as regards of aircraft (e.g. movable item), while it did not cover sabotage 
as regards ground facilities located in airports. The same analogy can be found in 
the Rome Convention and the Fixed Platforms Protocol. Initially, the Rome 
Convention applied only to offences made against ships and persons on board of 
ships (e.g. movable property). The Fixed Platforms Protocol addresses offences 
against immovable property which is the fixed platform. Kuwait ratified the 
Protocol on 30 June 2003.106 
The scope of the Rome Convention is further broadened by the Protocol of 
2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation. In particular, the 2005 Protocol specifies that the following 
acts constitute an offence: unlawful and intentional use against the ship or on the 
ship any radioactive material, explosive, biological or chemical weapon in manner 
that induces death or serious injury, or discharge from a ship of liquefied natural 
gas, oil, or other hazardous substance in a quantity or concentration which is likely 
to cause death or serious injury, or transportation on board of a ship of 
aforementioned substances knowing that they are to be used to threat to cause or to 
cause death or serious injury, or transportation on board a ship of persons who have 
committed terrorist acts.107 
The Rome Convention contains the requirement to provide for appropriate 
penalties for the offences concerned.108 There are also obligations to establish 
jurisdiction over the offences. Thus, the State is under the duty to take all necessary 
measures to establish jurisdiction when the offence is committed against its ship 
(flying the flag of the State), or committed in its territory, or committed by its 
national.109 Another previously established obligation which is set forth in the 
Convention is the duty to take an alleged offender into custody and investigate the 
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facts of the offence.110 Also, the State which took an alleged offender into custody 
is under the duty to notify this fact to the State which has established jurisdiction 
over the offence and to other interested States.111 Furthermore, there are certain 
obligations of the Contracting State as regards the definition of the authority of a 
master of a ship. In particular, the Rome Convention specifies that the States should 
ensure that the master of a ship is under the obligation, whenever it is practicable, 
while delivering an alleged offender to give a notification to the authorities of the 
receiving State and the reasons for delivery.112 To put it differently, the Contracting 
States in their legislation should foresee the master’s obligation to notify the 
receiving State about the delivery of an alleged offender. 
The Rome Convention also set forth the well-known prosecution/extradition 
formula. In other words, the treaty provides that if the State chooses not to extradite 
the offender, it should submit the case before the competent authorities with the 
purpose to prosecute an alleged offender. 113  The offences foreseen by the 
Convention and its protocols should be treated as extraditable ones.114 
4.2.2.6.3 Limitations of the Convention 
Article 2 (1) of the Convention stipulates that the treaty does not apply to 
warships, ships operated by States in the course of use for customs or police 
purposes, or as a naval auxiliary, or laid up ships or ships withdrawn from 
navigation. Here, one may draw the analogy with the counter-terrorist convention 
in the area of aviation. The aviation conventions do not apply to the aircraft used 
for the state purposes (customs, military, and police). The same concept is adopted 
by the Rome Convention: it does not apply to ships used for state purposes. 
There are also limits set forth in the 2005 Protocol. Thus, by virtue of the 
Protocol the Convention does not apply to the activities of the armed forces during 
an armed conflict.115 It means that if armed forces of one country seize by force the 
ship flying under the flag of the belligerent country, such an act would not be 
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covered by the Rome Convention. In such a case, the situation would fall under the 
existing international humanitarian law treaties. 
One more limitation is contained in Article 4 (1) of the Rome Convention. The 
Article reads as follows: ‘This Convention applies if the ship is navigating of is 
scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the 
territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent 
States’. Apparently, this provision is inserted to ensure the ‘internationality’ of the 
Convention. For instance, if the seizure had taken place in the territorial sea of 
Kuwait, the incident would not fall under the scope of the Convention. At the same 
time, by virtue of Article 4 (2) if the seizure of a ship had taken place in the 
territorial sea of Kuwait, but the offender would be found in the territory of Saudi 
Arabia, the Convention would still apply. The point is that Article 4 (2) stipulates 
that the Convention ‘nevertheless applies when the offender or the alleged offender 
is found in the territory of a State Party other than the State referred to in paragraph 
1’. Despite this reservation, the limitation contained in Article 4 (1) still seems 
unreasonably strict.  Suppose a ship was seized by force in the territorial sea of 
Oman by a Kuwaiti national. In such a case, the Convention would not apply if 
such a Kuwaiti national would be found in the territory of Oman. This case would 
be subject to the Omani national law, and Kuwait, at least under the Rome 
Convention, would not be able to claim its jurisdiction over the offence. 
4.2.2.7 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention) 
4.2.2.7.1 Brief History 
After the 1996 deadly bombing attack on U.S. military staff in Dhahran, Saudi 
Arabia, the United States started negotiating the Terrorist bombing Convention.116 
The Dhahran attack demonstrated that existing counter-terrorist conventions did not 
address such a form of terrorism. The United States proposed the negotiations on an 
international instrument that would address terrorist bombing less than a month 
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after the Dhahran attack.117 Such a proposal was submitted at the meeting of 
counterterrorism experts of the Group of Seven Major Industrialised Countries and 
the Russian Federation in Paris.118 In the aftermath of the meeting the UN General 
Assembly agreed to establish an Ad-Hoc Committee to prepare the draft 
Convention.119 Shortly after the Ad-Hoc Committee prepared the draft, it was 
approved and signed on 15 December 1997 in New York. Kuwait ratified the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention on 19 April 2004.120 
4.2.2.7.2 How does the Convention address terrorism? 
The Convention defines the offence of terrorist bombing. In particular, 
unlawful and intentional delivery, placing, discharging and detonating an explosive 
or other lethal device in, into or against the place of public use, a State or 
governmental facility, or an infrastructure facility, or a public transportation system 
with the intent to cause serious bodily injury or death, or with the intent to cause the 
extensive destruction of the place concerned, constitutes an offence of terrorist 
bombing under the Convention.121 Furthermore, an offence of terrorist bombing 
also includes an attempt to conduct the aforementioned acts, and participation as an 
accomplice, organiser, or director of such acts.122 
In line with other counter-terrorist Conventions, the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention imposes certain obligations upon the Contracting States. Thus, the 
Convention requires the Contracting States to criminalise the offence of terrorist 
bombing. 123  Also, the Convention mandates appropriate penalties for the 
commission of the offence. 124  Unlike the earlier discussed counter-terrorist 
Conventions, the Terrorist Bombings Convention explicitly uses the term ‘criminal 
offence’. To recall, all the aforementioned Conventions do not explicitly require 
denoting offences as a criminal offence, but simply require States to treat certain 
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acts as offences and to provide appropriate penalties. Therefore, in this case there is 
no room for discussion as to whether the offence of terrorist bombing should be 
criminalised. The Convention mandates States to criminalise it. Moreover, the 
Convention imposes an obligation to ensure that domestic legislation leaves no 
room for justification of the terrorist bombings by considerations of ideological, 
political, philosophical, ethnic, racial, or religious nature.125 Thus, one may observe 
that the Convention provides some sort of guidance as to the content of domestic 
law. Compared to other counter-terrorist Conventions, this one establishes the 
duties of the Contracting States in a stricter manner. It not only says that terrorist 
bombings should be treated as criminal offences, but also does not allow the 
exception for bombings committed on political and religious grounds. In addition, 
the Convention requires treating the terrorist bombing as an extraditable offence.126 
The Terrorist Bombings Convention shares with the other counter-terrorist 
Conventions the absence of a definition of terrorism. Indeed, there is not any 
internationally agreed definition of terrorism. It is attributable to unresolved 
political differences between states.127 For this reason, the least the international 
community can do is to address sectoral forms of terrorism such as aircraft 
hijacking, aviation sabotage, hostage-taking, attacks against the diplomats and other 
internationally protected persons without defining terrorism as such. The Terrorist 
Bombing Convention, as well as the other counter-terrorist conventions, follows 
this approach. 
Under the Convention, each Contracting Party should establish its jurisdiction 
over the offence of terrorist bombing when the offence took place in the territory of 
that State, on board of the vessel with the flag of that State or on board of an 
aircraft registered in that State, or when the offence is committed by a national of 
that State.128 Furthermore, the Convention allows the States to establish their 
jurisdiction over the offence in the following cases. If the offence is committed 
against the national of a State, such a State may claim the jurisdiction.129 For 
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instance, if terrorist bombing is directed against Kuwaiti nationals, Kuwait may 
claim the jurisdiction over the offence. Also, if the offence is committed against a 
State or governmental facility of the State abroad, including an embassy and other 
diplomatic or consular premises, the State has the right to claim jurisdiction.130 
Suppose the Kuwaiti embassy in Pakistan was attacked by a terrorist bombing. In 
such a case Kuwait has a legitimate interest in establishing its jurisdiction over the 
offence. Moreover, under the Convention Kuwait has a legitimate right to claim its 
jurisdiction over the terrorist bombing committed on board of the aircraft operated 
by its government, or committed with the purpose to compel Kuwait to do some 
acts or abstain from some acts, or committed by a stateless person, whose habitual 
residence is in the territory of Kuwait.131 One should distinguish cases when the 
Contracting State is obliged to establish its jurisdiction over the terrorist bombing 
and the cases when it has the right to claim its jurisdiction. Article 6 (1) refers to 
cases when the Contracting State is obliged to establish its jurisdiction, e.g. cases 
involving its territory, its vessel or aircraft, or national, who committed the offence. 
Article 6 (2) enlists cases when the Contracting State may establish its jurisdiction 
such as a case when the terrorist bombing is committed against the State’s embassy 
abroad. 
In line with other counter-terrorist Conventions, the Terrorist Bombings 
Convention requires a Contracting State to take an alleged offender into custody, 
when such an offender is found on its territory, and to take appropriate measures 
under its national law to prosecute him.132 The extradition provisions are similar to 
those ones contained in other counter-terrorist conventions. Thus, the Terrorist 
Bombings Convention does not contain an imperative language as to extradition of 
an alleged offender. There are also the notification obligations. To specify, the State 
that took an alleged offender into custody should immediately notify the States 
which established a jurisdiction over the terrorist bombing and directly, or via the 
UN Secretary-General.133 Also, the State that prosecutes an alleged offender is 
under the obligation to notify the UN Secretary-General of the outcome of the 
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proceedings.134 In addition, the Convention requires the Contracting Parties to take 
all practical measures to prevent terrorist bombings.135 
The Terrorist Bombings Convention contains a standard clause on dispute 
resolution. This clause reads as follows: 
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be 
settled through negotiation within a reasonable time shall, at the 
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If, within six 
months from the date of the request for arbitration, the parties are 
unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of 
those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice, by application, in conformity with the Statute of the 
Court.136 
When Kuwait acceded to the Convention, it made a reservation that it will not 
comply with Article 20 (1).137 Such a reservation means that another State with 
which Kuwait may have unsettled differences regarding the interpretation of the 
Convention cannot bring Kuwait to the International Court of Justice. 
4.2.2.7.3 Limitation of the Convention 
Article 3 provides that the Convention does not apply when the terrorist 
bombing occurred in a single State, and the victims and the alleged offender are 
nationals of the State, and the alleged offender is found on the territory of that 
State. This reservation makes it clear that the Convention applies only when a 
terrorist bombing involves a foreign element. In other words, the Convention 
applies only to international terrorist bombings; i.e., it does not apply to cases that 
lack an international aspect. Suppose that terrorist bombing occurred in Kuwait, 
was committed by a Kuwait national, and only Kuwait nationals were victims. 
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Furthermore, suppose that the Kuwait national who committed the bombing was 
found on the territory of Kuwait. One may observe that there is a lack of foreign 
element in this hypothetical situation. Therefore, by virtue of Article 3, the Terrorist 
Bombings Convention would not apply in such a case. At the same time, if at least 
one of the victims was of British, American, Saudi or any other foreign nationality, 
the Convention would apply. 
4.2.3 Concluding Remarks 
International treaties address various forms of terrorism, from aircraft 
hijacking to terrorist bombings. This section has reviewed the treaties to which 
Kuwait is a party, and excluded some treaties which either will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter or do not present a significant issue in Kuwait. These 
treaties constitute part of Kuwait counter-terrorist laws. Under these treaties Kuwait 
is obliged to address certain terrorist acts in its domestic law. Therefore, in its 2006 
report to the CTC the government of Kuwait respond that: 
Article 70 of the Kuwaiti Constitution indicates that a treaty has the 
force of law after signature, ratification and publication in the 
official gazette … Kuwait applies a monist doctrine, meaning that 
after ratification in accordance with article 70 of the Kuwaiti 
Constitution, a treaty enters into force and becomes an integral part 
of the national legal system without the need to turn it into a law 
through an act enacted by the legislative authority in accordance 
with the procedures for enacting domestic laws.138 
However, ‘most of the international laws against terrorism contain non-self-
executing articles. This means that without enacting national/special law clarifying 
its mode and mechanism of enforcement, such articles cannot be applied. 
Therefore, the principle of ‘no crime and no punishment without a legal provision’ 
requires the State of Kuwait to enact laws in order to implement the international 
                                                
138 UN Security Council (CTC), ‘Kuwait’s Report to the CTC (2006)’, Security Council, Distr.: 
General, 17 November 2006, S/2006/903, Letter dated 8 November 2006 from the Permanent 
Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, online: UN Security Council, Counter Terrorism Committee, 17 November 2006. 
 138 
instruments against terrorism.’139 In addition, by virtue of the treaties Kuwait is 
under an obligation to prosecute alleged offenders and to make the aforementioned 
offences extraditable. Another requirement with which Kuwait should comply 
while enacting its counter-terrorist laws is provision for appropriate punishment for 
those, who found guilty of the aforementioned terrorist acts. Therefore, the next 
section examines the extent in which Kuwait implemented and embedded the 
international instruments against terrorism in its national legal system. In addition, 
section II will investigate the extent to which Kuwait has been forced to enact laws 
which are driven from international obligation. 
4.3   Section II: The Kuwaiti Criminal Laws Against Terrorism 
4.3.1 Introductory Remarks 
In the previous section the author observed that international law compels 
States to have their own counter-terrorist laws. Kuwait is a party to a number of the 
treaties designed to address terrorism. Therefore, Kuwait is bound to provide a 
legislative framework for terrorism. The question to be answered in this section is 
that since Kuwait had ratified thirteen international conventions against terrorism, 
has Kuwait implemented them by enacting national laws? The answer is negative to 
some and positive to others. 
In this section the author explores Kuwait laws that may cover such types of 
offences as terrorist acts. It should be noted that Kuwait does not have, to date, a 
special antiterrorism code; instead terrorism is prosecuted under the normal 
criminal law and its amendments. In particular, this section examines Kuwaiti Penal 
Code No. 16 of 1960 and its Amended Laws, Law No. 31 of 1970 In Regards to 
Crimes Related to State Security, Law No. 35 of 1985 In Regards to Crimes of 
Explosives, Decree of Law No. 13 of 1991 In Regard to Weapons and Ammunition, 
Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regard to Crimes Related to Safety of Aircrafts and Air 
Navigation, and Law No. 17 of 1960 promulgating the Criminal Procedure Code. 
After the examination, the author reaches the conclusion that the common 
feature of these laws is that they lack specificity, as far as terrorist acts are 
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concerned. In addition, some of these laws were already in existence even before 
the emergence of the 13 relevant treaties. As a result, on the one hand, they address 
terrorism in general ways, and on the other hand they overlap with the international 
offences set in the international conventions against terrorism. Therefore, the author 
presents some solutions by looking at the UK jurisdiction, and at the international 
conventions. 
This section is divided into different types of terrorism offences and the state 
response to it. Those offences will be the focus of section II. 
4.3.2 Offences Against the Security of the State 
There are a number of offences within the Law No. 31 of 1970 In Regard to 
Crimes Relating to State Security that may cover terrorist acts and to some extent 
catch the spirit of the Security Council Resolution 1373, although the 1970 law was 
passed three decades before.140 Among such offences are: the crime of assembling 
soldiers without the Government’s authorisation (Article 4), the crime of 
participating in an assembly with the purpose to commit crimes or to breach public 
order (Article 34), the crime of using explosives to kill persons, cause destruction, 
or create panic.141 In addition, Article 31 prohibits weapons training, training on 
war skills and techniques, and using ammunition with the intention of conducting 
illegal activities. These crimes are punished by imprisonment, the term of which 
may range from three years to lifelong incarceration.142 
Law No. 31 of 1970 has amended part of the Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 
1960. The Law has been criticised for three reasons.143 First, some of its articles are 
vague and broad, and others contain ambiguous terms. Secondly, some of its 
articles are tightening the freedom of expression, which might be used against 
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opposition groups.144 Third, it extended the protection set forth to the Crown 
Prince. In addition, Article 30 of the Amendments prohibits ‘organizations, groups, 
or associations, which aim to spread principles that promote the destruction of the 
basic systems illegally or that promote overpowering the social system or the 
economic system that is present in the country by force’. On the one hand, this 
provision can be interpreted as the one designed to prevent the formation of the 
terrorist groups in the territory of Kuwait. On the other hand, this provision 
substantially restricts such universally recognised rights as freedom of association. 
Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proclaims: 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed 
in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others145 
Kuwait ratified the Covenant in March 1996. Therefore, Kuwait is bound to 
respect the freedom of peaceful assembly. There can be, of course, arguments that 
Article 30 of the Law No. 31 of 1970 is designed to insure public safety and public 
order, and for this reason the prohibition can be seen as a legitimate exception 
within Article 21. Furthermore, one of the Judges interviewed explained that 
‘Article 30, like any other Articles, can always fall under the revision of the court 
which can, after looking at each case, accept or deny such accusation’.146 However, 
a representative from the Kuwait Human Rights Association argued that ‘the 
Article contains many vague terms, and this vagueness can become a loophole for 
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prohibition of associations which pursue legitimate rights’.147 For instance, it is not 
clear what is meant by ‘overpowering the social or economic system’. If the 
majority of people wish to change the social or economic system of Kuwait in a 
legal way, through elections for instance, it is their legitimate right. Therefore, 
Article 30 of the Amendments seems to be unreasonably restrictive. There are 
strong grounds to suggest that Article 30 excessively restricts the freedom of 
peaceful assembly guaranteed by international law. 
If Kuwait seeks to prohibit the formation and operation of terrorist groups on 
its territory, it would be preferable to find more specific ways than simply 
restricting freedom of association. Thus, the UK Terrorism Act 2000 prohibits only 
certain organisations. The exhaustive list of these organisations is contained in the 
law.148 Moreover, Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence to direct a terrorist 
organisation contrary to Section 56. More interestingly, Section 56 applies to all 
organised terrorism in the UK, and not only limited to the proscribed lists.149 
Kuwait could follow this approach and to define the list of terrorist organisations 
which are to be proscribed instead of prohibiting organisations and associations in 
generic terms as it is done under Article 30 of the Amendments. 
4.3.3 Explosives and Firearms Offences 
The purpose of the current section is to look at the contemporary Kuwaiti laws 
against munitions offences relevant to terrorism. In particular, the focus of this 
section will be on the following laws: the Penal Code No.16 of 1960, Law No. 35 
of 1985 In Regard to Crimes of Explosive and the Decree of Law No. 13 of 1991 In 
Regard to Weapons and Ammunition. 
The Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 has addressed the crimes of 
explosives under Article 161, which reads as follows: 
Anyone who causes extensive harm to others by throwing any type 
of bomb, by attacking with a knife or any dangerous tool, by 
throwing an acidic liquid, or by putting this liquid or any other 
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explosive substance at any place with the intent to inflict harm upon 
a person, or handing the person drugs, is penalized with 
imprisonment for a term that is no more than ten years, and can be 
fined with an amount that is no more than 750 Dinars. 
One may observe that Article 161 addresses such forms of terrorist acts as 
bombings. At the same time, the crime is very vaguely defined. First of all, the 
expression ‘by throwing any type of bomb’ raises concerns about the very narrow 
approach taken. A bomb can be not only ‘thrown’ but also placed, installed, 
delivered, and detonated and so on. It is not clear what is exactly meant by the word 
‘throwing’. Does that mean if one person delivered the bomb, and another one 
threw it, the former cannot be punishable under Article 161? Furthermore, what if 
one person installed the bomb and another one detonated it, which one will be 
considered as the one that ‘threw’ the bomb? Thus, it remains unclear what kind of 
acts the word ‘throwing’ covers. 
In this respect, Kuwait could follow an example of the UK and address 
terrorist bombing in more overreaching terms. Thus, under the Explosive 
Substances Act 1883 anyone who unlawfully and maliciously ‘causes by any 
explosive substance an explosion of a nature likely to endanger life or to cause 
serious injury to property’ is liable to life imprisonment irrespectively of whether 
such an act caused actual death and injury.150 The expression ‘causes by any 
explosive’ is more inclusive that the term ‘by throwing a bomb’. The verb ‘cause’ 
is undoubtedly broader than the term ‘throw’. The term ‘cause’ potentially covers 
such acts as placing a bomb and detonating a bomb. As far as the terrorist bombing 
is concerned, Kuwait could also look at the definition of the offence set forth in the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention. 
Another serious concern about how Article 161 addresses bombing is that it 
provides for a very light punishment. Indeed, the offence foreseen by Article 161 is 
punishable by imprisonment for no more than ten years. To compare, such an act in 
the UK is punishable by life imprisonment even if it did not cause injury or harm.151 
The way Article 161 is drafted does not allow seeing what kind of harm is 
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considered to be ‘an extensive harm’. If the term ‘extensive harm’ covers serious 
physical injury to persons, the punishment is very light indeed. One of the 
prosecutors explained, ‘the measurement of such term is left to the discretion of the 
Forensic Medical Department, which is under the General Department of Criminal 
Evidence in the Ministry of Interior’.152 Reading Article 161 in conjunction with 
Article 163 raises even more concerns about the inadequacy of the penalties. Thus, 
Article 163 of the Kuwait Penal Code stipulates that anyone who commits a minor 
assault that does not lead to the previously mentioned consequences (e.g. extensive 
injury to others –Art 161–, or causing a permanent disability –Art 162–), is 
punishable only by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. The 
Article can be potentially read as providing for the no-more-than-three-months-
punishment if throwing a bomb did not lead to serious consequences, e.g. 
permanent disability or serious physical injury, an offender will have to spend no 
more than three months in a prison. In other words, a failed terrorist will be 
exposed to a very liberal punishment. All these suggestions lead to the conclusion 
that Kuwait needs to reconsider its approach to terrorist bombings. 
4.3.3.1 Law No. 35 of 1985 In Regard to Crimes of Explosives 
In the 1980s, the issue of bombing became sensitive for Kuwait. The country 
suffered from terrorist bombings on several occasions. On December 12, 1983 
Hezbollah together with members of the Iraqi Shiite group, Da'wa, conducted 
seven coordinating the bombings in Kuwait City.153 As the result of the bombings, 
six people lost their lives and more than ninety people were injured.154 The 
terrorists targeted French and US embassies, an oil rig of the Kuwait National 
Petroleum Company, the Kuwait airport and some other places.155 The government 
of Kuwait realised that the current law, i.e. the Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 1960, 
is not efficient. Thus, Law No. 35 of 1985 was enacted two years after the 
bombings and to a certain extent represented a response to the terrorist attacks. The 
Law In Regard to Crimes of Explosives foresees penalties for a number of offences 
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involving explosives. One of the offences laid down by the Law is the use or 
attempted use of explosives with the purpose to kill people, create panic and 
damage utilities and buildings.156 One may observe that these provisions may cover 
various forms of terrorist bombings. 
An offence provided by the 1985 Law is the use or attempt to use an explosive 
in a manner that endangers lives of persons or their property.157 This provision may 
cover cases when terrorists did not intend to induce deaths or mass destructions, but 
merely wanted to send warning signals to the government by exposing people and 
their property to danger. If the use of an explosive resulted in the injury of a person, 
the punishment is an imprisonment for a term not less than ten years.158 If the acts 
led to the death of a person, it is punishable by life imprisonment or death 
penalty.159 
Furthermore, the 1985 Law criminalises unauthorised acquisition, possession, 
manufacture, procurement, import and export, transportation and trafficking of 
explosives.160 There is a possibility of legal acquisition, manufacture, procurement, 
export and import, and transportation of explosive if there is a license. The license 
is assigned by the Minister of Interior. To commit these acts without properly 
obtained license is an offence which is punishable under Law No. 35 of 1985. The 
attempt to commit such acts is also criminalised.161 
In addition, the 1985 Law makes it an offence to train persons or to incite them 
to manufacture or use explosive for the achievement of illegal ends.162 The illegal 
ends concept is very broad and certainly covers the purposes of terrorism. In other 
words, if someone trains another to manufacture and use explosive with the purpose 
to commit or facilitate a terrorist bombing, his acts will be covered by the provision 
concerned. 
Finally, if a person, who has the knowledge about any plan to commit the 
aforementioned offences and who fails to notify the competent authorities, commits 
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an offence under Law No. 35 of 1985.163 The Law also criminalises assistance to an 
offender to flee from justice and concealing or destroying the relevant evidence.164 
Next it is interesting to see whether Kuwait fully complies with the obligations 
imposed upon it by the Terrorist Bombings Convention.165 The Convention obliges 
Kuwait to criminalise the following acts: (1) unlawful and intentional delivery, 
placing, discharge, detonating an explosive or other lethal device in, into, or against 
place of public use, a State or government facility, an infrastructure facility, or a 
public transportation system with the purpose to cause death or serious bodily 
injury or to cause destruction of a place, facility or system concerned; (2) attempt to 
commit the aforementioned acts; (3) participation as an accomplice in such an 
offence; (4) organisation and direction of the offence; (5) intentional contribution to 
the offence.166 The Law No. 35 of 1985 fails to address the organisation and 
direction of the bombings. Of course, one may argue that this is covered by the 
concept of participation in the offence. However, it is not an accident that the 
Terrorist Bombings Convention makes a distinction between mere participation, 
and organisation and direction of the offence. The latter is obviously more 
outrageous crime because it involves the mastermind behind terrorist-related 
crimes. The Kuwait laws, as far as terrorist bombings are concerned, unfortunately, 
do not make such a distinction. Such a distinction is desirable because it shows that 
the State and Kuwaiti people perceive the organisation and direction of terrorist 
bombing as an even more serious crime than mere participation in the terrorist-
related crimes. Therefore, Kuwait could enhance its laws by addressing the illegal 
use of explosive by inserting more precise and clearer terminology. One should 
draw attention to the fact that Law No. 35 of 1985 employs such generic term as 
‘use’. By contrast, the Terrorist Bombing Convention enlists particular forms of 
use: delivering, placing, discharging, and detonating. The approach adopted in the 
Convention ensures a better legal certainty. Kuwait could consider following such 
an approach. 
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4.3.3.2 Decree of Law No. 13 of 1991 In Regard to Weapons and Ammunition 
One of the legacies of the first Gulf War for Kuwait was that a large number of 
weapons remained in the country.167 Naturally, for the sake of security and public 
order, such situation needed strict regulation. Therefore, nine months after the end 
of the first Gulf War Kuwait adopted an act imposing stricter penalties for illegal 
possession and use of weapons - Law No. 13 of 1991 In Regard to Weapons and 
Ammunition, which abolished the Law No. 16 of 1961 on Weapons and 
Ammunition.168 In addition, ‘an Amiri decree was issued to form a special task 
force named 'the Arms Collection Squad' and was given the necessary powers in 
order to achieve its goal. The Arms Collection Squad practiced its work for more 
than 8 years which resulted in the collection of many weapons and 
ammunitions.’169 
The 1991 Law covers all types and sizes of rifles and guns capable of firing 
gunshots, cannons (firearms producing powerful gunshots), machine guns, and 
ammunition. 170  The illegal possession of weapons and ammunition involves 
possession without a license from the Minister of Interior. The licensing 
requirements limit those who can legally possess weapons and ammunition. Thus, 
to be eligible for the licence a person should be a Kuwaiti citizen who reached age 
of 21, who has no sentencing history as far as crimes involved weapons are 
concerned, who has a legitimate source of income, who has necessary physical 
fitness, and who is not a suspect, or under police surveillance, or homeless.171 
To a certain extent, the licensing requirements may serve as a measure that 
prevents terrorism. Thus, by virtue of the licensing requirements only Kuwaiti 
citizens are eligible for legal possession of weapons. There is, however, a 
reservation that the Minister of Interior can make exceptions to this rule.172 The rule 
that weapons can be, in general, legally possessed by Kuwaiti citizens means that 
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real or potential terrorists of other nationalities cannot legally possess and acquire 
weapons. Thus, a potential terrorist, who holds, for example, British citizenship, 
will not be able to acquire and possess weapons legally. Also the age requirement 
eliminates the legal acquisition and possession of weapons by real or potential 
terrorists of young age. Finally, the requirement that an eligible candidate should 
not have a history of sentencing for crimes involving the use of weapons also may 
eliminate potential terrorist from legal acquisition and possession of weapons. 
The Kuwaiti government considers the 1991 Law as establishing an effective 
control on preventing access to weapons by terrorists.173 In its report to the UN 
Security Council Committee concerning counterterrorism, the Kuwaiti government 
specified that the Law does not have any limits of number of licenses that can be 
obtained by the same person.174 However, the government noted that the usual 
practice is to assign one weapons license to an applicant.175 The assignment of an 
additional license can be conducted in special cases involving public good or 
individual’s benefit.176 
The 1991 Law restricts the use of even those weapons which are legally 
possessed. In particular, Article 13 of the Law prohibits using weapons and 
ammunitions in oil and industrial regions, residential areas, areas of public 
gatherings, and other areas which can be determined by the Minister of Interior. 
Furthermore, the Law proscribes carrying a licensed weapon in conventions and 
public meetings, harbours and airports, sports club (except licensed shooting clubs), 
and other areas that can be determined by the Minister of Interior.177 These 
limitations can serve the purposes of preventing terrorist acts. 
Export and import of weapons and ammunition require licensing.178 This 
provision ensures governmental control over the flow, whether inward or outward, 
of weapons and ammunitions. Controlling export and import of weapons is one of 
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the major tasks in the fight against terrorism. The license for export or import of 
weapons or ammunitions is assigned by the Minister of Interior.179 The Minister has 
the power to revoke the license at any time.180 Thus, one may observe that the 
Minister of Interior has the extensive powers over the export and import of 
weapons. This has both positive and negative aspects. The positive aspect is that 
such powers allow the Minister to react promptly to situations, when, he, for 
instance, find out that the weapon is exported or imported for the purposes of 
terrorist activity. The negative aspect is that if the Minister lacks integrity and 
diligence and does not act in a good faith, there is a loophole for supply of weapons 
and ammunitions to potential terrorists. 
Another weapon-related activity which is strictly controlled by the government 
is the production of weapons. Article 19 of the Law prohibits establishing any 
weapon manufacturing facility without a duly obtained license from the Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Defence. In other words, the production of weapons 
and ammunitions is regulated even stricter than export and import. In case of export 
and import, there is only one supervising body which is the Ministry of Interior, 
while production of weapons is subject to authorisation of two bodies – the 
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence. 
Next, the physical movement of weapons is firmly regulated. Thus, Article 20 
of the Law prohibits transfer of weapon from one place to another without 
authorisation of the Minister of Interior. The Minister’s permission is subject to 
certain rules. Thus, the permission should indicate the amount of weapon that is 
allowed to be transported, its type, the destination, the name of the receiver, the 
name of the transporter, and the transportation map.181 This information can enable 
the Kuwaiti government to control all circulation of weapon in the country, and 
thus, give an opportunity to prevent any unauthorised handing over the weapon. 
Potential terrorists, deprived of the possibility to buy and possess weapons 
legally, may resort to illegal means. In simple terms, they may acquire and keep 
weapons illegally. In order to fight against illegal acquisition and possession of 
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weapons, the Law imposes serious sanctions. Thus, failure to comply with the rule 
that prohibits unlicensed acquisition and possession of weapons and ammunitions is 
punishable by imprisonment for a term which is not less than five years.182 
Furthermore, failure to comply with licensing requirements for the use and carrying 
legally acquired and possessed weapons and ammunitions is punishable by which is 
no more than one year.183 The punishment for failure to comply with the weapon 
export and import licensing requirements is an imprisonment for a term which does 
not exceed seven years.184 The same kind of punishment is foreseen for those who 
obtain a license for weapon production due to deceit and invalid documents.185 
The main drawback of the 1991 Law is that it does not address terrorism as a 
special crime. Thus, the Law does not specifically address cases when weapons and 
ammunition are intentionally supplied to terrorists. The Law only addresses cases 
when the supply of weapons is unauthorised. However, the intentional supply of 
weapons to terrorists is obviously a graver crime compared to merely unauthorised 
supply of weapons, and thus, deserves a more severe punishment. Also, the Law 
does not cover cases when a potential terrorist violates the prohibition to use 
weapons in public places with the purpose of committing of terrorist acts. Such a 
crime is much more socially dangerous than a mere violation of the prohibition. 
In the UK the terrorist related crimes involving weapons are addressed 
separately. Thus, according to the Terrorism Act 2000 s 57, possession of articles 
for terrorist purposes is a criminal offence which is punishable by imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding fifteen years.186 One may observe that the term ‘articles’ is 
very broad and may cover weapons and ammunition. Kuwait may consider 
following the UK approach and addressing terrorism-related crimes involving 
weapons in a more specific way. 
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4.3.4 Transport Security 
This section will explore the Kuwaiti national laws on transportation security 
against the threat of terrorism. The focus will be on the Penal Code No. 16 of 1960, 
the Law No. 31 of 1970 In Regard to Crimes Relating to State Security and the Law 
No. 6 of 1994 In Regard to Crimes Related to Safety of Aircrafts and Air 
Navigation. 
The Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 addresses terrorist acts that may endanger 
aviation and maritime safety. In particular, Article 170 makes it an offence to send 
misleading signals, or issuing misleading announcement, warning or instruction 
which may lead to the misguidance of an aircraft or ship. The offence is punishable 
by imprisonment for a term of no more than five years.187 If such an offence leads 
to serious injury of one or more persons the penalties increase – imprisonment for 
term of no more than fifteen years.188 Finally, if the offence resulted in a person’s 
death, it is punishable by life imprisonment or death penalty. 189 It is worth 
mentioning that, although the offence foreseen by Article 170 was passed years 
before the advent of the international conventions against terrorism, it to some 
extent corresponds with offences set forth in the Sabotage Convention and in the 
Rome Convention.190 To recall, the Sabotage Convention and the Rome Convention 
make it an offence to communicate false information which engenders the safety of 
aircraft or navigation of a ship.191 As far as the false communication aspect is 
concerned, it can be said that Article 170 in part provides a compliance of the 
Kuwaiti laws with international laws. 
In addition, Article 171 of the Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 makes it an offence 
to communicate any hoax information by sending misleading signals or issue 
misleading instructions, warnings or calls which endanger persons and property 
transported on a public thoroughfare. One may observe that the provision is similar 
                                                
187 Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 1960, Art 170. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 UN Security Council (CTC), ‘Kuwait’s Report to the CTC (2003)’, Security Council, Distr.: 
General, 19 November 2003, S/2003/1103, Letter dated 10 November 2003 from the Chargé 
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman 
of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning 
counter-terrorism, online: UN Security Council, Counter Terrorism Committee, 19 November 2003. 
191 The Rome Convention, Art 3 (1) (f); the Sabotage Convention, Art 1 (1) (e) 
 151 
to the provision contained in Article 170 which was discussed earlier. Article 170 
covers air and maritime transportation, while Article 171 applies to road 
transportation. The offence defined in Article 171 is punishable by imprisonment 
for a term which does not exceed five years or by fine. If the acts criminalised in 
Article 171 lead to serious injury of persons the punishment is up to fifteen years of 
imprisonment. Finally, if the offence results in death of a person, it is punishable by 
life imprisonment or death penalty.192 
The Penal Code partly addresses offences covered by the Rome Convention. 
Thus, Article 251 of the Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 makes it an offence the 
intentional sinking or destruction of a ship or other means of naval 
transportation.193 The Rome Convention defines, among acts that may constitute the 
offence, destruction or damage to a ship. 194  Therefore, Article 251 is a 
demonstration that Kuwait, at least in part, complies with the requirement of the 
Convention to make acts enlisted in Article 3 of the Convention offences. Under 
Article 251 the offence is punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
seven years. If the act led to serious injury of a person the term of imprisonment is 
increased up to ten years.195 Finally, if the act resulted in the death of a person, it is 
punishable by life imprisonment.196 
The Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 covers such an offence as an attack on a ship 
in the open sea with the intention to exercise control over ship or take over the 
cargo the ship carries, or with the intention to inflict harm on the individuals on 
board of the ship.197 Such a provision corresponds to the offence of seizure or 
exercise of control over a ship by force set forth in the Rome Convention.198 Under 
Article 252 of the Penal Code such an offence is punishable by a lifetime 
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imprisonment. If the offensive acts resulted in the death of one or more individuals, 
they are punishable by death penalty.199 
Article 8 of the Law No. 31 of 1970 In Regard to Crimes Relating to State 
Security makes it an offence to cause damage or defects to infrastructure that is 
used for the defence purposes. Such infrastructure includes aircraft and ships, 
obstruct weapons, means of public transport, equipments and facilities, 
ammunition, rations, or drugs.200 Article 8 also covers some sabotage acts such as 
intentional not-repairing the items of infrastructure or making them dysfunctional 
intentionally. This article potentially covers terrorist sabotage acts. 
4.3.4.1 Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regard to Crimes Related to Safety of Aircrafts and 
Air Navigation 
As has been mentioned earlier, Kuwait is a party to a number of international 
treaties that address terrorist acts against aviation. Under these conventions, Kuwait 
accepted an obligation to criminalise aircraft hijacking and the acts of sabotage in 
aviation. At the same time, the Penal Code did not fully address aircraft hijacking 
and the acts of sabotage. Indeed, previously it has been observed that the Penal 
Code deals only with crime of false communication with aircraft. Such lack of 
provisions made the Kuwaiti government pass the Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regard to 
Crimes Related to Safety of Aircraft and Air Navigation that would address crimes 
relating to aviation in a more comprehensive way. Therefore, Tokyo, Hague and 
Montreal conventions, as well as Montreal Protocol on combating terrorist crimes 
against civil aviation have been incorporated and implemented within the Law No. 
6 of 1994 In Regard to Crimes Related to Safety of Aircrafts and Air Navigation. In 
other words, Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regard to Crimes Related to Safety of Aircrafts 
and Air Navigation was passed in order to implement the international requirements 
on aviation security.201 
The Law In Regard to Crimes Related to Safety of Aircraft and Air Navigation 
was enacted in 1994. Article 1 of the Law outlines the key definitions. The analysis 
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of these definitions demonstrates that the law follows the approaches set forth in 
international treaties. For instance, the Law defines aircraft in flight in the same 
manner as the Tokyo Convention does. In particular, under the Law aircraft is 
considered to be in flight from the moment of closure of all external doors until the 
moment they are opened. The Law also specifies the meaning of the expression of 
aircraft in service. The definition of aircraft in service under the Law is the similar 
to the definition contained in Article 2 (b) of the Sabotage Convention. Thus, 
according to Article 1 (c) of the Law an aircraft is considered to be in service from 
the beginning of the pre-flight preparations and until the expiration of 24 hours 
after the landing of aircraft. Interestingly, however, Law No. 6 of 1994 does not 
only apply to civil aircraft but it also covers aircraft used in military, police and 
customs services. This can be read by Article 1 (A) of the law, which does not 
make any differentiation between civil and non-civil aircrafts. Article 1 (A) state 
‘Aircraft: is any means used or meant to be used for aviation or navigation in air or 
space’.202 Thus, it can be said that Law No. 6 of 1994 is wider than the International 
conventions on aviation area. 
Furthermore, the Law defines crimes related to the safety of aircraft and air 
navigation. Thus, Article 2 of the Law makes it a crime to attack a person on board 
of aircraft in flight, when such an attack endangers the safety of aircraft.203 This 
provision covers not only ordinary violent crimes committed on board of aircraft 
but also terrorist attacks. Suppose that terrorists attack a chief pilot, who 
undoubtedly can be considered as a person on board, with the purpose to gain 
control over the aircraft. Article 2 covers this hypothetical situation and thereby 
covers terrorist attacks. 
Another offence determined by Article 2 is making or inserting device or 
substance on board of aircraft in service that caused damage to or destruction of 
aircraft so that the aircraft is unable to fly or flying of aircraft is endangered.204 
What raises concerns in this formulation is the term ‘makes’. It may happen that the 
device was legitimately made. After all, there are companies which are duly 
licensed to produce explosives and weapons. What if such legitimately produced 
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device occurred in the hands of terrorists without actual knowledge of a 
manufacturer? Here one should note that the article does not specify that the maker 
of the device should have knowledge that it will be used by terrorists to destroy or 
damage an aircraft in service. It would be more accurate to make it an offence the 
production of devices and substance with the purpose of its subsequent use for 
destruction and damaging the aircraft in service. Such an approach would exclude 
the legitimate manufacturers of devices and substances. Instead, it would target the 
production of devices for the sole purpose of using them for terrorist attacks. 
Furthermore, Article 2 makes it an offence to commit actions that lead to the 
destruction or damaging airport equipment and facilities or to the interruption of 
airport operations or to exposing the aircraft in flight to danger.205 One may observe 
that this is a very broad formulation. The positive aspect of this wording is that it 
covers terrorists attacks or terrorist sabotage acts. The negative aspect is that it 
covers all other less grave crimes and offences. Article 2 states that ‘Anyone who 
commits one of the following acts deliberately is penalized with temporary 
imprisonment for a term that is no less than seven years’.206 In other words, Article 
2 does not make a distinction between terrorist sabotage and simply a hoax call 
stating that there is a bomb in an airport. The latter would undoubtedly interrupt the 
operations of airport since the security services had to check the airport. While the 
hoax call is a serious offence because it leads to interruption of airport services, 
rescheduled flights, and many inconveniences for passengers, it is still hardly 
comparable to the terrorist sabotage acts. In other words, the hoax call and a 
terrorist sabotage act are not the same in terms of the degree of danger they pose. 
For this reason, the terrorist sabotage acts should be a separate kind of crime. 
The final offence defined by Article 2 is a false communication with aircraft 
that put an aircraft in flight to danger.207 This provision is traditional for the 
aviation and maritime counter-terrorist conventions. At the same time, the similar 
provision is already contained in Article 170 of the Penal Code No. 16 of 1960. To 
recall, Article 170 makes it an offence to issue misleading signals, instructions and 
warnings to aircraft. One may observe that there is a great likelihood that Article 
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170 of the Penal Code and Article 2 of the Law may overlap. It is unclear what 
kinds of acts are to be qualified under Article 170 of the Penal Code and what kinds 
of acts fall under Article 2 of the Law. In its report to the CTC, the government of 
Kuwait stated that: 
The Office of the Prosecutor-General affirms that there is no conflict 
between these texts because the accepted legal principles of 
interpretation applied in Kuwaiti criminal legislation stipulate that 
the provisions of any special act override the provisions of general 
law if they conflict. This is based on the principle that the special 
law particularizes the general law.208 
As a result, Article 2 of the Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regard to Crimes Related to 
Safety of Aircrafts and Air Navigation, as a Special Act, is the one that apply at 
present instead of Article 170 of the Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 1960. 
Article 3 of the Law criminalises use of force or threat to use it with the 
purpose to take over an aircraft in flight, to exercise control over it, or to change its 
direction. The article clearly covers the cases of aircraft hijacking. The punishment 
for such a crime is imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years. If the 
aforementioned crime was accompanied by making persons to go to the destination 
other than the supposed on, the punishment is no less than ten-year imprisonment or 
life time imprisonment. The last provision, perhaps, is designed to address the 
hostage-taking. At the same time, it does not make much sense. Thus, if an aircraft 
was taken over by a terrorist, all passengers are hostages, no matter what 
destination the aircraft adopts under the control of terrorists. It is unclear why the 
legislator treats the case when the taken over aircraft lands follows its supposed 
destination and the case when such an aircraft diverts from the original destination 
differently. In both cases there is the same degree of danger by virtue of the fact 
that the aircraft is taken over by terrorists. 
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The Law further specifies that if a crime specified in Article 2 or Article 3 
resulted in injury to persons, or destruction of aircraft, or cause damage to airport 
facilities or equipment, such a crime should be punishable by life imprisonment or 
death penalty.209 If the crimes resulted in death of a person, the punishment is death 
penalty.210 These provisions shed a light on the nature of acts foreseen by Article 2 
and Article 3. Both articles employ the expression ‘expose aircraft to danger’ or 
‘endanger the safety of aircraft’. Apparently, Article 2 and Article 3 imply that the 
actual destruction or damage did not occur, but there was only the danger of such 
occurrence. Article 4 thus provides a more severe punishment in case if such danger 
actually occurs and results in damage and destruction, and in injury of persons. 
Article 5 of the Law criminalises an intentional attempt to commit crimes set 
forth in Article 2 and 3. In addition, Article 5 criminalises the assistance to the 
offender in the form of helping him to escape from justice, or by concealing or 
destroying the evidence. This approach is compatible with the philosophy of the 
Hague Hijacking Convention and the Sabotage Convention. To recall, these treaties 
make it an offence not only acts which endanger civil aviation but also an attempt 
to commit such acts. At the same time, Article 5 criminalises not only an attempt to 
commit the crime but also a failure to notify about such crimes if a person had 
knowledge that they will occur. The punishment for an attempt to commit the 
crimes, assistance to the crimes, failure to notify about the crimes is punishable by 
the imprisonment for a term which does not exceed five years.211 
The Law also discusses certain procedural and penal matters. Thus, the Law 
confers the jurisdiction over the crimes set forth in it to the State Security Court.212 
Although the State Security Court was repealed in 1995,213 this provision can be 
interpreted as the reflection of the official position of the government to the 
aforementioned crimes. In particular, the Kuwaiti government views these crimes 
as directed against the security of the State. 
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It will now be considered whether the Law provides for full compliance with 
Kuwait’s obligation under the counter-terrorist conventions related to the safety and 
security of civil aviation. The Hague Hijacking Convention imposes on the 
Contracting States to treat as offences the following acts: unlawful seizure or 
exercise of control over aircraft in flight by use of force, a threat of thereof, or any 
other form of intimidation, and assistance to commit such acts.214 Furthermore, the 
Sabotage Convention requires to make as offences the following acts: (1) violence 
against a person on board of an aircraft in flight; (2) destruction of or damage to 
aircraft in service which makes aircraft incapable of flying; (3) placing device or 
substance in aircraft which is likely to destroy or damage aircraft so as it is 
incapable of flight; (4) destruction of or damage to air navigation facilities or 
interference with the facilities; (5) intentional communication of false information 
which endangers the safety of aircraft in flight.215 In addition, the Montreal Protocol 
to the Sabotage Convention obligates the State to treat as offences the following 
acts: (1) acts of violence against persons in airport if it is likely to cause serious 
injury or death; (2) destruction and damage of airport facilities or aircraft not in 
service, or disruption of airport services.216 
In response, the Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regard to Crimes Related to Safety of 
Aircrafts and Air Navigation criminalises: (1) an attack a person on board of 
aircraft in flight when it endangers the safety of aircraft in flight; (2) damage to or 
destruction by making or inserting device or substance in aircraft in service; (3) the 
destruction of or damage to aircraft equipment or interruption of airport operation 
and thereby exposing aircraft in flight to danger; (4) communication of false 
information; (5) the unlawful takeover of aircraft and exercise of control by use of 
force or threat to use thereof; (6) attempt, failure to notify, assistance to the 
aforementioned offences. This survey shows that the Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regard 
to Crimes Related to Safety of Aircrafts and Air Navigation fails to criminalise the 
following acts: (1) destruction of or damage to air navigation facilities or 
interference with the facilities; (2) acts of violence against persons in airport if it is 
likely to cause serious injury or death. Since the Law does not address these crimes, 
it cannot be said that Kuwait fully complies with the duties imposed by the 
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international treaties. One may argue that these crimes potentially fall under the 
Penal Code. However, it is important to address these crimes in the specific act so 
as to bring more legal certainty and to underline the gravity of these acts. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Kuwait was one of the many countries that 
suffered from aircraft hijacking in the 1980s. Two Kuwaiti aircrafts have been 
hijacked by pro-Iranian Shia. Their demands were to release their friends from 
Kuwaiti prisons. It should be noted that no one knows what happened to the 
hijackers of the Al-Kazma, as they have been captured by the Iranian authorities and 
nothing has been heard afterward. As for the hijackers of the Al-Jabriah they have 
been escaped after they negotiated their escape with the Algerian authorities for the 
release of the hostages.217 
4.3.5 Diplomats 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents has been ratified by Kuwait on 1 March 1989.218 However, till 
today the convention has not been implemented by domestic Law. The obvious 
reason for not implementing this convention is the fact that the crimes covered in 
this convention are already covered by the Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 1960, but 
under the name of common crimes. 
The Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 addresses this form of terrorism in several 
ways. The Code criminalises homicides and murders.219 The former is punishable 
by life imprisonment or the death penalty, and a fine can be added to it.220 The latter 
is punishable by death penalty.221 One may observe that this is a very broad way to 
address terrorism. In other words, any terrorist act that results in the assassination 
of diplomatic personnel may fall under the aforementioned provisions of the Penal 
Code. At the same time, if a terrorist act did not result in death of a person, but only 
in injuries or destruction of property or infrastructure, or kidnapping, other 
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provisions in the criminal law can be applied.222 As one of the interviewed Judges 
said ‘most of the terrorist crimes involve killing innocent people, kidnapping, 
assault or causes grievous bodily harm ... These acts are already punished by the 
Penal Code and its amendments, and they are punished with a severe penalties’.223 
Another representative from the National Assembly stated that, 
what we have so far is sufficient ... Although we need to develop our 
contemporary criminal law in order to meet the international 
requirements on terrorism, we afraid to do so now especially in this 
political situation ... We are afraid to make the same mistake which 
has been done with the Law No. 31 of 1970 In Regard to Crimes 
Relating to State Security.224 
In addition, in terms of establishing jurisdiction over the crimes occur within the 
territory of Kuwait, the government of Kuwait stated in its report to the CTC that: 
‘the Kuwaiti Penal Code applies in respect of all acts committed inside Kuwaiti 
territory, whether by a Kuwaiti or by an alien, in accordance with the principle of 
the territoriality of the Kuwaiti Penal Code’.225 Furthermore, Article 11 of the Penal 
Code No. 16 of 1960 expand the Kuwaiti jurisdiction to criminals who are not 
residence in Kuwait where their acts contribute to the crime that occurred fully or 
partially in the territories of Kuwait. Thus, Article 11 stated that ‘This Code is 
applied also on any individual who commits a crime outside the territories of 
Kuwait where this individual is the actual criminal or is accomplice in crime that 
occurred fully or partially in the territories of Kuwait’.226 Moreover, Article 12 of 
the Penal Code stipulates that: 
The provisions of this law shall apply also to every Kuwaiti citizen 
who, outside Kuwait, commits a crime that is punishable under the 
provisions of this law and of the law in force at the place where this 
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crime was committed, when a Kuwaiti citizen returns to Kuwait 
without having been acquitted by the foreign courts of the charge 
against him.227 
The problem with this Article is that when the attack is not punishable by the 
Kuwaiti laws or vise versa. Another interesting point is that when non-Kuwaiti 
citizen who resident in Kuwait committed a crime outside the territory of Kuwait, 
then the Penal Code will not apply to such an example. However, in its report to the 
CTC, the government of Kuwait stated that: 
in this case, the State of Kuwait is obliged to extradite the 
perpetrator of the crime to the State in which it occurred to be tried 
there, in accordance with judicial cooperation agreements or the 
principles of reciprocity applicable in this regard.228 
4.3.6 Hostage-Taking 
Although Kuwait has ratified the Hostage Convention on 6 February 1989,229 
it has not implemented it. Specifically, the reason for not implementing the Hostage 
Convention is exactly the same reasons mentioned for diplomats. 
The Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 contains provisions which may potentially 
cover hostage taking. Thus, Article 178 of the Penal Code makes it an offence to 
abduct a person by force to move from place where he normally resides and to 
detain such a person. This article is very broad and may, indeed, cover the incidents 
of hostage taking. However, as far as hostage taking is concerned, Article 178 fails 
to cover a situation when a person was detained and forcibly moved from places 
other than the place of his usual residence. Suppose the person’s usual place of 
residence is Kuwait City. Then, suppose a person, while being on a business trip in 
Salmiya City. If such a person would be taken as a hostage in Salmiya City, where 
he came voluntarily for business purposes, the case of hostage taking could not fall 
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under Article 178. However, Article 180 eliminates such deficiency. Article 180 
makes it an offence to anyone who uses force, threats or deception to abduct a 
person ‘with the intention of killing him, inflicting harm upon him, having sexual 
intercourse with him, committing indecent assault against him, inducing him to 
engage in prostitution or extorting something from him or from third person’.230 An 
important specification in this Article is that ‘extorting something from him or from 
third person’, as one of the public prosecutors said ‘extort as a word can be mean: 
doing or abstaining from doing some acts in order to release the person detained … 
And third person can be mean: a third person or a governmental body’.231 One may 
observe that Article 180 of the Penal Code grasps hostage taking as a form of a 
terrorist act in a more comprehensive way. First, the Article clearly makes an 
offence to cover the terrorist hostage-taking by specifying that such an act should 
be done with the purpose to compel a government or other persons to do or not to 
do something. This is a traditional tactic of terrorists. Second, the wording 
employed in the Article 180 allows coverage of all instances of hostage taking 
irrespectively of place the detained person at the moment of the taking was located. 
Under Article 180 the offence is punishable by death penalty. 
4.3.7 Concluding Remarks 
The examination of Kuwait laws shows that, most of the examined laws were 
already in existence before the advent of the international treaties. Furthermore, 
although most of the international conventions on terrorism have been ratified by 
Kuwait, only very few have been implemented. Thus, the Penal Code addresses 
terrorism in very general terms. In other words, terrorist acts are criminalised only 
as long as they fall under the provisions of the general criminal law, and under 
some other offences laid down in its amendment laws. The deficiency of such an 
approach is that terrorism is not recognised as a special problem, while it should be 
treated separately to underline its outrageous nature. 
Although Law No. 6 of 1994 In Regard to Crimes Related to Safety of 
Aircrafts and Air Navigation was passed in order to implement the international 
conventions on aviation security; however, the law fails to cover some offences 
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which Kuwait is obliged to address under international law. In particular, the Law 
does not specifically address such offences as destruction of or damage to air 
navigation facilities or interference with the facilities and acts of violence against 
persons in airport if it is likely to cause serious injury or death. 
In addition, Decree of Law No. 13 of 1991 In Regard to Weapons and 
Ammunition lacks specificity: it does not make a distinction between crimes 
involving unauthorised use, possession, export and import and production of 
weapons and ammunition, and the same offences committed with the purpose to 
support terrorism. Moreover, the Law No. 35 of 1985 In Regard to Crimes of 
Explosives does not specifically address the organisation and direction of the 
bombings as it is required by the Terrorist Bombings Convention. Finally, the 
aforementioned laws contain provisions that raise serious concerns about the 
observance of human rights. All these drawbacks demonstrate that Kuwait should 
reconsider its approach toward the counterterrorism legislative framework. 
4.4   Section III: Why Kuwait Needs Comprehensive Counterterrorism Laws 
4.4.1 Introductory Remarks 
In the previous section it was explained that current laws fail to some extent to 
comply with the international requirements when it comes to counterterrorism. In a 
wake of such a conclusion the next question arises: why Kuwait would need 
comprehensive counterterrorism laws at all? Indeed, as has been mentioned earlier, 
terrorist acts can be treated as crimes of murder, injury to a person, destruction of 
and damage to property and so on. Therefore, one may have a reasonable question 
why the Kuwaiti legislator should think of enacting comprehensive 
counterterrorism laws. In the present section the author explains the reasons for the 
need of having counterterrorism laws. The author outlines general as well as 
specific reasons. 
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4.4.2 Reasons to Have Comprehensive Counterterrorism Laws 
4.4.2.1 General Reasons 
4.4.2.1.1 Terrorism – Outrageous Conduct of International Concern 
A good explanation for the criminalisation of terrorism was given by the US 
Military Tribunal in the Hostages case at Nuremberg.232 The Tribunal pointed out 
that an international crime should be criminalised because it is recognised as a 
grave matter of international concern.233 It is well established that terrorism is an 
international crime.234 Indeed, there are fourteen international conventions that 
prohibit various forms of terrorism. These treaties were developed under the 
auspices of the UN.235 In other words, they reflect the will of the international 
community.236 Therefore, it is essential to implement these conventions and passing 
national laws against terrorism in order to present a ‘symbolic solidarity’ to the 
international effort to combat terrorism.237 
In recent decades terrorism became a matter of international concern. The 
reason for that is not only the immense suffering it induces but also the fact that it 
has transnational impact. Indeed, nowadays one may often hear or read the term 
‘international terrorism’. This is not simply a buzzword adopted by the media but 
the term which actually reflects the nature of the phenomenon. The most 
outrageous terrorist attacks, as a rule, have an international nature. The 9/11 attack 
was of the international nature for several reasons. First, the nationality of the 
terrorists was diverse. The majority of the 9/11 attackers held the Saudi 
nationality.238 In addition, there were terrorists with Egyptian, Lebanese and the 
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UAE nationality.239 Second, people from different parts of the world became 
victims of the terrorists. Thus, citizens of the United States, Canada, Mexico, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Egypt, Ethiopia, UK, France, Germany, 
Turkey, Syria, Italy, Belarus, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Iran, India, Pakistan, 
Australia and other countries became victims of 9/11 attacks.240 One may observe 
that the map of the victims is quite impressive. It allows one to state that the 9/11 
attacks were directed against the entire world. Third, a rather symbolic reason is 
that the attacks were made inter alia against the World Trade Centre which is by 
definition an international environment. Therefore, it is not surprising why the 9/11 
attacks shocked not only the United States but the entire international community. 
Even before the attacks, terrorism has been a matter of international concern, but 
after 9/11 counterterrorism became practically the priority for the international 
community agenda. 
The fact that the international community sees the problem of terrorism as 
utterly grave shows that despite significant cultural differences, the States share 
some universal values. One of the examples of universal values is respect for 
human life. For this reason, virtually in all countries of the world unlawful murder 
is regarded as an extremely serious crime. The crimes of murder touch the very 
bottom of morals in any society. Murder is outrageous from any religious 
perspective. Indeed, the major religions of the world, Christianity, Islam, 
Buddhism, and Judaism treat murder as a grave sin. Terrorist attacks often involve 
murder and other despicable consequences. Therefore, terrorism attacks some 
universally agreed human values. For this reason, UN Security Council Resolutions 
1373, 1456, 1566 and 1624 require from States to take an action against terrorism 
by criminalising it.241 
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4.4.2.1.2 Condemnation and Stigmatisation of Unacceptable Behaviour 
Criminalisation of a certain conduct in national law serves as a tool for 
advancing of certain policy purposes.242 Among such purposes are: incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, punishment or retribution, and general and specific deterrence.243 
However, not all of these policy purposes can be effective in combating terrorism. 
For instance, deterrence is a less relevant purpose when it comes to terrorism. Saul 
reasonably expresses doubts that terrorists are likely to be deterred by 
condemnation or imprisonment because they reject the legitimacy of legal systems 
that imprison and condemn them.244 Moreover, there are even more doubts that 
suicide bombers are inclined to be concerned about prosecution or any other 
processes that will have an extremely negative impact on their lives.245 In a word, 
deterrence is a weak argument for the criminalisation of terrorism. 
Another doubtful argument for criminalisation is incapacitation. It is true that 
such punishment as imprisonment is likely to incapacitate terrorist of committing 
terrorist attacks. However, Saul correctly points out that terrorists can be 
incapacitated within the ordinary crime conviction.246 Indeed, a terrorist can be 
imprisoned for the crime of murder, and thus, incapacitated anyway.247 To clarify, 
here the author is concerned with the question of why terrorists should be brought 
to justice not on the account of ordinary crime but on the specific account of 
terrorism as a grave crime. 
In the wake of such an analysis, it seems that the most justifiable purpose of 
criminalisation of terrorism is retribution and punishment. Saul refers to retribution 
and punishment as ‘the most significant factor supporting the distinct 
criminalisation of terrorism’.248 The author explains that retribution and punishment 
reflect condemnation and stigmatisation of the offender and brings ‘some sense of 
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justice for victims’.249 If Kuwait specifically criminalises terrorism, it will mean 
that the country officially condemns and stigmatises it. In simple terms, Kuwait will 
officially reflect its extremely negative position toward terrorism as a phenomenon. 
Moreover, a terrorist convicted under the comprehensive counterterrorism law 
would be aware that he is punished not simply for murder, injury, destruction and 
damage, but also for the purposes he pursued. Criminalisation of terrorism makes 
the purposes of terrorism illegitimate. As far as Kuwait is concerned, there is no 
sign in the laws that the country deeply condemns the purposes of terrorism. For 
instance, in Kuwait, a terrorist who committed a bombing which caused death, 
injuries and destruction would be convicted only for these acts. The purpose with 
which these acts are committed has lesser relevance, and thus, so does terrorism as 
a phenomenon. 
4.4.2.1.3 Absence of Internationally Agreed Definition of ‘Terrorism’ 
As has been mentioned before, there is no internationally agreed definition of 
the term ‘terrorism’. There are, however, ongoing efforts to insert such a definition 
in an international treaty. Thus, in 1996 the UN General Assembly decided to 
establish an Ad-Hoc Committee to tackle further means of developing a 
comprehensive international legal framework to address terrorism.250 At the twelfth 
meeting of the committee India submitted a draft for a comprehensive convention 
against international terrorism.251 The draft convention incorporates some key 
provisions of the major counterterrorism conventions.252 For instance, the draft 
convention contains an obligation to criminalise the offences laid down in the 
Convention and to provide an appropriate punishment for them.253  However, at the 
current stage the further development of the draft convention is deadlocked by 
virtue of the absence of the agreement on the scope of international terrorism. In 
particular, States cannot agree on a clear distinction between terrorist acts and right 
to self-determination. For instance, the Arab States consider the actions of Israel 
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toward Palestine as ‘official state terrorism’. 254  At the same time, the 
representatives of the Arab States noted that Palestine legitimately struggles for its 
right to self-determination.255 Thus, one may observe that the major concern of 
some countries is that the ‘liberation fighters’ will be treated as terrorists under the 
comprehensive convention. The distinction represents not only a political problem, 
but also an academic one.256 Buchanan explained that in order to draw the line 
between terrorists and ‘liberation fighters’, it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of the concept of state legitimacy.257 The scholar draws attention that 
namely against this concept the claims of self-determination are to be evaluated.258 
Overall, the disagreement over the scope of international terrorism indicates that it 
will take a while for the international community to agree upon the definition of 
‘terrorism’. 
Many countries instead of waiting for the internationally agreed definition of 
terrorism, determined the scope of terrorism in their domestic laws. Thus, the UK 
law, for example, provides that terrorism is defined as the action or threat of action 
that: (1) involves serious violence against a person or serious damage to property; 
(2) expose to danger a person’s life (meaning the person other than perpetrator); (3) 
produces a serious risk to public health and safety; (4) is intended to provide a 
serious interference or disruption to an electronic system.259 These actions fall 
under the definition of terrorism only if they are designed to affect the government 
or intimidate public, or to advance ideological, religious or political cause.260 In 
July 2013, Kuwait passed the Law No. 106 of 2013 Regarding Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), which is 
explained in detail in chapter five. Within this Law Article 1 has defined Terrorism, 
Terrorist Person and Terrorist Organisation. The effectiveness of these definitions 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
                                                
254 UNGA Legal Committee Urges Conclusion of the Draft Convention on International Terrorism 
(8 October 2012) GA/L/3433 
255 Ibid. 
256 Saul, B., Defining Terrorism in International Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). 
257 Buchanan, A., Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International 
Law, (Oxford University Press, 2004), 11. See also Stephens, T., ‘International Criminal Law and 
the Response to International Terrorism’, (2007) 27 UNSW Law Journal, Available at: 
<http://worldlii.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/2004/30.html> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11), s 1 
260 Ibid. 
 168 
4.4.2.2 Specific Reasons 
4.4.2.2.1 Need to Comply with International Law 
As it has been discussed earlier, Kuwait took certain obligations under 
international treaties. In particular, Kuwait committed to criminalise certain forms 
of terrorism, as it has ratified most of the international conventions on terrorism. 
However, closer examination of the Kuwaiti laws shows that it still fails to address 
in clear terms the particular types of offences. Among such offences are: (1) 
destruction of or damage to air navigation facilities or interference with the 
facilities; (2) acts of violence against persons in airport if it is likely to cause 
serious injury or death; (3) organisation and direction of terrorist bombings. 
Also, Kuwait law does not specifically address taking diplomats and other 
internationally protected persons as hostages. In reply to the UN Security Council 
inquiry regarding legislation and procedures that exist to prevent terrorists from 
acting against other States or citizens, the Kuwait government cited Article 4 of the 
Law No. 31 of 1970 In Regard to Crimes Relating to State Security.261 Article 4 
prohibits hostile action against a foreign State when such an action might expose 
Kuwait to the severance of diplomatic relations or to the risk of war.262 One may 
observe that this article has a very limited scope. In particular, it is limited to 
situations involving real risk of declaring war from the State, whose nationals 
suffered from terrorist attacks. However, in the age of sophisticated diplomacy and 
intensive peace-making efforts, it is difficult to imagine that one nation would 
declare war to another only because its citizens suffered from a terrorist attack. The 
same concerns the severance of the diplomatic relations. The predominant trend in 
the modern foreign policy is the philosophy of practical politics. In simple terms, in 
international relations States are mainly governed by their practical interests rather 
than by ideologies, values, emotions and so on. It means that even if foreign 
nationals were targeted by terrorists in Kuwait, it is highly unlikely that the foreign 
nations would freeze diplomatic relations with Kuwait. If a given nation has its 
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interests in Kuwait, it would not fuel a conflict with Kuwait merely to demonstrate 
how protective it is, when it comes to its citizens. Therefore, there is a very little 
possibility that a terrorist attack in Kuwait would become a pretext for war or 
freezing the diplomatic relations. In a word, Article 4 of the Law No. 31 of 1970 In 
Regard to Crimes Relating to State Security has little to do with the protection of 
foreign nationals from terrorist attacks. Overall, Kuwait should pass a specific law 
that would define the crime of hostage taking with consideration of the Hostages 
Convention and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. 
4.4.2.2.2 Need to Prevent Violation of Human Rights 
In Section II the author noted that some of the provisions of the Penal Code 
raise serious concerns about the restriction of the universally recognised human 
rights. To recall, the broadness and vagueness of some of the provisions in the 
Penal Code create a room for the suppression of human rights. The risk of 
limitation of freedom of association and speech were cited as one of the examples. 
The example shows that there is a risk that Kuwait may justify violations of basic 
human rights by the necessity to enforce the counterterrorist provisions of the Penal 
Code. 
The debate about security considerations versus human rights is extensive. The 
views on the relationship between national security and human rights can be 
divided into three major groups.263 The first group is centred on the idea that 
national security is more important and thus, should be maintained at the expense of 
human rights if necessary. The second group holds that human rights are superior to 
national security considerations, and thus, they should be given a priority. Finally, 
the third includes views according to which it is possible to find an appropriate 
balance between national security and human rights.264 For a long time, the views 
belonging to the first group prevails. Indeed, even in the United States that has a 
reputation of a democracy watchdog for the past fifty years policymakers treated 
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the goal of promoting human rights and goal of protection of national security as 
mutually exclusive.265 
Because national security often clashes with human rights, some may argue 
that it is not desirable to enact comprehensive counterterrorism laws. In other 
words, there are certain apprehensions that counterterrorist laws may have a 
negative impact on fundamental human rights. At the same time, those, who believe 
that the counterterrorism laws are unnecessary because they may suppress 
fundamental human rights, should take into account that terrorism brings more 
harm to such rights than a well-balanced counterterrorist legislation. Indeed, 
terrorist acts violate such fundamental human rights as right to life and right to 
security and liberty. Moreover, it would be an absurd to compare the harm done to 
human rights by the counterterrorism legislature with that one inflicted by terrorist 
attacks. The author, however, acknowledges that one of the ways in which 
terrorism suppresses human rights is that it compels the government to adopt 
restrictive laws that, in fact, limit human rights. Brysk correctly points out that: 
Terrorism has succeeded in destroying democracy when a national 
security state, without knowledge or consent of its citizens, tortures 
and kills detainees, runs secret prisons, kidnaps foreign nationals and 
deports them to the third countries to be abused, imprisons asylum 
seekers, spies on its citizens, and impedes freedom of movement, 
association, and expression on the basis of religion and national 
origin.266 
While there are risks that counterterrorism legislation may restrict human 
rights, it is possible to find an appropriate balance between counterterrorist 
considerations and the observance of human rights. 
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4.4.3 Concluding Remarks 
Kuwait counterterrorism laws lack specificity. Why should they be specific? 
Why cannot terrorism be addressed under the general framework of criminal 
offences? Firstly, terrorism represents an outrageous conduct of international 
concern. The international community agreed that terrorism is an extremely grave 
crime. For this reason, the international community developed and concluded a 
series of the international treaties that address various forms of terrorism. Such an 
attitude makes terrorism a very special crime. Such crimes should be treated 
separately by virtue of the specificity. Second, there is a need to condemn and 
stigmatise terrorism, thereby showing that Kuwait does not tolerate terrorist acts, 
and that terrorists would not find a safe haven in the country. Third, comprehensive 
counterterrorist laws are necessary to enable Kuwait to define the scope of terrorist. 
Fourth, the analysis of the Kuwait laws shows that it does not fully comply with the 
obligations imposed by the counterterrorist treaties. Finally, the comprehensive 
counterterrorism laws are necessary to limit the broad scope of the Kuwait law, and 
thereby provide better guarantees for the observance of human rights. 
4.5   Conclusion 
The international community regards terrorism as one of the most pressing 
global threats to international peace and security.267 This vision compels States to 
take decisive action at the international level. In response to a growing number of 
instances of terrorist acts, States have adopted a series of the multilateral 
international treaties designed to address terrorism. The treaties cover various forms 
of terrorism: aircraft hijacking, attacks on diplomats and other internationally 
protected persons, attacks on ships and seizure of ships, hostage taking, aviation 
sabotages, attacks on fixed platforms in the sea, and terrorist bombings. The 
conventions define such acts, attempts to commit such acts, or assistance to commit 
such acts as offences. 
                                                
267 See UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1368 (2001) Threats to international 
peace and security caused by terrorist acts, 12 September 2001, S/RES/1368 (2001), para. 1, 
Available at: <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 1 Dec. 2014 
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The counterterrorist conventions contain a standard set of obligations imposed 
on the Contracting States. Such obligations include: (1) to establish the 
aforementioned acts as offences (or criminalise them); (2) provide appropriate 
punishment for the offences; (3) to establish jurisdiction over offences under 
prescribed conditions; (3) to treat the offences as extraditable; (4) to take an alleged 
offender into custody; (5) submit the case to the competent authorities for further 
prosecution of an offender, if the State chooses not to extradite him; (6) to notify 
interested States about the prosecution of an alleged offender; (7) to cooperate with 
other states to prevent the offences, and some other obligations. The common 
weakness of all the conventions is lack of enforcement. In other words, if a State 
does not comply with the obligations, there are no direct sanctions, though there 
may be indirect measures such as economic and diplomatic retaliation. 
Kuwait is a party to most of the counterterrorist international treaties. By virtue 
of its participation in such treaties Kuwait is bound to address the aforementioned 
offences in its national law. In particular, Kuwait should criminalise aircraft 
hijacking, hostage taking, terrorist bombing, attack on ships and seizure of ships 
and a number of other acts set forth in the international law. In a word, the 
international legal framework compels Kuwait to enact counterterrorism laws to 
show its solidarity to the international efforts to combat terrorism. 
Unlike the UK, Kuwait does not have comprehensive counterterrorism 
criminal laws beyond the precise implementation of the international conventions. 
Terrorist acts are to be addressed within the framework established for ordinary 
crimes. Thus, a terrorist bombing would be treated as a crime of ‘throwing a bomb’. 
However, the crime of ‘throwing a bomb’ may not necessarily cover terrorist 
bombing, since it is unclear what is meant by ‘throwing’. The offence of false 
communication to aircraft or ships may fall under the crime of sending misleading 
signals and warnings as set forth in the Kuwaiti Penal Code. 
Close examination of the relevant Kuwait laws that may potentially address 
terrorist acts shows that they are not even fully in compliance with the international 
requirements to combat terrorism. In addition, they contain at times obscure 
wording. The obscurity hinders legal certainty and, as a result, may lead to violation 
of human rights. Equally, legal uncertainty allows interpreting laws in a broad 
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sense. For instance, a broad provision can cover not only wrongful conduct but also 
legitimate conduct, as discussed in section II. Thus, the prohibition of associations 
aiming to spread principles that promote the destruction of the basic State systems 
illegally or that promote the overpowering the social system or the economic 
system that is present in the country by force, when interpreted broadly, may cover 
some legitimate associations. At this point, it is important to recall that Kuwait is a 
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which guarantees a 
range of freedoms. Therefore, Kuwait is bound to respect the internationally 
accepted rights and freedoms and take it into account in applying these provisions. 
In order to ensure the respect of human rights, it would be preferable for Kuwait to 
provide a better legal certainty in its laws. 
In addition, there are general reasons why every State should have 
comprehensive counterterrorist laws. The first reason is that terrorism represents an 
outrageous conduct of international concern. In other words, terrorism is different 
from ordinary crime by the reason of its gravity, and thus, should be treated in a 
distinctive manner. The second reason is that the gravity of terrorism necessitates 
the States to condemn it at the official level. Criminalisation, in fact, indicates such 
condemnation. Putting it differently, the fact that terrorism is criminalised shows 
the State’s official negative position toward it. In addition, judicial authorities will 
be able to prosecute terrorists more effectively. The third reason is that there is no 
internationally agreed definition of terrorism. In order to effectively combat 
terrorism, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the essence of terrorism. 
It is doubtful that without such understanding anyone would succeed in the fight 
against terrorism. States should define terrorism in their national laws so as to 
create a comprehensive legal framework for tackling terrorism. A definition of 
terrorism in national law would serve as a foundation for such a framework. 
Also, there are some specific reasons why Kuwait should have laws which are 
expressly designated to address terrorist acts. The examination of the more indirect 
Kuwait laws shows that they contain a lot of drawbacks. Among such drawbacks 
are: lack of compliance with international law, and risks of violation of human 
rights. As a result, Kuwait need to pass comprehensive counterterrorism laws in 
order to fill the gap between the international obligations outlined in the 
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conventions and the current national legislation, to comprehensively cover 
terrorism beyond the international conventions, but equally to eliminate the undue 
breadth of laws that pose a threat to human rights. Although there were not so many 
cases in Kuwait related to terrorism, yet it has been found that some of the terrorists 
have escaped the punishment due to the lack of offences in the current criminal law. 
In addition, considering the surrounding threats and the instabilities in Iraq and 
Syria from the Islamic State, and the possible future threats from such instabilities 
to Kuwait, provide an evident need to pass comprehensive counterterrorism laws, 
which will help Kuwait to prevent and counter such threats in the long run. 
However, any such law/code must adhere the human rights standards set out in the 
Constitutional law of Kuwait and the other international laws in human rights to 
which Kuwait has acceded.  
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Chapter Five 
Terrorist Financing: Kuwait’s Response 
5.1   Introduction 
Terrorism financing became one of the major international security threats 
during the last two decades. The September 11 attacks in the United States changed 
the perception of international security in the world and triggered a global 
revolution in combating terrorism financing and money laundering that led to the 
restructuring of major international bodies, including the United Nations (UN) 
which set up new institutions and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which 
refocused its regulatory attention.1 
Historically, terrorist activities have been funded by a wide range of methods, 
such as ‘state sponsorship, diaspora donations, charitable contributions, drug 
trafficking, extortion, and involvement in criminal activities’2, and these methods 
have developed over time. Today, however, terrorists resort to other multiplicities 
of sources, which are difficult for governments to stop. Therefore, much focus has 
been aimed at supervising and protecting the Money Services Businesses (MSBs), 
including those engaged in informal money or value transfers (MVTs), and non-
profit organisations from being misused by financiers of terrorism. The cash flow in 
such cases is sometimes small and thereby difficult to stop. However, it can be 
traced by ensuring that all suspicious financial transactions are reported and 
investigated. In addition, correct measures should be taken by governments to 
                                                
1 See Financial Action Task Force, IX Special Recommendations, Available at: <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.html> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. 
2 Shapiro, J. N., ‘Terrorist Financing and State Response’, American Political Science Association, 
Available at: <https://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/Shapiro_TerroristFinancingStateResponse.pdf> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. See also Biersteker, T. J., and Eckert, S. E., ‘The Challenge of terrorist 
financing’, in Biersteker, T. J., and others (eds.), Countering the Financing of Terrorism, 
(Routledge: London, 2008), 12. See also Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC). Fifth Report 
of the Independent Monitoring Commission: Presented to the Government of the United Kingdom 
and the Government of Ireland under Articles 4 and 7 of the International Agreement establishing 
the Independent Monitoring Commission, (HC 46), (24 May 2005), (London: The Stationery 
Office), 31-39. See also Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing, (OECD: Paris, February 
2008). See also Roth, J., Greenberg, D. and Wille, S., National Commission on Terrorist Attack 
upon the United States, (Monograph on Terrorist Financing, 2004), Available at: 
<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf> accessed 1st 
Dec. 2014. 
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regulate the uses of such services and to stop or suppress the unregulated uses. 
Therefore, the ‘economic life has been affected by the surveillance of financial 
transactions.’3 
Examples of such measures undertaken by the United Nations are the adoption 
of numerous resolutions with regard to financing terrorism, including Security 
Council Resolutions 1267, 1333, 1373, and 1989 discussed in this chapter. In 
addition, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999 (ICSFT) that entered into full force 
in 2002.4 Since then, a number of resolutions and recommendations have been 
developed to boost the effectiveness of combating terrorist financing. A good 
example of such measures are the 40 + 9 recommendations put forward by the 
FATF to counter the crimes of terrorist financing and money laundering.5 
These international obligations and standards are to some extent overlapping. 
For instance, both the UN resolutions and the FATF recommendations urge all 
states to ratify the ICSFT and to implement it nationally. In addition, the ICSFT, 
the UN resolutions, and the FATF recommendations deal with such characteristics 
as freezing, seizure, and confiscation of terrorist assets. Moreover, the ICSFT 
compels member countries to consider following and implementing some of the 
standards contained in the FATF recommendations on AML/CFT. Interestingly, 
however, each obligation has provisions that are not found in the others. For 
instance, the FATF recommendations direct how to regulate the alternative 
remittance systems, wire transfers and non-profit organisations, which are not 
covered by the ICSFT and the UN resolutions.6 
Therefore, and as explained in chapter four, this chapter explores the measures 
imposed on terrorist financing and money laundering crimes in Kuwait before and 
after June 2013, when Kuwait criminalised terrorism financing. The measures have 
                                                
3 See Walker, C., Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation, (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press, United States, 2009). 
4 Durrieu, R., Rethinking money laundering & financing of terrorism in international law: Towards 
a new global legal order, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 111. 
5 See the last revision of the FATF Recommendations 2012, Available at: <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> accessed 1st 
Dec. 2014 
6 International Monetary Fund, Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: a Handbook for Legislative 
Drafting, (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 2003). 
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been evaluated in terms of compliance with the 40 + 9 recommendations developed 
by the FATF. The chapter also looks at the reasons behind the delay in 
implementing the ICSFT in Kuwait, and how external pressures have helped in 
paving the way to implement the international standards. However, before looking 
at the situation in Kuwait, it is worth elaborating the international efforts on 
countering terrorism financing and money laundering. Therefore, this chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first section outlines the development of the 
international responses and obligations to combat terrorism financing. The second 
and third sections examine and evaluate Kuwait’s efforts to combat terrorist 
financing before and after June 2013 respectively. The analysis of this chapter 
considers the effectiveness and fairness of the measures imposed in order to combat 
terrorism financing. However, as Law No. 106 of 2013 has enacted recently, 
measuring the effectiveness of its practical implementation is premature. 
5.2   Section I: International Responses to Combat Terrorism Financing 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This section investigates how the international community has developed its 
legal framework for combating terrorism financing. It first examines the situation 
before and after the 9/11 attacks against the United States. Then the section 
examines the three international legal reactions to terrorist financing, specifically 
the freezing of terrorist assets, the international regulatory measures, and the 
criminalising of terrorism financing. Therefore, this section outlines the 
international instruments against terrorism financing and explores the obligations 
that international bodies have imposed upon their member states. In addition, this 
section sets out how countries should criminalise the financing of terrorism and 
how that crime is a separate and independent crime that differs from other crimes 
relating to money laundering or corruption. 
5.2.2 The International Legal Framework Prior to September 11, 2001 
Before the 9/11 incidents, the international community did not prioritise its 
efforts to prevent terrorism financing, even though they were aware that terrorists 
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need money to carry out their attacks.7 In fact, although frameworks had been 
developed to fight against terrorism financing, states showed little inclination to 
adopt them. Therefore, Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organisations 
faced no serious financial interdiction efforts from the international community. In 
addition, international criminal enforcement actions against the terrorist financial 
networks and their financial donors did not exist. For example, prior to 9/11, the 
Justice Department of the United States was involved in counter-terrorism 
prosecution. These included prosecutions against the perpetrators of the World 
Trade Centre bombing that took place in 1993 and the attacks in 1998 against the 
United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Yet, the individuals who were 
prosecuted were those who had plotted and carried out the attacks, not those who 
had financially sponsored the attacks. 8  Moreover, before September 11, no 
international efforts were undertaken to initiate criminal prosecutions against the 
facilitators, the financial sponsors and donors of international acts of terror. 
In addition, the international bodies did not take serious action against 
terrorism financing. In fact, international standards against the financing of 
terrorism had not been developed. FATF, the international organisation that has the 
responsibility of establishing international standards, adopted ‘Forty 
Recommendations on Money Laundering’. 9  However, none of these 
recommendations provided international standards specifically to suppress 
terrorism financing prior to 9/11. It is true that in December 1999, the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) was drafted 
and opened for signature.10 However, countries did not have the sense of necessity 
                                                
7 Gurulé. J., Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism, 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited; 2009), 3-4. 
8 See United States v. Usama Bin Laden, [et al.], Indictment, No. S(6) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (indictment charging Osama bin Laden and 14 other defendants with the bombings of the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; see also United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 982, 120 S.Ct. 439, 145 L.Ed.2d 344 (1999) (Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman was 
convicted of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism against the United States). 
9 See Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, The Forty Recommendations, 1996, 
Available at: <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%201996.pdf> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. See also Gardner, K. L., ‘Terrorism Defanged: The Financial Action Task 
Force and International Efforts to Capture Terrorist Finances’ in Cotright, D. and Lopez, G. A., 
Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat, 
(Cambridge and London: MIT Press; 2007), 157-186.  
10 UNGA International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 
December 1999, opened for signature 10 January 2000) (2000) 39 ILM 270. 
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to approve the Convention until after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To be precise, only 
four countries, including the United Kingdom, had ratified the ICSFT as of 9/11.11 
In addition, the ICSFT did not enter into force until April 10, 2002.12 
Despite the effort to ensure that counter-terrorist financing measures were 
implemented and adopted through the United Nations Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 
1333 (2000), many countries showed little interest in the matter. The Resolutions 
required the Member States to enact these measures in addition to fighting against 
international terrorism. In October 1999, the Security Council decided to use its 
power under the UN Charter Chapter VII to combat Al-Qaida terrorist threats.13 It 
was realised by the Security Council that Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida had a safe 
haven in Afghanistan, where terror attacks were plotted. It was in Afghanistan that 
the terror group managed to plan, supervise and initiate the August 1998 bombing 
of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.14 As a result, the Security 
Council imposed sanctions on the Taliban, which represented the Afghanistan de 
facto government, as a way to confront Al-Qaida. Moreover, the Security Council 
approved Resolution 1267 as a mechanism to bar the Taliban from hosting Bin 
Laden and Al-Qaida members.15 The Resolution also forced countries to implement 
several economic measures to fight the Taliban. The measures included the 
responsibility to freeze the assets of the Taliban and associated individuals and 
entities.16 A UN Committee consisting of the Security Council members was given 
the mandate to monitor the implementation of the measures that Resolution 1267 
required. The 1267 Committee was referred to as the ‘Al-Qaida and Taliban 
                                                
11 See Lehto, M., Indirect Responsibility for Terrorist Acts: Redefinition of the Concept of Terrorism 
Beyond Violent Acts, (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2010), ch. 6. See also Walker, C. ‘Terrorism Financing and 
the Policing of Charities: Who Pays the Price?’, in King, C. and Walker, C., Dirty Assets: Emerging 
Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets, (Ashgate, Farnham, 2014), ch. 11. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter gives the Council the power to ‘determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and to take military and 
nonmilitary action to ‘restore international peace and security’. See Charter of the United Nations, 
Chapter VII: action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression, Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> accessed 1st 
Dec. 2014. 
14 Gurulé. J., Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism, 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited; 2009), 5. 
15 UN Security Council, Resolution 1267 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4051st 
meeting on 15 October 1999, 15 October 1999, S/RES/1267 (1999), Available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2298.html> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
16 Ibid, para. 4(b). First called the 1267 Committee; since September 2003 officially titled ‘The Al-
Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee’, see UN Security Council document SC/7865, of 4 
September 2003. 
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Sanctions Committee’.17 Nonetheless, most countries did not comply with the 
resolution, hence making it ineffective. 
On October 12, 2000, a small boat exploded upon impact with the USS Cole in 
Aden, Yemen. Seventeen American sailors were killed, and thirty others were 
seriously injured.18 This attack together with other Al-Qaida terrorist activities 
prompted the adoption of Resolution 1333 by the Security Council in December 
2000.19 In addition to the enforcement of economic sanctions against the Taliban, 
Resolution 1333 requested that countries freeze the financial assets of Bin Laden, 
Al-Qaida, and other entities and individuals associated with them.20 Moreover, 
Resolution 1333 established a list of people who had a relationship with Bin Laden 
or the Al-Qaida, known as the United Nations ‘Consolidated List’.21 Unfortunately, 
compliance with Resolution 1333 was similarly disappointing at that time, since no 
names were forwarded to the committee that was responsible for implementing the 
asset freeze and for imposing other sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida.22 
Thus, before 11th September 2001, the international community’s efforts to combat 
terrorism funding were weak and ineffective. 
5.2.3 The International Legal Responses to the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks 
Within a few months after the 9/11 attacks, the international community 
developed and implemented a global legal framework to deprive Al-Qaida and its 
affiliated terrorist organisations of funding. A few days after the incidents, a major 
law enforcement initiative was adopted to combat terrorist financing. On September 
28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 to ensure 
that the assets of terrorists, terrorist organisations and the individuals and other 
                                                
17 Ibid, para. (6) 
18 Comras, V. D., Flawed Diplomacy: the United Nations and the War on Terrorism, (1st edn, 
Washington, D.C., Potomac Books, 2010). 
19 UN Security Council, Resolution 1333 (2000) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4251st 
meeting, on 19 December 2000, 19 December 2000, S/RES/1333(2000), Available at: 
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/806/62/PDF/N0080662.pdf?OpenElement> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
20 Ibid, 8(c) 
21 Ibid. 
22 See UN Security Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Seventh Report of 
the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, para. 25, (U.N. Doc. S/2007/677, 
November, 2007), Available at: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/677> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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entities associated with them were seized and frozen.23 One month later, in October 
2001, FATF implemented Eight Special Recommendations on terrorist financing, 
which set out the first international standards on the suppression of the financing of 
terrorism.24 The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism became effective in April 2002, the purpose of which was to impose 
several legal responsibilities on State signatories to ensure that terrorist funding was 
curtailed.25 In this way, the legal framework needed to combat terrorist financing 
was put in place. In fact, the international legal framework against terrorism 
financing available today was to a large extent constructed based upon these 
initiatives that were developed within 7 months after the 9/11 incidents. 
The legal reaction to terrorist financing has three major components. The first 
is freezing both domestic and international terrorist assets. The second component 
is the implementation and enforcement of regulatory measures against the 
terrorists’ misuse of international financial systems. The third involves the 
prosecution of terrorist financiers. A brief description of the legal framework to 
deny and deprive terrorists of funding follows. 
5.2.4 Freezing Terrorist Assets 
The adoption of Resolution 1373 by the United Nations Security Council 
imposed a number of important responsibilities on countries to fight against 
international terrorism.26 According to Resolution 1373, member states should 
prevent terrorists’ movement through their territory by establishing border controls 
                                                
23 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) [on threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts], 28 September 2001, S/RES/1373 (2001), Available at: 
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
24 In October 2004 the FATF published a Ninth Special Recommendations. See Financial Action 
Task Force, IX Special Recommendations, Available at: <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.html> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. 
25 UNGA International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 
December 1999, opened for signature 10 January 2000) (2000) 39 ILM 270 
26 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) [on threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts], 28 September 2001, S/RES/1373 (2001), Available at: 
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
 182 
and restricting the issuance of travel documents (by a travel ban).27 The Resolution 
also encouraged a weapons embargo to ensure that terrorists did not have access to 
weapons. In addition, Resolution 1373 ensured that terrorist individuals, who are 
planning, supporting and committing terrorist acts, are denied safe heaven (safe 
haven ban). The Resolution also sought to ensure mutual assistance and cooperation 
among member states with regard to terrorism investigation activities (mutual 
assistance). Lastly, Resolution 1373 imposed a number of duties on states to 
suppress and prevent financing terrorism and to freeze ‘without delay funds and 
other financial assets or economic resources’ of individuals who commit, finance 
and facilitate acts of terrorism together with individuals and entities associated with 
them.28 In comparison to its predecessors, Resolutions 1267 and 1333, Resolution 
1373 was much broader, since Resolutions 1267 and 1333 were limited to freezing 
the financial assets of Bin Laden, Al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associated 
entities. Resolution 1373 extended the freeze to cover all terrorists and terrorist 
organisations by ordering member states to freeze without delay all assets of 
individuals and entities identified in the Security Council resolution. However, 
Resolution 1373 does not refer to its predecessor resolutions, which set up the 
responsibility to freeze the assets of named persons and entities, nor does it mention 
any list of such persons and entities established under its predecessor resolutions. 
Consequently, the general responsibility of freezing terrorist assets in accordance 
with the Resolution does not depend on the regime established under the earlier 
resolutions.29 The general responsibility of freezing terrorist assets according to the 
Resolution is comparable to the ICSFT responsibility to take measures toward 
freezing funds that are set aside for terrorist activities. In fact, according to Article 8 
of the Convention, each signatory party ‘shall take appropriate measures … for the 
identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for 
the purpose’ of committing acts of terrorism.30 The Resolution and the Convention 
afford the states considerable latitude to ensure that there is appropriate freezing, 
                                                
27 Ibid, 2(a), (c) and (f). For further analysis see Millar, A. and Rosand, E., Allied against Terrorism: 
What’s Needed to Strengthen the Worldwide Commitment, (New York: The Century Foundation, 
2006), 17-25. 
28 Ibid, 1(c). 
29 International Monetary Fund, Suppressing the financing of terrorism: a handbook for legislative 
drafting, (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 2003), Ch.2. 
30 See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Art. 8 paras. 1 
and 2. 
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seizure and confiscation of the targeted assets, and the Resolution obliges them to 
take action. 
The adoption of Resolution 1373 by the international community reinforced 
the significance of restraining the flow of funds to terrorist organisations. Before 
the 9/11 attacks, many countries did not comply with Resolution 1267 or with 
Resolution 1333. However, Resolution 1373 confirmed the commitment of the 
United Nations Security Council to fight the sources of funds to finance terrorist 
activities. Therefore, the resolution renewed and strengthened the commitment of 
the Security Council to reinforce both Resolution 1267 and Resolution 1333. 
Consequently, the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee began to receive 
names submitted by member states, mainly the United States, to ensure that they 
are included on the UN Consolidated List. The UN Sanctions Committee received 
285 names by the end of 2001, and the Committee ordered that terrorist assets 
worth $52 million be frozen worldwide.31 In 2008, more than 480 names were 
included by the UN Sanctions Committee on the Consolidated List, and a total of 
$85 million worth of assets were frozen.32 By June 2014, the number of individuals 
and entities listed on the Al-Qaida Sanctions list had been reduced to 212 and 67 
respectively; five of whom are related to Kuwaiti citizens.33 The reduction in the 
number of the listed individuals and entities can be attributed, first, to the states’ 
reluctance to submit names to the Consolidated List for freezing and designation. 
The states are reluctant, because  
the UNSCR 1267 scheme in its original form failed to afford any 
avenue for challenges by listed individuals, and any review by the 
Security Council encouraged by diplomatic pressure was lacking in 
                                                
31 See UN Security Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Seventh Report of 
the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Annex III, (U.N. Doc. S/2007/677, 
November, 2007), Available at: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2007/677> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
32 See UN Security Council, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, Eighth Report of 
the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, para. 23, (U.N. Doc. S/2008/324, 14 May 
2008), Available at: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/324> accessed 1st 
Dec. 2014. See also The Consolidated List maintained by the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated 
individuals and entities, Available at: <www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
33 See The List established and maintained by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with respect to 
individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida, 26 June 2014, 
Available at: <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/AQList.pdf> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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transparency, fairness, proportionality in duration, and objectivity in 
the absence of clear standards and procedures.34 
The second reason is the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson by 
the Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009), which is responsible for the delisting 
processes.35 The third reason for the reduction is the attraction and the states’ resort 
to the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 sanctions regime. The benefit from 
resorting to the UNSCR 1373 is that countries can ‘operate more autonomously 
from the UN at the state level’, and, if any problem occurs, ‘it is possible to pass the 
problem down the line for national governments and courts to resolve’.36 
Today, Resolutions 1267, 1333, 1373, 1989, and successor resolutions together 
with the ICSFT and the FATF 9 Special Recommendations have imposed the 
responsibility of freezing terrorist assets on the States. Therefore, the responsibility 
to freeze terrorist assets is set out by different international instruments, and they 
constitute the main focus of the international legal framework in fighting terrorist 
financing. 
5.2.5 International Regulatory Standards on Terrorist Financing 
Before 2001, the FATF was primarily involved in the development of 
international standards on combating money laundering. However, after the 9/11 
incidents, the FATF expanded its mission to address terrorist financing.37  In 
October 2001, the FATF published its Eight Special Recommendations that deal 
specifically with the issue of terrorist financing.38 In October 2004, the FATF 
                                                
34 See Clubb, K. and Walker, C., ‘Heroic or hapless? The legal reform of counter-terrorism financial 
sanctions regimes in the European Union’, A paper presented at the IACL Round Table, held at 
Harvard Law School (USA) – 6-7 March 2014 “Constitutionalism Across Borders in the Struggle 
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35 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1904 (2009) [on continuation of measures 
imposed against the Taliban and Al-Qaida], 17 December 2009, S/RES/1904 (2009), Available at: 
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/656/62/PDF/N0965662.pdf?OpenElement> 
accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
36 See Clubb, K. and Walker, C., ‘Heroic or hapless? The legal reform of counter-terrorism financial 
sanctions regimes in the European Union’, A paper presented at the IACL Round Table, held at 
Harvard Law School (USA) – 6-7 March 2014 “Constitutionalism Across Borders in the Struggle 
Against Terrorism”. 
37 See the Financial Action Task Force, ‘History of the FATF’, Available at: <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
38 Ibid. 
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issued a ninth Special Recommendation related to terrorism financing.39 The total 
of forty-nine Recommendations represents the international standards for 
combating money laundering and terrorism financing. In February 2012, the FATF 
codified those Recommendations into one document. 40  The 9 Special 
Recommendations require countries to ratify the ICSFT (1999) and to adopt the 
measures set out in Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1333 and 1373. In addition, 
States are required to pass domestic law that criminalises terrorism financing and to 
freeze and seize terrorist assets without delay. Furthermore, countries are 
recommended to instruct financial institutions in their jurisdictions to report every 
suspected transaction linked to terrorism and to allow other States great measures of 
assistance and cooperation with regard to terrorism financing investigations. 
Another important recommendation is to protect the alternative remittance system 
by applying the Anti-Money Laundering Laws and to instruct the financial 
institutions to implement accurate originator information on money transfers. 
Finally, countries are required to prevent the misuse of non-profit organisations by 
terrorists, to protect the funds from being diverted to finance terrorism, and to 
prevent and detect large amounts of cash smuggling.41 
Remarkably, the FATF developed international standards within seven weeks 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the main aim of which was to prevent terrorism 
financing that had previously been ignored by the international community. 
5.2.6 Criminalising the Financing of Terrorism 
5.2.6.1 The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (1999) 
The ICSFT was a French initiative supported by the Group of Eight (G-8). In 
May 1998, the G-8 Foreign Ministers recognised the preclusion of terrorism fund-
                                                
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Financial Action Task Force, IX Special Recommendations, Available at: <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.html> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. See also Chatain, P., [et al.], Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A 
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raising as a ‘precedence [area] for additional action’.42 In early 1998, France 
instigated the Convention's negotiations while proposing a text to the United 
Nations. In December 1998, an Ad Hoc Committee, which was established by 
Resolution 51/210, elaborated the Convention as agreed upon by the General 
Assembly.43 On 9 December 1999, the General Assembly adopted the Convention. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States prompted the international 
community to ratify and implement the ICSFT. In fact, the Convention was ratified 
by the required number of countries and entered into force in April 2002. 
The Convention clearly articulates three main duties for all state parties. One 
of them is to criminalise all forms of funding that support terrorists and their 
activities by imposing upon each state the duty to establish the offenses of 
financing terrorism within their national legislation.44 As a result, the Convention 
demands that each state party assume the following measures: (a) within their 
domestic law, establish the offenses related to financing terrorist activities laid out 
in the Convention; and (b) establish appropriate penalties that consider the grave 
nature of such offences. The Convention defines the financing of terrorism as a 
crime committed when someone ‘by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully 
and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used 
or in the knowledge that they will be used in full or in part, in order to carry out [a 
terrorist act as defined in the Convention]’.45 Both the mental and the material 
elements of the crime will be discussed next. 
5.2.6.1.1 The mental element (mens rea) 
The Convention defines the mental element of the financing of terrorism as 
including two aspects. First, the crime must be wilfully done. Second, the 
                                                
42 See Johnson, C. M., ‘Introductory Note to the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism’, (2000) 39 ILM 268. See Also Conclusion of G8 Foreign Ministers, May 
1998, paragraph 28, Available at: <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/g8rmae/bir_g8concl-en.asp> cited 
in International Monetary Fund, Suppressing the financing of terrorism: a handbook for legislative 
drafting, (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 2003). 
43 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 53/108, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 83rd 
mtg. Supp. No. 49, at para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/Res/53/108 (1999). The International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 
54/109 of 9 December 1999 as corrected. 
44 Ibid, Art. 4. 
45 Ibid, Art. 2, para. 1. 
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perpetrator must have been aware that the funds will be utilised for such acts or at 
least have the intention that the funds will be utilised to finance terrorist actions.46 
Within the second aspect, the intent and the knowledge are alternative elements. 
However, the Convention provides no further details regarding the two aspects of 
these mental element and their application within each state, but they must be in 
harmony with the state's general criminal laws.47 
5.2.6.1.2 The material elements (actus reus) 
The Convention contains two aspects in defining financing terrorism offenses 
based on the material element. The first aspect entails financing, which is widely 
defined as the collection or the provision of funds. The element is established when 
a person ‘by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or 
collects funds [...]’.48 The second material element is a relationship to terrorist 
actions that are defined in the Convention in reference to two different sources. The 
first source contains a list of international treaties; specifically, the nine treaties that 
were opened to signatures between 1970 and 1997, which require the parties to 
institute various terrorism offenses in their national legislation. The list is set out in 
the Convention's Annex. The Convention gives each state party the privilege to 
exclude any treaty from the list only if the particular state is not a party to it. The 
exclusion privilege becomes ineffective if the state becomes a party to the treaty. 
Conversely, when a state party stops being a party to one of the listed conventions, 
it can also be eliminated from the enlisted treaties applicable within the 
Convention.49 
The other source is a ‘self-contained’ definition of terrorist actions stipulated 
in the Convention itself. It describes terrorist actions as: ‘Any [...] act intended to 
cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking 
an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of 
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 International Monetary Fund, Suppressing the financing of terrorism: a handbook for legislative 
drafting, (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 2003), Ch.2. 
48 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Art. 2, para. 1. 
49 Ibid, Art. 2, paras. 2(a) and (b). 
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Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any 
act’.50 
Therefore, under the Convention's general definitions, an action becomes a 
terrorist act if it meets the mentioned conditions: (1) its intention is to cause the 
death or severe bodily injuries of any civilian or persons not actively involved in 
the hostile situation or an armed conflict, and (2) its purpose is to intimidate 
residents or compel an international organisation or government to do or refrain 
from a certain act. 
Although the ICSFT required state parties to adopt the definition of terrorism 
financing as stated in the Convention, which included the abovementioned 
elements, nothing prevents states from going further than the mental element (mens 
rea) and the material element (actus reus) of the ICSFT definition, a good example 
of which can be found in the UK Terrorism Act 2000.51 However, there is a risk if a 
state goes further than the Convention requires, as it might result in failing to win 
international acceptance of such an initiative, which could hinder international 
cooperation. 
5.2.6.2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) 
The Resolution contains two separate requirements concerning the fight 
against terrorist financing. One relates to the funding of the terrorist actions, while 
the other relates to funding the terrorist. The first requirement is covered in 
paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) within the Resolution. According to paragraph 1(a), states 
must ‘prevent and suppress’ the funding of terrorist actions.52 Paragraph 1(b) 
requires the states to criminalise any deliberate provision or collection by whatever 
means, either directly or indirectly, of the funds by their respective nationals or 
within their borders with the intent that the funds be utilised or in the awareness 
that are to be utilised to conduct terrorist actions.53 Noticeably, paragraph 1(b) is 
close to the ICSFT language. In addition, under paragraph 3(d), the Security 
                                                
50 Ibid, Art. 2 para. 1(b). 
51 See Terrorism Act 2000, Sections 15-19, Available at: 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. See also Walker, 
C., Terrorism and the Law, (Oxford University Press, United States, 2011), 390-393. 
52 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) [on threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts], para. 1(a). 
53 Ibid, para. 1(b). 
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Council calls upon states to become parties to the Convention as soon as possible.54 
Also, under paragraph 2(e), every state must ensure that such terrorist acts are 
instituted as grave criminal offenses as part of their domestic laws and that the 
criminal punishment related to such crimes reflects their gravity. 55  Similar 
provisions are contained within the Convention. Therefore, the abovementioned 
paragraphs of the Resolution appear to refer to the Convention. 
The other requirement contained in paragraph 1(d) of the same Resolution is 
that states prohibit their residents, citizens and entities within their borders 
from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or 
financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for 
the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate 
or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and 
entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons.56 
Paragraph 1(d) of the Resolution sets out an independent obligation that is not 
contained in the Convention, since the Convention does not address questions 
regarding any financial aid to terrorists or terrorist bodies.57 Therefore, there are 
two different but related types of conduct based on terrorism funding. The first is 
the financing of terrorist acts as defined within Article 2 of the Convention. The 
other is the provision of financial support to terrorists or terrorist organisations as 
stipulated in paragraph 1(d) of the Resolution. Even though the requirements 
regarding these forms have similar conduct, they are not entirely alike, and each 
state is left to decide how to characterise the conduct within their local laws. 
While both the ICFSTF and paragraph 1(d) of Resolution 1373 deal with the 
provision of financial assistance in relation to terrorism, the two have notable 
differences. First, the Convention clearly states that it requires the criminalisation 
                                                
54 Bantekas, I., ‘The International Law of Terrorist Financing’, (2003) 97(2) The American Journal 
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55 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) [on threats to international peace 
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56 Ibid, para. 1(d). 
57 See Gilmore, W. C., Dirty Money: The Evolution of International Measures to Counter Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, (4th edn, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2011), 122-
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of the financing of terrorist acts, whereas paragraph 1(d) of the Resolution requires 
states to prohibit people within their borders from making financial assistance 
available to terrorists and terrorist organisations.58 Paragraph 1(d) appears to be 
deliberately different from the language used in paragraph 1(b), which requires 
states to criminalise the financing of terrorist acts. The ultimate aim of paragraph 
1(d) is to prevent the flow of funds and to dry the financial assistance to terrorists 
and terrorist organisations, whether this is achieved through criminalisation or other 
means. 
Secondly, as for the type of such assistance, the requirement in paragraph 1(d) 
of Resolution 1373 is broader than the requirement in the ICSFT. The Convention 
criminalises the provision of ‘funds’,59 whereas the Resolution covers a wider range 
of activities by using the broader term ‘funds, financial assets or economic 
resources or financial or other related services’.60 Despite the broad definition of 
‘funds’ in the Convention, the Resolution covers the provision of ‘financial or 
related services’, which is not expressly covered by the ICSFT. 
Lastly, the range of people and entities that must be prohibited from receiving 
funds or services is defined in the Resolution but not in the Convention. According 
to Resolution 1373 paragraph 1(d), the list not only includes individuals who 
commit or attempt to commit, or facilitate or participate in acts of terrorism, it also 
includes the entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such people and 
entities acting on behalf or at the direction of such people.61 
Thus, in addition to criminalising the financing of terrorist acts as stipulated in 
the Convention, paragraph 1(d) of Resolution 1373 requires that countries prevent 
the flow of funds and facilities to terrorists and terrorist organisations. The 
Resolution leaves to each country the implementation of suitable measures to 
accomplish this mission. For example, one way to achieve this could be to freeze 
the assets of the classes of people and entities listed in paragraph 1(d) of the 
                                                
58 Ibid. 
59 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Arts. 2 and 8. 
60 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) [on threats to international peace 
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Resolution and to forbid the provision of financial and other services to such 
individuals.62 
5.2.6.3 Terrorist Financing as a Distinct Crime 
5.2.6.3.1 Financing of Terrorism Compared to Money Laundering 
Through the adoption of money laundering legislation, some countries 
contended in their responses to the questionnaires given by the United Nations 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) that they complied with the Resolution 1373 
provisions that require the criminalisation of terrorism funding. However, the 
countries’ responses appeared to the CTC not to appreciate and embrace the spirit 
of the Resolution and the Convention. An autonomous offence of terrorist financing 
acts is established differently by the Convention. Terrorism financing and money 
laundering are distinct, even though the two phenomena share the common idea of 
attacking criminal groups using measures that target their financial activities. To be 
precise, the funds used to finance terrorist activities need not be laundered or be the 
proceeds of illicit acts, because it is possible that terrorism funds might be acquired 
legally and deposited in financial organisations without breaking any laws.63 Thus, 
criminalising one source of terrorism financing does not criminalise all sources of 
terrorism financing. It is the intended use of the funds to facilitate an attack that 
established the offense of financing of terrorism.64 Therefore, legislation will have a 
significant gap whenever the country exclusively depends on existing money 
laundering offenses to criminalise terrorism financing. In that instance, terrorism 
financing offences will be established only when the monies that are aimed to 
finance a terrorist act come from an illicit origin. Consequently, funding terrorist 
acts with legally obtained funds cannot be prosecuted. 
 Nevertheless, money laundering and terrorism financing are linked 
inasmuch as FATF Special Recommendation II requires the inclusion of terrorism 
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financing by jurisdiction as a money-laundering predicate offense. For countries 
that consider the predicate offenses to be ‘all crimes’, such as, for instance, has 
been required by the Strasbourg Convention, the inclusion is, then, automatic.65 The 
inclusion of terrorism financing as a predicate offence can also be automatic if the 
predicate offences are defined as all ‘serious crime’ and the terrorism financing 
offenses fall within the ‘serious crimes’ definition in the jurisdiction.66 There is also 
a need to amend the list in countries that set out the predicate offences in a list, in 
which the predicate offenses are defined to make sure that the terrorist financing 
offenses are included in the list. 
5.2.6.3.2 Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy as Substitute Offences 
In some countries, the offense of financing terrorism has been included in the 
offence of aiding and abetting acts of terrorism. However, according to the ICSFT, 
an act of terrorism need not have been carried out or even attempted to convict a 
person of financing terrorist acts.67 Paragraph 3 of article 2 of the Convention 
states: 
For an act to constitute an offense set forth [in the Convention], it 
shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out 
an offense [under the Convention].68 
In the case of the Convention, the intent of the usage of the funds is crucial. If 
the party intended that the funds be used to commit acts of terrorism, then that party 
can be found guilty of financing acts of terrorism. This holds whether or not the 
acts were actually carried out. Therefore, terrorism financing offences are separate 
and independent from the terrorist acts. This is in contrast to aiding and abetting. To 
be found guilty of aiding and abetting, an offense must either have been attempted 
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or have taken place. In addition, aiding and abetting occur only when the accused is 
proven to have had prior knowledge of the act or the attempt to commit the act.69 
Similarly, the offense of financing terrorism has sometimes also been joined 
with the charge of conspiracy.70 However, being a distinct crime, as stated above, 
the act of terrorism financing can be committed by one person acting alone, which 
is inconsistent with conspiracy’s mode of operation.71 
5.2.7 Conclusion 
International efforts to combat terrorism financing have developed 
dramatically since the 9/11 incidents. Before 9/11, preventing terrorism financing 
was not a priority for the international community. Today, however, combating the 
financing of terrorism is not a choice, and every member state of the international 
community has the duty to adopt and implement the international instruments on 
the suppression of terrorism financing and the international standards developed by 
the FATF. This section has elaborated that terrorism financing is a distinct crime; 
its nature is separate and independent from any other related offences discussed in 
this section. As a result, countries should pass domestic laws and regulations that 
criminalise terrorism financing and secure its national financial/non-financial 
bodies according to the demands of the international instruments and standards. 
Therefore, the next two sections of this chapter examine the Kuwaiti response to 
combating terrorism financing before and after June 2013 respectively. 
5.3   Section II: Kuwait Response to Terrorist Financing before June 2013 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Although money laundering is believed not to be a major problem in Kuwait,72 
that country’s geographic location in the Gulf has made Kuwait serve ‘as a transit 
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country for money, equipment and operatives into countries in which “Holy War” 
is being waged – mainly Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also Syria since 
2012’.73 In addition, there are still concerns from the international bodies and the 
US Department of State about the potential misuse of charities in Kuwait by 
terrorist financiers. 74  Therefore, this section explores and evaluates the legal 
framework of the Kuwaiti government for combating terrorism financing and anti-
money laundering operations before the ratification of the ICSFT. The available 
measures have been studied in accordance to the level of compliance with the 
ICSFT, the UN resolutions on terrorism financing and the 40 + 9 FATF 
recommendations. As such, this section looks, first, at how the government of 
Kuwait criminalised terrorism financing before June 2013. Then, the section 
outlines and assesses the institutional framework developed to combat terrorism 
financing and money laundering, after which the section explores how and the 
extent to which the State of Kuwait implements the UN Security Council 
resolutions demands against terrorist financiers and the 40 + 9 FATF 
recommendations. 
5.3.2 Criminalising Terrorism Financing in Kuwait 
Until June 2013, Kuwait had neither criminalised terrorism financing in itself 
nor ratified the ICSFT. After the 9/11 incidents, most of the Islamic and Arab 
governments expressed their deepest condolences and sympathies to the people and 
the government of the United States75 and all of those who were affected by the 
terrorist attacks. The government of Kuwait and the members of the Kuwait 
National Assembly, for example, condemned the 9/11 attacks and described those 
who committed them as criminals and deviants.76 As a legislative response, on 10 
March 2002, the government of Kuwait enacted Law No. 35 of 2002 for Combating 
Money Laundering Operations believing that it would comply with all international 
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obligations. Unfortunately, Law No. 35 of 2002 does not specifically criminalise 
terrorist financing and is mainly about criminalising money laundering processes. 
Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti authorities stated that ‘Kuwait had ratified all of the 
treaties listed in the ICSFT Annex and that, therefore, financing of such crimes can 
be prosecuted under the general penal code of instigation, conspiracy, aiding and 
abetting.’77 
The 200278 and 200379 Kuwait reports to the CTC stated that articles 48 and 52 
of the Penal Code criminalise terrorist financing, but the text of the articles does not 
explicitly identify terrorist financing. 
Article 48 states: 
The following shall be regarded as an accomplice in the crime 
before it is committed: 
First: any person who instigates the commission of an act 
constituting a crime… 
Second: any person who agrees with another to commit an act 
constituting a crime… 
Third: any person who, by any means whatever, knowingly assists 
the perpetrator in actions in preparation for a crime… 
Similarly, paragraph 1 of article 52 of the Penal Code specifies that ‘any person 
who participates in a crime before it is committed shall be liable to its punishment, 
except where the law prescribes otherwise’. According to these two articles, 
terrorism financing can be included amongst the crimes to which these punishments 
apply, since such acts are considered to be one form of participation in the crime by 
instigating it, consenting to it or assisting in it. 
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Furthermore, in its reports of 2003 and 200480 to the CTC, the government of 
Kuwait stated that terrorism financing might be criminalised under the general 
terms of ‘criminal arrangements’ (or conspiracy) in accordance with article 56 of 
the Penal Code. Article 56 states: 
If two or more persons arrange to commit an offence, whether 
serious or less serious, and make preparations to do so in a manner 
which gives no reason to expect their abandonment of the 
arrangement, they shall each be deemed responsible for a criminal 
arrangement, even if the offence which is the subject of the 
arrangement did not take place. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section I of this chapter, terrorism financing differs 
from aiding and abetting and conspiracy.81 Therefore, relying only on the general 
criminal liability for those who support, incite, conspire, or help others in the 
commission of a criminal offense ‘will not satisfy Kuwait’s post 9/11 obligations 
under the international requirements’.82 Consequently, the absence of specific 
legislation that criminalises terrorism financing left the financial system in Kuwait 
both vulnerable and under threat of being misused by terrorist financers. 
Nevertheless, the authorities claimed that the attempt to commit terrorism 
financing was criminalised under the Kuwaiti Penal Code. The 200683 Kuwaiti 
report to the CTC stated that an attempt to commit terrorism financing can be 
criminalised under article 45 of the penal code. Article 45 provides that 
an attempt to commit an offence is the commission of an act with the 
intention to complete it inasmuch as the actor is unable to complete 
the offence for reasons in which his will plays no part. 
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However, since terrorism financing is not a crime in itself under the national laws 
of Kuwait, how can attempting to commit terrorism financing be a crime? 
As for the predicate offense for money laundering, Kuwait follows the ‘all 
crimes’ approach. Thus, all of the crimes included in the treaties listed in the annex 
of the ICSFT are automatically included as predicate offenses to money laundering. 
Nevertheless, since terrorism financing, in itself, is not a crime in Kuwait, it is not 
considered a predicate offence for money laundering. More importantly, since 
terrorist financing is not a crime in itself, the Kuwaiti jurisdiction-related issues for 
terrorist financing offence cannot be applied. Specifically, since articles 11 and 12 
of the Penal Code require the act to be a criminal offense under the Kuwaiti Penal 
Code in order for applying and extending the jurisdiction of the Kuwait.84 
Finally, the fact that terrorism financing is not criminalised in Kuwait can 
cause problems when dealing with international cooperation cases. For example, 
extradition requires the crime to be criminalised in both countries under the 
doctrine of ‘dual criminality’.85 
5.3.3 Regulatory Framework Against Terrorism Financing in Kuwait 
5.3.3.1 Overview of the Financial Sector 
Since the economy of Kuwait is relatively open, it has attracted a significant 
number of foreign investors, who have been involved in different sectors of the 
economy including the banking and industry sectors. As mentioned earlier, 
Kuwait’s economy depends mainly on petroleum products processed within the 
public sector. In addition, Kuwait’s banking sector provides one of the main 
economic pillars of the economy. The country hosts a number of banks, some local 
and others international. Foreign-owned banks are permitted to open only one 
branch in Kuwait and to offer only investment banking services.86 In addition, 
                                                
84 Kuwaiti Penal Code No. 16 of 1960, Arts 11 and 12. 
85 El Khoury, N., ‘Implementing Human Rights and Rule of Law Aspects of the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy: The UNODC/TPB Experience’ in de Frias, A. M. S., [et al.] (eds), 
Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice, (Oxford University Press, United States, 2012), 
1040. See also UNODC, ‘Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime against Terrorism; 
Prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’, (UN, New York 2008), 40. 
86 See ‘Principles, Rules and Regulations for the Licensing and Operation of Foreign Banks’ 
Branches in the State of Kuwait, According to Amended Article (56) of Law No. 32 of year 1968 
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foreign-owned banks are prohibited from competing in the retail banking sector.87 
However, all banks are allowed to work under the guidelines of the Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below show the general structure of the Kuwaiti 
banking and financial sector. 
Table 5.1: The General Structure of Kuwait’s Financial Sector up to August 
2014 
 Number of Institutions 
Authorised/Registered & 
Supervised by: 
Commercial banks88 22 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Conventional banks 16 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Islamic banks 6 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Specialised banks89 1 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Foreign banks 
(Both conventional and Islamic) 
12 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Investment companies 88 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Conventional 41 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Islamic 47 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Exchange companies/houses 
(engage in the transfer of money 
abroad and currency exchange) 
39 Central Bank of Kuwait 
Exchange organisations90 
(engage only in currency exchange) 
159 Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
                                                                                                                                   
Concerning Currency, the Central Bank of Kuwait and the Organisation of Banking Business’, (21 
March 2004), Available at: <http://new.cbk.gov.kw/en/images/foreign-banks-branches-10-2727-
2.pdf> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
87 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume II 
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes “Kuwait”, (Washington D.C.: March 2009), 321. 
88 Data provided in this table for banks, investment companies, and exchange companies are 
available on: The Central Bank of Kuwait Official Website: Supervision. Available at: 
<http://new.cbk.gov.kw/en/supervision/financial-units/kuwaiti-banks.jsp> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
89 According to Article 76 of the CBK Law No. 32 of 1968, ‘Specialized banks refer to banks whose 
main function of which is to finance certain economic sectors, such as the real estate, industrial or 
agricultural sectors, and which do not accept demand deposits as part of their basic activities.’ Due 
to their nature, specialized banks are not included in the total number of conventional banks. 
90 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011). 
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Insurance companies91 36 Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
Brokerage companies92 14 Kuwait Stock Exchange 
 
Table 5.2: Banking and Financial System Structure up to August 201493 
 
                                                
91 Data provided for Insurance Companies are Available on: Al Jarida Newspaper, 27 July 2014. 
Available at: <http://www.aljarida.com/news/index/2012674244/للااتتععللاا-ـلل-ةةددييررججللاا•--ععااططقق-ننييممأأتتللاا-
ننلل-ممظظتتننيي-االلإإ-ةةئئييههبب-ههططببضضتت> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
92 Data provided for Brokerage Companies are available on: Kuwait Stock Exchange Official 
Website: Brokerage Firms. Available at: <http://www.kuwaitse.com/KSE/Broker.aspx> accessed 1st 
Dec. 2014. 
93 Data provided in this table for banks, investment companies, and exchange companies are 
available on: The Central Bank of Kuwait Official Website: Supervision. Available at: 
<http://new.cbk.gov.kw/en/supervision/financial-units/kuwaiti-banks.jsp> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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As shown by Table 5.2, the CBK controls and supervises the performance of 
all banks (Islamic, commercial, foreign and local), investment companies (Islamic 
and conventional) and exchange companies in Kuwait based on the requirements 
stipulated in the CBK Law No. 32 of 1968. 
Referring to Table 5.1, there are 22 commercial banks in Kuwait. About 30% 
of the banks are Islamic, while the remaining 70 percent are conventional banks. 
This implies that Islamic banks have not dominated the financial sector as may be 
expected. About 55 percent of the banks are foreign as compared to 45 percent that 
are locally owned. 
There are 88 investment companies in Kuwait, 46 percent of which are 
conventional in nature, while 54 percent are Islamic. This shows that there are more 
Islamic investment companies in the country. Most of the foreign investment 
companies are conventional in nature, since they are universal in their mode of 
operation. However, ‘all investment companies serve the citizens irrespective of 
their religion’.94 
The data also shows that there are 39 exchange companies in Kuwait. Just like 
banks and investment companies, exchange companies are registered and 
supervised by the CBK. Finally, a total of 36 insurance companies and 14 
brokerage companies were registered in Kuwait by the end of August 2014 under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) and the Kuwait 
Stock Exchange (KSE). 
Although there are two different banks and investment companies 
characterised by their mode of operation and the sources of guidelines, ‘both 
Islamic and conventional organisations are subjected to similar AML/CFT 
regulations’.95 Islamic financial institutions operate under the regulations stipulated 
in Sharia law 96  while conventional institutions are governed by the general 
conventional rules and regulations. 
                                                
94 Interview with F.I.4. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Islamic Shari’a prohibits the payment or acceptance of interest charges for the lending and 
accepting of money. It also prohibits investment in goods or services considered contrary to the 
principles of Shari’a. 
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According to a representative of the CBK, to eliminate any form of illegal 
financial activities through institutions, ‘the government of Kuwait imposes strict 
regulations on all financial institutions when opening and while in operation’, and 
‘terrorism financing and money laundering activities can only be suppressed 
through the control of financial institutions’.97 In the state of Kuwait, the license of 
activity for banks must be obtained from the CBK and approved by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). In addition, banks must be registered with MOCI.98 All investment 
companies are required to obtain a commercial registration certificate with MOCI 
followed by registration with the CBK.99 Similarly, all exchange companies must 
be registered with both MOCI and the CBK before being allowed to transact in the 
country.100 ‘During operations, all banks, investment companies and exchange 
companies are subject to close supervision and regulation by the CBK’, said a 
representative of the CBK.101 
However, insurance companies are supposed to be registered only with MOCI, 
which supervises their operations. Brokerage companies under the supervision of 
the KSE are supposed to be registered with both MOCI and the KSE.102 
The KSE, MOCI and CBK act as legal agencies that control the flow of 
finances within the country in a bid to limit the occurrence of illegal activities, such 
as terrorism financing and money laundering. Since banks are the most vulnerable 
financial institutions, the country imposes stricter rules and regulations on them 
compared to other institutions. The suppression of terrorism financing and money 
laundering can be achieved through the establishment of a proper institutional 
framework. The next sub-section discusses the existing institutional framework in 
Kuwait with respect to money laundering and terrorist financing. 
                                                
97 Interview with G.O.8. 
98 The CBK Law No. 32 of 1968, Chapter III: Organisation of Banking Business, Section 2: 
Registration of Banks. 
99 Ministerial Order Concerning subjugation of the Investment Companies to the Control of the 
Central Bank of Kuwait (Issued January 1987). 
100 Ministerial Order Concerning subjugation of the Currency Exchange Companies to the Control of 
the Central Bank of Kuwait (Issued 19 March 1984). 
101 Interview with G.O.8. 
102 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011). 
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5.3.3.2 The Institutional Framework for Combating Terrorism Financing 
This section discusses the role of different ministries and legal entities that 
combat terrorism financing and money laundering. 
The MOF contributes to combating terrorism financing and money laundering 
by issuing and implementing the necessary regulations in accordance with the 
country’s law. The MOF has issued a number of executive decrees for the Law No. 
35 of 2002, with decree No. 15/2002 being the most important. This latter decree 
was issued on April 14, 2002 and was written with regard to legal and judicial 
proceedings followed in cases of money laundering. Furthermore, decree No. 
252/2002 issued on September 22, 2002 specified instructions that must be adopted 
to combat money laundering and to prevent terrorist financing operations, and 
decree No. 9/2003 issued on June 7, 2003 pertained to travellers to and from the 
country who carry national or international currencies or gold alloys or 
merchandise that are worth more than three thousand Kuwaiti Dinars. In addition, 
regulation 5/2005 was issued by the MOF to authorise the CBK Governor to lead 
both the National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of 
Terrorism Committee, which is charged mainly with strategic and policy matters 
regarding the AML/CFT, and the Kuwait Financial Investigation Unit (KFIU) and 
to define the way forward. The regulation culminated in the establishment of a 
special Money Laundering Department that has been leading the fight against 
terrorist financing and money laundering since then. The department represents all 
of the matters of state at all levels, including locally, regionally and internationally. 
MOF also holds the authority to implement local legislation and measures with 
regard to terrorist financing and money laundering through available channels. 
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) has the responsibility to maintain internal 
security for all citizens and foreigners. To combat terrorism financing and money 
laundering, MOI launched the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) that 
investigates money laundering cases within the country. However, the ‘MOI does 
not deal with cases originating from other countries without having a direct effect 
on internal security’, said a representative from the MOI.103 In addition, the MOI 
provides the necessary documentation for all draft reports concerning the 
                                                
103 Interview with P.O.2. 
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investigation of money laundering cases to the Public Prosecutor Office (PPO). The 
PPO then implements the law (Law No. 35 of 2002) by deciding whether the 
suspects should be arrested. To improve security even more, the CID might ask to 
be granted permission by the PPO to investigate suspicious bank accounts and 
records of properties owned by suspicious individual or groups.104 Furthermore, the 
State Security Bureau (SSB) is responsible to investigate terrorist financing cases in 
the country. However, since there is no terrorist financing offence, convictions 
against perpetrators were hindered. 
MOCI is one of the most important supervisory authorities for institutional 
frameworks in Kuwait. MOCI holds the authority to register various financial 
institutions, including banks, investment companies, insurance companies and 
exchange companies. By so doing, MOCI controls financial processes executed by 
the institutions registered under its umbrella. In most cases, MOCI’s activities do 
not cross with those of the CBK, since they operate independently. In 2003, MOCI 
issued a Ministerial Decree No. 284 of 2003 to establish the Office of Combating 
Money Laundering Operations within the Ministry to investigate, supervise and 
issue instructions related to money laundering and terrorist financing to the 
institutions under its supervision (exchange organisations and insurance 
companies). 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) ‘is the responsible authority to receive 
information, through its permanent mission at the United Nations (UN), on the 
listing and de-listing procedures with regard to UNSCRs 1267 and 1989 and to 
distribute them to the relevant authorities at the national level.’105 
The stock market in Kuwait is organised and controlled by the KSE. In 
addition, all activities having a relationship with the trading of securities are 
monitored appropriately. KSE registers and offers working licenses for brokerage 
companies operating within the state of Kuwait. Another legal authority for finance 
institutions is the CBK. Though the CBK works under the MOF, it is an 
                                                
104 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 30-31. 
105 Interview with G.O.6 and G.O.5. 
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independent body that controls and monitors the operations of banks, exchange 
companies and investment companies in Kuwait. 
5.3.3.3 The Role of Kuwait Financial Investigation Unit (KFIU) 
Decree No. 10/2003 was issued by the MOF on June 10, 2003 authorising the 
Governor of the CBK to form the KFIU within the Central Bank of Kuwait. The 
Governor of the CBK then issued a resolution No. (1/191/2003) on June 23, 2003 
with regard to that resolution, and another decision was issued by the director of the 
KSE with regard to money laundering and terrorist financing. 
According to the Egmont Group definition, an financial investigation unit 
should be 
a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as 
permitted, requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the competent 
authorities, disclosures of financial information: (i) concerning 
suspected proceeds of crime, or (ii) required by national legislation 
or regulation, in order to counter money laundering.106 
However, one of the problems is that the KFIU is not established as a national 
centre that has the responsibility for receiving, analysing and disseminating 
Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and other information related to possible 
money laundering or terrorist financing. In fact, the KFIU works in collaboration 
with the PPO, which is a major department of the legislative authorities of Kuwait, 
pursuant to article No. 167 of the Kuwaiti Constitution and articles No. 53 and 54 
of the amended Judicial Regulation Law No. 23/1990. Law No. 35 of 2002 for 
Combating Money Laundering Operations gives the PPO the authority to 
investigate and prosecute crime related to money laundering. Under Law No. 35, 
the PPO is responsible for receiving reports of suspicious transaction operations.107 
Then, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding between the KFIU 
and the PPO, the latter can, upon receiving these reports, refer them to the KFIU, 
the subsequent role of which is to investigate and gather available data and 
                                                
106 Masciandaro, D. and Volpicella, A., Economics and Politics in Designing Supervision: The Case 
of the FIUs Against Money Laundering, (BAFFI Center Research Paper Series No. 2014-156, 
Milan, 2014). 
107 Law No. 35 of 2002 for Combating Money Laundering Operations, Art. 5 
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information and then advise the PPO of its technical opinion based on its analysis 
of such data.108 The PPO uses the reports sent by the KFIU to launch the necessary 
investigations for the prosecution of all money laundering cases. Furthermore, 
according to a representative from the PPO, 
the PPO considers it possible to take measures to trace and 
confiscate belongings and assets used or derived from money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, should such measures be 
requested by foreign judicial authorities in accordance with judicial-
cooperation agreements or on the basis of reciprocity with friendly 
States until a judicial ruling is issued.109 
However, the overall role and operation of the KFIU is not efficient, since the 
PPO has the central role in receiving the STRs from the financial institutions and 
then giving the KFIU particular powers to review each report. 
5.3.3.4 Regulating the Non-Profit Organisations in Kuwait 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MOSAL) has the responsibility to 
supervise and provide registration certificates and licenses to organisations, such as 
Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), operating within the state of Kuwait. Before 9/11 
‘some of the NPOs in Kuwait have been subject to misuse by terrorist financers’ 
said a government official.110 As a result, after 9/11 MOSAL started to control the 
operation of NPOs and carries out regular investigations into their activities to 
measure their compliance with the law and regulations. 
Even before the incidents of 9/11, MOSAL issued resolution No. 101 of 1995, 
which included rules to regulate collections by charities by forcing those who are 
interested in collecting for charities to obtain permission from the MOSAL.111 This 
ensures adherence to the purpose of the charity and that the money collected will be 
                                                
108 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume II 
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes “Kuwait”, (Washington D.C.: March 2009), 323. 
109 Interview with P.P.1. 
110 Interview with G.O.1. 
111 UNODC, ‘Study on anti-terrorism legislation in the Arab Gulf States and Yemen’, (Arabic 
Version), (2009) United Nations, 100-101, Available at: 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Study_CT_Legislation_Gulf_Yemen/Ara
bic.pdf> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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used for the purposes that have been previously specified. Nevertheless, MOSAL 
did not monitor the application of resolution No. 101 of 1995 effectively. In fact, 
after 9/11, inspections showed that there were some money boxes 
and kiosks spread around the country, which intended to collect 
money, clothes, furniture and so on, that did not obtained any 
permission from the MOSAL.112 
Following the incidents of September 11, 2001, the Kuwaiti Council of 
Ministers, on 7 October 2001, issued decree No. 867, which set up a ministerial 
committee co-chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to review and implement the recommendations and proposals made by the 
Council of Ministers at its meeting number 2001/36. It also established the 
‘Supreme Committee for the Control of Charitable Work’, under the chairmanship 
of the MOSAL, to act as a permanent authority for the control of charitable work 
and to define policies and regulations for the collection of donations. 113 
Furthermore, the Council of Ministers issued decree No. 868 of 2001 regarding 
transactions of public welfare charities and foundations that provide charitable 
work. Article 2 of this decree states: ‘It is prohibited for all local banks and Kuwait 
Finance House to open bank accounts or to conduct any foreign remittances for 
charity organisations and foundations unless these organisations and foundations 
were licensed to collect money and to perform foreign remittances’. Furthermore, 
paragraph 2 of the article prohibits these actions as well within money exchange 
companies.114 
All NPOs in Kuwait were originally supervised by the Department of Non-
Profit Organisations (DNPO), now known as the Department of Associations. 
However, on 5 August 2002, MOSAL introduced the ‘Department of Charities and 
Foundations (DOCF)’ pursuant of the ministerial decree No. 104 of 2002. The 
                                                
112 Interview with N.O.S.2. 
113 UN Security Council (CTC), ‘Kuwait’s Report to the CTC (2002)’, Security Council, Distr.: 
General, 6 August 2002, S/2002/886, Letter dated 17 July 2002 from the Permanent Representative 
of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, online: UN Security 
Council, Counter Terrorism Committee, 6 August 2002. 
114 UNODC, ‘Study on anti-terrorism legislation in the Arab Gulf States and Yemen’, (Arabic 
Version), (2009) United Nations, 100-101, Available at: 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Study_CT_Legislation_Gulf_Yemen/Ara
bic.pdf> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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DOCF’s primary duties are to continue receiving applications for registration, 
monitoring, inspecting, and following up of all of the charitable works in Kuwait 
and to supervise all currently licensed and future NPOs with a charitable purpose 
(charities) and foundations to ensure that they observe their obligations under 
Kuwaiti laws. The previous department, the DNPO, continues its role in 
supervising NPOs that are not authorised to conduct charitable activities 
(associations).115 
Table 5.3: Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) Supervision 
 
 
According to the authorities, associations and foundations are not allowed to 
collect donations, yet they can receive funds from companies and persons. In 
addition, they cannot transfer funds abroad or conduct international projects. On the 
                                                
115 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 179. Also Interview with G.O.1. 
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Law 24/1962 
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and 12/1993  
Nonprofit 
Organisations/
Associations (88) 
(Only non-charities or 
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funds, prohibited from 
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Only 5 are 
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abroad 
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Decrees 48 and 
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Number of 
Foundations 
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85 
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other hands, charities can collect funds (including Zakat), and, if authorised, they 
can transfer funds abroad.116 
The 2003 Kuwait report to the CTC indicated that the local banks send out 
monthly reports to the CBK on all money transactions performed by charitable 
organisations and foundations that are allowed to carry out charitable work in 
Kuwait. These reports also have to be audited and certified by foreign accounts 
auditors. ‘Currently, eleven charities are authorised by MOSAL, only 5 of which 
are authorised to transfer funds abroad.’117 MFA works closely with MOSAL to 
supervise and monitor charity activities conducted abroad by coordinating with the 
recipient governments and by steering visits to the projects overseas funded by 
Kuwaiti charities.118 In addition, MOSAL demands that ‘all transfers of funds 
abroad be made between authorized charity officials after getting an approval from 
the MFA.’119 
According to the authorities, the collection of public donations (including 
Zakat) is forbidden unless it is authorised by MOSAL. In addition, a representative 
from MOSAL stated that 
the Ministry encourages the authorised charities to collect their 
donations/or Zakat by K-net or electronic bank transfer instead of 
cash. However, if it happened that the donor wanted to pay by cash, 
a personal detail together with a photocopy of his/her Civil ID or any 
official document should be retained and the charities should give 
the donor a receipt of his/her donation.120 
Furthermore, money boxes and kiosks that are intended to collect for charities 
are prohibited, except those that are licensed by MOSAL for that purpose. MOSAL 
performs field inspections for charitable activity and detects violations of the Law 
of Regulation Licensing for collecting money and Law No. 24 of 1962 that is 
related to clubs and public welfare associations. In addition, a Committee for Field 
                                                
116 Ibid. 
117 Interview with G.O.1. 
118 Ibid. 
119 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 181. Also Interview with G.O.1. 
120 Interview with G.O.1. 
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Inspection of Charitable Work was formed inside Kuwait pursuant to the resolution 
of the Undersecretary of MOSAL No. 2724 on July 23, 2003. This Committee 
constitutes representatives of the MOI, the MOCI, and the Municipality of 
Kuwait.121 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Information is responsible for monitoring 
advertisement by the public welfare associations and committees that collect charity 
from the public to ensure that these charities are used for the purposes previously 
specified. Finally, the MOI and the Ministry of Information prohibit advertisements 
and commercials that advertise the collection of charities in visual, audible, or 
printed media communications unless permission is first obtained from MOSAL 
and after particular procedures are followed with regard to each advertisement.122 
In addition to the abovementioned charities, associations and foundations, 
there are also two charities, the Kuwait Zakat House and the Public Secretary of 
Awkaf, that are supervised by the State Audit Bureau. On January 16, 1982, Law 
No. 5 of 1982 was issued to establish the Kuwait Zakat House as an independent 
government body with an independent budget. The ultimate aim of the Kuwait 
Zakat House is to collect Zakat and donations and spend them domestically and 
abroad.123 The Public Secretary of Awkaf, also known as the Kuwait Awqaf Public 
Foundation, was established by an Amiri Decree No. 257 of 1993 to practice the 
call for waqf124 and to conduct all matters related to its affairs. For the most part, 
these two charities follow the same law and regulations as the normal charities. 
5.3.4 Freezing Terrorist Assets in Kuwait 
Before June 2013, there was no legal framework or basis that effectively 
implemented UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373. However, there was 
                                                
121 UN Security Council (CTC), ‘Kuwait’s Report to the CTC (2004)’, Security Council, Distr.: 
General, 31 December 2004, S/2004/945, Letter dated 17 December 2004 from the Chargé 
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman 
of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, online: UN Security Council, Counter Terrorism Committee, 
31 December 2004. 
122 Ibid. 
123 See Kuwait Zakat House, ‘About Us’, Available at: 
<https://www.zakathouse.org.kw/AxCMSwebLive/en_about.cms> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
124 A waqf, also spelled wakf, is, under the context of 'sadaqah', an inalienable religious endowment 
in Islamic law, typically donating a building or plot of land or even cash for Muslim religious or 
charitable purposes. The donated assets are held by a charitable trust. The grant is known as 
mushrut-ul-khidmat, while a person making such dedication is known as wakif. 
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an ‘informal way’, which was not provided under any legal text, of implementing 
them. According to representatives from the CBK, the MOF and MOCI: 
We coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which provides 
us with an updated list of the designated individuals and entities, 
and, upon the receiving of the lists, we issue instructions to all 
financial sectors under our supervision to comply with the UN 
resolutions.125 
As for the implementation of Resolution 1267, in its report of December 2001 
to the Counter Terrorism Committee, the government of Kuwait stated: 
The Central Bank has issued a number of circulars on this subject, 
such as that dated December 1999 concerning the freezing of assets 
and other financial resources directly or indirectly connected with 
the Taliban movement, adopted pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1267 (1999).126 
In addition, according to a representative from the CBK: 
Articles 21 and 71 of the CBK Law No. 32 of 1968 give the 
Governor of the CBK the authority to issue the necessary regulations 
and instructions, including those related to AML/CFT, to all 
Financial Institutions under its supervision (namely banks, 
investment companies and exchange companies), and, if the 
mentioned Financial Institutions failed to comply or violate the CBK 
instructions and regulations issued to it by the Governor of the CBK, 
such FIs may be sanctioned by warnings, imposing financial 
penalties, temporarily suspending some or all its operations, and 
                                                
125 Interview with G.O.2, G.O.6 and G.O.10 
126 UN Security Council (CTC), ‘Kuwait’s Report to the CTC (2001)’, Security Council, Distr.: 
General, 21 December 2001, S/2001/1221, Letter dated 19 December 2001 from the Chargé 
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman 
of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning 
counter-terrorism, online: UN Security Council, Counter Terrorism Committee, 21 December 2001. 
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such penalty may reach to a withdrawal of and deleting from the 
Register of Banks.127 
In its Instructions No. (2/BS/92/2002) regarding Combating Money 
Laundering Operations and the Financing of Terrorism, the CBK ordered all local 
banks to give special attention to the circulars sent to them by the CBK related to 
freezing assets, accounts and financial activities belonging to individuals and 
entities listed in the UN Consolidated List.128 However, it did not define the 
methods or formal ways of reporting back to the CBK, and the instructions were 
addressed only to banks and not to other FIs. 
Not until October 19, 2004, did the CBK issue a circular regarding the 
unification of the form of replying to the CBK concerning the freezing of the assets 
and funds of some entities and individuals. It ordered all local banks, investment 
companies and exchange companies to report to the CBK within five working days 
from the date of receiving the respective circular sent to them with regard to 
freezing the assets and funds of those whose names appeared in the Consolidated 
List. In addition, the circular expresses the CBK’s desire to unify the form of letters 
received from the FIs under its supervision with regard to this issue.129 However, 
none of the names and entities listed on the UN Consolidated List at that time 
included any Kuwaiti citizens, and none of the names and entities listed had any 
accounts in Kuwait. Therefore, the assessment of the effectiveness of the above 
mentioned ‘informal way’ was not questioned. 
In 2004, the first Kuwaiti citizen, Sulaiman Abo Ghaith, was listed as being 
associated with Al-Qaida.130 However, he has not returned to Kuwait since he 
joined Al-Qaida, and, after the incidents of 9/11, the government of Kuwait 
withdrew Abo Ghaith’s citizenship.131 Abo Ghaith was captured in Jordan on 
                                                
127 Interview with G.O.8. 
128 Instructions No. (2/BS/92/2002) of combating money laundering operations and terror financing 
transactions. 
129 Circular dated 19/10/2004 regarding the unification of the form of replying to Central Bank’s 
concerning the freezing of the assets and funds of some entities and individuals. 
130 Abo Ghaith was listed on 16 January 2004 pursuant to paragraph 1 and 2 of resolution 1390 
(2002), Available at: <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI15404E.shtml > accessed 1st 
Dec. 2014 
131 See Chapter Two for Further information. See also Joscelyn, T., ‘Report: New leader of al Qaeda 
network in Iran named’, The Long War Journal, Available at: 
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March 7, 2013 and was subsequently extradited to the United Sates. On September 
23, 2014, Abo Ghaith was sentenced to life in prison.132 
In February 2005, just after one month after the incidents of the Peninsula 
Lions in Kuwait, Muhsin Al-Fadhli133 became the second Kuwaiti citizen listed as 
being associated with Al-Qaida.134 However, Al-Fadhli did not have any bank 
accounts in Kuwait. On September 23, 2014, Al-Fadhli was believed to be killed by 
an American strike during the military intervention in Syria. However, on 
November 1, 2014, CNN reported that American officials believed that Muhsin Al-
Fadhli ‘almost certainly survived the strikes’.135 
In July 2006, The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US 
Department of the Treasury designated three Kuwaiti citizens, Mubarak Al-Bathali, 
Hamid Al-Ali and Jaber Al-Jalahmah, as being associated with Al-Qaida.136 
Nevertheless, since there was no legal basis for freezing the assets of the designated 
persons in Kuwait, Kuwait’s ability to implement the OFAC request successfully 
was hampered. Thus, when the Kuwait Finance House (KFH) froze Al-Bathali’s 
bank account based on the OFAC listing, he brought a legal action before the 
Kuwaiti court, which fined the KFH bank 500 KD for breaching the account 
contract, and forced the bank to reactivate his account.137 
                                                                                                                                   
<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/report_new_leader_of.php> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. 
132 ‘Sulaiman Abu Ghaith sentenced to life in prison’, BBC, (US & Canada, 23 September 2014), 
Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29331395> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
133 See Chapter Two for further information about Muhsin Al-Fadhli and the Peninsula Lions in 
Kuwait. 
134 Al-Fadhli was listed on 17 February 2005 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 16 of resolution 1526 
(2004), Available at: <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI18405E.shtml > accessed 1st 
Dec. 2014. 
135 Cruickshank, P., ‘French bomb-maker with Khorasan radicalized over 'several years'’, CNN, 
(U.S., 1 November 2014) Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/31/world/meast/syria-
khorasan-bomb-maker/> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
136 U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, Treasury Designations Target Terrorist Facilitators, (7 
December 2006), Available at: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp191.aspx> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. See also Pollock, D. and Jacobson, M., 
‘Blacklisting Terrorism Supporters in Kuwait’, (25 January 2008), The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, PolicyWatch #1333, Available at: 
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2709> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
137 ‘Verdict in favour of Al-Bathali against Kuwait Finance House’, Alaan, (29 April 2008), 
Available at: <http://www.alaan.cc/pagedetails.asp?cid=48&nid=12761> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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In January 2008, the UN’s Consolidated List designated Al-Bathali, Al-Ali and 
Al-Jalahmah as being associated with Al-Qaida.138 As a result, on May 7, 2008, the 
CBK issued a circular to all financial sectors under its supervision to freeze without 
delay their financial assets, to deny them from opening bank accounts and to deny 
them from dealing in any financial activities.139 
As for Resolution 1373, the authorities have stated that the government of 
Kuwait is using the same ‘informal way’ discussed above. It seems from their 
responses that they do not recognise the differences between Resolutions 1267 and 
1373 discussed in section I of this chapter. In fact, Resolution 1373 gives the 
member states the duties to identify and designate, based on concrete evidence, 
those individuals and entities that are associated with terrorism and to freeze 
without delay their assets and funds. 
Moreover, according to a representative from the MOI with regard of the 
availability of any lists of designated individuals or entities: 
Of course, all countries have lists of individuals and groups that are 
suspected to or are actually involved in crimes related to terrorism 
and terrorist financing. However, such lists are always kept in secret, 
and if there is any evidence of committing such crime then a 
criminal suit/case will be lunched against them.140 
However, it seems that the lists that he mentioned relate to general security 
intelligence lists and do not relate to individuals and entities associated with 
terrorist financers. 
                                                
138 Al-Bathali, Al-Ali and Al-Jalahmah were listed on 16 January 2008 pursuant to paragraph 1 and 
12 of resolution 1735 (2006), Available at: 
<http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI23808E.shtml> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. Also see 
Chapter Two for further information about the abovementioned individuals. 
139 Circulated to all local banks, investment companies and exchange companies, (7 May 2008), 
Circulated no. 1/105/5494 [Confidential], disclosed and Available at: 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CK-k7zap9NY> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
140 Interview with P.O.1. 
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5.3.5 Kuwait’s Compliance with the 40 + 9 FATF Recommendations and the 
Effectiveness of AML/CFT System in Kuwait 
The techniques employed in money laundering and terrorism financing have 
significantly altered the response and effectiveness of the counter-measures 
deployed in the past. For instance, the FATF noted that money laundering and 
terrorism financing in the last decade developed into a relatively complex process 
that employed a number of sophisticated techniques. Accordingly, modern money 
laundering has used professional advice on how to propagate the illegal process and 
has used legal persons in a bid to disguise the illegitimate possession of property 
and money. 
Because of these challenges, it was inevitable that new measures would be 
developed that would combat money laundering and suppress terrorism financing. 
In addition, the FATF XI Special Recommendations propose a set of feasible 
measures necessary and important to combat terrorism financing through 
individuals and/or organisations. In this regard, countries are required to implement 
the FATF recommendations, which set an international standard, to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing. Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), which is itself a member of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF). Furthermore, Kuwait is a member of the Middle East and North Africa 
Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF)-style regional body. 
On February 16, 2012, the new revision of the Forty Recommendations was 
developed by the FATF for adoption.141 Though this was not the first revision, it 
was the most effective revision, since it incorporated the rules against money 
laundering and terrorism financing. This section of the paper focuses on the 40142 + 
9143 FATF recommendations of 2003 as the basis for compliance with Kuwait’s 
domestic law and measures. In addition, this section implements the results of the 
detailed assessment by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) about Kuwait on 
                                                
141 See the last revision of the FATF Recommendations 2012, Available at: <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> accessed 1st 
Dec. 2014. 
142 Financial Action Task Force, FATF 40 Recommendations, October 2003 (incorporating all 
subsequent amendments until October 2004), (FATF/OECD: Paris, 2010). 
143 Financial Action Task Force, FATF IX Special Recommendations, October 2001 (incorporating 
all subsequent amendments until February 2008), (FATF/OECD: Paris, 2010). 
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anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism in 2011,144 and 
evaluates the development of the government of Kuwait since then. 
In this section, an overview of the 40 + 9 recommendations and Kuwait’s 
compliance with the recommendations prior to June 2013 will be discussed. For 
simplicity, the letter ‘R’ shall be used to represent recommendation and the letter 
‘n’ will be used to represent the recommendation number. Therefore R1 represents 
recommendation 1 and so on. 
5.3.5.1 Kuwait Compliance with 40 Recommendations before June 2013 
Recommendations 1 and 2 (Now Recommendation 3) 
R1 requires that all activities falling under money laundering be criminalised. 
A further requirement put forward in R1 is that the authorities are recommended to 
undertake money laundering prosecutions effectively irrespective of whether any 
prior conviction were obtained. In addition, R1 requires that all forms of terrorist 
financing and smuggling of immigrants be included in the list of predicate offences 
with regard to money laundering in the domestic law. In terms of compliance, an 
evaluation by the IMF of Kuwait’s law prior to 2013 revealed that compliance with 
the requirements stipulated in R1 were not fully achieved. For instance, terrorist 
financing and immigrant smuggling were not included in the list of predicate 
offences with regard to money laundering. In addition, there was a significant 
reluctance to prosecute money laundering without the initial conviction of the 
corresponding predicate offences.145 
In addition, all authorities are recommended to ensure that criminal liability is 
extended to legal persons and not just to MOCI-licensed companies. An evaluation 
by the IMF of compliance revealed that compliance with R2 was not fully achieved 
before 2013. For instance, it was found that criminal liability was applied only to 
MOCI registered companies, leaving out other legal persons, such as NPOs and 
public stockholding companies. As a result, only the individual persons who act as 
                                                
144 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011). 
145 Ibid, 33-41. 
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managers of the NPO can be charged with money laundering crimes, and not the 
NPO itself, which limits the purposes of this recommendation.146 
Recommendation 3 (Now Recommendation 4) 
This recommendation lays down the guidelines for freezing, seizing and 
confiscating finances and related assets having a link to terrorism and money 
laundering. In reference to Kuwait’s domestic law prior to 2013, R3 is supported by 
article 78 of the Penal Code and article 6 of Law No. 35 of 2002 for Combating 
Money Laundering Operations that require that all crime related instrumentalities, 
money and proceeds be confiscated. Dealing with property liable to confiscation is 
regulated by provisional measures stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Code 
(CPC).147 In articles 78 to 97, the CPC provides a channel for the PPO to locate and 
seize all properties that are subject to confiscation. According to the law, any 
person who deals with the properties due for confiscation will be found guilty and 
sentenced to imprisonment.148 Even after such individuals have been sentenced to 
imprisonment, the corresponding properties remain seized until all of the legal 
matters are addressed and fully settled.149 Ultimately, R3 calls for the confiscation 
of properties related to terrorist financing and money laundering. In addition, R3 
calls for an effective implementation of the anti-money laundering regime that 
recommends confiscation of all criminal assets and those related to predicate 
offences. 
Based on the level of incorporation of R3 in Kuwait prior to 2013, most of the 
money laundering requirements were met. However, as mentioned above, terrorism 
financing was not clearly defined as a crime in Kuwait’s domestic law prior to June 
2013. Thus, the implementation of R3 requirements related to the crime of terrorist 
financing has faced ‘a significant level of difficulty in practice due to the absence of 
criminalisation of terrorism financing’150 as discussed earlier. In addition, the 
confiscation process constantly experienced difficulties due to the lack of sufficient 
                                                
146 Ibid. 
147 Law No. 17 of 1960 promulgating the Criminal Procedure Code. 
148 Law No. 35 of 2002 for Combating Money Laundering Operations. Also Article 1(f) of 
Resolution 9 of 2005 for “Procedures and Rules Required to Execute Provisions of Law 35/2002 for 
Combating Money Laundering”. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Interview with N.O.S.2 and N.O.S.5 
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evidence and effectiveness of the framework of confiscation with regard to the 
terrorist financing offense. Thus, making the implementation of R3 with regard to 
terrorist financing ineffective. 
Recommendation 4 (Now Recommendation 9) 
This recommendation addresses matters related to the confidentiality and 
secrecy of financial institutions, including banks, investment companies, exchange 
companies and brokerage companies. According to the CBK Law No. 32 of 1968, 
articles 78 and 82, and Resolution 113 adopted in 1992, access to financial 
information, including those related to money laundering or terrorist financing, can 
be granted. However, article 85(bis) of the CBK law demands that nobody should 
disclose any piece of information to another entity except the CBK itself. Also, the 
CBK has been provided with the authority to investigate investment records from 
any investment company and to ask for information from any exchange companies 
operating within Kuwait.151 
In addition, R4 requires the CBK to share information with foreign 
counterparts to provide an efficient mechanism through which terrorist financing 
and money laundering can be combated effectively. 
Based on Kuwait’s law, R4 could not be complied with fully prior to 2013, 
because the financial law governing the CBK, specifically articles 78 and 82(3) of 
the CBK law, did not allow information to be shared or regulatory cooperation 
outside of consolidated supervision.152 As such, the requirements put forward in the 
context of R4 could not be accomplished without amending the existing domestic 
law. 
Recommendation 5 (Now Recommendation 10) 
This recommendation addresses matters related to the due diligence of 
customers during execution of financial transactions both locally and 
internationally. 
                                                
151 The CBK Law No. 32 of 1968, Article 78(b) 
152 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 96. 
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According to the IMF, Kuwait’s incorporation of R5 requirements prior to 
2013 lacked a well-defined and explicit obligation for customer due diligence on 
different occasions, such as, for instance, when executing occasional transactions, 
such as a wire transfer in accordance with Special Recommendation 7 (Now 
Recommendation 16), in cases when money laundering or terrorist financing is 
suspected regardless of exemptions, and in cases when the FI develops doubts 
concerning the adequacy or veracity or of financial information provided by the 
customer.153 
The IMF detailed assessment of 2011 found that the means of identifying the 
identity of persons claiming to act on behalf of a legal person and verifying their 
information were lacking. Such persons should be identified by investigating all 
transactions carried out by persons who purport to be acting on behalf of legal 
persons. According to the IMF, Kuwait law or regulations had not fully developed a 
platform for identifying persons, who transact on behalf of another, especially 
online, prior to 2013.154 
In addition, under Article 3 of the Ministerial Resolution 9/2005 issued by the 
MOF for implementing Law No. 35 of 2002 for Combating Money Laundering 
Operations requires all FIs to verify the identity of the customer and the actual 
beneficiary of transactions of 3000 KD and above. This, however, limits the 
application of CDD measures for transactions under 3000 KD. An overview of the 
situation before 2013 revealed that R5 was not implemented effectively because of 
two main challenges. First, there was a lack of sufficient supportive evidence in 
applying the CDD, especially with regard to exchange companies, brokerage 
companies and insurance companies. Secondly, potentially risky firms, including 
insurance companies, brokerage companies and exchange organisations, were 
poorly supervised and controlled. 
Recommendation 6 (Now Recommendation 12) 
This recommendation focuses on politically exposed persons (PEPs). An 
investigation on the Kuwait’s legal framework with regard to PEPs showed that 
                                                
153 Ibid, 81-83. 
154 Ibid. 
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there lacked a clear definition of the term PEP until 2009. As a result, no 
regulations were imposed on financial institutions, such as banks and investment 
companies among others in this regard. In addition, the law lacked clear 
requirements for banks and investment companies to carry out customer due 
diligence assessments and to launch relevant measures in accordance with the law. 
However, in 2009, the CBK issued its instruction No. (2/BS, IBS, RS, 
IRS/242/2009) in respect of dealing with politicians – non-residents in Kuwait, 
which for the first time defined those politicians, representing risk.155 
Recommendation 7 (Now: Recommendation 13) 
This recommendation seeks to govern cross-border correspondent banking 
matters in accordance with terrorist financing and money laundering regulations. 
Based on the report by the IMF, compliance with the R7 requirements were not 
fully achieved. 156  However, Kuwait showed great interest in 2010, when it 
incorporated some elements of terrorist financing in the guidelines for running 
financial institutions.157 Nevertheless, there lacked the necessary regulations for 
banks, brokerage companies and exchange companies to collect enough 
information concerning respondent institutions that could enable the authority to 
establish whether the institutions were associated with money laundering or other 
forms of regulatory actions or not. Also, most financial institutions, especially 
banks, had not satisfied the requirement of record keeping. This made it difficult to 
obtain past records that might have been important for investigations.158 
Recommendation 8 (Now: Recommendation 15) 
Recommendation 8 addresses the guidelines for successful utilisation of new 
technologies in the financial sector and the use of other activities that are not face-
                                                
155 See Circular No. (2/BS, IBS, IS, IIS/242/2009) on the manner of dealing with political persons 
non-resident in Kuwait, and who represent risks in the area of AML/CFT. See also Instructions local 
banks and investment companies in respect of dealing with politicians – non-residents in Kuwait – 
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156 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 85-87. 
157 Circular No. (2/BS,IBS/300/2010) regarding the amendment of certain clauses of the instructions 
No. (2/BS/92/2002) regarding AML/CFT. 
158 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 85-87. 
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to-face. The use of the Internet to transfer money through credit cards, wire 
transfers and other types of online money transfers have complicated the process of 
controlling money laundering and terrorist financing. As such, relevant regulations, 
such as those suggested in recommendation 8, are worthy of consideration. 
However, Kuwait did not fully incorporate R8 requirements prior to 2013.159 For 
instance, there were no feasible guidelines that could govern the misuse of new 
technologies in the transfer of money both locally and internationally. In addition, 
the law did not stipulate any requirements for financial institutions regarding the 
misuse of financial activities that are not face-to-face leading to execution of legal 
transactions.160 
Recommendations 9, 10 and 11 (Now Recommendations 17 and 11) 
Recommendations 9, 10 and 11 addressed financial matters related to third 
parties, record keeping and unusual transactions. Prior to 2013, Kuwait’s law did 
not regulate the use of third parties by financial institutions to perform customer 
due diligence measures in accordance to the requirements stipulated under R9. 
Secondly, the law did not regulate the storage of identification data for the 
termination of an account or business relationship, because the CBK instructions 
only required financial institutions to retain such information for transaction for 
five years.161 For instance, once an account was terminated for any reason, the 
details were deleted from the institution’s database to avoid overburdening the 
system with redundant data. Finally, the law lacked the necessary regulations for 
the control of insurance companies, brokerage companies, and exchange companies 
against unusual transactions, and there were no obligation on them to provide 
information on a timely basis to the competent authorities.162 
                                                
159 Ibid, 87-88. 
160 Ibid. 
161 See Instructions No. (2/BS/92/2002) regarding Combating Money Laundering Operations and the 
Financing of Terrorism. 
162 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 98-109. 
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Recommendations 12, 13, 14 and 15 (Now Recommendations 22, 20, 21 and 18 
respectively) 
Recommendation 12 applies the requirements stipulated under R5, R6 and R8 
– R11 to Designate Non-Financial Business and Professions (DNFBPs). As such, 
its compliance is defined by the corresponding compliance with R5, R6, 8, R9, 
R10, R11, R13, R14 and R15 that address issues related to reporting suspicious 
transactions, protecting reported suspicious transactions, and internal audit and 
compliance respectively. 
Referring to R13, Kuwait’s law prior to 2013 did not provide any regulations 
that prohibited the execution of suspicious transactions within the state. 
Furthermore, failed transactions related to terrorist financing were not regulated 
under the law due to the lack of an effective implementation of requirements for 
suspicious transactions.163 
Referring to R14, the law did not prohibit existing financial institutions, 
including investment companies, brokerage companies and exchange companies, 
from leaking or disclosing reported information to unauthorised bodies.164 In fact, 
the institutions were not supposed to inform any other authoritative or non-
authoritative bodies that a specific suspicious transaction was reported to the CBK. 
In relation to the requirements of R15 about internal audit, control and 
compliance, the domestic law did not provide the necessary regulations for some 
financial institutions, such as brokerage companies, with regard to the maintenance 
of internal policies and procedures geared toward the prevention or suppression of 
terrorism financing.165 Furthermore, no law sought to govern the hiring of new 
workers in sensitive financial institutions, such as banks and investment 
companies.166 According to R15, such financial institutions are required to employ 
proper worker-screening techniques before hiring new employees, because the 
institutions could otherwise hire the accomplices of terrorists, resulting in serious 
difficulties in the control of terrorist financing and money laundering within the 
institutions. 
                                                
163 Ibid, 109-111. 
164 Ibid, 112-113. 
165 Ibid, 118-123. 
166 Ibid. 
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Recommendations 16 – 21 (Now Recommendations 23, 35, 26 and 19 respectively) 
Recommendation 16 applies the requirements stipulated under R13 – R15 and 
R21 to DNFBPs. In terms of compliance with regard to R 13, there lacked the 
necessary requirements in Kuwaiti law that could regulate DNFBPs on submission 
of reports to the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU). In addition, in accordance with 
R14, no regulatory measures, other than suspicious transaction detection, were put 
in place to ensure that all financial institutions maintain proper internal policies and 
procedures aimed at preventing or suppressing terrorist financing and money 
laundering.167 
Recommendation 17 addresses the imposition of sanctions on various financial 
institutions. However, the level of compliance of Kuwait with this recommendation 
was relatively low. For instance, the law lacked a consistent definition and 
designation of authorities mandated to impose sanctions on exchange organisations 
and insurance companies that failed to comply with the anti-money laundering 
requirements as stated in the law. Finally, agencies in the security sector, MOCI 
and KSE have not been effective in their roles, which contributed much to the low 
level of compliance with the requirements of R17.168 
In reference to Kuwait law, R18 addresses the establishment of shell banks in 
the country. According to R18, Kuwait should erect the necessary legal provisions 
that seek to prevent the establishment and operation shell banks within the state. 
However, the IMF assessment to Kuwaiti law before June 2013 showed that it was 
lacked the necessary legal provisions that could govern the physical presence of 
banks in the country in accordance with the requirements provided by FATF.169 
Finally, only banks170 and investment171 companies are prohibited from entering 
into, or continuing, correspondent banking relationships with shell banks, leaving 
exchange companies without any prohibition.  
                                                
167 Ibid, 168-171. 
168 Ibid, 161. 
169 Ibid, 129-131. 
170 Article 6.1 of the CBK Instructions No. (2/BS/92/2002) regarding Combating Money Laundering 
Operations and the Financing of Terrorism 
171 Article 13 of the CBK Instructions No. (2/IS-IIS/180/2005) For all local investment companies 
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R19 addresses forms of reporting other than those addressed in R13 (reporting 
of currency transactions above a threshold). Based on the IMF report, compliance 
with all of the requirements stipulated in R19 was achieved. For example, section 
20 of the CBK Instructions to banks, section 12 of CBK Instructions to investment 
companies and section 13 of CBK Instructions to exchange companies require them 
to provide the CBK with data, using an online system and on a daily basis, on any 
cash transactions equal to or above 3000 KD or its equivalent in foreign currency. 
The CBK Instructions also prohibit all financial institutions, except banks, to accept 
cash transactions above 3000 KD.172 
In accordance with the requirements stipulated under R20 concerning secure 
transactions, R5, R6, R8 – R11, R13 – R15 and R17’s application to DNFBPs 
requirements have not been fully satisfied. R20 requires a reduction in reliance on 
cash transactions, since they are relatively insecure to handle. In addition, cash 
payments have been subject to misuse by providing a non-traceable method of 
payment. Kuwait has developed different measures to reduce cash payments within 
the economy, but this was not fully assimilated into the financial system prior to 
2013 because of the very high reliance on cash among the large expatriate 
community in the country.173 
Recommendation 21 required financial institutions to apply enhanced due 
diligence measures to business relationships and transactions, with the ability to 
apply appropriates countermeasures, and to pay special attention to terrorist 
financing and money laundering when dealing with natural and legal persons, and 
financial institutions from countries listed in the high-risk regions. Based on the 
FATF definition, high-risk countries are those that do not apply the 
recommendations put forward by FATF. According to the IMF, prior to 2013, 
Kuwait did not apply any requirements for exchange companies, insurance 
companies, exchange organisations, or brokerage companies regarding business 
relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons, and financial 
institutions from countries that labelled by the FATF as high-risk countries. Kuwait 
                                                
172 Instructions No. (2/BS/92/2002) of combating money laundering operations and terror financing 
transactions. 
173 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 175-176. 
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also did not launch appropriate measures to help financial institutions to identify 
non-compliant countries and countries whose anti-money laundering laws were 
compromised. Finally, Kuwait did not apply appropriate measures to countries that 
listed as high-risk countries.174 
Recommendations 22 – 26 (Now Recommendations 18, 26, 28, 34 and 29 
respectively) 
Recommendation 22 addresses the requirements of subsidiaries and foreign 
branches of financial institutions in Kuwait with respect to anti money laundering 
measures put forward by FATF. In terms of compliance, Kuwait did not stipulate 
the necessary requirements and regulations to ensure that subsidiaries of financial 
institutions located in other countries followed the requirements put forward by 
FATF.175 Since some countries may fall under the high-risk regime, failure to 
incorporate proper restrictive measures might result in poor coordination and 
increased perpetuation of terrorist financing and money laundering offences 
without the knowledge of government. 
Recommendation 23 focuses on monitoring, regulating and supervising 
financial institutions to prevent the commission of terrorist financing and money 
laundering offences. Kuwait’s law lacked a clear basis for the supervision of 
insurance companies with the requirements of anti-money laundering and terrorism 
financing within the state. In addition, no clear regulatory measures were 
undertaken to prevent criminals from having an ownership interest in Kuwait’s 
financial institutions. 176  Supervision and control of the conduct of financial 
institutions is the task of authoritative bodies, such as the CBK, the KSE and 
MOCI. 
Recommendation 24 focuses on the regulation, monitoring and supervision of 
DNFBPs. Assessment has shown that compliance with R24 was not achieved prior 
to 2013. For instance, DNFBPs in Kuwait were not subject to effective monitoring 
systems that ensured improved compliance with the existing anti-money laundering 
and terrorist financing requirements. The noncompliant behaviour could be 
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attributed to the lack of a necessary legal framework that would bring all 
stakeholders together in favour of R24 requirements. 
Referring to R25 that focuses on feedback and guidelines put forward and 
provided by supervisory authorities, the recommendation was not fully satisfied 
prior to 2013. For instance, no guidelines were stipulated with respect to STRs and 
other reporting for brokerage companies, exchange organisations and insurance 
companies on the matters relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. In 
addition, the CBK did not erect a platform for reporting cases of suspicious 
transactions. Furthermore, there were lacks of sufficient and appropriate feedback 
from competent authorities.177 
Recommendation 26 focuses on the FIU and its role. Based on evaluation, 
compliance with R26 was not achieved prior to 2013, because Kuwait lacked the 
necessary legal platform for the establishment of Kuwait FIU and assigning it the 
appropriate functions and powers, as discussed earlier. Furthermore, there was 
insufficient strategic tactical analysis of suspicious transaction reports. According 
to the IMF, there was no periodic publication of terrorist financing and money 
laundering reports as well as insufficient protection of premises information.178 
Recommendations 27 – 32 (Now Recommendations 30, 31, 27, 2 and 33 
respectively) 
Recommendation 27 suggests the best operation procedures for law 
enforcement bodies. Evaluation has shown that compliance with R27 was partially 
achieved. It was found that Kuwait’s investigation authorities and prosecution 
bodies did not pursue money laundering cases satisfactorily in accordance with the 
requirements of R27 prior to 2013. In addition, insufficient evidence and lack of 
relevant statistical data were the main causes of the partial compliance state. 
Similarly, compliance with R28, which addresses the powers of competent 
authorities, was only partially achieved. Also, the challenges that faced R28 were 
similar to those of R27.179 
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Recommendation 29 covers the requirements of supervisory authorities in the 
fight against money laundering in Kuwait. The main supervisory authorities that 
were affected by R29 include the KSE and MOCI. According to the research 
findings covered in this paper, this recommendation was not implemented prior to 
2013.  
It was found that MOCI lacked the necessary power to regulate exchange 
organisations and insurance companies in accordance with R29 requirements with 
regard to money laundering. In addition, the KSE lacked sufficient powers to 
control the existing financial institutions through a clear process.  
Other challenges that led to non-compliance with R29 include the low 
efficiency of operation of supervisory bodies, insufficient powers for the KSE and 
MOCI to impose sanctions whenever necessary, and a lack of clear evaluation 
procedures for MOCI on matters regarding money laundering and terrorist 
financing. 
Recommendation 30 takes care of training, resources and integrity of various 
bodies that are directly involved in the control of money laundering and terrorist 
financing activities. This recommendation was not implemented prior to 2013. One 
of the major causes of this noncompliance was the uneven allocation of available 
resources.180 Also, both professional and confidentiality standards in Kuwait were 
not developed to a level that could guarantee successfully combating terrorist 
financing and money laundering crimes within the state. This can be attributed to 
insufficient training of responsible personnel, including the Kuwait FIU, the KSE 
and MOCI on the control of terrorist financing and money laundering activities. 
Recommendation 31 focuses its attention toward national cooperation of all 
bodies responsible for the control of terrorist financing and money laundering 
offences. At the Kuwaiti national level, four competent authorities are specialised 
in combating money laundering and terrorism financing, namely the National 
Committee for Anti-Money Laundering and the Combating of Terrorist Financing, 
the Kuwait Financial Intelligence Unit, the Office of Combating Money Laundering 
Operations, and lastly the Department of Charitable Organizations. Evaluation by 
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the IMF has shown that compliance with this recommendation was only partially 
achieved. For instance, there lacked proper mechanisms that could enhance 
improved coordination of relevant authorities at the domestic level. As such, the 
poor development of strategies and implementation of existing policies become 
inevitable. Also, poor coordination resulted in inefficient implementation of 
UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.181 
Recommendation 32 addresses the importance of statistics as a way to 
accelerate the identification and successful investigation of terrorist financing and 
money laundering activities. Compliance with this recommendation was not 
achieved prior to 2013, because the existing authorities were not in a position to 
develop the relevant statistics needed to accelerate an efficient investigation of 
terrorist financing and money laundering activities within the state. Some of the 
statistics deemed highly important in this context included prosecution reports, 
investigation information, confiscated properties, convictions, on-site examinations 
and frozen property. Also lacking were governmental review reports concerning the 
effectiveness of an anti-money laundering system.182 
Recommendations 33 – 40 (Now Recommendations 24, 25, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 
respectively) 
Recommendation 33 suggests the necessary requirements for combating 
terrorist financing and money laundering through the access to beneficial ownership 
and control information related to legal persons. Compliance with this 
recommendation was not achieved prior to 2013. For instance, it was found that 
changes in ownership and corporate information took too long to be updated.183 
Consequently, adequate and reliable information of the current beneficial 
ownership and control of legal persons could not be obtained efficiently at any time 
by competent authorities involved in the fight against terrorist financing and money 
laundering activities. 
Based on Kuwait’s law, no legal entities, such as trusts, exist. As a result, 
Recommendation 34, which deals with the requirements of legal arrangements, did 
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not apply.184 Recommendation 35 suggests the requirements for the adoption of 
important conventions that seek to prevent or suppress terrorist financing and 
money laundering offences in all countries. Partial compliance with this 
recommendation was achieved prior to 2013, because Kuwait has not ratified the 
1999 ICSFT. In addition, the Palermo185 and Vienna186 Conventions have not been 
implemented satisfactorily. For instance, Kuwait’s law defines criminal liability as 
applicable only to natural persons and companies leaving out other legal persons. 
Furthermore, terrorist financing and the smuggling of migrants are not included as 
predicate offences for money laundering.187 
Recommendation 36 encourages Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) among 
countries as a strategy to suppress terrorist financing and money laundering 
internationally. The lack of MLA inhibits the investigation of terrorist financing 
and money laundering offences, since only the requests should emanate from 
competent judicial authorities can be investigated. This limit cooperation to 
requests issued from other competent authorities in another country. As such, MLA 
in Kuwait was provided at a relatively slow pace. On the other hand, compliance 
with R37, which addresses MLA and dual criminality matters, was not achieved 
prior to 2013. Kuwait’s national law lacked clarity with regard to the 
implementation of the requirements of paragraph 9 of article 18 of the Palermo 
Convention (providing assistance irrespective of dual criminality). In addition, the 
Kuwaiti authority stated that providing MLA is solely a discretionary decision by 
the requested State (Kuwait) on a case-by-case basis.188 
Kuwait has partially succeeded in its adoption of Recommendation 38, which 
delves into the importance of MLA with respect to the freezing and confiscation of 
property. However, there were no specific arrangements with other countries with 
regard to coordination of seizure and confiscation actions. In addition, there have 
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been serious constraints due to the lack of legislation in relation to value-based 
assets confiscation. 
Recommendation 39 addresses extradition of suspects involved in terrorist 
financing and money laundering within the state of Kuwait. However, evaluation 
by the IMF revealed that compliance with R39 was not fully achieved prior to 
2013, because there were two reasons that made it impossible to carry out the 
assessment of the efficiency of the state’s extradition system. First, since terrorism 
financing is not criminalised in Kuwait, the effectiveness of the extradition process 
was hampered especially where dual criminality remains a requirement for Kuwait. 
Second, there was only one case relating to money laundering.189 
Finally, R40 addresses on the other forms of international cooperation. 
However, Kuwait was partly complied with R40 since the KFIU was not able to 
exchange information with its counterparts due to the central role of the PPO, as 
discussed above. In addition, the international cooperation by the CBK is restricted 
by a prior approval from the PPO. Furthermore, there was a lack of clear gateways 
for international cooperation and sharing with regard to MOCI and the KSE.190 
5.3.5.2 Kuwait’s Compliance with the 9 Special Recommendations before June 
2013 
The 40 FATF recommendations of 2003 discussed in the previous section of 
this paper addressed mainly matters related to money laundering. However, some 
recommendations incorporated some elements of the control of terrorist financing. 
The FATF developed the 9 Special Recommendations (9 SRs) to address matters of 
terrorism financing more deeply.191 The main purpose of the 9 SRs, however, is not 
to replace the 40 recommendations (40 R) but to work in conjunction with each 
other for the sole purpose of strengthening the fight against terrorists and their 
financers. 
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The 9 SRs were created by FATF in October 2001. The recommendations 
propose a set of feasible measures deemed necessary and important as tools with 
which to combat terrorism financing through individuals and/or organisations. The 
9 SRs can be divided into two broad categories depending on the desired function. 
The first category consists of recommendations that seek to establish a platform for 
detecting and convicting terrorist financing offences through a legal framework. 
This category includes SR 1 – SR 5. The second category, which is comprised of 
SR 6 to SR 9, provides the necessary specific measures aimed to enhancing the 
detection of terrorist financing acts.  
This section shall focus on the 9 SRs with respect to Kuwait. To accomplish 
the main aim of this section, the level of compliance of the 9 SRs was evaluated. 
The 9 SRs are as discussed in the following sub sections. 
Special Recommendation 1 (Now Recommendation: 36) 
To stress the importance of international security by combating of terrorism 
financing, SR 1 calls for all member states to adopt the 1999 UN ICSFT and other 
relevant resolutions, including Resolutions 1267 and 1373. Before 2013, Kuwait 
was not a party to and did not implement the ICSFT. In addition, UNSCRs 1267 
and 1373 have not been implementing effectively by Kuwait.192 Therefore, it can be 
concluded that compliance with the recommendation was not achieved prior to 
2013. 
Special Recommendation 2 (Now Recommendation: 5) 
The main purpose of SR 2 is to provide all member states with the necessary 
legal powers with which to investigate, prosecute and implement relevant sanctions 
against criminal persons found committing the act of terrorist financing. Basically, 
SR 2 calls for the criminalisation of acts of terrorism financing and all related 
activities, including those perpetuated by individuals and/or terrorist organisations. 
The recommendation therefore offers sufficient flexibility to all member countries, 
thus establishing a common platform through which all members can cooperate for 
the sake of international security. However, SR 2 was not achieved in Kuwait prior 
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to June 2013, because there was no legal provision which criminalised terrorism 
financing.193 
Special Recommendation 3 (Now Recommendation: 6) 
With the sole purpose of creating an atmosphere conducive to punishing 
participants in terrorist financing, SR 3 requires all member countries to confiscate 
or freeze all assets owned by terrorists or their financers without delay. Generally, 
SR 3 calls for the provision of relevant powers to competent authorities, such as 
MOCI, the CBK and the KSE in Kuwait, to seize or confiscate all financial assets 
linked to terrorists and their financers. 
Compliance with this recommendation was not achieved prior to 2013 for a 
number of reasons. For instance, there lacked a clear basis for the implementation 
of UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 that focus on terrorist financing suppression by 
ordering direct asset freezing. In addition, the implementation of freezing orders 
took more time than necessary – ‘within two/three working days’, thus slowing 
down the process of investigating terrorist financing offences.194 In Kuwait, most of 
the financial institutions run under the supervision of the CBK. However, some 
operate under the supervisory authorities, including MOCI and the KSE. For the 
institutions that do not run under the supervision of the CBK, there lacked a proper 
mechanism that could ensure coordination through communication between 
authorities and financial institutions.195 
Due to the poor development of sanctioning and monitoring procedures, the 
implementation of asset freezing orders remained ineffective. Finally, Kuwait lacks 
an efficient coordinating mechanism that could enhance the implementation of 
Resolutions 1267 and 1373. 
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Special Recommendation 4 (Now Recommendation: 20) 
Detection of the act of terrorist financing is not a straightforward process. To 
enhance improved detection, SR 4 imposes effective reporting requirements for 
financial institutions and other forms of businesses that are vulnerable to the act. In 
most cases, terrorists take advantage of organisations that deal with numerous 
transactions to conceal their financial operations against suspicion by the authority. 
To counter this, SR 4 recommends that all vulnerable institutions, such as banks, 
develop proper and efficient terrorist financing and money laundering reporting 
channels to ensure that all suspicious transactions are identified and investigated 
and that the responsible persons are contacted for further investigation. Therefore, 
SR 4 comes into action once detection measures raise an alarm concerning a given 
suspicious transaction. Comparing the requirements stipulated in SR 4 with 
Kuwait’s law, it can be concluded that compliance with this recommendation has 
not been achieved. 
Kuwait’s law did not provide effective regulation of financial institutions 
against disclosure of attempted suspicious transactions prior to 2013.196 Regardless 
of the amount or value of any suspicious transaction, SR 4 recommends that such 
transactions be reported as soon as they have been detected to initiate and 
accelerate the investigation process. Also, the legal system lacked the obligation to 
control the manner in which suspicious transactions were reported to the 
authorities. This could be attributed to the absence of an autonomous terrorism 
financing offence. 
Special Recommendation 5 (Now Recommendation: 37) 
While internal security can be achieved by developing tight local security 
measures, international security and action against terrorist financing require great 
cooperation between countries. SR 5 provides the necessary measures needed to 
ensure that countries assist each other optimally in cases relating to terrorism 
financing. Basically, SR 5 calls for an effective MLA reinforced with proper 
information sharing. The requirements of SR 5 aim to prevent opportunistic 
terrorists, who flee from prosecution by migrating to countries that have loose 
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restrictions with regard to terrorism and terrorist financing. An overview of SR 5 
with respect to Kuwait revealed that full compliance has not been possible hitherto. 
A number of deficiencies may be attributed to the partial compliance achieved 
in Kuwait. It was very difficult to carry out the assessment of MLA alongside 
extradition regimes with regard to terrorist financing, especially since terrorist 
financing is not a crime, and there were a limited number of cases. In fact, there 
was only one MLA request to Kuwait that was partly related to terrorist financing 
in the last decade, and the request is still pending a decision by the authorities.197 In 
addition, the exchange of information related to terrorist financing between 
different authorities was relatively ineffective.198 This led to a lack of valuable 
statistical data necessary for continued investigation and analysis of transaction 
patterns related to terrorism financing. 
Special Recommendation 6 (Now Recommendation: 14) 
The previous recommendations provided the necessary infrastructure required 
to identify, prosecute, criminalise and finally punish individuals or groups of 
individuals involved in the illegal act of terrorist financing. To tighten the measures 
even more, SR 6 attempts to regulate Money or Value Transfer services (MVTs). 
SR 6 requires that all MVTs must be licensed appropriately and registered with a 
competent authority that should supervise their operations to note any misconduct 
in relation to SR 6 requirements. 
Kuwait complied with most of the SR 6 requirements prior to 2013. For 
instance, the CBK is provided with the authority to register, control and supervise 
MVTs operating in the country. According to Article 59 of the CBK law, banks and 
exchange companies are the only legal MVTs operating in the country. However, it 
was noted by the IMF that there was ‘lack of effective system to identify and 
monitor a potential small informal money/value transfer system operating in 
Kuwait’.199 On the other hand, some elements of SR 6 were not satisfied prior to 
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2013. For instance, no effective financial system could guarantee a successful 
detection of suspicious informal money transfers within Kuwait.200 
Special Recommendation 7 (Now Recommendation: 16) 
The advancements in electronic money transfer methods, such as wire transfers 
and other online money transfer channels, have attracted the attention of terrorists 
and their financers. Since they are informal, these methods can easily be used to 
make illegal transactions without the knowledge of respective authorities. In this 
regard, SR 7 addresses wire transfers as one of the most potent electronic money 
transfer methods used by terrorists. SR 7 requires that all wire transfer transactions 
to be accompanied by specific details about the sender and the recipient, including 
their name, address, account number, the locations of the sender and the recipient, 
and the specific time that the transaction was executed. The recommendation 
obliges all financial institutions to carry out extensive scrutiny of all wire transfer 
transactions performed without a clear indication of the required details especially 
for the sender. 
Kuwait only partially complied with the above SR 7 requirements. Though 
suspicious wire transfer transactions involving huge amounts of funds are mostly 
detected, small transactions are sometimes overlooked due to the large number of 
transactions and internal flaws in the detecting system. In addition, the 
requirements stipulated in R 17 of the 40 recommendations presented a few 
challenges that affect SR 7 implementation. For example, the CBK did not apply 
sanctions effectively to all identified cases due to poor coordination with competent 
authorities and existing financial institutions regarding issues related to wire 
transfers.201 The ineffectiveness of the imposition of sanctions can be attributed to 
difficulties in obtaining important statistical data for the identified cases related to 
suspicious wire transfer transactions. 
Special Recommendation 8 (Now Recommendation: 8) 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, some entities are more vulnerable to 
terrorist financing and money laundering compared to others. SR 8 seeks to prevent 
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the perpetuation of terrorist financing by focusing on entities that are constantly 
exploited by terrorists to carry out their illegal acts. A research conducted by FATF 
revealed that the most vulnerable entities are non-profit organisations.202 These 
organisations are mostly non-governmental and are often easily exploited. In effect, 
FATF requires that all member states implement restrictive measures to ensure that 
these organisations are not used in terrorist financing acts. According to SR 8, 
vulnerable entities should be protected against terrorist financing perpetration 
through close monitoring, sector outreach and supervision by a competent 
authority. Finally, SR 8 supports international cooperation between countries as a 
tool to fight terrorist financing at the international level. 
Based on the situation in Kuwait, the above SR 8 requirements were not 
achieved prior to 2013. The execution of supervision by competent authorities to 
association and foundations were not as effective compared to charitable 
organisations, because Kuwait did not intensify its concern about non-profit 
organisations despite the call by FATF to do so. 203  Virtually no non-profit 
organisations in Kuwait keep records of terminated processes for the recommended 
five years.204 While not keeping such records might be viewed as an important way 
to reduce the number of redundant records in the organisation’s archive, it impedes 
the process of terrorist financing investigation due to data unavailability. In 
addition, sanctions for non-compliance with the existing registration requirements 
were not effective and dissuasive, due to the absence of outreach to non-profit 
organisations.205 
Special Recommendation 9 (Now Recommendation: 32) 
SR 9 seeks to combat terrorism financing by imposing strict measures on the 
physical transportation of money across borders. To accomplish this, SR 9 obliges 
all member states to develop feasible methods of detecting physical currency 
transportation across borders. It was recommended under SR 9 that viable 
                                                
202 Financial Action Task Force, Best Practices: combating the abuse of non-profit organisations 
(recommendation 8), (OECD: Paris, June 2013). See also Financial Action Task Force, Risk of 
terrorist abuse in non-profit organisations, (OECD: Paris, June 2014). 
203 International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International 
Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011), 184. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid. 
 236 
disclosure requirements or an effective declaration system be developed to combat 
the crime. 
When false declarations are made, SR 9 calls for an immediate imposition of 
sanctions, including seizure of all funds under the names of suspects and asset 
freezing. Terrorists trust other terrorists, and their accomplices prefer manual cross-
border money transfers over electronic transfers, since no financial details were 
required at the borders of most countries prior to the inception of the 40 
recommendations and the 9 special recommendations discussed herein. 
An overview of Kuwait’s compliance with the requirements of SR 9 shows 
that compliance with most of the requirements was not achieved prior to 2013. 
Kuwait’s border declaration system was not developed fully to make it effective in 
the identification of bearer negotiable instruments (BNI) and the related outbound 
transportation of funds across the border. In addition, no clear and comprehensive 
definition of BNI instruments existed under Kuwaiti law. 206 Kuwait’s border 
investigation team lacked clear powers to obtain and request details about the origin 
of the transported currency or BNI and their intended use from the responsible 
carrier in cases of suspected money laundering or terrorist financing.207 The most 
important details include the source of the funds and the reasons behind the manual 
money transfer across the border. In addition, Customs are not provided with 
proportionate sanctions for those who false to disclose, or failure to disclose, or 
cross-border transportation for money laundering and terrorist financing 
purposes.208 Finally, the lack of sufficient data for use during evaluation of the 
effectiveness of existing measures reduced the level of compliance significantly. 
5.3.6 Conclusion 
The research considered in this section has shown that Kuwait has been the 
subject of criticism by the international community (IMF, FATF and UN) due to its 
delayed implementation of measures against terrorism financing. Though the crime 
of money laundering was addressed under Law No. 35 of 2002 for Combating 
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Money Laundering Operations, terrorist financing was not criminalised until June 
2013. 
According to the authorities, Kuwait was not considered a high risk country 
with regard to terrorist financing. However, the UN and other security agencies 
continued pressuring the Kuwaiti government to criminalise terrorist financing to 
help suppress terrorist activities within the region. Though terrorist financing and 
money laundering crimes were not rampant compared to other countries in the 
region, 
a significant number of terrorist financing criminals were operating 
within the country without being noticed. In addition, terrorist 
financing crime is usually committed by individuals who have a 
common agenda, and most of the funds used to finance terrorists are 
obtained from illegal activities.209 
Kuwait established a number of supervisory authorities, including MOCI, the 
KSE and the CBK, which are responsible for ensuring financial security and 
combating of terrorist financing and money laundering crimes. However, prior to 
June 2013, Kuwait had not criminalised terrorist financing, and, therefore, these 
authorities could not impose effective measures against terrorism financing. 
The compliance level of Kuwait with regard to the FATF 40 + 9 
recommendations was established to be relatively low. For instance, only a few 
recommendations were implemented prior to June 2013. The main challenge that 
contributed to reducing compliance levels was the absence of important legal 
requirements that could sufficiently address money laundering and terrorist 
financing crimes. In fact, during an evaluation by the IMF in 2011,210 Law No. 35 
of 2002 for Combating Money Laundering Operations was found to harbour 
numerous shortcomings. According to the IMF, Law No. 35 was unsuccessful, 
since it failed to criminalise the act of terrorist financing within its scope. In 
addition, the law did not require the necessary measures that would enable effective 
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detection of terrorist financing acts and other related offences, such as money 
laundering. Similarly, Law No. 35 did not provide a platform for freezing financial 
assets and seizing funds from terrorist financing suspects and their accomplices.211 
Though the government of Kuwait has constantly asserted that issues of terrorism 
financing are not widespread in the country,212 legislative shortcomings and lack of 
money laundering and terrorist financing statistics form a fertile environment for 
money laundering and terrorist financing. The next section evaluates the level of 
compliance after June 2013. 
5.4   Section III: Kuwait’s efforts to Combat Terrorist Financing after June 
2013 
5.4.1 Introduction 
This section considers the Kuwaiti government's legal regime for combating 
money laundering and terrorist financing established after the ratification of the 
ICSFT.213 In addition, this section examines Law No. 106 of 2013 Regarding Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 214  which 
implements the ICSFT. This section is a continuation after June 2013 of the 
evaluation carried out in section II. As such, the section evaluates the current level 
of Kuwait’s law with the international regulations provided by FATF and other 
international agencies. To accomplish this, the requirements of Law No. 106 will be 
studied extensively, and each of the 40 + 9 FATF recommendations will be 
evaluated for compliance with Kuwait’s law. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that there were three reasons why the 
government of Kuwait took so long to ratify the ICSFT and to issue a 
comprehensive CFT law. The first reason is related to the political unrest in the 
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country, as the parliament was dissolved by the Emir five times in seven years, and 
‘the political situation was not stable in Kuwait’.215 
Secondly, during the last decade, the Islamist bloc seats were to some extent 
dominant, ranging between 15 to 24 members. In February 2012, the election 
increased the seats of the conservative tribal and Islamist members of parliament to 
35 seats out of 50. As a result, there were many debates in the parliament during 
2012 about whether to separate the comprehensive draft law on money laundering 
and the law on combating the financing of terrorism. ‘The reason behind these 
discussions was to pass the money laundering law and to abandon the law on 
combating the financing of terrorism’ according to a representative from the 
Council of Ministers.216 In October 2012, the Emir issued a Decree Law to amend 
the electoral law by decreasing the number of votes that each Kuwaiti could cast 
from 4 to 1 vote.217 Consequently, the Islamists and the tribal groups, which form 
the opposition in the country, boycotted the December 2012 election resulting in 
the emergence of a new political class that tends to cooperate with the Emir’s 
government.218 Consequently, 2013 has witnessed the issuance of more than one 
hundred laws ranging from the ratification of bilateral and multilateral conventions 
to passing national laws, including the ratification of the UN ICSFT and the passing 
of Law No. 106 of 2013.219 
The third reason, and the most important, is related to the pressure applied by 
the international bodies on the government of Kuwait to pass laws that criminalised 
terrorist financing and money laundering according to the international standards. 
As already noted, Kuwait was identified and listed by the FATF as having Anti-
Money Laundering deficiencies.220 A representative from the National Assembly 
said: 
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The State of Kuwait was warned by the international bodies that 
either Kuwait pass laws which criminalised money laundering and 
terrorism financing or Kuwait may join in the month of June (of 
2013) to the blacklist on the fight against terrorism and money 
laundering; and as a result, the Kuwaiti banking transactions will be 
affected significantly if it did not join the international convention in 
this regard.221 
5.4.2 Law No. (106) of 2013 Regarding Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
An evaluation of the level of compliance of Kuwait with respect to the 40 + 9 
recommendations prior to June 2013 revealed that some of the requirements were 
not met. Though Kuwait delayed in adopting the requirements stipulated in the 
ICSFT and the 40 + 9 recommendations, 2013 became the turning point. In that 
year, Kuwait ratified the UN ICSFT and developed a number of suitable measures. 
Law No. 106 adopted in 2013 seeks to combat crimes related to terrorism financing 
and money laundering in Kuwait by superseding Law No. 35 of 2002 and 
supporting the terrorist financing and money laundering requirements put forward 
by FATF and other international security organisations. 
5.4.2.1 Criminalising Terrorist Financing Under Law No. 106 of 2013 
Law No. 106 criminalises terrorist financing and all related offences included 
under article 3, which defines terrorist financing and states the guidelines for 
identifying the terrorist financing crime. Article 3, paragraph 1 states: 
A person is considered an offender in a crime of terrorism financing, 
if the person willingly and unlawfully provided or attempted to 
provide or collect monies, directly or indirectly, with the purpose to 
use it in committing a terrorist act, or with knowledge that it will 
fully or partially be used for such act, or for the benefit of a terrorist 
organisation or a terrorist. 
                                                                                                                                   
International Monetary Fund, Kuwait: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism, IMF Country Report No. 11/268, (International Monetary 
Fund: Washington, D.C., September 2011). 
221 Interview with G.O.4 
 241 
Article 3 paragraph 2 of the Law goes further to establish that the crime of 
terrorism financing is committed 
even if the terrorist act was not committed, or even if the monies 
were not actually used for the execution or the attempt to execute the 
terrorist act, or if the monies were linked to a specific terrorist act 
regardless of the country where the terrorist act attempt occurred. 
Furthermore, Article 1 of the Law No. 106 of 2013 defines ‘terrorist act’ as 
any of the following actions or the attempt to commit these actions in the State of 
Kuwait: 
A. If the action’s purpose was to cause the death or to inflict 
serious physical injuries to a civilian, or to any other person who is 
not participating in hostile actions if an armed conflict arose, and 
when the natural purpose of the action or its context was to spread 
panic among people or to force the government or an international 
organization to perform a particular act or to prevent it from doing 
an act. 
B. If the action constitutes an offence within the scope of and as 
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex of the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
The State of Kuwait has ratified all nine treaties and protocols listed in the 
annex of the UN ICSFT.222 Moreover, Law No. 106 of 2013 included a tenth 
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element under (B), which stated that ‘Any other international conventions, or other 
international protocols that are in regards to terrorism or its financing that were 
ratified by the State of Kuwait and were published in the official newspaper 
(Gazette Kuwait Al-Youm).’223 As a result, Law No. 106 does not limit the 
criminalisation of terrorist financing to the nine treaties and protocols listed in the 
annex of the ICSFT but extends the criminalisation of terrorist financing to all 
treaties and protocols related to terrorism that the State of Kuwait has ratified. This 
gives the government of Kuwait the flexibility to include future treaties and 
protocols related to terrorism and its financing, which keeps the State of Kuwait 
current in this regard. In addition, the crime of smuggling migrants that has been 
linked to terrorist financing and money laundering becomes a predicate offence 
after the enactment of Law No. 91 of 2013 concerning the fight against trafficking 
in persons and smuggling migrants.224 
Law No. 106 imposes penalties and sanctions on persons convicted of 
undertaking activities that are criminalised under the Law. If article 2, which 
criminalises money laundering, is violated, article 28 requires that the criminal be 
sentenced to jail for a period of 10 years or less depending on the degree of 
violation. In addition, article 28 requires a financial penalty to be imposed on the 
criminal for an amount equal to or less than the laundered sum depending on the 
seriousness of the case.225 By comparison, any person who violates article 3 and is 
found guilty of committing a terrorist financing offence under the requirements of 
article 29, may be sentenced to jail for up to 15 years. On top of the sentence, such 
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a criminal is fined for an amount ranging between the amount involved in the crime 
and double that amount.226 
As a method of obtaining terrorist financing and money laundering 
information, article 31 allows the court to exempt from the penalties those who are 
involved in terrorist financing and money laundering crimes if they cooperate with 
the authority thereby aiding in the investigation, which might otherwise not be 
launched due to lack of relevant information. According to article 31, the penalties 
imposed on offenders under articles 28 and 29 mentioned above may be exempted 
by the court under the following circumstances: 
 
A. Preventing a money laundering or terrorism financing crime. 
B. Enabling authorities to capture or prosecute the other criminal 
offenders. 
C. Enabling authorities to obtain evidence. 
D. Preventing or minimising the consequences of the crime. 
E. Depriving terrorist groups or criminal groups of any monies that 
the accused offender does not have a right in or cannot control. 
5.4.2.2 Regulatory Measures that Aim to Counter Terrorism Financing 
The competent authorities did not change any of the regulatory measures after 
the adoption of Law No. 106 of 2013. However, the scope of their responsibilities 
was expanded.227 For instance, financial institutions are still under the supervision 
of the CBK. Other supervisory authorities involved in the execution of the 
requirements of Law No. 106 include the KSE and MOCI. The CBK has issued 
instructions to financial institutions after the adoption of Law No. 106 ordering 
them to consider the new requirements from all perspectives including strict 
adherence to their customers’ due diligence. 228  This allows for the quicker 
incorporation of the new requirements in accordance with Law No. 106 
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requirements. Customer Due Diligence (CDD) acts as a tool through which all 
competent authorities and financial institutions notify each other about detected 
suspicious transactions. The law provides CDD measures under article 5, together 
with other necessary measures that need to be undertaken by financial institutions 
operating within Kuwait. In addition, article 10 (B) of Law No. 106 requires all 
financial institutions to ensure that their staff are trained professionally on how to 
detect and handle suspicious transactions and to ensure their familiarity with anti-
money laundering and anti-terrorism financing requirements and with requirements 
for customer due diligence.229 Consequently, the law insists that workers should be 
in a position to note suspicious customers’ behaviours and report accordingly. 
The existence of Hawaladers and their courier services in Kuwait and other 
countries in the Middle East presents a great potential challenge to CTF. It has been 
found that Hawaladars offer their services without sufficiently inquiring about the 
source and the intention of the transfer. 230  Consequently, terrorists and their 
financers have been using these agents to conduct their illegal transactions. 
However, as stated in the previous section, only banks and exchange companies are 
authorised to provide Money or Value Transfer services (MVTs) in Kuwait, and 
both of them must be registered by the CBK. In addition, article 9 of Law No. 106 
obliges the financial institutions that perform electronic transfer activities to obtain 
information regarding the transfer order requestor and the receiver during the 
transaction procedures. In fact, article 9 requires all financial institutions to ensure 
that the funds receiver and the requestor have presented enough details before a 
transaction can be initiated. They must also ensure that this information is stored 
with the transfer order or with any related correspondents of serial payments.231 
Such a requirement has been implemented to limit the misuse of electronic money 
transfer methods, such as wire transfer by terrorists. 
Another notable method of financial transaction in the Middle East is the 
courier service. The courier is an agent who offers physical money transaction 
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services both locally and internationally.232  In fact, it is one of the Hawala 
processes.233 Therefore, Law No. 106 has ensured that such services are not used. 
The government of Kuwait has laid special requirements under article 20 which 
help to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer 
negotiable instruments. Article 20 requires any person leaving or entering the 
country to disclose the amount of cash they intend to travel with to the customs 
authority if the amount exceeds 3000 KD.234 The information disclosed to the 
authority may as well be subject to evaluation by the KFIU whenever necessary. 
According to article 4, DNFBPs and all financial institutions are required to 
evaluate their businesses in the presence of any potential risk of terrorism financing 
and money laundering. In addition, article 4 imposes an obligation on the financial 
institutions and DNFBPs to ‘keep records of evaluation of risks and information 
that is related to these evaluations in written documentations, and should update 
these documents periodically, and provide them for supervisory authorities upon 
their request’.235 It is further required that strict measures be put in place to achieve 
CDD when terrorist financing and money laundering cases are at a peak.236 Most 
terrorists fabricate their identities and open new bank accounts with fictitious 
names. As a result, any investigation carried out does not yield any reliable results, 
as such persons are not registered under any legal register. To counter this, article 5 
together with the CBK instructions No. (2/BS/IBS/308/2013) require that all 
financial institutions, especially banks, make sure that no anonymous persons are 
allowed to open bank accounts in Kuwait by imposing the necessary CDD 
measures. Consequently, the institutions are supposed to verify the identity of all 
new customers and their beneficiaries using available reliable information. Also, 
the institutions should understand the main purpose of the business before 
activating business accounts. Moreover, it is recommended that close follow up be 
maintained on suspicious accounts to detect any perpetuation of terrorist financing 
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and money laundering illegal acts.237 Similarly, article 8 prohibits registration and 
licensing of Shell Banks within the state of Kuwait. In effect, all financial 
institutions are required to avoid any relationship with Shell Banks not licensed 
under Kuwait legislation. The CBK bears the capacity to register institutions in 
conjunction with Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), and therefore the 
supervisory authorities are required to carry out sufficient investigation before 
registering and giving a license of operation to any new financial institution. 
Brokerage companies, especially in the real estate industry, are required to 
observe the regulations stipulated under article 6 of Law No. 106 regarding terrorist 
financing and money laundering offences perpetuation within the industry. 
Unavailability of CDD information had been great concern in Kuwait since the 
inception of Law No. 35 of 2002. To counter this, article 11 of Law No. 106 
requires DNFBPs and all financial institutions to maintain records for at least 5 
years, even when the owner has terminated the account or relationship with the 
institution. This move attempts to eliminate the spread of terrorist financing and 
money laundering acts by terrorists who open bank accounts for short periods to 
carry out some illegal transactions only and later block the investigation by 
terminating the accounts. Basically, the institutions are required to keep records 
relating to CDD, including identity documents, account files, names of clients, and 
their business among other personal details. 
Article 13 prohibits employees working in financial institutions from 
disclosing the reporting to the authorities of suspicious transactions to the suspects 
by whatever means. If this were to happen, the effectiveness of the investigation 
would be hampered significantly. Therefore, the financial institutions and their 
employees are required to observe the requirements stipulated under article 13. In 
addition, the institutions are required to adhere to all requirements/instructions put 
forward by supervisory authorities, such as MOCI, the CBK and the KSE, 
regarding terrorist financing and money laundering acts.238 
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Supervisory authorities are required to adhere to article 14 of Law No. 106, 
which orders them to regulate, monitor, and supervise the compliance of financial 
institutions and DNFBPs with the terms mentioned in the law and its executive 
regulations along with the related ministerial decisions and instructions. In addition, 
the supervisory authorities must inspect to obtain important information regarding 
DNFBPs and financial institutions.239 The authorities are also mandated to impose 
necessary fines to DNFBPs and financial institutions that fail to comply with the 
requirements of the law. 240  Moreover, article 33 penalises the DNFBPs and 
financial institutions if they violate the stipulated rules and regulations under 
articles 5, 9, 10 and 11 with a fine that is not less than five thousand Dinars and no 
more than five hundred thousand Dinars for each violation or for any intentional 
violation or gross negligence of the mentioned provisions.241 
5.4.2.2.1       The Role of the KFIU after June 2013 
In the light of Law No. 106, Kuwait has developed the KFIU to ensure that 
terrorism financing and money laundering acts are suppressed. The KFIU acts in 
accordance with the requirements under article 16, which provides that the KFIU is 
formed with legally independent presence and is the only special investigative body 
that receives detected cases of terrorist financing and money laundering for further 
analysis and investigation, and if necessary can request further information.242 As 
such, the new role of the KFIU depicts a new image of Kuwait in being proactive 
against terrorism through suppression of their funding sources. 
The KFIU has the responsibility to investigate and identify the countries that 
are listed in the high-risk category and to determine the measures that should be 
followed when dealing with these countries.243 Once these countries have been 
identified by the FATF, the KFIU forwards the list to the national competent 
authorities that impose the necessary regulations on financial institutions to ensure 
complete compliance with the law. However, supervisory authorities have no direct 
link to suspects and such high-risk countries, because the authority directs financial 
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institutions that have a direct relationship with the suspects. Therefore, the financial 
institution has the duty to apply the requirements put forward by supervisory 
authorities. In terms of the sanction lists, Kuwait is still using the method developed 
by the CBK, which was discussed in Section II of this chapter. 
5.4.2.3 Freezing and Confiscating Terrorist Assets 
As mentioned in section 5.3.4 of this chapter, the implementation of UN 
Resolutions 1267, 1333 and 1373 together with other international sanction lists 
was enforced administratively and not based on any legal measure in Kuwait. 
However, Law No. 106 has now laid down the first legal bases under article 25, 
which provides: 
The Council of Ministers, in accordance to proposals submitted by 
the Minister of Foreign Affair, issues the necessary decisions to 
execute the Security Council Resolutions of the United Nations 
pursuant of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that is related 
to terrorism, terrorism financing, and financing weapons of mass 
destruction proliferation.244 
In addition, the CBK’s Instruction No. (2/BS/IBS/308/2013) ordered all 
financial institutions under its supervision not to deal with any persons or entities 
listed in the international recognised sanction lists. For example, the last policy 
statement on AML/CFT submitted by the Commercial Bank of Kuwait stated: 
[T]he Bank is not dealing with customers included in the sanction 
lists of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and United Kingdom (UK 
Treasury) and other official lists given the fact that the Bank counts 
on database prepared and updated by major institutions specialised 
in this area.245 
To improve the effectiveness of Law No. 106, relevant measures are taken into 
account regarding the immediate freezing of terrorist funds as stated in article 22. 
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The power to freeze financial assets associated with terrorists and their financers is 
bestowed on the Attorney General or public lawyers that he assigns in accordance 
with the requirements of article 22. In addition, the Attorney General is empowered 
to initiate the confiscation of instruments and/or funds identified and proved to be 
obtained through illegal acts of money laundering, terrorist financing, or predicate 
offences.246 
If property is confiscated by the government, article 41 states that it shall 
remain and hold its initial rights according to the law for persons declared to have 
good faith. If money is confiscated, it shall be transferred to the public treasury 
until all disputes are settled.247 
5.4.3 Kuwait’s Compliance with the 40 + 9 FATF Recommendations and the 
Effectiveness of AML/CFT System in Kuwait 
5.4.3.1 Kuwait’s Compliance with 40 Recommendations after June 2013 
Section 5.3.5 of this chapter was concerned with defining and establishing the 
level of Kuwait’s compliance with FATF’s 40 + 9 recommendations prior to June 
2013 and established that the level of compliance was relatively low. However, the 
enactment of Law No. 106 and other related measures by the government of Kuwait 
has significantly improved the level of compliance. This section of the chapter 
evaluates the new level of compliance of Kuwait’s law to the requirements 
stipulated under the consolidated FATF 40 recommendations on money laundering 
and terrorism financing. 
5.4.3.1.1 Criminal Law Compliance 
Kuwait has criminalised money laundering crimes and terrorism financing 
under articles 2 and 3 of Law No. 106, thus complying with the requirements put 
forward by FATF Recommendations 3 and 5 respectively (previously 
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Recommendations 1 and 2, and Special Recommendation 2 respectively).248 In 
addition, the crime of smuggling migrants that has been linked to terrorist financing 
and money laundering became a predicate offence after the enactment of Law No. 
91 of 2013 concerning the fight against trafficking in persons and smuggling of 
migrants.249  Before 2013, evaluation has shown that the effectiveness of the 
prosecution of money laundering in the absence of a prior conviction was 
problematic.250 However, this has not yet been established under Law No. 106, as it 
has still not been used in practice. Therefore, it can be concluded that compliance 
with Recommendations 3 and 5 have largely been achieved. As such, this is an 
improvement, since, prior to 2013, there was no compliance with these 
recommendations even to the slightest degree. 
A comparison between current Kuwaiti law and the previous level of 
compliance revealed that compliance with Recommendation 3 (previously 
Recommendation 2) was fully achieved, because the law has extended criminal 
liability to legal persons.251 Prior to 2013, it was impossible to confiscate financial 
assets owned by money laundering suspects due to the lack of the necessary 
measures. However, this issue has been addressed satisfactorily under articles 2 and 
40 of Law No. 106. In addition, Kuwaiti law has addressed the issue of 
ineffectiveness in the entire confiscation framework. Based on the evaluation, full 
compliance with Recommendation 4 (previously Recommendation 3) has been 
achieved. 
5.4.3.1.2 Administrative Compliance 
The FATF Recommendations address the necessary preventive measures to be 
undertaken to prevent money laundering in Kuwait. 
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Prior to 2013, an overview of the CBK financial secrecy law (FSL) showed 
that it ‘impedes regulatory cooperation and sharing at the international level outside 
of the context of consolidated supervision and criminal cases’.252 However, under 
Law No. 106, international cooperation was enhanced under articles 19 and 23. 
Article 19 gives the KFIU the authority to disclose its information to any foreign 
entity, whether voluntarily or if requested based on reciprocity agreements or 
agreements of exchange of information that are based on cooperation arrangements 
between the KFIU and the other entity.253 Moreover, article 23 states: 
The Attorney General’s office exchanges international cooperation 
requisitions with the competent foreign authorities in regard to 
penalties of crimes of money laundering, predicate offenses, or 
crimes of terrorism financing, where these requisitions are with 
respect to assistance, judicial delegation, and extradition of accused 
and sentenced individuals as well as requisitions regarding 
allocating, tracking, freezing, reservation, or confiscating monies. 
All this must be performed in accordance with the rules that are 
determined in bilateral or multilateral agreements ratified by the 
State of Kuwait or in accordance to reciprocity.254 
As a result, compliance with Recommendation 9 (previously Recommendation 4) 
has been achieved. 
Articles 4, 5, and 7 of Law No. 106 have developed a focus on CDD with 
respect to the operation of DNFBPs and financial institutions. For instance, 
verification of the identity of legal persons when transacting has been emphasised 
under the law. It can be concluded that compliance with Recommendation 10 
(previously Recommendation 5) has been fully achieved. 
An evaluation of compliance of corresponding banking requirements as 
stipulated under Recommendation 13 (previously Recommendation 7) reveals a 
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great improvement. Article 7 of Law No. 106 requires that all financial institutions 
investigate the details provided by respondent institutions to ascertain that they 
have not been subject to money laundering offences before entering into any form 
of business relationship.255 In addition, the law requires that all financial institutions 
develop a good and reliable documentation system and ensure that all information 
is retained at least for five years.256 This enables the authorities to carry out their 
investigations faster using past records. Based on this evaluation, it can be 
concluded that compliance with Recommendation 13 has been fully achieved. 
According to Recommendation 11 (previously Recommendation 10), financial 
records should be retained for at least five years irrespective of whether the 
relationship between the client and the financial institutions has ceased (record 
keeping). Article 11 of Law No. 106 addresses this by ordering the existing 
financial institutions to store copies of documents containing CDD transaction 
investigations as provided in article 5. It is also required that the stored records be 
available and accessible in a timely manner by the supervisory authorities that are 
mandated to carry out terrorist financing and money laundering investigations in 
accordance with the law. Therefore, it can be concluded that compliance with 
Recommendation 11 has been fully achieved. 
Based on the compliance results for Recommendations 10 and 11 (previously 
Recommendation 11) presented in the previous section, the only deficiency noted 
was lack of the necessary requirements for brokerage companies, insurance 
companies and exchange organisations with regard to identification and the 
handling of unusual transactions. However, this deficiency was addressed under 
article 5 of Law No. 106 and articles 13 and 16 of the Ministerial Decree No. 37 for 
the year 2013. According to Kuwait’s law, DNFBPs and financial institutions must 
apply strict CDD measures to unusual transactions as such, all transactions that lack 
legal or economic aims must be investigated, and the information availed to 
competent authorities for further action. 257  Since the deficiency of 
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Recommendations 10 and 11 has been addressed, compliance with the 
recommendation has been achieved. 
Recommendation 22 (previously Recommendation 12) applies to the CDD and 
record-keeping requirements set out under Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15 and 17 
with regard to DNFBPs. 258  Focusing on the deficiencies identified during 
evaluation for compliance prior to June 2013, it can be shown that most of the 
deficiencies have been addressed under Law No. 106 of 2013. For instance, article 
5 of Law No. 106 obliges the financial institutions and DNFBPs to apply strict due 
diligence measures for all complex and major unusual transactions and for unusual 
transactions that do not have purposes or obvious legal economic aims. Therefore, 
they should examine the background of these transactions and their purposes and 
record all information that is related to the transactions and the identities of all 
participating parties, where these records should be stored in accordance with the 
provisions of Article (11) of this law. Furthermore, this information must remain 
accessible for the competent authorities upon their request to access it.259 In 
addition, article 5 of the same law gives the DNFBPs and the FIs the right to apply 
additional measures on CDD if they determine that the client or the beneficial 
owner is a politically exposed person.260 Also, article 5 gives permission for the 
DNFBPs to obtain the assistance of other organisations to perform some of the 
elements of the due diligence operations in accordance with Recommendation 
17. 261  Based on the above compliance information, compliance with 
Recommendation 22 has been fully achieved. 
Article 12 stresses the importance of filing STRs and forwarding them to the 
KFIU. This addresses Kuwait’s compliance with Recommendation 20 (previously 
Recommendation 13). Law No. 106 of 2013 under article 12 requires all financial 
institutions and DNFBPs to report STRs as soon as they are detected or there is 
enough evidence of suspicion.262 Consequently, since the necessary measures for 
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identifying STRs have been enforced, the deficiency of poor reporting experienced 
prior to 2013 and discussed in Section II of this chapter has been resolved. 
Similarly, compliance with Recommendation 21 (previously Recommendation 14), 
which deals with protection against the disclosure of information that an STR has 
been reported to the authorities, has been achieved, because article 13 addresses the 
issue by providing the necessary requirements to supervisory authorities and 
financial institutions. Article 13 states: 
Financial institutions and DNFBPs, their directors, and their 
employees are prohibited from notifying clients or others regarding 
reports that were performed in accordance to the previous article, or 
any information that is related to the unit, or anything that is related 
to the investigation of money laundering or financing of terrorism.263 
In reference to Recommendation 18 (previously Recommendations 15 and 22), 
Kuwait’s Law No. 106 has erected the necessary requirements needed to enhance 
internal communication and understanding of employed institution policies by 
employees to accelerate the fight against money laundering through effective 
detection and investigation. In addition, the law provides the requirements for 
forcing financial institutions to create their own efficient management systems that 
can be used to evaluate the compliance of institutional operations with 
Recommendation 18 demands. According to article 10, all financial institutions and 
DNFBPs must establish policies, procedures, systems, and internal controls, 
including proper arrangements to control compliance and adequate screening 
measures that ensure the use of high standards when hiring employees.264 In 
addition, they need to implement a continuous programme that trains their 
employees to ensure their familiarity with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism 
financing requirements; their familiarity with new developments, common 
methods, techniques, and trends in the field of money laundering and terrorism 
financing; and their familiarity with requirements for due diligence and for 
reporting of suspicious transactions.265 Moreover, the financial institutions and 
DNFBPs should establish independent internal auditing tasks to ensure compliance 
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with policies, procedures, systems, and internal controls, and to ensure its 
efficiency and its compliance with the provisions of the national law. 266 
Furthermore, under article 10 (D), financial institutions and DNFBPs must develop 
mechanisms for the exchange of available information and for maintaining its 
confidentiality within the financial institution and its domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries and affiliates in accordance with articles (4) and (5) of Law No. 106. It 
can therefore be concluded that compliance with Recommendation 18 has been 
fully achieved. 
The deficiencies witnessed by the IMF during the evaluation of compliance 
with Recommendation 23 (previously Recommendation 16) prior to 2013 were all 
related to the Kuwait FIU. Article 19 now states that the KFIU must evaluate and 
provide results to competent authorities for all suspected terrorist financing 
offences. The KFIU may also obtain past records from competent authorities 
whenever deemed necessary to improve functioning. Finally, since 
Recommendation 23 applies to the requirements stated under Recommendations 18, 
20 and 21 that have already been addressed, compliance with the recommendation 
can be concluded to have been achieved. 
As mentioned in section II of this chapter, compliance with the requirements of 
Recommendation 35 (previously Recommendation 17) was not achieved prior to 
2013. However, in 2013, the enactment of Law No. 106 Section 4 sought to address 
all of the noted deficiencies. Articles 27 to 40 outline the requirements for imposing 
penalties and sanctions on individuals or organisations convicted of money 
laundering within the State of Kuwait. In addition, a clear basis for the application 
of sanctions by MOCI, the KSE and the CBK has been established. Therefore, all 
of the deficiencies noted in the previous section have been resolved. For 
deficiencies related to shell banks, addressed under Recommendations 13 and 23 
(previously Recommendation 18), Law No. 106 provides enough legal provisions 
for the evaluation of the institutions to prevent terrorists from using them to 
continue their illegal activities under cover. In fact, article 8 makes clear: 
It is not permissible to license a fictitious/shell bank or to allow this 
bank to perform any actions inside Kuwait. Financial institutions are 
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prohibited from starting or continuing working through 
correspondent relationships or through business relationships with 
fictitious/shell banks or a correspondent financial institution in a 
foreign country that allows the use of accounts for a fictitious/shell 
bank.267 
Article 34 of the law penalises anyone who establishes or attempts to establish a 
shell bank in Kuwait, the punishment for which can be a fine of not less than 5000 
KD and not more than 500,000 KD or a term of imprisonment of not less than three 
years. The article also punishes any financial institution that starts a business 
relationship with such a bank, the penalty for which will be no less than 5000 KD 
and can be raised up to 1,000,000 KD if a legal person commits the violation.268 
Cash transactions are more vulnerable to money laundering and misuse by 
terrorists for their financing and are therefore insecure compared to other methods. 
Compliance with the requirements of Recommendation 20 of the FATF 
recommendations of 2003 to reduce cash transactions was partly achieved in 
Kuwait prior to 2013. Law No. 106 was silent on this issue, which means that 
Kuwait still has not fully complied with this recommendation, because there is still 
a heavy reliance on cash as a payment method in Kuwait, especially among the 
large expatriate community.269 
The deficiencies identified in relation to Recommendation 19 (previously 
Recommendation 21) compliance evaluation prior to 2013 have been addressed 
fully under article 17 of the Law No. 106 as discussed earlier in this section. 
The defined roles of supervisory authorities, such as MOCI, the CBK and the 
KSE, have enabled the resolution of Recommendation 26 (previously 
Recommendation 23) deficiencies identified during the previous compliance 
evaluation for the period prior to 2013. In addition, monitoring, supervising, and 
regulating DNFBPs have been addressed under articles 4 and 5 of Law No. 106 of 
2013. 
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Law No. 106 not only addresses the crime of money laundering through the 
establishment of independent bodies, such as the KFIU, but it also defines the role 
of competent authorities in the fight against money laundering and terrorism 
financing. Recommendations 27, 29, 30 and 31 focus on the requirements of law 
enforcement, competent authorities, and financial institution supervisors with 
regard to the crime of money laundering. During the previous compliance 
evaluation, compliance with the requirements was partially achieved. However, 
since the inception of Law No. 106 of 2013, under Section 2 – Chapter 1, articles 
14 and 15 stipulate the new requirements for supervisory authorities. The 
authorities are obliged to apply penalties and to collect relevant information from 
financial institutions to investigate, monitor and control the conduct of the 
institutions in accordance with the anti-money laundering law. 270  As such, 
deficiencies related to a lack of evidence and ineffectiveness of supervisory 
authorities have been addressed fully. 
Referring to Recommendation 2 on national cooperation and coordination and 
considering the deficiencies prior to 2013, it can be concluded that it has been 
addressed fully with Law No. 106 of 2013. Article 19 of the Ministerial Decree No. 
37 of 2013 established the National Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism Committee, which is the mechanism to ensure cooperation 
among the national authorities in the fight against money laundering and terrorist 
financing. The National AML/CFT Committee includes the KFIU, the CBK, the 
MOI, the Ministry of Foreign Affair, the PPO, the MOJ, MOCI, the MOF, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, the KSE, and the General Administration of 
Customs.271 After June 2013, the KFIU was included within the structure of the 
National Committee. However, the law is still new, and the effectiveness of this 
Committee needs some time to be evaluated. 
With regard to Recommendation 33 (previously Recommendation 32), which 
requires states to maintain comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their AML/CFT systems, prior to 2013, Kuwait had 
not complied with the stipulated requirements. However, article 14 (10) obliged the 
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supervisory authorities to retain statistics of the measures that taken and the 
penalties imposed that are determined by the supervisory authorities. Thus, it can be 
concluded that compliance with Recommendation 33 has been fully achieved.272 
As stated earlier in this section, Kuwait has addressed virtually all of the 
requirements of the UN ICSFT. Kuwait Law No. 35 of 2002 had already addressed 
some issues related to money laundering. However, terrorist financing in Kuwait 
was not officially criminalised until 2013, when Law No. 106 was adopted. 
Therefore, having addressed the issue of terrorist financing, compliance with 
Recommendation 36 can be concluded to have been fully achieved. 
In reference to Recommendations 39 and 40, the inception of Law No. 106 has 
addressed all of the deficiencies identified for the period prior to 2013. The 
extradition system has been refined under the penalties and punishment section of 
Law No. 106. However, the deficiency identified against Recommendation 37 of 
the FATF recommendation of 2003 relating to the lack of clarity and 
implementation of article 18 paragraph 9 of the Palermo Convention has still not 
been addressed. 
5.4.3.2 Kuwait’s Compliance with the 9 Special Recommendations after June 2013 
Kuwait ratified the UN ICSFT and implemented it in June 2013. In addition, 
Article 25 of Law No. 106 of 2013 implemented UNSCRs 1267, 1333 and 1373 as 
mentioned earlier in this section. Thus, compliance with all of the requirements and 
guidelines stipulated under the convention and the resolutions has been achieved. 
As a result, it can be concluded that compliance with Recommendation 36 
(previously Special Recommendation 1) has been fully achieved. Furthermore, Law 
No. 106 criminalises terrorism financing and all related acts. This implies 
compliance with Recommendation 5 (previously Special Recommendation 2) has 
been fully achieved. 
Based on the deficiencies identified for Recommendation 6 (previously Special 
Recommendation 3) regarding property and funds confiscation and freezing 
respectively, Law No. 106 provides a complete solution. The KFIU is designated 
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and equipped with the power to investigate all sorts of terrorist financing and 
money laundering crimes and to avail the results later to competent authorities for 
further action. This addresses one of the Recommendation 6 deficiencies for the 
period prior to 2013. Also, the law under article 22 authorises the Attorney General 
to order monies and instrument freezing or to confiscate them, provided that there is 
sufficient evidence that these items are related to crimes of money laundering, or 
terrorism financing, or predicate offenses.273 
In addition, the ineffectiveness experienced prior to 2013 in relation to 
requisitions, tracking, confiscation or freezing of monies has been addressed under 
article 23 of the Law No. 106. As such, the requirements stipulated under UN’s 
Resolutions 1373 and 1267 with regard to the handling of confiscation requests 
have been addressed. The evaluation reveals that all deficiencies identified prior to 
2013 in relation to Recommendation 6 have been addressed, thus raising the level 
of compliance with the international standards. 
Prior to 2013, compliance with Recommendation 20 (previously Special 
Recommendation 4) was not achieved due to a number of notable deficiencies. The 
two main deficiencies included lack of proper regulation of financial institutions 
with regard to the reporting of STRs and the absence of the autonomous terrorist 
financing offence. In effect, article 10 of Law No. 106 addresses the requirements 
of STRs and the best way for them to be employed by DNFBPs and financial 
institutions to handle them within their operations. Specifically, article 10 requires 
financial institutions to develop proper training programmes for their workers to 
place them in a position to handle STRs that are related to terrorist financing and 
money laundering crimes. Also, articles 12 and 13 give the directions for reporting 
suspicious transactions without delay once detected. Finally, article 3 criminalises 
terrorist financing and all related offences within Kuwait’s law. As such, it can be 
concluded that compliance with Recommendation 20 has been fully achieved. 
Recommendation 37 (previously Special Recommendation 5) calls for 
international cooperation between countries as a tool to enhance information 
sharing and to create an environment that discourages terrorist financing and money 
laundering acts. Prior to 2013, compliance with Recommendation 37 was not fully 
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achieved as a result of several deficiencies within the law. Among these 
deficiencies were lack of sufficient statistical data, low effectiveness of information 
exchange and lack of cooperation among authorities and financial institutions. 
Article 19 of Law No. 106 requires information sharing on the basis of reciprocity 
and mutual agreement among authorities and other entities responsible for 
maintaining financial security. 274  The Kuwait FIU is the only special body 
authorised to carry out investigations and avail the results to supervisory authorities 
on matters relating to terrorist financing and money laundering. This is in 
accordance with article 16 of Law No. 106. With all of the explained measures in 
place, it can be concluded compliance with Recommendation 37 has been fully 
achieved. 
Compliance with Recommendation 14 (previously Special Recommendation 
6) was partially achieved prior to 2013. Although MVTs are regulated under 
Kuwaiti law, one of the deficiencies that contributed to partial compliance included 
the absence of an effective transaction monitoring system that could detect terrorist 
financing and money laundering acts irrespective of transaction values. An 
overview of the Law No. 106 and other imposed measures with regard to 
monitoring small transactions revealed that there are no effective measures to 
address the deficiency satisfactorily. Therefore, full compliance with 
Recommendation 14 has not yet been achieved. 
Compliance with Recommendation 16 (previously Special Recommendation 
7) concerning measures against the misuse of wire transfer services for carrying out 
illegal terrorist financing transactions was partially achieved prior to 2013. The 
deficiencies related to supervision and monitoring, ineffective sanctions and 
scarcity of important statistical data. Though Law No. 106 does not address wire 
transfers in particular, electronic money transfers that include wire transfers have 
been addressed sufficiently. Article 9 provides that sufficient details must be 
provided by the sender clearly stating the details of the recipient and the sender. 
Consequently, financial institutions are required to retain the information for the 
purposes of investigation if the need arises. The law also provides the necessary 
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requirements for the imposition of sanctions and penalties.275 The issue of data 
unavailability has been discussed in this section and was concluded to have been 
resolved. Therefore, based on the above provisions, compliance with 
Recommendation 16 has been fully achieved. 
The issue of non-profit organisations and their positive contribution with 
respect to terrorist financing and money laundering crimes is addressed under 
Recommendation 8 (previously Special Recommendation 8). Prior to June 2013, 
compliance with Recommendation 8 was partially achieved in relation to Kuwait’s 
law.276 However, an evaluation of the Law No. 106 and other imposed measures did 
not reveal any positive attempt to address the identified deficiencies. As such, it can 
be deduced that compliance with Recommendation 8 is still only partially achieved. 
The basic requirements for an effective cross-border disclosure and declaration 
system are addressed under Recommendation 32 (previously Special 
Recommendation 9). Prior to June 2013, compliance with the recommendation was 
partially achieved, since a number of challenges resulting from the absence of law 
impacted negatively on the border processes. Article 20 requires bearer negotiable 
instruments (BNIs) with respect to cross-border currency transportation as 
discussed earlier in this section. The article allows the authorities to seize the 
monies being transported as soon as sufficient evidence is available to convict the 
owner as a terrorist financing or of laundering money. In addition, article 37 
provides that whoever violates the provisions of article 20 or gives a false report 
about a currency or bearer negotiable instruments, or whoever intentionally or in 
gross negligence conceals facts that should be reported shall be jailed for at least 
one year and fined in an amount more than 50 percent of the value of transported 
currency or BNI.277 Since the identified deficiencies have been addressed, it can be 
concluded that compliance with Recommendation 32 has been fully achieved. 
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5.4.4 Conclusion 
The levels of compliance of Kuwait with FATF recommendations and the 
requirements stipulated under UN ICSFT were boosted significantly by the 
adoption of Law No. 106 and other relevant internal measures. 
Law No. 106 sought to address the requirements put forward by international 
securing agencies against terrorist financing and money laundering crimes. Articles 
3 and 28 criminalise terrorist financing and other related acts, a move that was 
eagerly anticipated by the UN. Also, various measures were developed to improve 
the effectiveness of implementing the Law No. 106 and to succeed in combating 
terrorist financing and money laundering. 
This section has extensively discussed the compliance of Kuwait with the 
requirements stated in the 2012 FATF 40 recommendations after June 2013 and 
noted a significant improvement. For instance, criminalisation of terrorist financing 
and the establishment of the KFIU resulted in a high compliance level. In addition, 
most of the deficiencies that revolved around the ineffectiveness of the legal 
framework due to poor coordination and cooperation and the absence of regulations 
against terrorist financing have been resolved. However, there is still room for 
improvement, since compliance with a number of requirements has not yet been 
achieved. 
As Law No. 106 of 2013 is still new, a detailed evaluation of its practical 
effectiveness cannot be given. However, the recommendations set out by FATF 
have been embraced and taken on board by the Kuwaiti Government and thus 
included in the Law No. 106 of 2013. 
5.5   Conclusion 
This chapter has extensively explored the measures taken against terrorism 
financing and money laundering in Kuwait with respect to the requirements put 
forward by the UN under various platforms. The research has established that 
terrorist financing in Kuwait was not effectively criminalised until June 2013, when 
Law No. 106 was adopted. The level of compliance of Kuwait law with the FATF 
40 recommendations prior to June 2013 was found to be relatively low, because 
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most of the recommendations called for the establishment of legal requirements that 
were lacking in Kuwait. The lack of interest by the national government led to low 
efficiency of implementation of the existing law against money laundering, thus 
increasing the level of threats and vulnerability to terrorist financing offences. 
Perhaps one of the reasons for this belated timetable and why the crime-related 
conventions have been implemented earlier than the finance-related conventions is 
that the former criminalise offences which rarely happen and therefore 
implementing them by the Kuwaiti national government is at no great internal cost 
and is therefore preferable to upsetting the international community. However, with 
regard to the ICSFT and its measures, the situation is different because it requires 
national authorities to apply these measures on a daily basis which makes the 
government to some extent resistant to implementing such demanding legislations 
and measures which cause problems for administrators and Kuwaiti citizens. 
Therefore, such hesitancy may be understandable. The relevant international 
obligations have been associated with international measures pushed by the FATF 
which to some extent being viewed as a hegemonic-western body, which trigger the 
questioning of legitimacy and causing national tensions that in turn caused the 
hesitancy in implementing such external standards. 
Though Kuwait delayed in developing the requirements against terrorist 
financing and money laundering, the enactment of Law No. 106 was the turning 
point. It was enacted in response to the help and the pressure of the international 
bodies. In addition, the law was able to address nearly all of the deficiencies that 
were present prior to its adoption. Therefore, it can be concluded that Kuwaiti law 
now performs well on paper against terrorism by suppressing sources of finances 
using the rule of law. Nevertheless, although Law No. 106 has been implemented 
by the government of Kuwait, there are still allegations that terrorists in Syria are 
financed by individuals in Kuwait.278 
Based on the research considered herein, it is recommended that Kuwait 
proceed with the implementation of the requirements of Law No. 106 to address the 
existing deficiencies in the previous provisions. Although externally inspired and 
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imposed, Kuwait should establish and implement fully the relevant procedures 
necessary for an effective identification of suspicious behaviour and transactions 
and impose relevant measures, including asset freezing and funds seizure. 
Moreover, the government of Kuwait needs to ensure that the KFIU is very 
effective in its functions especially with regard to operational autonomy. Finally, 
Kuwait must create an environment that allows all financial institutions to report 
suspicious transactions efficiently to the KFIU. The curtailing of terrorism 
financing can only be effective by way of these further actions and laws. While 
there may have previously been some room for doubt and prevarication, the 
situation in Iraq and Syria and the threat of powerful groups like Islamic State 
surely shift the balance of convenience in Kuwaiti national policy interests and 
those of the protection of its citizens towards more action against terrorism 
financing. That this trend has been externally imposed may be distasteful to 
Kuwait, but it may be an important and positive result in the long run.    
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
6.1   Introduction 
The main purpose of this study has been to investigate how Kuwait, as a Gulf 
nation with limited geo-political influence and very much dependent on the 
protection of others, is subjected to international influences and seeks to interpret, 
modulate, and apply international expectations within its own jurisdiction to 
prevent and fight terrorism and its financing. The study has included all of the 
available measures to counter terrorism and its financing in Kuwait since its 
independence in 1961 until 1st August 2014. In addition, the study has evaluated 
and assessed the effectiveness and fairness of the different counterterrorism policies 
and laws that Kuwait has implemented and adopted to combat terrorism and its 
financing. In that regard, the study has also focused on criminal law and counter 
terrorism financing measures. 
As a result, this study has uncovered and analysed important and original 
research findings that permitted an original exposition and critical analysis and an 
evaluative study of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kuwait. This study provided 
for the first time an in depth analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism in Kuwait and 
how the government of Kuwait has developed its counterterrorism policy and 
measures since its independence in 1961. In addition, the exposition of detailed 
measures has been tested against the normative criteria of effectiveness and 
fairness, and the impacts of the external influences were assessed, especially within 
the contexts of criminal law and counterterrorism financing law in Kuwait.  
In response to these materials, this study has focused on four issues related to 
terrorism and counterterrorism in Kuwait, which reflect and respond to the main 
objectives of the research study. It first analysed the different level of threats of 
terrorism to Kuwait and provided a comprehensive understanding of the level of the 
threats and the phenomenon of terrorism in Kuwait since its independence in 1961. 
Second, the study explored and documented the counterterrorism policies and 
strategies that Kuwait has developed to react to the different phases of threats of 
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terrorism to Kuwait. Third, the criminal offences related to terrorism in Kuwait 
have been analysed. Finally, this study has explored and evaluated the measures 
that Kuwait has developed to combat terrorism financing over two distinct periods 
before and after the implementation of ICSFT 1999 by Kuwait in June 2013. 
This concluding chapter aims to summarise the findings of this study in 
relation to the abovementioned research aims and objectives. The present chapter 
will also reflect on the adopted research methodology and proposed future studies 
that could enrich the analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism in Kuwait. Finally, 
the chapter will conclude with final comments and remarks related to the future 
development of counterterrorism in Kuwait. 
6.2   Research Findings in Kuwait 
This study has determined that, although concerns about terrorism became 
very prominent after 9/11, terrorism first affected Kuwait well before the incidents 
that occurred that day, and counterterrorism initiatives were to some extent 
developed by the government of Kuwait even before those attacks. Chapter two has 
provided a comprehensive analysis of the different phases of threats and sources of 
terrorism to Kuwait since its independence in 1961. The study has demonstrated 
how the conflicts in the region have affected Kuwait and created an environment 
conducive to radicalisation. Kuwait has suffered three episodes of terrorist activities 
since 1961.  
The first episode was related to the People’s Revolutionary Movement in 
Kuwait, which occurred between 1968 and 1969. The study has explored how the 
conflicts within the Arab Nationalist Movement produced a rivalry between groups 
in the Arab world that were revolutionary in nature and that did not believe in the 
existing regimes and wanted to bring them down. It also showed how the nature of 
their ideology was broadly socialist and anti-Western. 
The second episode was the Iranian-inspired revolution between 1979 and 
1989. Within this concept this study has analysed the impact on the Shiites of 
Kuwait of the Islamic Revolution that occurred in Iran in 1979. The Farsi Shiites, 
and more precisely the young Shiite people, in Kuwait were more influenced by the 
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Iranian ideology, as they consider Iran the protector of their religious beliefs. It also 
analysed the consequences of the First Gulf War and the Kuwaiti political stance 
arising from that war. This study has explored how the radical revolutionary 
Islamic regime in Iran targeted those Shiite sympathisers to destabilise the political 
arena in Kuwait in retaliation for the Kuwaiti support of the Iraqi regime. This 
study has also shown how the Iranian regime has inspired and aided a group of 
armed Kuwaiti youth to carry out terrorist attacks outside the territory of Kuwait. 
Finally, this study has examined how the political changes that took place in Iran 
after the death of Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini led to direct changes in the political 
atmosphere in Kuwait. Nevertheless, those Iranian-inspired domestic or Hezbollah 
in Kuwait still pose possible future threats to Kuwait, especially with the recent 
changes in the region that might affect Kuwait in the near future. 
The third episode related to the development and the root of the new 
phenomenon of terrorism in Kuwait and the future threats from terrorism to 
Kuwait. In fact, this study looked at Kuwait’s position within the global Jihadi 
agenda and explored how Al-Qaida’s ideology has influenced Kuwaiti citizens on 
the one hand and how terrorism has exploited Kuwait on the other hand. First, this 
study has determined that, although Kuwait is not a key target of Al-Qaida, it has 
played an important role within the global Jihadi agenda. Kuwait hosted American 
troops and bases, which act as a target for different extremists following the Jihadist 
philosophy. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, Kuwait is a crucial 
transit station for money transfers, equipment and operatives from the countries in 
the Gulf to other countries in which ‘Holy War’ is being waged. 
Furthermore, this study has also illustrated the future threats to Kuwait from 
terrorism. Four continuing threats pose potential future threats to Kuwait’s national 
security. The first threat comes from the veteran Jihadists who began returning in 
the 1990s. The second threat relates to Kuwait’s geographical position within an 
unstable region. The third threat comes from those who finance terrorist activities. 
The final threat relates to the role played by the fundamentalist intellectuals in 
Kuwait who spread extremist views that can encourage terrorism. 
This study has explored how changes that happened in the region directly 
affected the situation within Kuwait. It was clear that external influences generated 
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most of the terrorist ideologies and actions in Kuwait. Undoubtedly, the doctrines 
have had great effect on the people of Kuwait, who adopted and implemented them. 
Nevertheless, terrorist threats to Kuwait were limited in nature and have not 
remotely threatened the stability of the state or compared to the existential threats 
posed by states hostile to Kuwait, especially Iraq. 
Chapter three has analysed and documented for the first time the 
counterterrorism strategies that the government of Kuwait has adopted since its 
independence in responding to terrorism. Kuwait lacks a comprehensive policy 
statement on counterterrorism. In fact, this chapter has shown how in practice, 
while Kuwait’s political policy wants to be seen as an active player in the American 
concept of the ‘war on terror’, firm action does not follow, and the government of 
Kuwait has not mirrored the war on terror concept. Nevertheless, the chapter has 
explored some strategies that Kuwait has implemented in its reaction to terrorism 
throughout history. One problem that has been faced is that Kuwait’s legal 
documents do not provide comprehensive counterterrorism legislation nor even a 
definition of terrorism. Hence, the country’s laws with regard to counterterrorism 
and its official definition of terrorism are mostly based around the criminal law and 
other fragmented laws. Despite fragmentation in information on counterterrorism 
strategies, the study has found an association between the measures and elements, 
such as criminalisation, protective security, internationalisation and countering 
radicalisation. Criminalisation as a strategy has been the most basic and continuous 
response to terrorism. In fact, criminalisation was the main strategy to 
counterterrorism during the three different periods of threats that Kuwait has faced 
from terrorism. The second strategy that has been explored was related to the 
protective security strategy that Kuwait has implemented since the Iraq-Iran war. 
These two strategies mirrored, yet on much reduced scale, the UK’s CONTEST 
strategies of ‘pursue’ and ‘protect’. Furthermore, although Kuwait’s 
counterterrorism measures are restrained, they have confronted the terrorism threats 
in response to their emergence. 
In addition, chapter three has explored the Kuwaiti institutions that perform 
functions in the sphere of counterterrorism initiatives. Kuwait’s counterterrorism 
establishments and practices are based on the distribution of functions, 
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accountability, and lines of cooperation between the involved agencies. Yet, the 
involved agencies work too much in isolation and not adequately in coordination. 
Therefore, for effectiveness and efficiency, Kuwait needs to define a public, 
institutional and legal framework to react to terrorist acts and threats. In fact, 
Kuwait needs to establish clear counterterrorism methods for those of its 
institutions that are involved in counterterrorism and to define their roles within the 
counterterrorism agenda. One way to help this effort would be to create a national 
counterterrorism centre that would ensure effective coordination between the 
involved agencies. 
Chapter four provided a critical analysis of the criminal offences that are 
related to terrorism in the Kuwaiti criminal laws. The chapter was divided into three 
sections. Section I illustrated the international obligations in the area of 
counterterrorism that have been imposed on member states, including Kuwait, by 
international conventions on terrorism. Section II analysed the national laws related 
to terrorism in Kuwait and evaluated their effectiveness and fairness. It also 
investigated whether such laws were enacted in response to external influences or 
internal initiatives. Section III cited general and specific reasons why Kuwait needs 
to have comprehensive counterterrorism law. 
Most of the examined laws already existed before the advent of the relevant 
international treaties. In fact, very few of the ratified conventions have been 
specifically implemented by Kuwait. Therefore, terrorist acts have been addressed 
within the framework established for ordinary crimes. As a result, the current laws 
have failed to cover some offenses, which Kuwait ought to address under 
international law, thereby, hindering the effective implementation of the 
international conventions on terrorism. As stated in chapter four, this point is 
effectively illustrated by Law No. 6 of 1994 in Regard to Crimes Related to Safety 
of Aircraft and Air Navigation, the Decree of Law No. 13 of 1991 in Regard to 
Weapons and Ammunition, and Law No. 35 of 1985 in Regard to Crimes of 
Explosives. Therefore, since one of the aims of this study was to test the Kuwaiti 
laws against the normative criteria of effectiveness and fairness, it has found that 
the current laws contain instances of non-compliance with the international 
requirements stipulated in the related international conventions on terrorism. In 
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addition, the current laws contain some articles that risk violating internationally 
accepted rights and freedoms. In fact, Law No. 31 of 1970 in Regard to Crimes 
Relating to State Security contains provisions that raise serious concerns about the 
observance of human rights as discussed in chapter four.1 
Chapter five explored and evaluated the measures developed by the 
government of Kuwait to combat terrorist financing and money laundering crimes 
before and after June 2013. The chapter was divided into three sections. Section I 
set out the international development and efforts to combat terrorism financing. It 
explained that terrorism financing is a distinct crime and that countries need to 
prevent and criminalise it by following the related international requirements and 
standards. Sections II and III extensively examined and evaluated Kuwait’s efforts 
to combat terrorist financing before and after June 2013 respectively. The 
effectiveness and fairness of the adopted measures have been evaluated in terms of 
compliance with the ICSFT 1999 requirements and the FATF 40 + 9 
recommendations on combating terrorist financing and money laundering. 
As discussed in chapter five, Kuwait took so long to ratify and implement the 
ICSFT 1999 and other international standards for four reasons. 2  Kuwait did 
establish a number of supervisory authorities, including the CBK, MOCI, and the 
KSE, which are responsible for ensuring financial security and for combating 
terrorist financing and money laundering crimes. In addition, the MOSAL has the 
responsibility to supervise and register all NPOs operating within the state of 
Kuwait. However, prior to June 2013, Kuwait had not criminalised terrorist 
financing, and, therefore, these authorities could not implement effective measures 
against terrorism financing. Freezing terrorist assets was not implemented in line 
with the international requirements. According to the internal authorities, Kuwait 
was not considered a high-risk country with regard to terrorist financing. However, 
chapters two and five have shown that Kuwait has been accused of funding 
terrorists, and there are individuals who financed terrorism. Consequently, the UN 
and other security agencies continued pressuring the Kuwaiti government to 
criminalise terrorist financing to help suppress terrorist activities within the region. 
In fact, external pressures have helped to pave the way to implementing the 
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international standards on terrorism financing and anti-money laundering. As a 
result, in June 2013, Kuwait ratified and implemented the ICSFT 1999. Law No. 
106 of 2013 implemented most of the international requirements and standards in 
combating terrorism financing and money laundering. In fact, with the help and 
pressure of the international bodies, Kuwait was able to address nearly all of the 
deficiencies that existed before June 2013. Therefore, this study has shown that, 
today, Kuwaiti law regarding combating terrorism financing and money laundry 
crimes performs well on paper. 
6.3   Future Research 
Among the potential future research projects that can be carried out in Kuwait 
and that can build upon this study would be a study of the impact of the new law 
CFT/AML (Law No. 106 of 2013), especially with regard to its implementation. As 
discussed in chapter five, terrorism has been defined in line with the 1999 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
However, a practical assessment of this definition needs to be undertaken. For 
example, it is still unclear, for Kuwait at least, what is meant by those who are not 
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict. 
Another worthwhile future study is to look at Kuwait’s role within the regional 
cooperation on countering terrorism. Kuwait’s role can be divided into two 
different levels of cooperation. The first level is related to state cooperation, which 
involves state engagement in multilateral and bilateral treaties. In terms of a 
regional multilateral convention, one of the most important multilateral conventions 
can be found within the GCC organisation. The importance of looking at the GCC 
organisation comes from the fact that Kuwait may have more influence in such a 
regional organisation than it has, for example, in the United Nations. Therefore, it 
becomes more important to look at Kuwait’s involvement and role within this 
context of regional cooperation. Nevertheless, the GCC organisation aims to bring 
its member states into one consolidated convention by adopting the GCC Counter 
Terrorism Convention. Yet, it is not sure whether it has done so to Kuwait, 
especially since Kuwait is not yet a member of this convention. Therefore, and until 
it become such a member, Kuwait will continue to rely on bilateral conventions on 
countering terrorism. Therefore, the study also needs to look at Kuwait’s 
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engagement in bilateral treaties on countering terrorism, especially with regard to 
its neighbouring countries. 
The second level is related to sub-state cooperation, which involves the 
cooperation between and among the individual organisations in one country and in 
other countries (e.g. the police, the border agency, the courts through MLA, etc.). 
Therefore, it is worthwhile and important to investigate the sort of cooperation/or 
rules between these different organisations and how effective Kuwait is in 
implementing and accommodating the regional multilateral and bilateral 
conventions on terrorism. Further, the study could explore how the GCC 
organisation and the regional countries have defined terrorism and Kuwait’s stance 
regarding these definitions. Are the regional conventions on countering terrorism 
providing a different perspective on terrorism, or are they similar to the United 
Nations conventions on countering terrorism? This study would be especially 
important, since it would reveal how small and vulnerable countries cooperate to 
strengthen their borders and intelligence against potential terrorist threats. 
Finally, another related issue that has not been covered in this study and should 
be the task for future study is to examine how Kuwait has implemented UNSCR 
2178 on ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighters’ (FTFs). On September 24, 2014, the United 
Nations Security Council adopted this resolution under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, which requires states to take certain steps to address the threat from FTFs. 
The resolution is mainly concerned with the threat of FTFs in Iraq and Syria. 
Therefore, the resolution ordered member states, first, to prevent individuals 
believed to be FTFs from crossing or entering their borders; second, to stop and ban 
financing and facilitating such individuals; third, to prosecute, rehabilitate and 
reintegrate returning foreign fighters; fourth, to enhance international cooperation 
to counter FTFs; and, fifth, to stop and prevent ‘recruiting, organising, transporting, 
and equipping’ those FTFs.3 These obligations can be categorised as criminal, 
administrative (e.g. passports), and counter-radicalisation interventions. Therefore, 
it would be worthwhile to investigate what Kuwait has done in this regard. The 
                                                
3 See UN Security Council, Resolution 2178 (2014) [on foreign terrorist fighters], Adopted by the 
Security Council at its 7272nd meeting, on 24 September 2014, S/RES/2178 (2014), Available at: 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20(2014)> accessed 1st Dec. 
2014. 
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study could also look at what other countries have done to implement this 
resolution and to benefit from their responses.4 
6.4   Final Comments 
To conclude, this study has demonstrated that terrorism is a threat to Kuwait 
and that Kuwait is not immune from the consequences of the conflicts that have 
occurred in the region and specifically in the surrounding countries. The study has 
provided information that will be very useful for the government of Kuwait 
practitioners, and analysis. It has provided a deeper and further understanding of 
some of the major threats facing Kuwait. In addition, it has revealed major risks 
facing Kuwait, since it does not have substantial law governing counter terrorism. 
The study has identified different threats and sources of terrorism that endanger 
Kuwait. As a result, it will be possible for Kuwait to take appropriate action against 
those threats. Since the threats are limited and are not extensive as compared with 
the threats against Kuwait’s neighbours (like Iraq), Kuwait should be able confront 
and overcome the threats. Therefore, Kuwait needs to develop its current 
counterterrorism policies to bring them in line with the UN global counter-terrorism 
strategy5 and to enhance the effectiveness of the legal and institutional ability to 
counter any potential terrorist activities. One way to enhance the institutional ability 
is to establish a national centre to combat terrorism in Kuwait, which would include 
members from different disciplines. Such a centre should first assess the security 
situation through the study and review of the local, regional and international 
terrorist events, the extent of the deterioration of the security situation, the possible 
outcomes, estimate its dimensions, reactions and expected strength and weaknesses 
against terrorist acts and evaluate the available capacities and capabilities. Second, 
the centre should predict future terrorist trends, by collecting the necessary 
information about the threats and dangers from extremist and terrorist groups that 
threaten security in Kuwait and the region. Third, the centre should develop plans 
and scenarios to deal with terrorism through analytical study and planning to 
confront and resolve the crisis in addition to developing effective strategies and 
                                                
4 See Vidino, L., Foreign Fighters: An Overview of Responses in Eleven Countries, (Centre for 
Security Studies, Zurich, 2014). 
5 See UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Available at: 
<http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml> accessed 1st Dec. 2014. 
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tactics. Fourth, the centre should coordinate various security agencies. Fifth, the 
centre should develop and update early warning methods to anticipate all possible 
terrorist events. Sixth, the centre should conduct an ongoing study of the state of 
public opinion and the internal and external conditions and the changes that might 
occur. Seventh, the centre should educate and inform the citizens of the facts of 
terrorist events and the actions required to counter them. 
As for counterterrorism laws, although the available Penal Code and its 
subsequent amendments have to some extent been effective in countering the 
threats of terrorism, a comprehensive counterterrorism law should still be enacted 
for the many reasons stated in chapter four.6 In addition, the existing broad laws, 
especially within the state security law, must be amended to respect both the rule of 
law and human rights. In fact, new laws against terrorism should recognise the 
important need to identify acts of terrorism clearly and in line with the rule of law 
and respectful of human rights. Therefore, having a comprehensive 
counterterrorism law is necessary to enable the government of Kuwait to define the 
scope of terrorism, to comply with international obligations on terrorism, and to 
limit the broad scope/vague terms of the current Kuwaiti laws. 
As for combating the financing of terrorism, enacting Law No. 106 of 2013 
was the turning point in the counterterrorism development of the country. 
Therefore, the government of Kuwait needs to address and overcome some of the 
remaining deficiencies outlined in chapter five 7  and to proceed with the 
implementation of the requirements of Law No. 106 of 2013. Finally, Kuwait needs 
to ensure and support the effective operation of the KFIU, especially with regard to 
its operational functions and autonomy. 
 
 
                                                
6 See chapter four, section 4.4. 
7 See chapter five, section 5.4. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Schedules 
1. Interview with government officials from representative ministries and 
law enforcement officials that deal with terrorism 
Please note that this interview will be divided into sections. 
Firstly, I will start by asking you questions about your background and experiences and 
work relating to terrorism. 
Section One: Professional Questions. 
1. What are the main tasks of your organisation in combating terrorism? 
2. What is your position? And how long have you been in your position? 
3. What are the tasks you encounter or come across in your work in relation to 
terrorism? And how often are they? 
4. Did you get any training relating to your work on terrorism that you are 
doing now? 
 
Now I would like to ask you a number of questions about how you see the development of 
terrorism in Kuwait since its independence. 
Section Two: Terrorism in Kuwait. 
5. What do you think are the major threats from terrorism currently facing 
Kuwait? Were they different in the past? 
6. In your opinion, does it matter that there is not any definition about 
terrorism in the Kuwaiti laws? 
7. In your experience, what is the position of Kuwait in regard to the regional 
definitions on terrorism, i.e. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorism in 1998 & The Convention of the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf on Combating Terrorism in 2004? 
 
Next I would like to ask you questions about how your organisation is involved in the 
processes of countering terrorism in Kuwait. 
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Section Three: Countering Terrorism. 
8. What is your department contributing in combating terrorism? And what is 
it specifically involved in? Can you give examples? 
9. Since when has your department been established? 
10. How have counterterrorism laws/measures developed in your department 
and how have they changed over the time? 
11. What is your department’s present agenda in countering terrorism? 
12. What do you think your department has achieved? 
13. What was successful in your efforts to combat terrorism? And what was 
not? Can you give examples? 
14. What are the most important ministerial decrees that have been issued by 
your ministry to counter the threat of terrorism in Kuwait? And why have 
such decrees been issued? And how effective are they in countering 
terrorism? 
15. Has your department implemented any international and regional 
conventions on combating terrorism? And what have you implemented? 
16. Were there any obstacles in implementing such international initiatives? If 
yes, what were they? And how have you overcome them? 
17. What was successful in these conventions in terms of your efforts to combat 
terrorism? And what was not? Can you give examples? 
18. What, in your opinion, are the further developments needed to the Kuwaiti 
counterterrorism strategies, especially with regard to your department? 
 
The next section will be about the criminal laws that articulated in order to response to 
terrorism. 
Section Four: The Kuwaiti Criminal Law related to Terrorism. 
19. What are the criminal laws, if any, that specifically relate to your work 
against terrorism? 
20. How effective are they in helping your department to counteract terrorism? 
And do they achieve what they are meant to achieve? 
21. What more, if anything, do you think is needed to further develop the 
current criminal laws? 
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22. What do you think about having a comprehensive counterterrorism law in 
Kuwait? 
23. What changes do you suggest might be needed in the current criminal laws 
in order to counterterrorism efficiently? 
24. To what extent has Kuwaiti criminal law implemented international laws or 
laws from Western jurisdictions? Why were you influenced to pass these 
international laws or Western style laws? 
25. From your point of view, why has the government of Kuwait not yet ratified 
some of the international conventions on terrorism? 
26. What is the general policy on ratification/implementation of international 
conventions? 
27. Do the current criminal laws related to terrorism comply with the Kuwaiti 
constitutional law and with the human rights treaties and conventions that 
Kuwait has signed and ratified? Can you give examples? 
28. Is there any future prospect for passing more criminal counterterrorism laws 
in the government’s agenda? 
 
Now we will move on to look at the national/regional/international cooperation to combat 
terrorism. 
Section Five: Cooperation. 
29. How do you cooperate with other departments which are concerned in 
combating terrorism? Which are these? And how is this conducted and 
regulated? 
30. To what extent are they cooperative/helpful with your department? 
31. Are there any joint committees? If there are, how many times do you meet 
in a year? What are the topics that you are discussing or have discussed? 
32. Are there any regional or international cooperation mechanisms related to 
your department? Or is it only concerned about the national threats? 
33. Are there any bilateral cooperation treaties with Arab/Western country 
related to counterterrorism, for example with (Saudi or USA)? 
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34. In your experience, how has the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as a 
regional organisation, been successful in providing an effective multilateral 
response to countering terrorism? And what it has achieved so far? 
35. How far does the GCC ensure the protection of fundamental liberties and 
human rights in the region? 
36. To what extent has the GCC, and especially the State of Kuwait, been 
effective in strengthening their security from any potential terrorist 
activities? 
37. Which is the most important body in helping Kuwait to counter the national 
and international terrorism – is it national, regional or international? 
 
Conclusion: 
38. How do you see the future agenda of your department in combating 
terrorism? 
39. Is there anything that you would like to add, which you think we have not 
covered? 
40. Are there any sources of information you recommend me to look at that 
related to my research topic? 
 
Many thanks for your participation. 
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2. Interview with representative from Financial Institutions 
This interview will be divided into three sections. 
The first section will be about a number of questions which applicable for both the 
Regulators and the Implementers. 
Section One: 
(a) General Questions: 
1. What are the main tasks of your department in combating financing 
terrorism? 
2. What is your position? And how long have you been in your position? 
3. What are the tasks you encounter or come across in your work in relation to 
financing terrorism? And how often are they? 
4. Did you get any training relating to your work on combating AML/CFT that 
you are doing now? 
 
(b) Threats of Financing Terrorism. 
5. From your point of view, what are the major threats facing Kuwait in 
relation to financing terrorism? 
6. In your understanding, why Kuwait has been used or involved in financing 
terrorism? 
7. What are the sources of financing terrorism in Kuwait? And how have the 
terrorists used them? 
8. What are the current sources of financing terrorism? And how have they 
been used in Kuwait? 
9. In the absence of a clear definition of what is labelled as terrorist financing 
and given that Kuwait has not yet ratified the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, how does your department 
define financing terrorism? What can been seen as financing terrorism? Can 
you give examples? 
10. From your point of view, what are the future sources of financing terrorism? 
And how dangerous are they to Kuwait? 
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The second section will be about questions which will be only asked in the regulators’ 
interviews. 
Section Two: 
(a) Countering Financing Terrorism. 
11. How has your department regulated the banking system and the money 
service businesses in order to combat financing terrorism? 
12. What do you think about the current laws in force on countering financing 
terrorism? And how do they comply with international standards? Are they 
effective? Are they fair? 
13. Do you think the current AML Law has achieved what it meant to be 
achieved on combating terrorist financing or not? Can you give me 
examples? 
14. How do you identify and freeze terrorist assets? 
15. Why do you think that Kuwait has not ratified the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism? 
16. What did your department do to meet the normative requirements set by the 
United Nations Terrorism Finance Convention and the special 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)? 
17. How has your department responded to the possibilities of terrorism 
financing through the informal money transfer system, the Hawala system 
of money remittances? What has worked, and what has not? 
18. What are the measures that have been set by your department to 
regulate/supervise Islamic charitable (Zakat) and humanitarian 
organisations? And how successful are they? Are they fair? 
19. From your point of view, how effective is the National Committee for 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism on 
combating financing terrorism? 
20. How successful is the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) in countering 
financing terrorism? Are there any deficiencies? What are they? And how 
can they be eliminated? 
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21. Are there any other departments that are relevant to this work? 
 
(b) Cooperation. 
22. What are the other national departments that you collaborate with in 
fighting against financing terrorism in Kuwait? How does your department 
cooperate with them? What do you think about them, are they cooperative? 
23. What do you think about the degree of cooperation between your 
department and the implementers (banks, Charities, Money transfer 
businesses …etc)? 
24. Are there any international cooperation/collaboration on combating 
AML/CFT with your department? How successful are they? 
25. Are there any obstacles affecting national/international cooperation? Why? 
And what do you think is needed to tackle such obstacles? 
26. What is the role of the GCC cooperation with regard to combating financing 
terrorism? Is it helpful? And does it help Kuwait and your department to 
combat financing terrorism? 
27. Considering the international concern about combating financing terrorism, 
in your experience were there any regional or international pressures on 
Kuwait to deal with terrorism supporters in Kuwait? Can you give some 
examples? 
28. What do you think about the recent Mutual Evaluations provided by the 
FATF on Kuwait? Do you think they are fair or not? 
29. What do you think about the US Department of State assessment on 
Kuwait’s response to financing terrorism? 
30. What do you think about the recent assessment report on Kuwait’s AML 
and CFT provided by the International Monetary Fund? 
31. How has your department responded to the abovementioned assessments? 
And what have been done in your department in order to comply with the 
recommendations? 
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32. Are there any other assessments that I have not looked at and you think are 
important? Are there any internal assessments, whether to the regulators or 
to the implementers? 
 
The third section will be about questions which will be only asked in the implementers’ 
interviews. 
Section Three: 
(a) Countering Financing Terrorism & Cooperation. 
33. How has your department implemented the laws, regulations and policies of 
the regulating bodies in Kuwait in order to combat the financing of 
terrorism? 
34. What do you think about the current laws in force for countering financing 
terrorism? Do they comply with international standards? Are they effective 
in countering the financing of terrorism in Kuwait? Do they restrict the right 
of the citizen or are they fair? 
35. From your point of view, how appropriate are the current laws in countering 
the financing of terrorism to the Kuwaiti cultures and constitutional values? 
36. In your experience, which laws/decrees were helpful on combating terrorist 
financing? And which were not? Can you provide me with examples? 
37. In your point of view, how successful has your department been in deterring 
the possibilities of terrorism financing through the informal money transfer 
system, the Hawala system of money remittances? What has been worked, 
and what has not? 
38. How successful do you think are the current regulations and laws on 
regulating the Islamic charitable (Zakat) and humanitarian organisations? 
39. How do you ensure that the money donated to the charities are not diverting 
to terrorist? What are the measurements implemented in order to ensure that 
the money collected is sent to the right people? 
40. How do you see the effectiveness of your department in implementing laws 
related to combating financing terrorism?  
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41. In which way do you cooperate with the following government departments: 
And how useful are they: 
• The National Committee for Combating Money Laundry and the 
Financing of Terrorism; 
• The Financial Investigation Unit (FIU); 
• The Central Bank of Kuwait. 
42. What do you think about the degree of cooperation between your company 
and the regulators bodies? 
 
Conclusion: 
43. Is there any future plan for passing more AML/CFT laws? 
44. What is the future agenda of your department in combating financing 
terrorism? 
45. Is there anything that you would like to add, which you think we have not 
covered? 
 
Many thanks for your participation. 
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3. Interview with Judges and Prosecutors 
This interview will be divided into sections. 
First I will ask you questions about the nature of your work and your experiences, and 
about terrorism in Kuwait. 
Section One: 
(a) General Questions. 
1. What are the tasks you come across in your work in relation to terrorism? 
And how often have you dealt with terrorism cases? Are they frequent or 
rare? 
2. What is your position? And how long have you been in your position? 
3. Is terrorism considered as a normal/general crime in Kuwait or is it 
considered as a special crime? Are there any special rules, procedures and 
resources whilst dealing with terrorism? 
(b) Terrorism in Kuwait. 
4. What do you think are the major threats from terrorism currently facing 
Kuwait? 
5. What type of terrorist cases have you dealt with? And what had the suspect 
done (support, incite, commit …etc)? 
6. In your opinion why there is not any definition of terrorism in the Kuwaiti 
laws? 
7. How do you classify a crime as terrorism-related? Do you have any official 
guidance on this? 
8. In your experience, what is the position of Kuwait in regard to the regional 
definitions on terrorism (the GCC Convention + The Arab Convention)? 
 
Now I would like to ask you questions about how the court/the prosecution services 
involved in combating terrorism. 
Section Two: Countering Terrorism. 
9. In Kuwait, there is neither a comprehensive counterterrorism law nor laws 
that explicitly refer to terrorism? Therefore, how has the current criminal 
law been interpreted and applied to terrorism? 
10. How do you recognise or label a case as a terrorism case? 
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11. What sort of criminal offences would you expect to encounter in terrorism 
cases? 
12. What sort of procedures and resources have you applied and used in 
terrorism cases? 
13. How successful is the Kuwaiti penal legislation in confronting the crimes of 
terrorism? 
14. How efficient are the criminal process laws in helping the court/the 
prosecution service to prosecute terrorist suspect? And do they achieve what 
they are meant to achieve? 
15. Do you think that the current laws are adequately criminalising terrorist 
financing? 
16. How are the court/the prosecution service involved in identifying and 
freezing terrorist assets? 
17. What, in your opinion, are the further developments needed to the Kuwaiti 
criminal laws with regard to criminalising terrorism and its financing? 
18. Kuwait has ratified some of the international/regional conventions against 
terrorism? Have you dealt with a terrorist suspect according these 
conventions? Can you give examples? 
19. Are there any obstacles in implementing such international initiatives? If 
yes, what are they? And how can they be overcome? 
20. Why do you think that Kuwait still has not ratified/implemented the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism? 
21. Have the Court of Cassation issued any judicial principles related to 
terrorism? What are they? And did they help to fill the gaps in the current 
legislation? 
22. From your point of view what is the impact of counterterrorism on human 
rights in Kuwait? In other words, what is the impact of the national laws and 
the implemented conventions related to terrorism on the constitutional 
values protected by the constitution of Kuwait? 
23. Overall, do you think the judicial system in Kuwait is effectively responsive 
to terrorism? If yes or no, how and why? 
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In the next section I would like to ask you some questions regarding the 
national/regional/international judicial cooperation in the matters of terrorism crimes. 
Section Four: Cooperation. 
24. How do you cooperate with other government departments which are 
concerned with combating terrorism? In what ways? And how is this 
currently regulated? 
25. To what extent are the government department’s cooperative/helpful with 
your department? 
26. Is there any regional or international cooperation in judicial matters, 
criminal investigation, information exchange …etc? How helpful are they? 
27. Have you dealt with matters of extradition/rendition? What is the basis of 
such cooperation? And can you give examples where Kuwait done so? 
 
Conclusion: 
28. What is the future agenda of your department on combating terrorism? 
29. Is there anything that you would like to add, which you think we have not 
covered? 
 
Many thanks for your participation. 
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4. Interview with Academics, Lawyers and Humanitarian 
Please note that this interview will be divided into sections. 
Firstly, I will start by asking you questions about your background and experiences and 
work relating to terrorism. 
Section One: General Questions: 
1. What is your position? And how long have you been in your position? 
2. What are the tasks you encounter or come across in your work in relation to 
terrorism and/or terrorism financing? And how often are they? 
 
Now I would like to ask you a number of questions about how you see the development of 
terrorism and counterterrorism in Kuwait since its independence. 
Section Two: 
(a) Terrorism in Kuwait: 
3. What do you think are the major threats from terrorism currently facing 
Kuwait? Were they different in the past? 
4. What type of terrorist cases have you dealt with? And what had the suspect 
done (support, incite, commit …etc)? 
5. In your opinion, does it matter that there is not any definition about 
terrorism in the Kuwaiti laws? 
6. In your opinion why there is not any definition of terrorism in the Kuwaiti 
laws? 
7. In your experience, what is the position of Kuwait in regard to the regional 
definitions on terrorism (the GCC Convention + The Arab Convention)? 
 
(b) Countering Terrorism: 
8. In Kuwait, there is neither a comprehensive counterterrorism law nor laws 
that explicitly refer to terrorism? Therefore, how has the current criminal 
law been interpreted and applied to terrorism? 
9. What sort of criminal offences would you expect to encounter in terrorism 
cases? 
10. How successful is the Kuwaiti penal legislation in confronting the crimes of 
terrorism? 
11. What, in your opinion, are the further developments needed to the Kuwaiti 
criminal laws with regard to criminalising terrorism and its financing? 
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12. From your point of view what is the impact of counterterrorism on human 
rights in Kuwait? In other words, what is the impact of the national laws and 
the implemented conventions related to terrorism on the constitutional 
values protected by the constitution of Kuwait? 
13. What was successful in the government efforts to combat terrorism? And 
what was not? Can you give examples? 
14. What are the most important ministerial decrees that have been issued 
related to counter the threat of terrorism in Kuwait? And why have such 
decrees been issued? And how effective are they in countering terrorism? 
15. What are the international and regional conventions that Kuwait has 
implemented till today? 
16. Since Kuwait has ratified some of the international/regional conventions 
against terrorism? Have you dealt with a terrorist suspect according these 
conventions? Can you give examples? 
17. Were there any obstacles in implementing such international initiatives? If 
yes, what were they? 
18. What, in your opinion, are the further developments needed to the Kuwaiti 
counterterrorism strategies? 
19. What do you think about having a comprehensive counterterrorism law in 
Kuwait? 
20. What changes do you suggest might be needed in the current criminal laws 
in order to counterterrorism efficiently? 
21. From your point of view, why has the government of Kuwait not yet ratified 
some of the international conventions on terrorism? 
22. What is the general policy on ratification/implementation of international 
conventions? 
23. Do the current criminal laws related to terrorism comply with the Kuwaiti 
constitutional law and with the human rights treaties and conventions that 
Kuwait has signed and ratified? Can you give examples? 
24. Is there any future prospect for passing more criminal counterterrorism laws 
in the government’s agenda? 
 
Next I would like to ask you a number of questions related to threats of the Financing of 
Terrorism and how Kuwait has counter it. 
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Section Three: 
(a) Threats of Financing Terrorism: 
25. From your point of view, what are the major threats facing Kuwait in 
relation to financing terrorism? 
26. In your understanding, why Kuwait has been used or involved in financing 
terrorism? 
27. What are the sources of financing terrorism in Kuwait? And how have the 
terrorists used them? 
28. What are the current sources of financing terrorism? And how have they 
been used in Kuwait? 
29. In the absence of a clear definition of what is labelled as terrorist financing 
and given that Kuwait has not yet ratified the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, how does Kuwait define 
financing terrorism? What can been seen as financing terrorism? Can you 
give examples? 
 
(b) Countering the Financing of Terrorism: 
30. What do you think about the current laws in force for countering financing 
terrorism? Do they comply with international standards? Are they effective 
in countering the financing of terrorism in Kuwait? Do they restrict the right 
of the citizen or are they fair? 
31. Do you think the current AML Law has achieved what it meant to be 
achieved on combating terrorist financing or not? Can you give me 
examples? 
32. Do you think that the current laws are adequately criminalising terrorist 
financing? 
33. From your point of view, how appropriate are the current laws in countering 
the financing of terrorism to the Kuwaiti cultures and constitutional values? 
34. In your experience, which laws/decrees were helpful on combating terrorist 
financing? And which were not? Can you provide me with examples? 
35. In your point of view, how successful has Kuwait been in deterring the 
possibilities of terrorism financing through the informal money transfer 
system, the Hawala system of money remittances? What has been worked, 
and what has not? 
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36. How successful do you think are the current regulations and laws on 
regulating the Islamic charitable (Zakat) and humanitarian organisations? 
37. Why do you think that Kuwait still has not ratified/implemented the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism? 
38. Is there any future plan for passing more AML/CFT laws? 
 
Now we will move on to look at the regional/international cooperation to combat 
terrorism. 
Section Four: Cooperation: 
39. Considering the international concern about combating terrorism and the 
financing of terrorism, in your experience were there any regional or 
international pressures on Kuwait to deal with terrorists or terrorism 
supporters in Kuwait? Can you give some examples? 
40. In your experience, how has the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as a 
regional organisation, been successful in providing an effective multilateral 
response to countering terrorism? And what it has achieved so far? 
41. How far does the GCC ensure the protection of fundamental liberties and 
human rights in the region? 
42. To what extent has the GCC, and especially the State of Kuwait, been 
effective in strengthening their security from any potential terrorist 
activities? 
 
Conclusion: 
43. How do you see the future agenda of the Kuwaiti government in combating 
terrorism? 
44. Is there anything that you would like to add, which you think we have not 
covered? 
45. Are there any sources of information you recommend me to look at that 
related to my research topic? 
 
Many thanks for your participation. 
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Appendix B: Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
Terrorism and the Law of Kuwait: 
The local responses to universal threats and international demands 
PhD Research Project Sponsored by Kuwait University 
 
Ref: Invitation for an interview as expert for a PhD research project on terrorism 
and the law of Kuwait. 
Dear NAME, 
My name is Bader Alrajhi, and I am a PhD research student at the University 
of Leeds, United Kingdom. I am also sponsored by, and work as a lecturer at, the 
Kuwait University (please see the attached letter). For the purpose of this research, 
I am presently acting under the remit of the University of Leeds and its Law 
School. 
You are being invited to take part in my research project on ‘Terrorism and the 
Law of Kuwait’. Before you decide whether to participate, please let me explain 
why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it with me if you wish. Ask me if there 
is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Feel free to take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part in this study. 
I am inviting you for an interview of at about one hour, which will take place 
in your work place or another place that can be arranged at your request. 
We will talk about your views, opinions and work around the topic of my 
research. You are invited as one of the experts in this area. Your experience is 
invaluable for the project. 
My research will investigate how the State of Kuwait, as a Gulf nation with 
limited geo-political influence and very much dependent upon the protection of 
others, is subjected to international influences and seeks to interpret, modulate and 
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apply international expectations on combating terrorism within its own jurisdiction. 
This research will focus on the conflict of international and local influences toward 
the overall responses to terrorism in Kuwait since its independence in 1961. 
My thesis will analyse the government’s overall policies and strategies against 
terrorism. This thesis will look into the legal framework, and it will also look into 
Kuwait’s banking system and financial services in relation to financing terrorism. 
Finally it will investigate how effective Kuwait is in implementing and 
accommodating the regional and international conventions on terrorism. 
I invite experts like you to answer questions related to my research topic. It is 
hoped that, with your participation, this research will contribute to a better 
understanding of how the State of Kuwait has responded to terrorism within its own 
jurisdiction. The interview will be recorded, and you are free to withdraw at any 
time without giving reasons. 
It is important to ensure the confidentiality of our conversation and your 
privacy. All of the information you give in the interview will be kept strictly 
confidential. The interview will be transcribed, and your identity will be fully 
protected in the transcribed material.  I will take the following steps in order to 
protect your identity from being identified in any materials, reports or publications. 
1. Your contact details will be destroyed once I have completed the interview. 
2. All recorded materials and transcripts will be stored on an encrypted 
external hard disc. Additionally, they will be saved in the University 
computer system, which is password protected and can only be accessed by 
me. 
3. No names will be used in any written text, including the transcript. . 
Furthermore, all names will be changed to protect your identity. 
4. Your consent form will be stored separately from the audio recording and 
transcription of the interview; thus, ensuring no connection between them. 
5. Brief quotes from the interview might be used in my final research thesis. 
All quotes will be fully anonymised. 
 
Please take your time to make your decision. If you have any further questions, 
please do not hesitate to ask. My contact details are below: 
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Bader A. J. Kh. J. Alrajhi 
Lecturer in Law 
School of Law, 
Department of Criminal Law, 
Kuwait University, 
P. O. Box 5476 Safat. 
Researcher email: lwbajk@leeds.ac.uk 
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Appendix C: Consent Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
Consent to take part in a project on Terrorism and the Law of Kuwait: 
The local responses to universal threats and international demands 
 
 Add your 
initials 
next to the 
statements 
you agree 
with  
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 
XX/XX/2012 explaining the above research project and I have had 
the opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there 
being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to 
answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. 
 
I give permission for Bader Alrajhi to have access to my anonymised 
responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the 
research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the 
report or reports that result from the research.   
I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I 
accept and understand the measures to be used to help protect my 
identity. 
 
I understand that the interviewer has requested that the interview is 
recorded. I am free to grant or remove my permission for this at any 
time prior to and during the interview. 
 
I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future 
research and publication.  
I understand that I am not required to reveal any personal wrongdoing 
that violate the law or might cause harm.  
I agree to take part in the above research project.  
 
Name of participant  
Participant’s signature  
Date  
Name of lead 
researcher  Bader A. J. Kh. J. Alrajhi 
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Signature  
Date*  
 
*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.  
Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the 
signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/ pre-written script/ information 
sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the 
signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project’s main documents 
which must be kept in a secure location.  
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Appendix D: Ethics Committee Approval 
 
Performance, Governance and Operations 
Research & Innovation Service 
Charles Thackrah Building 
101 Clarendon Road 
Leeds LS2 9LJ  Tel: 0113 343 4873 
Email: j.m.blaikie@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
Bader A. J. Kh. J. Alrajhi 
PhD Research Student, 
School of Law, 
University of Leeds 
Leeds, LS2 9JT 
 
AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
University of Leeds 
9 August 2012 
 
Dear Bader A. J. Kh. J. Alrajhi 
 
Title of study: Terrorism and the Law of Kuwait: The local responses to universal threats and international demands 
Ethics reference: AREA 11-194 
 
I am pleased to inform you that the above research application has been reviewed 
by the ESSL, Environment and LUBS (AREA) Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
and following receipt of your response to the Committee’s initial comments, I can 
confirm a favourable ethical opinion as of the date of this letter. The following 
documentation was considered: 
 
Document    Version Date 
AREA 11-194 Committee Provisional response 5 August 2012.docx 1 07/08/12 
AREA 11-194 Ethical_Review_Form final 9 July 2012.docx 1 09/07/12 
AREA 11-194 Information Sheet comments susanne 8 July 2012.docx 1 09/07/12 
AREA 11-194 Participant consent_form final 8 July 2012.docx 1 09/07/12 
 
Please notify the committee if you intend to make any amendments to the original 
research as submitted at date of this approval, including changes to recruitment 
methodology. All changes must receive ethical approval prior to implementation. 
The amendment form is available at www.leeds.ac.uk/ethics.   
 
Please note: You are expected to keep a record of all your approved documentation, 
as well as documents such as sample consent forms, and other documents relating 
to the study. This should be kept in your study file, which should be readily 
available for audit purposes. You will be given a two week notice period if your 
project is to be audited. 
 
Yours sincerely 
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Jennifer Blaikie 
Senior Research Ethics Administrator 
Research & Innovation Service 
On behalf of Prof Anthea Hucklesby 
Chair, AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
 
CC: Student’s supervisor(s) 
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Appendix E: Law No. (106) of 2013 Regarding Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) & Its Explanatory 
Memorandum 
 
Law No. (106) of 20131 
Regarding Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
 
Definitions 
(Article 1) 
In implementing the provisions of this law, the following words and phrases will 
have the meanings assigned: 
Monies: Any kind of assets or properties, whether money or securities and trade, 
movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and all related resources acquired by 
any mean. As well as all legal documents and instruments in all forms including 
electronic, digital, banking facilities, cheques, money orders, stocks, bonds, trade 
bills, and letters of indemnity, whether they exist inside or outside of Kuwait. 
Person: The natural, legal individual. 
Transaction: Any purchase, sale, loan, mortgage, donation, funding, transfer of 
funds, receipt of funds, deposition of funds, withdrawal of funds, transfer of funds 
via bank draft, or any similar actions, using any currency, whether cash, cheques, 
money orders, stocks, bonds, or any other financial instruments, or the use of 
treasuries or any other form of safe deposition, or any other action related to monies 
that is determined by the executive regulations.  
Financial Institution: Any person who exercises a trading business or exercises 
one or more of the following activities and operations for a client or on behalf of a 
client as follows: 
                                                
1 This law passed by the Government of Kuwait in (Arabic Version), and translated by the Author of 
this thesis. 
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A. Accepting deposits and other reimbursable monies from the public, 
including private banks. 
B. Loaning. 
C. Financial Leasing. 
D. Cash or Value Transfer Services. 
E. Issuing and controlling means of payments (such as credit cards, discount 
cards, travellers cheques, financial leasing, money orders, bank drafts, and 
electronic money). 
F. Financial Bonds and Liabilities. 
G. Trading with: 
1. Instruments of the cash market including cheques, trade bills, 
certificates of deposition. 
2. Foreign currency. 
3. Instruments of exchange rates index and interest rates, and financial 
indices.  
4. Securities that are exchangeable and financial derivatives.  
5. Future contracts of basic commodities. 
H. Transactions of the Foreign Sector. 
I. Participation in the issuing of securities and providing financial services in 
regards to these securities. 
J. Management of personal and group portfolio. 
K. Protection and management of liquidated cash or securities on behalf of 
other individuals. 
L. Contracting life insurance contracts and other types of insurance related to 
investments as an insurer or as a mediator in the contract.  
M. Investment, management, employing of monies on behalf of other 
individuals.  
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N. Any activities or other transactions that are determined by the executive 
regulations of this law. 
Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), includes the 
followings: 
A. Real estate brokers. 
B. Individual institutions and companies working in the gold, precious stones, 
and precious metal industries, when they use cash transactions as 
determined by the executive regulations of this law. 
C. Lawyers, independent legal professionals, and independent accountants, 
when they arrange, execute, or make transactions on behalf of clients with 
respect to any of the following activities: 
1. Purchase or sales of real estate. 
2. Management of the client’s monies including the client’s securities, 
bank accounts, or other properties. 
3. Establishing, operating, or managing a cooperate body or legal 
arrangements and the related underwriting. 
4. Selling or Purchasing of companies. 
D. Service providers for companies and trust funds, when they arrange or make 
transactions on behalf of a client with respect to the following activities: 
1. Acting as an Agent for setting up a cooperate body. 
2. Acting or arranging for another person to be a director, secretary, or 
partner in a company, or in a similar capacity in respect to cooperate 
bodies. 
3. Provision of registration office, headquarters, work office, mailing 
address, or managerial mailing address for a cooperate body or a legal 
arrangement. 
4. Acting or arranging for another person to act as a trustee for trust funds 
or to perform a similar action on behalf of a legal arrangement. 
5. Acting or arranging for another person to act as a nominal contributor. 
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E. Any other activity or profession that is mentioned in the executive 
regulations of this law.  
Business Relations: Any business, professional, or trade relations that are related 
to professional activities of a financial institution or DNFBPs, where these relations 
are expected to be continuous. 
Account: Any facilitation or arrangement that may allow a financial institution to 
accept deposits, or cash, or exchangeable instruments, or that may allow operations 
of withdrawal or transaction, or the payment of cheque values or the withdrawal of 
money orders of a financial institution or another person, or obtaining cheques, 
money orders, bank transfer, travellers cheques, electronic money on behalf of 
someone, or providing facilitations or arrangements to rent of treasuries or any 
other form of safe deposition. 
Client: Any person who does one of the following businesses with a financial 
institution or DNFBP: 
A. Any person who arranges, opens, or executes a transaction, a business 
relation, or a business account. 
B. Any person or any participating person who signs a transaction, a 
business relation, or a business account. 
C. Any person who allocates or transfers an account, rights, or any 
liabilities in accordance to the terms of a particular transaction. 
D. Any person who is allowed to make a transaction, or control a business 
relation or a business account. 
E. Any person who attempts to do any of the procedures mentioned above. 
Beneficiary Owner: Any natural person who owns or controls, wholly, directly or 
indirectly, the transactions of a client or of a person on which behalf the 
transactions are made. As well as have an actual whole control over a corporate 
body or a legal arrangement. 
The Unit: The Kuwaiti Unit of Financial Investigations. 
Supervisory Authorities: These authorities are responsible for ensuring the 
compliance of financial institutions and the DNFBPs with the provisions of this 
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law. These bodies include the Central Bank of Kuwait, Capital Markets Authority, 
Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of Industry or any other body that is 
determined by the executive regulations of this law. 
 Competent Authorities: All public authorities in Kuwait that are assigned with 
the responsibility to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, including 
the Unit, the Supervisory Authorities, the General Administration of Customs, and 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  
Freezing: is the temporary reservation of monies from its obtainer, and prohibition 
of its transfer, exchange, use, move, or physical transfer, based on a decision issued 
by the General Attorney, or any public lawyer that he assigns.  
Confiscation: Seizing monies and reserving it temporary by the Public Attorney 
office or any other entity based on the decision issued by the General Attorney or 
any public lawyers that he assigns. 
Legal Arrangements: Trust funds or any other similar arrangements. 
Politically-Exposed Person (PEP): A natural person who is entrusted or appointed 
to perform prominent public functions in Kuwait or foreign countries or to hold 
high executive positions in international organisations with his family members, 
where the executive regulations determine the individuals who are included in this 
definition without prejudice with the provisions of laws. 
Money Laundering: Any act of the actions mentioned in Article no. (2) of this 
law. 
Terrorism Financing: Any act of the actions mentioned in Article no. (3) of this 
law. 
Predicate Offense: Any act that is considered a crime in accordance to the laws of 
the State of Kuwait. It also includes actions that are committed outside of Kuwait 
where these actions are considered a crime in accordance to the laws of the country 
where the actions were committed and in accordance to the laws of the State of 
Kuwait. 
Crime Proceeds: Any monies that originate or are acquired – directly or indirectly 
– as a result of a predicate offense, where these monies include profits, interests, 
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revenues, or any other returns, whether these monies remained as they are, or were 
transferred fully or partially into other monies.  
Instruments: Anything that is used or was supposed to be used in any form, 
wholly or partially, in committing crimes of money laundering, terrorism financing, 
or in committing a predicate offense. 
Terrorist Act: Any of the following actions or the attempt to commit these actions 
in the State of Kuwait as follows: 
A. If the action’s purpose was to cause the death or to inflict serious physical 
injuries to a civilian, or to any other person who is not participating in 
hostile actions if an armed conflict arouse, and when the natural purpose of 
the action or its context was to spread panic among people or to force the 
government or an international organisation to perform a particular act or to 
prevent it from doing an act.  
B. If the action is considered a crime in accordance to the definitions that are 
mentioned in  international agreements or protocols as follows: 
1. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), 
approved with decree of law no. (19) Of 1979. 
2. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Committed against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation (1975), approved with decree of law no. (62) of 
1979. 
3. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Committed 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 
(1973), approved with decree of law no. (72) of 1988. 
4. The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1971), 
approved with decree of law no. (73) of 1988. 
5. The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation, approved with decree of law no. (71) 
of 1988, and the Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988), approved by 
decree of law no. (6) of 1994. 
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6. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (1988), approved be the law no. (15) of 2003. 
7. The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safely of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988), approved by law 
no. (16) of 2003. 
8. The International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (1980), approved by law no. (12) of 2004. 
9. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1977), 
approved by law no. (27) of 2001. 
10. Any other international conventions, or other international protocols that are 
in regards to terrorism or its financing that was ratified by the State of 
Kuwait and were published in the official newspaper. 
Terrorist: Any natural person, whether inside or outside of Kuwait, who does the 
following actions: 
A. Who performs a terrorist act in accordance to the provision of this law, 
directly or indirectly. 
B. Who participates in a terrorist act. 
C. Who arranges a terrorist act or guides others to conduct the act.  
D. Who intentionally contributes to a terrorist act that is performed by one 
person or by a group of persons who are guided by a common purpose, 
where the contribution is with the purpose to expand the terrorist act and 
with knowledge of the intention of the person or the group of persons in 
committing the terrorist act.  
Terrorist Organisation: A group of terrorists, whether residing in or outside of 
Kuwait, who perform any of the actions that are mentioned in the previous 
definition.  
Bearer Negotiable Instrument: Monetary instruments that are document in bearer 
form such as travellers cheques, negotiable instruments that include cheques, 
promissory notes, and money orders that are either in bearer form, endorsed without 
restrictions made out to a fictitious payee or otherwise in such a form that title can 
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pass upon delivery, and incomplete instruments signed, but with the payee’s name 
omitted.  
Electronic Transfer: Monetary transactions that are made by a financial institution 
using electronic means on behalf of the transfer order requestor, where this is used 
to deliver an amount of money for a beneficiary in another financial institution, 
without regard to whether the requestor and the beneficiary are the same person or 
not.  
Fictitious Bank: A bank that is registered or licensed in a particular country or a 
particular region without having any physical existence in that country or the 
region, and that does not belong to any financial group that follows regulations and 
efficient bank inspection procedures.  
Bearer Negotiable Instrument: Monetary instruments that are document in bearer 
form such as travellers cheques, negotiable instruments that include cheques, 
promissory notes, and money orders that are either in bearer form, endorsed without 
restrictions made out to a fictitious payee or otherwise in such a form that title can 
pass upon delivery, and incomplete instruments signed, but with the payee’s name 
omitted. 
 
Section One 
Crimes and Precautionary Measures 
Chapter One 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Crimes 
 
(Article 2) 
A person is considered an offender in a crime of money laundering, if the person 
was knowledgeable that the money is resultant of a crime, and if he intentionally 
committed the following: 
A. Transferred, moved, replaced the monies with the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the unlawful source of these monies, or assisted any person who 
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was involved in the predicate offense that resulted into obtaining these 
monies to escape the legal punishments of his actions. 
B. Concealing or disguising the true nature of the monies, their origin, place, 
manner of disposition, movement, possession, or the rights that are 
associated with these monies.  
C. Obtaining these monies, their possession, or their operation. 
 
The cooperate body is considered responsible for any crime that is mentioned in the 
provisions of this article if the crime was committed under its name or for its 
account. 
The penalty of the person who committed the predicate offense should not intercept 
penalisation of other crimes of money laundering that he might have committed.  
Whenever it is proven that the monies obtained is crime proceeds, there is no need 
to convict the person with the predicate offense.  
 
(Article 3) 
A person is considered an offender in a crime of terrorism financing, if the person 
willingly and unlawfully provided or attempted to provide or collect monies, 
directly or indirectly, with the purpose to use it in committing a terrorist act, or with 
knowledge that it will fully or partially be used for such act, or for the benefit of a 
terrorist organisation or a terrorist.  
Actions mentioned in the previous paragraph are considered crimes of terrorism 
financing even if the terrorist act was not committed, or even if the monies were not 
actually used for the execution or the attempt to execute the terrorist act, or if the 
monies were linked to a specific terrorist act regardless of the country where the 
terrorist act attempt occurred. 
 
Chapter Two 
Precautionary Measures 
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(Article 4) 
Financial Institutions and DNFBPs must evaluate the risks of money laundering 
and terrorism financing that may be related to their own businesses through the 
development of new products and techniques. It also should keep records of 
evaluation of risks and information that is related to these evaluations in written 
documentations, and should update these documents periodically, and provide them 
for supervisory authorities upon their request. 
Financial institutions and DNFBPs must apply strict measures to achieve due 
diligence when risks of money laundering and terrorism financing activities appear 
to be on the rise. It is also permissible for financial institutions and DNFBPs to 
apply moderate measures to achieve due diligence when risks of money laundering 
and terrorism financing activities appear to be low.  
It is not permissible to apply the moderate measures whenever there is a suspicion 
of money laundering and terrorism financing operations. 
 
(Article 5) 
Financial institutions are prohibited from opening an account for an anonymous 
person or persons using fictitious names, and are not allowed to keep such accounts 
open. 
Financial institutions and DNFBPs must take into consideration the results of the 
evaluation of risks in accordance to the provisions mentioned in the previous 
article, and must take the following due diligence measures: 
A. Identify and verify the identity of the client and the beneficiary owner using 
reliable and independent documents, data, or information.  
B. Understand the purpose and the nature of the business relationship. 
Moreover, it is permissible to request additional information in regards to 
that.  
C. Continuous follow-up of everything related to the business relationship, and 
the examination of any transactions that are performed in order to ensure its 
compliance with the information of the client, his trade activities, the nature 
of the risks he takes, and the source of monies when necessary. 
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D. Identify the structure of ownership and control of the client. 
The financial institutions and DNFBPs must execute the due diligence procedures 
that are determined in the second paragraph of the previous article as follows: 
A. Before opening an account and during the time the account is opened, or 
before and during having a business relationship with the client.  
B. Before performing transactions on behalf of a client who is not in a business 
relationship with the financial institution, where the transaction exceeds the 
limits that are determined by the executive regulations, whether a single 
transaction or multiple serial transactions that seem linked to each other.   
C. Before performing any electronic, domestic or international, transfer on 
behalf of a client. 
D. Upon suspicion of money laundering or terrorism financing operations. 
E. Upon suspicion of the validity or the adequacy of the identification 
information of the client that were previously obtained. It is permissible for 
the supervisory authorities to determine the conditions under which it is 
permissible for the financial institutions and the DNFBPs to delay the 
verification of the identity of the client or the beneficiary owner until after 
the business relationship is established. 
Financial institutions and DNFBPs can refrain from opening an account, start a 
business relationship, execute a transaction, or terminate a business relationship if 
provisions of the second paragraph of this article were not followed. Also, they can 
consider informing the unit in accordance to provisions of article (12) of this law. 
Furthermore, Financial institutions and DNFBPs imply specific measures that are 
enough to face the risks of money laundering and terrorism financing if an account 
was opened, or a business relationships was established, or a transaction was 
executed with a client who is not present in person for purposes of identification 
and verification of identify.  
Financial institutions and DNFBPs can establish appropriate systems to manage the 
risks and to determine whether the client or the beneficiary owner is a politically 
exposed person. 
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If it showed that the individual is politically exposed person, then the institution 
would apply additional measures – besides those mentioned in the second 
paragraph of this articles – where the executive regulations determines these 
measures.  
Financial institutions and DNFBPs apply strict due diligence measures for all 
complex and major unusual transactions, and the unusual transactions that do not 
have purposes or obvious legal economic aims. Therefore, they examine the 
background of these transactions and their purposes, and record all the information 
that is related to the transactions and the identities of all the participating parties, 
where these records are stored in accordance to the provisions of article (11) of this 
law. This information remains accessible for the competent authorities upon their 
request to access it.  
Furthermore financial institutions and DNFBPs must apply the strict due diligence 
measures in business relationships and transactions made by individuals or financial 
institutions from countries that are considered high risk in accordance to article no. 
(4). 
The existing accounts and the current clients who are in a business relationship at 
the time of the start date of this law are subject to measures of due diligence in 
accordance to the provisions of this article within a appropriate period and 
depending on the physical conditions and the degree of risks in accordance to 
specifications of the supervisory authorities. 
The financial institutions and DNFBPs must perform a periodical evaluation to 
ensure the validity of the data, information, and documents that were obtained, and 
must update them.  
It is permissible for financial institutions and the DNFBPs to obtain assistance of 
other organisations in order to perform some of the elements of the due diligence 
operations in accordance to specifications of the executive regulations. 
 
(Article 6) 
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The provisions of articles (4), (5) and (11) of this law are applied on agents and real 
estate brokers only if they participated in transactions related to purchasing or 
selling a real estate on behalf of their clients. 
 
(Article 7) 
In addition to the implementation of regular measures to achieve due diligence in 
accordance to article no. (5), the executive regulations determine the measures that 
are ought to be implemented by the financial institutions before starting a banking 
relationship with a foreign correspondent bank or before starting other similar 
relationships. 
 
(Article 8) 
It is not permissible to license a fictitious bank or to allow this bank to perform any 
actions inside of Kuwait. Financial institutions are prohibited from starting or 
continuing working though correspondent relationships or through business 
relationships with fictitious banks or a correspondent financial institution in a 
foreign country that allows the use of accounts for a fictitious bank.  
 
(Article 9) 
Financial institutions that perform electronic transfer activities must obtain 
information regarding the transfer order requestor and the receiver during the 
transaction procedures. They also must ensure that these information are stored 
with the transfer order or with any related correspondents of serial payments. It is 
prohibited for the financial institution that issues the electronic transfer to execute 
the transfer if this information was lacking.  
 
(Article 10) 
Financial institutions and DNFBPs must adhere to the following rules: 
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A. Establishing policies, procedures, systems, and internal controls, including 
proper arrangements to control compliance and adequate screening 
measures that ensure use of high standards when hiring employees. 
B. Implementing a continuous program that trains employees to ensure their 
familiarity with anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing 
requirements, and their familiarity with new developments, common 
methods, techniques, and trends in the field of money laundering and 
terrorism financing, and familiarity with requirements for due diligence and 
requirements for the reporting of any suspicious transactions.  
C. Establishing independent internal auditing tasks to ensure compliance with 
policies, procedures, systems, internal controls, and to ensure its efficiency 
and its compliance with the provisions of this law.  
D. Developing mechanisms for exchange of available information and 
maintaining its confidentiality within the financial institution and its 
domestic and external subsidiaries and affiliates in accordance to article (4) 
and (5).  
E. Appointing a supervisor at a senior management level to be responsible for 
the implementation of the provisions of this law. 
When possible, the provisions mentioned in this article can be applied on all 
domestic and external subsidiaries and affiliates of the institution. 
 
(Article 11) 
The financial institutions and the DNFBPs must store the following records and 
information, where these records and information can be viewed by the competent: 
A. Copies of all records that were obtained through the due diligence 
operations for the investigation of transactions in accordance to 
provisions of article no. (5). These will include documents that proof the 
identity of the actual clients and the accounting files, and correspondents 
of work for at least five years after the termination of the business 
relationship or the date of the execution of the transaction in accordance 
to section (B) of the third paragraph of article no. (5). 
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B. All records of domestic and international transactions, whether executed 
or attempted to be executed, within at least the last five years after the 
execution of the transaction or the attempt to execute it. These records 
must be detailed in order to allow re-representation of the steps of each 
transaction separately. 
C. Copies of all sent reports in accordance to the provisions of article no. 
(12) and any documents that are associated with them for at least five 
years after the date of the submission of the report to the unit. 
D. Risk evaluations in accordance to article no. (4) and any prescribed 
information for five years of the date of the procedure or its updating. 
It is permissible for competent authorities to request under specific circumstances 
to extend the storage of records for a term that is longer than the terms mentioned in 
this article. 
 
Chapter Three 
Requirements for Reporting of Suspicious Operations 
 
(Article 12) 
Financial institutions and DNFBPs must report to the unit without delay any 
transactions or any attempt to carry a transaction regardless of its value if there is 
suspension or enough evidence of suspicion indicating that the monies in these 
transactions may be obtained from or linked to a crime, or may be used in money 
laundering and terrorism financing.  
Lawyers, other law professionals, and independent accountants are not obligated to 
report transactions in accordance to the previous paragraph if the information in 
regards to these transactions were subject to professional confidentiality conditions. 
 
(Article 13) 
Financial institutions and DNFBPs, their directors, and their employees are 
prohibited from  notifying clients or others regarding reports that were performed in 
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accordance to the previous article, or any information that is related to the unit, or 
anything that is related to the investigation of money laundering or financing of 
terrorism. This does not preclude discloser or communication between the directors 
of financial institutions or the DNFBPs’ employees and users on one hand, and 
lawyers, competent authorities, and the General Attorney office on the other. 
It is prohibited to issue a criminal, civil, disciplinary, or administrative law suit 
against financial institutions, the DNFBPs, their directors, or employers due to 
violation of the reporting of information that are imposed according to contracts or 
other laws, if the organisation issued the report or any other information to the unit 
with good faith in accordance to article no. (12). 
The financial institutions and the DNFBPs must present information and documents 
to the competent authorises, upon their request, and are not allowed to jeopardise 
professional confidentiality unless with lawyers, law professionals, and independent 
accountants in accordance to the second paragraph of the article no. (12) 
 
Second Section: Competent Authorities 
Chapter One: Supervisory Authorities Competence 
 
(Article 14) 
Supervisory authorities are responsible for regulating, monitoring, and supervising 
the compliance of financial institutions and DNFBPs with the terms mentioned in 
the law and its executive regulations along with the related ministerial decisions 
and instructions. These supervisory authorities have the following authority and 
duties: 
1. Collecting information and data from financial institutions and DNFBPs, 
and conducting field tests procedures, where the supervisory authorities can 
ask for assistance from others to achieve these duties.  
2. Obligating financial institutions and DNFBPs to provide information, and to 
obtain copies of documents regardless of its storage forms and any 
documents outside of its premises. 
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3. Applying measures and imposing penalties over financial institutions and 
DNFBPs for failing to comply with the provisions of this law, and reporting 
this failure to the unit. 
4. Issuing ministerial decisions and instructions to assist financial institutions 
and DNFBPs to implement its obligations. 
5. Cooperating and exchanging of information with the competent authorities 
or the competent foreign agencies to combat money laundering and 
terrorism financing. 
6. Ensuring that external subsidiaries and companies that are affiliated with 
financial institutions and DNFBPs rely on and execute measures that 
comply with this law within the capacity of the permitted domestic laws of 
the host country. 
7. Reporting information or transactions that may be related to money 
laundering, terrorism financing, or predicate offense to the unit as fast as 
possible. 
8. Developing and applying efficient and appropriate procedures, and 
standards related to attain experience and integrity of the executive board of 
directors, the supervisory directors, or the directors of the financial 
institutions.  
9. Developing and applying standards for ownership or for control of the 
major shares of the financial institutions and the DNFBPs including the 
beneficiary owners of these shares, or developing standards in regards to 
direct or indirect participation in managing, deposition, or operation of these 
shares. 
10.  Retention of statistics of the measures that are taken and the imposed 
penalties that are determined by the supervisory authorities.  
11. Determining the kind and the extent of the measures that should be taken by 
the financial institutions and the DNFBPs in accordance to article no. (10) 
depending on the degree of risk for money laundering and terrorism 
financing, and depending on the size of the business.  
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(Article 15) 
In case of a proven violation committed by a financial institution, the DNFBPs, any 
of the members of the executive boards of directors, members of the executive 
management, supervisory directors, or the directors against the provisions that are 
mentioned in this law, its executive regulations, and ministerial decisions and 
instructions, the supervisory authorities is allowed to impose one or more measures 
or penalties as follows:  
1. Issuing a written warning of the violation. 
2. Issuing an order that requires compliance to specified procedures. 
3. Issuing an order to present organised reports in regards to the measures that 
are taken to resolve the particular violation. 
4. Imposing monetary penalty for the financial institution upon its violation, 
where this penalty should not be more than five thousand Dinars per each 
violation.  
5. Prohibiting the person who committed the violation from working in the 
related department for a term that is determined by the supervisory 
authorities. 
6. Restricting the authorities of the executive board of directors, members of 
the executive management, the supervisory directors, the directors, or the 
controlling owners, where this will include appointing a temporary 
supervisor.  
7. Isolating or requesting the removal of the executive board of directors, 
members of the executive management, supervisory directors, or directors, 
or requesting to hire new members or directors. 
8. Suspending the activity, the work, or the profession, or restricting it and 
prohibiting it from being practiced.  
9. Suspending the license. 
10. Withdrawal of license. 
It is permissible for the executive regulations to include any other measures. 
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Chapter Two 
Kuwait Financial Intelligence Unit 
 
(Article 16) 
The “Kuwait Financial Intelligence Unit” is formed with legal independent 
presence, and acts responsible for receiving, requesting, analysing, and sending 
information that is suspected to be obtained from a crime, or monies that may be 
linked or related to, or has been used in money laundering or terrorism financing in 
accordance to the provisions of this law.  
The Council of Ministers will issue a resolution to determine its subordination, 
duties and resources based on the proposal of the Minister of Finance.  
Personnel of the Financial Investigation Unit are not allowed to reveal any available 
information or data concerning their work nature whether during or after their 
employment term. It is prohibited to use this information unless for purposes 
mentioned in this law. 
 
(Article 17) 
The unit determines the countries that are considered high risk, and determines the 
measures that should be followed when dealing with these countries, where the 
supervisory authorities take responsibility to ensure the compliance of the financial 
institutions and the DNFBPs with implying these measures. 
 
(Article 18) 
In relation to the information that the unit has already obtained, the unit has the 
validity to request any additional information that are necessary for the unit to 
perform its functions from any person who is required to report information in 
accordance to article no. (12), where the requested information would be presented 
within a term that is specified by the unit in a form that is determined by the 
executive regulations of this law.  
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The unit determines its right in obtaining any information from the competent 
authorities and the state systems that it deems necessary in order to perform its 
functions, where this information may be related to reports and previous 
information that the unit has received.  
 
(Article 19) 
If reasonable evidence was provided in regards to suspicions of monies obtained 
from a crime, or monies that are linked or related to a crime, or monies that may be 
used in money laundering operations or terrorism financing, then the unit can notify 
the General Attorney office. Additionally, the unit must provide information that is 
related to the suspicion to the competent authorities. 
 The unit would also notify the specified supervisory authorities in case of any 
violation committed by any of the financial institutions or the DNFBPs, or any 
employee against the requirements mentioned in this law.  
The unit is allowed to provide its information to any foreign entity, whether 
voluntarily or if requested based on reciprocity agreements or agreements of 
exchange of information that are based on cooperation arrangements between the 
unit and the other entity. 
 
Chapter Three 
Transfer of Currency and Bearer Negotiable Instruments across Borders 
 
(Article 20) 
Any person who enters or departs the State of Kuwait with the possession of 
currencies or bearer negotiable instruments, or any person who arranges the transfer 
these items into the State of Kuwait or out of it through a person, mail service, 
shipping services, or by using any other means, must report to customs authorities 
when asked about the value of these currencies or bearer negotiable instruments. 
The unit can view this information whenever it requests. 
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The customs authorities are allowed to request information from the carriers 
regarding the source of the currency or bearer negotiable instrument, and the 
purposes of its use. Also, it is allowed for these authorities to seize some or all of 
the amount of currencies or the bearer negotiable instruments under one of these 
two situations: 
A. If there is sufficient evidence of suspicions indicating that these monies 
are proceeds of a crime, or that they are monies or instruments that are 
related to, linked to, or will be used to make money laundering 
operations or to finance terrorism. 
B. In case that the carrier refused to report or provide the requested 
information, or if the report and the information were wrongful.  
A decision issued by the Minister of Finance in regards to rules and procedures 
related to this article. 
 
Section Three 
General Provisions 
 
(Article 21) 
The General Attorney office alone is responsible for investigation and disposition, 
and prosecution of crimes mentioned in this law, whereas the criminal court 
specialises jurisdiction of these crimes. 
 
(Article 22) 
Without prejudice to the rights of others with good faith, the General Attorney or 
public lawyers that he assigns are allowed to order monies and instrument freezing 
according to the first paragraph of article no. (40) or to confiscate them, only if 
sufficient evidence provided that these items are related to crimes of money 
laundering, or terrorism financing, or predicate offenses.  
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The General Attorney office may manage and dispose the monies as it deems it 
appropriate. 
Any beneficiary may complain to the competent court within one month of the 
issuance of the order. The court must rule in this complaint as fast as possible by 
either rejecting the complaint, or by cancelling the order or modifying it, and 
reporting the necessary liabilities if needed. It is not allowed to complain for the 
second time until after three months pass from the date of the ruling of the first 
complaint. 
The General Attorney or public lawyers that he assigns can reverse or modify the 
order in accordance to his own considerations.  
 
(Article 23) 
The General Attorney office exchanges international cooperation requisitions with 
the competent foreign authorities in regards to penalties of crimes of money 
laundering, predicate offenses, or crimes of terrorism financing, where these 
requisitions are with respect to assistance, judicial delegation, and extradition of 
accused and sentenced individuals. As well as requisitions regarding allocating, 
tracking, freezing, reservation, or confiscating of monies. All this must be 
performed in accordance to the rules that are determined in bilateral or multilateral 
agreements ratified by the State of Kuwait or in accordance to reciprocity. 
 
(Article 24) 
The executive regulations determine the rules that allow the competent authorities 
that are responsible for cooperation and national coordination to develop and imply 
policies and activities to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and 
financing weapons of mass destruction proliferation. 
 
(Article 25) 
The Council of Ministers, in accordance to proposals of the Minister of External 
Affairs, issues the necessary decisions to execute the decision of the Security 
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Council of the United Nations pursuant of the seventh chapter of the United 
Nations Charter that is related to terrorism, terrorism financing, and financing 
weapon of mass destruction proliferation. 
 
(Article 26) 
Any contract or action is considered nullified if the contributing parties or one of 
them was knowledgeable of or believed that the purpose of the contract or the 
agreement was to obstruct the procedures of confiscation mentioned in article no. 
(40) of this law, without prejudice of others rights of good faith. 
 
Section Four 
Penalties 
 
(Article 27) 
Without prejudice to other stronger penalties stipulated by criminal law or other 
law, the crimes will have the penalty determined per each crime as mentioned in 
this law. 
 
(Article 28) 
A person is penalised with imprisonment for a term that is no less than ten years 
and a fine that is no less than half the value of monies of the crime and no more 
than the full value for whoever commits a money laundering crime as mentioned in 
article no. (2) of this law, and if the person was knowledgeable that these monies 
and instruments were proceeds of a crime.  
In all cases, the seized monies, and instruments will be confiscated. 
 
(Article 29) 
A person is penalised with imprisonment for a term that is no more than fifteen 
years and a fine that is no less than the value of the monies of the crime and no 
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more than double the value, where all the monies and instruments seized will be 
confiscated, for any person who commits crimes of terrorism financing mentioned 
in article (3) of this law. 
 
(Article 30) 
Penalties mentioned in articles (28) and (29) of this law are increased in severity to 
imprisonment for a term that is no more than twenty years, and the fine is doubled, 
under the following circumstances: 
A. The crime was committed through an organised criminal group or terrorist 
group. 
B. The criminal exploits his authority, position, or powers. 
C. The crime was committed through a club, public welfare association, and 
charities. 
D. The perpetrator was convicted with a previous crime. 
 
(Article 31) 
The court can exempt the criminal from the penalties mentioned in articles (28) and 
(29), if the criminal initiates in providing the police or the General Attorney office 
or the competent court with information that could not be obtained otherwise, 
where this information would assist in the following: 
F. Preventing a money laundering or terrorism financing crime. 
G. Enabling authorities to capture the other crime offenders or to prosecute 
them. 
H. Enabling authorities to obtain evidence. 
I. Preventing or minimising the consequences of the crime. 
J. Depriving terrorist groups or criminal groups of any monies that the accused 
offender does not have a right in or cannot control. 
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(Article 32) 
Without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural person, any cooperate body 
which performs money laundering or terrorism financing crime is penalised with a 
fine that is no less than fifty thousand Dinars and no more than one million Dinars, 
or with the equivalence of the value of the monies used in the crime, whichever is 
greater.  
It is permissible to penalise the cooperate body by banning it permanently or 
temporary for a term that is no less than five years from conducting particular trade 
activities directly or indirectly, or through closure of its offices that were used in 
committing the crime permanently or temporary, or by liquidating its business, or 
by assigning a judicial administrator for management of its monies, where the 
sentence would be published in the official newspaper. 
 
(Article 33) 
Financial institutions and DNFBPs, or any of the executive board of directors, 
members of the executive management, supervisory directors, or directories are 
penalised with a fine that is no less than five thousand Dinars and no more than five 
hundred thousand Dinars for each violation or for any intentional breach or gross 
negligence of the provisions of articles (5) or (9) or (10) or (11) of this law. 
 
(Article 34) 
A person is penalised with imprisonment for a term that is no less than three years 
and fine that is no less than five thousand Dinars and no more than five hundred 
thousand Dinars, or with one of these two penalties, for whoever establishes or 
attempts to establish a fictitious bank in the State of Kuwait in violation with the 
first paragraph of article no. (8), or for whoever starts a business relationship with 
this bank in violation of the second paragraph of article no. (8) intentionally or in 
gross negligence. The penalty would be a fine that is no less than five thousand 
Dinars and no more than one million Dinars if a cooperate body committed this 
violation. 
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(Article 35) 
A person is penalised with imprisonment for a term that is no more than three years 
and a fine that is no less than five thousand Dinars and no more than five hundred 
thousand Dinars, or with one of the two penalties for whoever intentionally or in 
gross negligence commits the following: 
A. Violation of the provisions of article no. (12) by presenting wrongful 
reports, data, or information, or by concealing facts that should be reported.  
B. Whoever reports information to others in violation of the first paragraph of 
this article. If a cooperate body does any of the violations mentioned in the 
two previous section, it would be penalised with a fine that is no less than 
five thousand Dinars and no more than one million Dinars. 
 
(Article 36) 
A person is penalised with imprisonment for a term that is no more than three years 
and a fine that is no less than one thousand Dinars and no more than ten thousand 
Dinars, or one of these two penalties, and a discharge from his position for whoever 
violates the provisions of the third paragraph of article no. (16). 
 
(Article 37) 
A person is penalised with imprisonment for a term that is no more than a year and 
a fine that is no less than half the value of the monies of the crime and no more than 
its full value, or by one of these two penalties for whoever violates the provisions of 
article no. (20) or gives a false report about a currency or bearer negotiable 
instruments, or whoever intentionally or in gross negligence conceals facts that 
should be reported. The penalty would be a fine that is no less than the equivalence 
of the monies of the crime and no more than its double if a cooperate body 
committed this violation. 
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(Article 38) 
Without prejudice of the penalties mentioned in this unit, the court is allowed to 
prevent the offender of any crime, permanently or temporary, from practicing any 
job, profession, or activity that gives him the opportunity to commit this crime. 
 
(Article 39) 
It is not permitted to imply penalties in accordance to the provisions of this law 
without implementing penalties and measures that are imposed by the supervisory 
authorities over financial institutions and DNFBPs in accordance to the provisions 
of article no. (15).  
 
(Article 40) 
Without prejudice to provisions of articles (28 and 29) of this law, and without 
prejudice to others rights of good faith, in the event of convicting a person with one 
of the other crimes mentioned in this law, the court must order the confiscation of 
the following monies and instruments: 
A. Crime proceeds, including monies mixed with these proceeds or resultant of 
it, or replaced by it. 
B. Income and other benefits that are resultant of the proceeds of the crime. 
C. Monies that are subjects of the crime.  
The court is allowed to sentence with the equivalence of the value of the monies 
and the instruments mentioned in section (A), (B), and (C), which cannot be located 
or is not available due o confiscation.  
It is not permissible to confiscate the monies mentioned in the first paragraph if it is 
proven that its owner is of good faith and that he obtained these monies in return to 
an appropriate price, or in return to services that match its value, or based on any 
other legal reasons, without his knowledge of that its source is not legal. 
The death of the offender does not affect the order to confiscate the monies and the 
instruments in accordance to provisions of the first article. 
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(Article 41) 
Unless the law states otherwise, the confiscated monies are moved to the public 
treasury, where these monies would continue to hold any rights that were legally 
determined for persons with good faith. 
 
Section Five 
Final Provisions 
 
(Article 42) 
At the completion of the term, the criminal case or the convicted sentence of the 
crimes mentioned in this law does not lapse. It is not permissible to apply the 
provisions of article (81) and (82) of the Penal Code in regards to these crimes.  
 
(Article 43) 
The Minister of Finance issues the executive regulations of this law within six 
month of the date of its publication. 
 
(Article 44) 
The indicated law no. 35 of 2002 will be void. Resolutions that are currently 
practiced will remain valid until issuing the rules of implementation of this law. 
 
(Article 45) 
The Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers and the Ministers must implement 
this law depending on their respective ministries, where implementation starts after 
the date of its publication in the official newspaper. 
 
Prince of Kuwait 
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Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah 
 
Issued in Seif Palace on: 28 Jumada II 1434 AH 
On May 8th of 2013 
 
 
Explanatory Memorandum2 
Of Law No. (106) of 2013 
In Regard to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing 
 
Law no. (35) of 2002 in regards to combating operations of money laundering was 
issued. This law succeeded in becoming the cornerstone law in combating these 
operations and in reducing the great proliferation of such crimes.  
In light of the new developments that are witnessed in the world, and the rise of 
new features that are controlled by the movement of capitalism in different regions, 
in addition to publications of the United Nations on agreements to combat 
organised crime and to combat corruption in order to reduce the number of crimes 
that are related to money laundering and terrorism financing, and all the 
developments that occurred following these crimes on institutional level, personal 
level, and organisational level. Thus, to keep pace with these developments, it was 
necessary to develop comprehensive legislation to adjudicate crimes of money 
laundering and terrorism financing, especially that law number (35) of 2002 that is 
indicated earlier did not include any criminalisation of crimes of terrorism 
financing. Therefore, considerations of the international and the domestic 
developments that bear these crimes were taken, as well as measures to avoid any 
deficiencies that were unravelled as a result of the actual execution of the current 
legislations. 
Therefore, to achieve this purpose, the attached law was issued with the aim to put 
these agreements into affect and achieve the desired goals, and to eliminate the 
                                                
2 This Explanatory Memorandum issued by the Government of Kuwait in (Arabic Version), and 
translated by the Author of this thesis. 
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types of crimes that harm national economy and its roots, thus article (1) of the 
indicated law included definitions of words and phrases that are mentioned in the 
law. 
The law was divided into a number of sections; each section included a number of 
chapters as follows: 
Section One: 
This section included the crime and the precautionary measures. The first chapter 
included crimes of money laundering and financing of terrorism. Article (2) 
considered a person a criminal in the crime of money laundering if the person was 
knowledgeable that the monies were proceeds of the crime, and has intentionally 
performed one of the actions mentioned in this article, which is consistent and in 
accordance to articles (5 and 6) of the United Nations Convention in Combating 
Transnational Organised Crime, where this was ratified under law no. (5) of 2006. 
Thus, it became part of the legislations of the State of Kuwait. Furthermore, the 
second chapter included precautionary measures, where the legislator pointed out to 
the executive regulations, which will determine the measures that are required by 
the financial institutions before starting banking relationships with corresponding 
external banks or other similar business relationships, in addition to regular 
measures mentioned in the article no. (5) of the law.  
Meanwhile, the third chapter included requirements for reporting suspicious 
operations, where the legislator required financial institutions and DNFBPs to 
provide information and documents to the competent authorities upon their request, 
and prohibited these authorities from jeopardising professional confidentiality 
unless under the rules of article no. (12/2) of the law. 
Section Two: 
This section regulated the competent authorities and determined their specialties, 
where it was divided into three chapters as follows: 
Chapter One: Supervisory Authorities Competencies 
Chapter Two: Kuwaiti Financial Investigations Unit 
Chapter Three: Reporting Requirements of Suspicious Operations 
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The law in the second chapter has made the Kuwaiti Financial Investigation Unit a 
legal independent personality by considering it responsible for receiving, 
requesting, analysing, and transfer of information that are in regards to suspected 
crime proceeds or monies that are linked to, related to, or may be used in money 
laundering and terrorism financing operations. Moreover, a decision must be issued 
by the Council of Ministers based on the proposal of the Minister of Finance on 
forming the unit and determining its subordinations, regulating its functions and 
resources. The unit specifies the countries that are considered high risk, and can 
investigate the compliance of the financial institutions and the DNFBPs with the 
provisions of this law. Furthermore, the third chapter has regulated the process of 
currency and bearer negotiable instruments transfer across borders, where the law 
pointed out in this chapter the role of the Minister of Finance issuing the necessary 
decisions regarding rules and procedures that are related to this chapter.  
Section Three: 
This section included general provisions, where it stated that the General Attorney 
office is responsible alone for investigating, disposing, and prosecuting crimes that 
are mentioned in this law, while the criminal court is responsible for jurisdiction of 
these crimes. This section also regulated international cooperation between the 
General Attorney office and the competent foreign entities in regards to penalties of 
crimes in the field of money laundering and terrorism financing.  
Section Four:  
This section determined the penalties that are used when crimes of money 
laundering and terrorism financing are committed. 
Section Five: 
This section regulated the final provisions, where it stated that prosecution cannot 
be lapsed in any of the crimes mentioned in this law, neither the sentenced penalty 
after the end of the term. It also stated that it is not permissible to apply the 
provisions of articles (81 and 82) of the Penal Code in regards to these crimes. 
Furthermore, it pointed out the role of the Minister of Finance in issuing the 
executive regulations of the law during six month of the publication of the law. 
Moreover, it cancelled law no. (35) of 2002 with continuation of work with valid 
decisions that do oppose this law until the executive regulations are issued. 
